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This study assesses the quality of national budget institutions and legislative 
budgetary power in the Euro Area (EA) and examines their implications on 
fiscal discipline. Following the sovereign debt crises, common EA 
requirements have been introduced for national budget institutions, most 
notably for fiscal rules and independent fiscal councils. Meanwhile, the 
legislature has a key role to ensure that budgetary decisions are 
democratically legitimate, but strong legislative budgetary power is generally 
associated with less fiscal restraint. Two comprehensive composite indices 
are produced, based on recent data which captures reforms implemented after 
the Crisis. The findings show that overall, budget institutions in the EA are of 
medium quality, whilst legislative budgetary power is weak. Notwithstanding 
the thrust for a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, the specific characteristics of 
budget institutions differ considerably among the EA countries. Furthermore, 
results from a two-way fixed effects panel model for 2006-2015 show a positive 
relationship between the quality of budget institutions and the budget balance, 
but, in contrast to previous studies, the effect is rather weak. Being supra-
nationally mandated, recent reforms to budget institutions in EA member 
states may suffer from a lack of ownership, thus impinging on their 
effectiveness to instil fiscal discipline. A qualitative case study on Malta 
provides further insight into the limitations of centrally-mandated institutional 
reforms. Finally, the findings suggest that stronger legislative budgetary power 
does not necessarily jeopardise fiscal discipline, if this involves a broad role of 
the legislature in the budgetary process, beyond amendment powers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  2 
 
1st January 2019 marked the 20th anniversary of Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The second half of the Euro’s young history has been 
characterised by deep financial and economic turmoil, with sovereign debt 
crises and bail-outs of a number of Euro Area (EA) countries1. These 
developments led to an “existential crisis” of the monetary union (Buti et al. 
2019: 1). Subsequently, financial stability has been gradually restored and the 
EA economy has slowly recovered2. But the bailed-out countries continue to 
suffer from the aftermath of the austerity response to the EA crisis3, in terms 
of persistently high unemployment, especially among youths and increased 
poverty (Darvas et al. 2014), as well as the rise of populist political parties 
(Guiso et al. 2018).  It is therefore not surprising that in contrast to the 10th 
EMU anniversary, when the former president of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), Jean-Claude Trichet boldly stated that “the euro has been a remarkable 
success” (ECB 2008: 2), a more cautionary stance was adopted during the 
20th anniversary of the Euro, with emphasis on the need to conclude the 
ongoing work to complete the EMU (European Commission 2018a). 
Indeed, the Great Crisis has brought to the fore fundamental weaknesses in 
the monetary union’s architecture. Although there have been important 
developments, including the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) to provide assistance to EA countries in financial difficulties 
and the initiation of a Banking Union in 20124, completing the EMU remains 
work in progress. The European Commission (CION)’s (2017a) roadmap 
presents various proposals to complete the financial, fiscal and economic 
union and to strengthen EMU’s democratic accountability and governance5. 
                                                          
1 Greece was the first country to receive financial support from EA member states and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2010. It was followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Cyprus. Latvia received support from the European Union (EU) balance of payments 
assistance programme in 2008, prior to joining the EA. Further details are available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-
coordination/eu-financial-assistance_en. 
2 In its October 2018 World Economic Outlook, the IMF (2018a) expects economic growth in 
the EA at around 2% in 2019. 
3 The EA crisis refers to the financial crisis which hit Europe in 2008 and the subsequent 
economic recession and sovereign debt crises. Thereafter, these are jointly referred to as the 
Great Crisis. 
4 Further details are available at: https://www.esm.europa.eu and 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/. 
5 This roadmap is based on the CION’s (2015a) report for completing Europe’s EMU by the 
Presidents of the CION, the Euro Summit, the Eurogroup, the ECB and the European 
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But the Great Crisis has caused deep rifts and a lack of mutual trust among 
the EA member states, so that a common, unified approach on the future of 
EMU remains elusive (Buti et al. 2019). At a more general level, the increasing 
Euroscepticism6 and the prospect of Brexit7 have also hampered further 
integration efforts within the EA.  
Meanwhile, the sovereign debt crises have clearly shown that a lack of fiscal 
restraint in any member state can have grave repercussions on the rest of the 
monetary union. Thus, subsequently, there has been an increased emphasis 
on the need to ensure fiscal discipline within the EA. The institutional set-up of 
the EA is unique in that, whilst characterised by a single currency and a single 
monetary policy entrusted to the ECB, fiscal policy is decentralised with the 
budget determined and implemented at the national level, but subject to supra-
national constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The 
SGP, which is monitored and enforced centrally by the CION and the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin), comprises both a corrective 
and a preventive arm. The corrective arm involves the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP), which is launched when a country’s budget deficit exceeds 
3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and/or its government debt ratio 
exceeds 60% of GDP. On the other hand, the preventive arm requires member 
states to present annual Stability Programmes (SP) outlining their plans to 
achieve the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), which for many 
countries is close to a balanced budget situation in cyclically adjusted terms8. 
The SGP has been subject to persistent academic criticism9. Its problems of 
lack of enforcement are also well known, as shown by the situations in 2004 
                                                          
Parliament (Five Presidents’ Report), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/five-presidents-report-completing-europes-
economic-and-monetary-union_en.  
6 See, for example, Brack and Startin (2015). 
7 At the time of writing, the United Kingdom was expected to exit the EU in the first half of 
2019. 
8 Further details on the SGP are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-
prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en.   
9 See for example, De Grauwe (2003) and Wyplosz (2013). 
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vis-à-vis France and Germany and more recently, in respect of Spain and 
Portugal in 201610. 
 
Nevertheless, the Pact remains at the core of the EA fiscal governance 
framework and it has been considerably tightened, with various reforms 
implemented since the Crisis (see Figure 1.1). In December 2011, a first 
legislative package, commonly referred to as the ‘Six-Pack’, entered into force, 
which includes stricter and clarified rules, stronger and more automatic 
sanctions which set in early in the surveillance process and common minimum 
standards for budgetary procedures in the member states. This was followed 
by a second legislative package in 2013 – the ‘Two-Pack’ – which includes a 
common budgetary timeline, the assessment of draft budgetary plans by the 
CION before the budget is approved by national parliament, as well as the 
                                                          
10 For a brief discussion of these cases, see, for example, Gros (2016). Wyplosz (2010) 
provides a broader discussion on the difficulties for EU institutions to impose sanctions on 
sovereign member states. 
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requirement to set up independent fiscal councils11. Also in 2013, the Fiscal 
Compact12 entered into force requiring the introduction of fiscal rules at the 
national level. 
Through these reforms, the supra-national approach of enforcing fiscal 
discipline in the EA (through the SGP) has thus been complemented by an 
alternative decentralised approach, which recognises the importance of 
national budget institutions (Hallerberg 2011). Since fiscal policy in the EA is 
a national prerogative (though subject to the SGP’s constraints), Wyplosz 
(2010: 4) strongly argues that country-level mechanisms represent the “correct 
solution” to achieve fiscal discipline in the EA. However, it is relevant to note 
that this approach involving domestic fiscal discipline mechanisms is centrally-
mandated, as the reforms involve common requirements, in particular for 
national fiscal rules and fiscal councils, for all the EA member states. 
Motivated by these developments, this thesis investigates national budget 
institutions in the EA and their implications on fiscal discipline. The focus on 
the 19 member states of the EA provides for more analytical relevance since 
they are subject to a common fiscal governance framework, which has 
become more differentiated following the abovementioned reforms13. At this 
juncture, it is relevant to highlight that, reflecting the main SGP rules, fiscal14 
performance is assessed through indicators of the size of the budget balance 
and of government debt, with smaller budget deficits (or larger budget 
surpluses) and lower levels of government debt (both in terms of GDP) 
considered as showing more fiscal discipline.  
                                                          
11 Further details on the legal basis of the SGP, including the ‘Six-Pack’ and the ‘Two-Pack’ 
legislations are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/node/4318. 
12 The Fiscal Compact is contained within the Inter-Governmental Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union. All the EU 
member states, except the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic are parties to the Treaty. 
The Treaty is available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:1403_3. 
13 For example, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on the sanctions applicable in the SGP and 
Regulation No 473/2013 on the monitoring and assessment of the draft budgetary plans and 
the correction of the excessive budget deficits only apply to the members of the EA. 
14 A fine distinction can be made between the terms ‘fiscal’, which covers all decisions related 
to government finances, and ‘budgetary’ which has a narrower scope, comprising those fiscal 
activities implemented through the budget (Yläoutinen 2004). However, as in the literature on 
budget institutions, the two terms are used as synonyms in this thesis. 
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Furthermore, it is pertinent to point out at the outset that this research is 
focused on analysing the influence of budget institutions on fiscal discipline 
and it does not discuss the merits of fiscal discipline per se. There has been 
considerable debate, also at an academic level, on the austerity response to 
the sovereign debt crises in the EA, and it has been blamed for the deep and 
long economic recession in some of the bailed-out countries15. Furthermore, 
the emphasis in the EA governance framework on fiscal discipline has also 
been subject to significant criticism as it inhibits the use of national fiscal policy 
for economic stabilisation purposes and also constrains economic growth in 
countries with low government debt16. However, these macroeconomic 
implications and other effects of fiscal discipline go beyond the scope of this 
study.  
Rather the focus of this thesis is on how national budget institutions17 can 
contribute to fiscal discipline. The literature on the political economy of budget 
deficits, reviewed in Chapter 2, shows that there is a tendency for policy-
makers to run excessive deficits. This deficit bias can be attributed to electoral 
motives, as the incumbent uses the budget to improve the chance of being re-
elected, and to the common pool resource problem, whereby due to 
fragmented budgetary decision-making, the full costs of government spending, 
including deficit-financing, are not internalised. In the context of the EA, 
international debt externalities exacerbate the deficit bias arising from 
domestic political conflicts.  
This study is carried out from a “fiscal institutionalists” perspective, whereby 
budget institutions are considered as important to contain this tendency of a 
deficit bias (Yläoutinen 2004: 4). Budget institutions are defined as: 
“all the rules and regulations according to which budgets are drafted, approved 
and implemented” (Alesina and Perotti 1995: 21).  
                                                          
15 For a discussion of the effects of austerity on the economy, see, for example, Holland and 
Portes (2012). Corsetti (2012) provides a broader discussion on austerity and the EA crisis.  
16 See, for example, De Grauwe (2009). 
17 The direct effects of the supra-national fiscal rule (the SGP) on fiscal discipline in the EA 
are outside the scope of this thesis, but its connectedness with the national budget institutions 
is also analysed in this study.  
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They include both the formal rules and provisions pertaining to the budget 
process which are written into law, as well as informal ones which are not 
legally binding but which are followed in practice. Following Alesina and Perotti 
(1996), the literature distinguishes between three different types of budget 
institutions: numerical fiscal constraints, such as fiscal rules and binding 
medium-term fiscal frameworks (MTBF) or targets; procedural rules which 
govern the budgetary process; and rules concerning budget transparency. 
This study also covers the role of independent fiscal institutions (IFI) or 
councils, which have recently become a more prominent aspect of budget 
institutions (Ayuso-i-Casals et al. 2009). 
One important way in which budget institutions can contribute to more fiscal 
discipline is through more centralised decision-making, which induces a more 
comprehensive view of the budget, thus addressing the common pool 
resource problem. This can be achieved by assigning strong decision-making 
powers to the finance minister during budget negotiations and implementation 
and by restricting legislative budget amendment powers during the approval 
stage (Alesina and Perotti 1999). An alternative approach achieves fiscal 
discipline through strong commitment by policy-makers with similar decision-
making powers to fiscal rules or medium-term budgetary targets (von Hagen 
and Harden 1995). Meanwhile, budget transparency also facilitates a more 
comprehensive view of the budget and can also mitigate against an electoral 
budget cycle by addressing information asymmetries between voters and the 
incumbent. It can also strengthen other aspects of budget institutions, for 
instance by reducing the possibility of circumventing fiscal rules. Similarly, 
independent fiscal councils can strengthen fiscal rules by increasing the 
reputational costs of breaching such constraints and can also improve budget 
transparency, for instance by producing or endorsing the economic forecasts 
underpinning the budget (Ayuso-i-Casals et al. 2009). Using a simple model 
of the budgetary process in EA countries, in Chapter 3, it is shown how these 
different types of budget institutions contribute to reduce the deficit bias during 
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the three different stages of the budgetary process – formulation, approval and 
implementation18. 
The influence of budget institutions on fiscal discipline is well established in 
the literature. It has been confirmed by various empirical studies for EU 
countries, which use composite indices to capture the overall quality of budget 
institutions. An early contribution was made by von Hagen (1992) for the 12 
members of the then European Economic Community (EEC), whilst more 
recent examples include Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) for the EU15 (the 15 
countries that were members of the EU before 2004) and Gleich (2003) and 
Yläoutinen (2004) for the 10 central and eastern European countries (CEECs) 
that joined the EU since 2004. 
At the same time, Wyplosz (2012) emphasises that there are different models 
of budget institutions and their effectiveness depends on how well they are 
embedded in a country’s political and social arrangements and on the political 
commitment to the constraints involved. Similarly, drawing on the successful 
experience with fiscal rules and IFIs in Netherlands and Sweden in Europe 
and Brazil and Chile in Latin America, Kopits (2012: 152) notes how these 
effective fiscal frameworks were “home-grown” and “home-owned” and were 
thus both well-designed to fit the countries’ respective institutional context and 
also supported by broad-based political ownership. 
Meanwhile, whilst there is a vast literature on the quality of budget institutions, 
the role of the legislature in the budgetary process is less studied. However, 
the legislature, as the representative body of citizens, has a key role to ensure 
that budgetary decisions are democratically legitimate. Budgetary decisions 
involve the redistribution of income among a country’s population and 
reflecting the “no taxation without representation” principle, such decisions are 
only legitimate if they are the result of a democratic process (Wyplosz 2012: 
505). Legislative budgetary power is defined as: 
“the power to scrutinise and influence budget policy and to ensure its 
implementation” (Wehner 2006: 768).  
                                                          
18 A fourth stage, concerning budgetary oversight and control (von Hagen 2002), is not 
considered in this study since it mainly involves ex-post financial scrutiny. 
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But, in many countries, especially parliamentary systems, the legislature tends 
to have a marginal role in the budgetary process (Posner and Park 2007). In 
the EA, democratic accountability of budgetary decisions is complex because 
whilst fiscal policy decisions are taken by national governments, at the same 
time these are increasingly constrained at the supra-national level by the SGP 
(Crum 2018). The recent reforms have further limited the role and relevance 
of the legislature in the budgetary process: for instance, the CION assesses 
and issues an opinion on the draft budget before this is approved by the 
country’s national parliament. Whilst these reforms introduced a system of 
economic dialogue involving the European Parliament and EU institutions as 
well as national parliaments, the European Parliament does not have any 
effective power on national budgetary matters (Crum 2018)19. Thus, 
democratic legitimacy for budgetary decisions remains within national 
parliaments.  
At the same time, emphasising the common pool resource problem among 
legislators, the literature on budget institutions considers that strong legislative 
budgetary power, especially amendment powers, result in larger budget 
deficits (von Hagen 2002). Alesina and Perotti (1996: 7) explicitly refer to a 
“trade-off” between fiscal discipline and democratic accountability of the 
budget process. However, as shown in the simple model of the budgetary 
process in EA countries, presented in Chapter 3, this may not apply to all 
aspects of legislative budgetary power. Rather, some characteristics of 
legislative budgeting, such as legislative approval of numerical budgetary 
constraints can improve their credibility, thus contributing to more fiscal 
restraint. Within this context, this thesis also analyses legislative budgetary 
power in the EA.  
Overall, the aim of this thesis is to assess the quality of budget institutions and 
the degree of legislative budgetary power in EMU and to analyse their 
implications on fiscal discipline. As shown in Figure 1.2, this study comprises 
                                                          
19 The European Parliament is thus not considered within the scope of this study. Furthermore, 
this thesis concerns national parliaments, which are responsible for the approval of a country’s 
budget, rather than other elected bodies at a regional or local level. For countries with 
bicameral legislatures, only the chambers with budgetary powers are considered (generally, 
the lower house). 
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four components which all contribute to achieve this research aim. The first 
two components are of a descriptive nature, whilst the third and fourth 
components involve explanatory research. 
The first two components, presented in Chapters 4 and 5, involve the 
construction of composite numerical indices to assess the overall quality of 
budget institutions and the budgetary power of national parliaments in the EA, 
respectively. The quality of budget institutions index contributes to the 
literature by providing a comparable, recent and comprehensive measure for 
all the 19 EA countries, whilst the legislative budgetary power index makes a 
similar contribution to the scant literature on legislative budgeting.  
 
On the other hand, the third and fourth components of this study examine the 
relationship between budget institutions and fiscal discipline, using different 
methodological approaches. In Chapter 6, a two-way fixed effects panel data 
model is used to examine the impact of the quality of budget institutions and 
legislative budgetary power on fiscal discipline in the EA during 2006-15. This 
constitutes new evidence on the effects of budget institutions on the budget 
balance using the recent, comprehensive constructed indices as explanatory 
variables. Moreover, a qualitative case study on one of the EA countries – 
Malta – is presented in Chapter 7. This research component focuses on the 
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influence of fiscal rules and fiscal councils, which constitute important 
elements of the common EA requirements and which have been recently 
introduced in Malta. This case study contributes to the literature through its 
alternative qualitative approach which enables an in-depth analysis of how 
budget institutions affect fiscal discipline. It also adds to the knowledge on 
budget institutions in the EA through its geographical focus, since Malta’s 
budget institutions have hardly been studied.  
The results show that overall budget institutions in the EA are of medium 
quality. The findings show an overall strengthening of the quality of budget 
institutions in the EA since the Great Crisis, with a more marked improvement 
among the bailed-out countries. The overall improvement in the EA is mainly 
due to reforms relating to fiscal rules and fiscal councils triggered by the 
common requirements, rather than more broad-based nationally-driven 
reforms. On the other hand, a similar general improvement is not discernible 
for legislative budgetary power. Overall, legislative budgetary power in the EA 
is rather weak, particularly as regards formal powers vis-à-vis the national 
budgetary process. But, legislatures fare better in terms of engagement in the 
SGP procedures and organisational budgetary capacity.  
Whilst there is limited variation in the overall indices’ scores among the EA 
countries, there is more diversity in the specific institutional characteristics. 
Thus, legislatures obtain budgetary power from different components of formal 
powers and organisational capacity. Moreover, the results show that there can 
be different models for achieving good quality budget institutions, which 
contrasts with the general thrust for a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in the 
common EA requirements. The findings also show considerable variation in 
the strength of fiscal rules and fiscal councils among the member states. 
Moreover, despite the rules-based nature of the common EA requirements, in 
some member states, a strong finance minister remains an important element 
of their fiscal governance framework. 
Meanwhile, in contrast to the findings in previous empirical studies, the results 
of the two-way fixed effects model show a weak, but still positive relationship 
between the quality of budget institutions and the budget balance. This 
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contrast with the findings in previous studies may be attributable to the more 
recent timeframe of the empirical analysis presented in this thesis, which 
captures reforms to budget institutions implemented since the Great Crisis. 
Thus, the long-term impact of certain reforms may have not been captured. 
This applies in particular to the influence of fiscal councils, which constitute a 
recent institutional development in various EA countries. Furthermore, the 
recent reforms in budget institutions were largely supra-nationally imposed, 
rather than being driven by a domestic policy agenda, which can affect their 
national ownership and effectiveness. The empirical results also show that 
strong legislative budgetary power does not necessarily conflict with fiscal 
discipline. This suggests that democratic legitimacy of the budget can be 
secured without jeopardising fiscal discipline, through a broader involvement 
of the legislature in the budgetary process beyond amendment powers.  
The qualitative case study on Malta provides insight into how fiscal rules and 
fiscal councils contribute to fiscal discipline. It also shows how they are 
adapted to the national context and identifies limitations of supra-nationally 
mandated institutional reforms. Thus, whilst fiscal rules have been introduced 
in national legislation and an independent fiscal council has been established, 
government’s fiscal policy stance continues to be largely determined by the 
SGP obligations and the CION’s assessments. On the other hand, the legally 
required assessment and endorsement of the budgetary forecasts by the fiscal 
council has resulted in more prudent budgetary forecasts. The case study 
findings also show that the institutional reforms have not resulted in a broad 
political commitment to fiscal discipline beyond the Ministry for Finance 
(MFIN). Finally, in Malta, the fiscal rules and the assessments by the CION did 
not replace the role of the finance minister to instil fiscal discipline in the 
budgetary process; rather they constitute ‘external anchors’ to reinforce its 
position. 
This thesis is organised as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews 
theoretical work as well as empirical studies on sources of political conflict 
which give rise to a deficit bias. Chapter 3 presents a simple model of the 
budgetary process in EA countries, which explains how these political 
motivations result in larger budget deficits and how this can be mitigated by 
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budget institutions. Subsequently, Chapters 4 and 5 present the quality of 
budget institutions and legislative budgetary power indices, respectively. 
Chapter 6 analyses empirically the relationship between budget institutions 
and fiscal discipline, using a two-way fixed effects panel data model, whilst 
Chapter 7 presents further investigation on this relationship through a 
qualitative case study on Malta. Finally, Chapter 8 provides general 
conclusions for the key findings of the entire thesis and also suggests areas 
for future research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
There is a rich and vast literature which seeks political explanations for 
government’s tendency to run persistent budget deficits and accumulation of 
government debt. These political economy models20 refer to a deficit bias, 
which results from governments pursuing sub-optimal fiscal policies. Optimal 
fiscal policy is that set by a benevolent social planner who aims to maximise 
the welfare of a representative consumer (Alesina and Perotti 1995). 
Therefore, a deficit bias implies that the budget deficit (and government debt 
accumulation) is higher than it would be if a social planner sets fiscal policy. It 
is outside the scope of this Chapter to review in detail the literature on optimal 
fiscal policy21; rather a brief outline of optimal fiscal policy is hereby presented 
to provide a benchmark against which political economy explanations of 
departures from optimality can be discussed.  
Optimal fiscal policy involves tax smoothing: to minimise the deadweight loss 
associated with taxation, the tax rate should be held constant at the level of 
permanent spending (Barro 1979). This tax smoothing theory thus predicts a 
rise in government debt when a country’s current government income or 
expenditure departs from its respective trend values, such as during an 
economic recession or war. According to this theory, a change in current 
taxation would only be required if these transitory factors become permanent. 
This is consistent with countercyclical fiscal policy, as prescribed by Keynesian 
theories, because spending increases during recessions would be 
compensated for by discretionary cuts during economic booms (Alesina and 
Passalacqua 2015)22, so that the budget would be balanced over the business 
cycle. However, the general accumulation of government debt in EA countries 
as well as the recurring budget deficits in some countries23 are inconsistent 
                                                          
20 Political economy concerns the effects of politics on economic outcomes (Drazen 2000). 
The literature reviewed in this Chapter focuses on the political effects on fiscal outcomes. 
21 See for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Velasco (2000). 
22 It is outside the scope of this Chapter to critically analyse the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
for economic stabilisation purposes. For a recent discussion in the context of the fiscal 
stimulus during the Great Crisis, see, for example Auerbach and Gale (2009). 
23 See Section 6.1 in Chapter 6 for an overview of fiscal performance in the EA during 1999-
2017. 
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with this optimal fiscal policy setting, thus suggesting the influence of political 
considerations on fiscal policy making.  
In a survey of the literature on the political economy of fiscal deficits, Eslava 
(2011) identifies three main sources of political conflict during the budgetary 
process which lead to a deficit bias: heterogeneity in fiscal preferences 
between policymakers and voters; across politicians; and across social groups 
or regions. These different preferences correspond to conflicts between the 
interests of the incumbent government and voters, between alternating 
governments or within the same government, respectively. Wierts (2008) 
adopts a slightly different categorisation, grouping the first two categories 
under “time fragmentation”, being related to the limited time horizon of the 
incumbent and differences in preferences between different political parties 
that alternate in power; and referring to the third category as “size 
fragmentation”24. 
The aim of the literature review presented in this Chapter is to explain how 
political conflict affects decision-making during the budgetary process and 
results in a deficit bias25. Then, the next Chapter, which presents a simple 
model of the budgetary process in EA countries, examines how budgetary 
institutions can influence the incentives of policy makers and address the 
deficit bias. Furthermore, this literature review also aims to identify the more 
relevant political variables which influence the budget balance, thus guiding 
the selection of the political explanatory variables in the empirical analysis, 
presented in Chapter 6. This literature review focuses on two sources of 
political conflict, namely heterogeneity of interests between the incumbent and 
voters and heterogenous fiscal preferences within government.  
                                                          
24 Wierts (2008) explains that degree of heterogeneity within society determines a country’s 
electoral rules, which in turn affect the conflicts of interest within government and these affect 
fiscal outcomes. This Chapter focuses on the latter part of this process. For a detailed analysis 
of the impact of electoral rules (majoritarian or proportional) on fiscal outcomes, see Persson 
and Tabellini (2004). 
25 Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) present an alternative model where the deficit bias results 
from intergenerational redistribution, where the current generation favours deficit-financing 
since this enables it to increase its lifetime income, whereas future generations have no voice 
in current fiscal policy decisions. However, this negative bequest model is not considered 
further in this study since it does not directly involve political conflict in budgetary decision-
making. 
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The other category of political economy models, focusing on different 
preferences across politicians, is not analysed in this literature review. This 
group of models involve traditional partisan differences in fiscal preferences, 
with left-wing governments associated with larger budget deficits and higher 
levels of government debt than right-wing governments, as originally 
described in the seminal contribution of Hibbs (1977). However, such partisan 
differences have become less accentuated over time (Cusack 1999), reflecting 
the decrease in the degree of ideological polarisation with modernisation and 
the convergence of the main political parties to more centrist policies26. Within 
the EU context, economic and financial integration processes can also 
contribute to weaken distinct partisan differences (Efthyvoulou 2011)27. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence supporting the traditional partisan model is 
rather weak (Eslava 2011). Finally, even theoretically, the implications of 
heterogenous fiscal preferences across political parties on fiscal outcomes is 
not clear, as strategic motives may lead political parties to act opposite to the 
traditional partisan view, as outlined in the strategic use of debt models 
developed by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990).  
The rest of this Chapter reviews theoretical and empirical work on the effect of 
heterogenous preferences between the incumbent and the voter and within 
government itself on the deficit bias. This review does not attempt to cover the 
vast literature in this area systematically. Rather, it focuses on key works in 
the different branches of this literature. In particular, the empirical studies 
reviewed mainly comprise European countries, reflecting the geographical 
focus of this study28. Furthermore, the emphasis is on studies where the 
electoral cycle involves fluctuations in the budget balance (or debt), rather than 
the composition of spending, since the aim of this study is to assess the 
                                                          
26 For a discussion of these issues from a political science perspective, see, for example Le 
Duc et al. (2010). However, the recent rise in radical, extremist and anti-establishment political 
parties in various EU countries in recent years constitutes an exception to this general trend 
for more centrist ideology.  
27 Using a timeseries analysis on the political budget cycle for Cyprus during 1978-2006, the 
partisan impact on the annual change in the government public debt ratio to GDP was found 
to have been weakened by a higher degree of globalisation and the run-up to joining the EA. 
28 Studies involving countries members of the Organisation for Economic Development and 
Co-operation (OECD) are also included, since they include also several EA member states. 
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relationship between budget institutions and fiscal discipline29. A more 
comprehensive summary and analysis of the contributions developed in this 
field, including the partisan models, is found, amongst others, in the seminal 
critical literature review by Alesina and Perotti (1995) and more recently by 
Eslava (2011) and Alesina and Passalacqua (2015). Finally, this Chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the deficit bias in the specific context of a 
monetary union. 
2.2 Models based on different fiscal preferences between 
policymakers and voters 
In the early political economy models of fiscal deficits, voters are characterised 
by fiscal illusion. This concept originated in Puviani (1903) from the Italian 
school of public finance at the turn of the twentieth century (Mourão 2008). It 
was then further developed by the public choice school, in particular by 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977). Fiscal illusion basically centres around: 
“a wrong perception of budget aggregates from the voters’ and taxpayers’ 
perspectives” (Mourão 2008: 50).  
Thus, in this model, voters value public spending, including its expansionary 
macroeconomic effects but they do not take into account the full cost (in terms 
of the required tax burden) of financing it. This model also involves 
opportunistic politicians, rather than the benevolent social planner under 
optimal fiscal policy. Instead of aiming to maximise social welfare, 
opportunistic politicians take advantage of voters’ fiscal illusion by increasing 
public spending to please voters and thus improve their re-election chances 
(Alesina and Perotti 1995). These outlays are financed through borrowing, 
because the future taxation required to finance current spending does not 
generate constituency pressures comparable to those resulting from a hike in 
current taxation (Buchanan and Wagner 1977). This effect was reinforced with 
Keynesianism as politicians implement asymmetric economic stabilisation 
policies: they are eager to increase discretionary spending and run budget 
                                                          
29 An example of an empirical study on the electoral cycle in the composition of spending is 
Bove et al. (2017), who find a significant shift from military expenditure to social expenditure 
during election times in a sample of 22 OECD countries during 1988-2009.   
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deficits during recessions, but then do not counterbalance it with budget 
surpluses during economic good times (Eslava 2011; Alesina and 
Passalacqua 2015). This model thus involves incentives for the incumbent to 
generate a budget deficit as elections approach in order to increase its 
popularity among voters and improve its chances of remaining in office, only 
to reduce it again immediately after an election, when faced with rising 
indebtedness. These periodic fluctuations in fiscal policy, which are induced 
by the timing of elections, are referred to as an electoral or political budget 
cycle (Mink and De Haan 2006; Efthyvoulou 2012)30. 
Whilst this model presents a simple yet pervasive view of the conduct of fiscal 
policy in democratic societies, the notion of fiscal illusion has been criticised 
as it implies that voters repeatedly fail to recognise the future tax burden 
implied by pre-election spending increases (Eslava 2011). There is no reason 
to expect that voters will systematically and always underestimate the future 
tax burden of current public spending (Alesina and Perotti 1995) and Alesina 
and Passalacqua (2015: 14) describe the fiscal illusion argument as “overly 
simplistic”.  
Indeed, in the late 1980s, the electoral cycle model was adapted with two 
important contributions by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). In their 
model, the electoral cycle in fiscal policy results from temporary information 
asymmetries about the incumbent’s competence. A competent policy-maker 
is able to provide a given level of government services with less revenue than 
a less competent one. Voters cannot observe the candidate’s competence 
directly and they have full information on the budget with a delay. They thus 
infer politicians’ competence from the part of government spending that they 
observe before an election. Incumbents have an incentive to signal their 
competency during an election year to improve their re-election prospects and 
they do this by lowering the tax bill, resulting in a budget deficit, which voters 
                                                          
30 The early literature derived an electoral economic cycle, with relatively low unemployment 
and inflation during electoral periods and high unemployment and low inflation after an election 
(Nordhaus 1975, Lindbeck 1976, MacRae 1977). However, this model was adapted so as to 
be consistent with a theoretical approach based on rational expectations, and predicting an 
electoral budget cycle, with higher spending and budget deficits around elections, but without 
specific clear implications for output and employment (Drazen 2000). 
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do not observe immediately (Rogoff and Sibert 1988). Rogoff (1990) develops 
a variation of this model, where competency is signalled through higher levels 
of public spending and a change in the composition of public spending towards 
transfers and more visible public projects31. These models thus predict short 
run cycles of budget deficits and transfers around elections, which depend on 
the fact that voters do not have full information on and understanding of the 
budget. These models thus predict that electoral budget cycles are more likely 
when budget transparency is weak32 (Eslava 2011; Alesina and Passalacqua 
2015).   
2.2.1 Electoral budget cycles: empirical evidence 
There is a rich array of empirical studies on electoral budget cycles, largely 
involving cross-country studies but there are also some studies focusing on 
individual countries. Evidence of an electoral budget cycle has been found in 
studies covering samples of OECD countries33. For instance, Alesina et al. 
(1991) find confirming results in a sample of 18 OECD countries during 1960-
1987. For a largely comparable sample, Franzese (1998) presents similar 
findings also when taking into account of more factors that affect the budget 
balance, but the timing and extent of the cycle differs. More recently, Tujula 
and Wolswijk (2004), using a sample of 22 OECD countries during 1970-2002, 
also find that the fiscal balance deteriorates in general election years. On the 
other hand, more limited evidence is found by Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) 
for a similar sample, but using a wider array of control variables, with an 
electoral influence on direct tax revenue and the composition of spending, but 
not on the aggregate fiscal variables.  
Focusing on studies with a more relevant geographical scope, two early 
studies by von Hagen (2003) and Buti and van der Noord (2004) find evidence 
                                                          
31 Ironically, these models predict larger electoral budget cycles with more competent 
politicians. But in the adapted version by Shi and Svensson (2006), all incumbents, 
irrespective of their competency level, face the same incentives to increase public spending 
before an election.  
32 The implications of budget transparency on the electoral budget cycle is discussed in 
Section 2.2.2 and also in Section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3. 
33 These findings contrast with other literature which claims that electoral budget cycles are 
largely a phenomenon restricted to less-developed countries or new democracies - see, for 
example, Schuknecht (1994) and Shi and Svensson (2006); and Brender and Drazen (2005) 
and Shelton (2014), respectively.  
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of an electoral budget cycle among the EU15 countries and the EA countries, 
respectively. In contrast to the mainstream literature which uses fiscal 
aggregates (namely, the budget balance or the change in government debt) 
as the dependent variable, both studies use a more sophisticated measure to 
capture the discretionary part of fiscal policy34. Using a simple t-test to 
compare the averages for electoral and non-electoral country year groups, von 
Hagen (2003) finds that the average fiscal impulse in pre-election years is 
statistically significantly higher than in all other country-year cases. Similarly, 
Buti and van der Noord (2004: 753) find that the fiscal discretionary stance 
eased in pre-election and election years and conclude that “the electoral 
budget cycle is alive and well in EMU”.  However, both studies are constrained 
by the relatively short period of time covered (1998-2001 and 1999-2003, 
respectively). Meanwhile, Mink and De Haan (2006) also confirm the presence 
of an electoral budget cycle in the 12 countries that had adopted the Euro by 
2004 over a similarly short timeframe (1999-2004), when early elections are 
excluded from the sample35. But the timing of the cycle differed, with the 
budget deficit increasing in an election year, but not in the year prior to the 
election. Taking a somewhat longer timeframe (1990-1999), Hallerberg et al. 
(2002) also found that budget deficits were larger in election years among the 
10 CEECs, but the effect was found to be significant only for those countries 
with a fixed exchange rate regime.  
The presence of an electoral budget cycle in EU countries was confirmed by 
studies using larger samples. For instance, Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) find a 
significant electoral cycle in the budget balance for the EU15 countries during 
1970-2002, which is stronger than that in their larger sample of OECD 
countries. Furthermore, the electoral effect seems to have intensified in the 
latter part of their sample period (1987-2002). Using a dynamic panel data 
model specification, Efthyvoulou (2012) also finds that fiscal deficits are higher 
in elections years for the EU27 (the countries that were members of the EU 
between 2007 and 2012) during 1997-2008, with a larger and stronger 
                                                          
34 The fiscal policy stance is defined as neutral if expenditure moves in line with potential or 
trend GDP, whereas tax revenue is measured as function of GDP. 
35 In contrast to pre-determined elections, early elections may involve endogeneity bias from 
reverse causation or from shocks affecting both the election date and the fiscal balance. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – The Political Economy of Budget Deficits 
 
  22 
 
electoral effect in the EA countries. In addition, the electoral budget cycle was 
found to be negatively related to the relative importance of non-economic 
issues prior to elections and positively related to electoral competitiveness. 
Some studies have adopted a single-country approach to analyse electoral 
budget cycles in EA countries, thus avoiding difficulties due to differences in 
cultural, institutional and economic aspects, which may hamper the analysis 
in cross-country studies. Most of these studies analyse fiscal policy at a sub-
national level. These include Veiga and Veiga (2007) for Portuguese mainland 
municipalities during 1979-2001; Chortareas et al. (2016) for Greek 
municipalities during 1984-2004; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2008) and 
Bastida et al. (2013) for Spanish municipalities during 1985-1995 and 1992-
2005, respectively; and Ashworth et al. (2005) for Flemish municipalities 
during 1977-2000. The first two studies use the budget balance as the 
dependent variable, whereas the third study uses deviations from the 
forecasted budget deficit and the last two studies use municipal debt per 
capita. Nevertheless, all these studies find evidence of an electoral budget 
cycle at the municipal level.  
Castro and Martins (2014) and Efthyvoulou (2011) also carry out single-
country studies but at a national level, employing time-series analysis to test 
for the presence of an electoral budget cycle in Portugal and Cyprus, 
respectively. Using monthly data to allow more accurate control of electoral 
timings, Castro and Martins (2014) find that, in Portugal, during 1991-2013, 
the government budget balance worsened before elections. On the other 
hand, using annual data, Efthyvoulou (2011) does not find evidence of an 
electoral cycle in the yearly change in the government public debt as a share 
of GDP in Cyprus during 1978-2006 and attributes this to the effect of 
globalisation and the run-up to participation in EMU. 
Summing up, the empirical studies reviewed in this Section differ in the time 
period covered, the range of control variables included in the models, the 
specification of the electoral variable as well as in the estimation methods 
applied, whilst some studies also distinguish between elections whose timing 
is pre-determined and early elections. Nevertheless, the evidence from cross-
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country studies covering EU or EA countries shows that despite the constraints 
imposed on national fiscal policy by the SGP, European governments still 
manage to manipulate the budget during electoral periods, although the 
strength of the electoral budget cycle as well as its timing differs across the 
studies. These results were also confirmed by some single-country studies. 
However, there is scope for further similar studies at the national level covering 
other member states using long time-series analysis. 
2.2.2 Voters as ‘fiscal conservatives’ and budget transparency 
The concept of an electoral budget cycle is based on the premise that a fiscal 
expansion during the electoral period influences voters’ preferences in favour 
of the incumbent. However, this has been challenged by various empirical 
studies. For example, in a study covering 19 OECD countries during 1960-
1995, Alesina et al. (1998) find that changes in the budget deficit neither have 
a significant influence on cabinet changes nor on the popularity of the 
incumbent, as measured by opinion polls. Covering a more recent timeframe 
(1975-2008) for the same sample of countries, Alesina et al. (2012) similarly 
find that fiscal adjustments (measured by a change in the cyclically adjusted 
balance over potential GDP ratio) do not have a statistically significant impact 
on terminations of government resulting from elections. Furthermore, for a 
broader sample of 74 developed and developing countries during 1960-2003, 
Brender and Drazen (2008) even find a positive relationship between the 
probability that the incumbent is re-elected and an improvement in the budget 
balance during the election year relative to the previous year. The corollary of 
this result is that incumbents who pursue an expansionary fiscal policy around 
election time are actually ‘punished’ by voters36. 
Whilst this empirical evidence questions the motivation for an electoral budget 
cycle, these conflicting views have been bridged by allowing for budget 
transparency: if budget transparency is lacking, voters will not be able to act 
                                                          
36 On the other hand, evidence consistent with the implicit view in the traditional literature on 
economic budget cycles, through a relationship between the win-margin of the incumbent and 
expansionary fiscal policies during electoral periods, was found in Mourão and Veiga (2010) 
for a large sample covering 68 countries from 1960 to 2006 and by Aidt et al. (2011) for a 
sample of 278 Portuguese municipalities from 1979 to 2005. 
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as ‘fiscal conservatives’37 because they cannot observe the true level of the 
budget balance before an election. This reflects the competency signalling 
models described earlier, where a lack of budget transparency increases the 
information asymmetry between the incumbent and the electorate (Benito and 
Bastida 2009). Indeed, in their seminal article, Alt and Lassen (2006a) find that 
during 1988-1998, among their sample of 19 OECD countries, elections had 
a statistically significant effect on the fiscal balance in the group of countries 
with low fiscal transparency but not in the countries with more transparent 
budgets38. This relationship was confirmed by Vicente et al. (2013), who find 
that financial and economic transparency (measured through the index by 
Transparency International Spain) dampens the electoral cycle in total 
spending in a sample of 97 Spanish municipalities during 1999-2009, and by 
Shelton (2014) for a large sample of 90 countries during 1980-2007 when 
using the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index.  
Summing up, the electoral budget cycle model has been adapted over the 
years to incorporate theoretical developments and to be compatible with the 
view that voters are ‘fiscal conservatives’ through budget transparency. This 
model can explain temporary deviations from optimal fiscal policy around 
electoral periods. The next Section examines an alternative political economy 
approach based on different interests within government, rather than between 
government and voters. This approach can provide explanations for the 
persistence of excessive budget deficits and for why such deficits exist in only 
some countries but not in others39. 
2.3 Models based on different fiscal preferences within 
government 
Conflicts within society or between regions can result in different fiscal 
preferences within cabinet or within parliament (Wierts 2008). These result in 
                                                          
37 This term was first used by Peltzman (1992) in a study on elections in the United States 
during 1950-1988, who found a negative relationship between growth in federal spending 
before elections and the incumbent’s party vote share in elections. 
38 They measure fiscal transparency by constructing an index comprising eleven 
characteristics of budgetary procedures, compiled from the responses to the 1999 OECD 
survey on budget procedures. 
39 See Section 6.1 in Chapter 6 for an overview of fiscal performance in the EA during 1999-
2017. 
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distributional conflicts over the budget among the stakeholders and the effect 
on the budget is exacerbated if decision-making is fragmented with groups 
with different interests having some influence on the budgetary process. This 
branch of the literature finds its origin in Weingast et al.’s model (1981), which 
was further developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). This involves legislative 
representatives elected from different geographical districts and public 
projects financed from general taxation. Legislators consider the full benefits 
of public projects accruing in their district, but do not internalise the effect of 
the implied spending on the tax burden for the country as a whole. Rather, 
they consider only their district’s share of the cost, which results in an increase 
in public spending beyond the efficient point. 
This model has subsequently been applied not only in systems with 
geographically distinct constituencies, but more generally to other institutional 
settings characterised by political fragmentation within government. In 
particular, von Hagen and Harden (1995) apply the model to a context where 
spending ministers have strong decision-making powers in the budgetary 
process, with each minister fully internalising the benefits of government 
spending falling within its remit but not fully its cost, thus resulting in higher 
public spending. This has been described as “the “common pool” property of 
public budgeting” (von Hagen 2002: 264). The implication of this model is that, 
with fixed tax revenue, the budget deficit is larger with fragmented rather than 
centralised budgetary decision-making and it is increasing with the number of 
decision-makers. Fragmentation in budgetary decision-making can manifest 
in the number of political parties forming part of a coalition government, the 
number of districts for geographically based legislative representatives as well 
as in the number of spending ministers in cabinet40. This model has been 
extensively applied to coalition governments, where bargaining within cabinet 
members is more difficult since spending ministers come from different political 
                                                          
40 The concept of government fragmentation has also been applied to situations of divided 
government in presidential systems, where the legislature and the executive are controlled by 
different political parties - see, for example, Alt and Lowry (1994) and Poterba (1994) for US 
states. Furthermore, Alesina et al. (2006) apply this characteristic to explain delayed fiscal 
adjustment in a large sample of countries during 1960-2003. In addition, in their literature 
review, Alesina and Passalacqua (2015) highlight the relevance of the common pool problem 
in the context of fiscal federalism, where spending is decided by local governments but 
financed from national taxation. 
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parties. The common pool problem is exacerbated if there are strong 
ideological differences among the members of cabinet: for instance, von 
Hagen (2002) argues that when there are ethnic, linguistic or religious conflicts 
within society, the tax burden borne by other groups is more likely to be 
ignored. 
Velasco (2000) makes an important contribution to this branch of the literature 
by putting the common pool problem model in a dynamic context, with the 
common pool involving government net assets, i.e. the present value of future 
income streams less outstanding debt. As explained by Persson and Tabellini 
(2002), in this context, all actors with decision-making powers in the budgetary 
process have incentives to not only spend more, but also to spend now rather 
than later, so as to appropriate more resources. Similarly, Battaglini and Coate 
(2008) also present a dynamic application of the common pool problem, where 
the cost of raising taxes to finance higher public spending is not fully 
internalised also across periods. Whereas earlier models explain the tendency 
for higher expenditure, these further developments in the common pool 
resources model explain also the bias towards deficit financing and debt 
accumulation.  
The common pool model has been applied, not only to explain different fiscal 
outcomes across countries and in the same country over time, but also why it 
takes time to address budget deficits once they arise and it has been 
recognised that fiscal adjustment is necessary. In this respect, Alesina and 
Drazen (1991) develop a ‘war of attrition’ model where conflict over the 
distribution of the burden of fiscal adjustment between different socio-
economic groups results in delayed fiscal stabilisation41. Although delayed 
fiscal adjustment is costly42, stabilisation does not take place immediately as 
groups perceive the possibility of shifting the burden of adjustment on other 
                                                          
41 Tornell and Lane (1998) develop a variant of this model, where in response to a positive 
shock resulting in a windfall increase in fiscal revenue, fiscal groups competing over fiscal 
resources appropriate a more than proportional increase from the common pool fiscal 
resources. Due to this ‘voracity effect’, the budget balance actually worsens in good economic 
times. Whilst the standard ‘war of attrition’ model involves a lack of policy action, in this model, 
there is ‘over-reaction’ by the relevant actors, which results in a procyclical fiscal policy during 
booms. 
42 In terms of higher inflation, if the deficits are financed by printing money, or in terms of the 
accumulation of the interest burden on debt, if financed by borrowing.  
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groups and decide to wait them out. Time is required to reveal which is the 
weakest group. Eventually, stabilisation takes place when it becomes too 
costly for this group to wait and it concedes, bearing more than an equal share 
of the cost of adjustment43. In support of their ‘war of attrition’ model, Alesina 
and Drazen (1991) present historical examples of delayed fiscal stabilisation 
from some European countries after World War I as well as from OECD and 
emerging economies during the 1980s.  
The ‘war of attrition’ model is related to the concept of veto players, defined 
as: 
“an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy 
decision” (Tsebelis 1995: 293).  
Thus, fiscal stabilisation is expected to be postponed more in fragmented 
political systems, such as countries with coalition governments, since there 
are more veto players involved in budgetary decision-making. Moreover, 
distributional conflicts are aggravated in highly polarised political systems, 
further delaying the necessary fiscal adjustment. On the other hand, 
stabilisation tends to occur when there is a political consolidation (for example 
after an election), when the dominant group which emerges is able to impose 
a larger burden of fiscal adjustment on the other (politically weaker) group/s. 
It is pertinent to note that whilst the ‘war of attrition’ model explains why fiscal 
adjustment is postponed, it does not explain why a budget deficit occurs in the 
first place.  
2.3.1 Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits: empirical evidence 
There are difficulties to operationalise empirically the concept of fragmentation 
in the budget process, since this can take many forms, as highlighted above. 
Furthermore, the distinction between the effects of the common pool problem 
and the war of attrition model may not be clear in practice. Nonetheless, a 
large body of empirical studies has developed, analysing the impact of 
government fragmentation on fiscal outcomes. This ection provides a review 
                                                          
43 At that point, the estimated additional tax payments related to further delaying the required 
fiscal adjustment exceed the benefits to the group from waiting for another group to concede. 
If the fiscal crisis is severe, adjustment is likely to happen earlier, because the cost of waiting 
rises. 
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of key contributions testing these models empirically, which have a 
geographical coverage similar to this study and where the dependent variables 
are the budget balance or government debt ratio. Three main categories of 
studies can be identified. The most prevalent category tests the relationship 
between government fragmentation and budget deficits through coalition 
governments, either by the number of political parties forming the coalition or 
more generally by the type of government (coalition or single party majority). 
The second category applies the concept of government fragmentation within 
the executive, measuring it with the number of spending ministers, whilst the 
third category uses a more general government characteristic – that of 
government ‘weakness’. 
2.3.1.1 Coalition governments 
Some of the studies testing for the influence of coalition governments on 
budget deficits and/or government debt use a crude measure to indicate the 
type of government rather than a more specific measure of the degree of 
fragmentation within government. One of these early studies was that by 
Roubini and Sachs (1989), covering 15 OECD countries during 1960-1985, 
where a simple dummy variable was used to distinguish between different 
types of government. When interacted with another dummy variable to capture 
periods of rapid or adverse economic growth (1960-1974 and 1975-1985, 
respectively), fragmented governments (coalition or minority governments or 
presidential governments with different parties in control of the executive and 
legislative branch) were found to have a significant effect on the fiscal balance 
(measured through the change in the government debt to GDP ratio), albeit 
only in the latter period. The authors consider these findings as evidence 
supporting the war of attrition model. However, their political variable has been 
the subject of notable criticism and their findings were subsequently disputed. 
In particular, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) criticise the functional form chosen for 
the political dummy variable as this implies a very restrictive form on its 
effects44. Using the same data as in Roubini and Sachs (1989) but using 
                                                          
44 For example, the specification of the dummy variable by Roubini and Sachs (1989) implies 
that the effect of minority government on the budget balance is three times that of a two-party 
coalition government. 
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different dummy variables for each type of government, they find that only 
minority governments have significantly larger budget deficits. They thus 
argue that the estimated coalition effect claimed by Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
is entirely due to minority governments having larger budget deficits and that 
this reflects difficult negotiations in parliament rather than within government. 
The implication of this conclusion is that the key institutional characteristic 
influencing the fiscal balance is not government fragmentation, as implied by 
the common pool problem and war of attrition models, but rather government 
‘strength’ in the legislature.  
The specification of the political variable by Roubini and Sachs (1989) and the 
effect of the type of government on fiscal outcomes has been further 
challenged by De Haan and Sturm (1994, 1997) and De Haan et al. (1999). In 
their 1994 study, De Haan and Sturm apply a similar model, including the 
specification of the political index, as in Roubini and Sachs, to a different 
sample, involving EEC member countries during a much shorter period (1981-
1989) and find that the coefficient of the political index is not statistically 
significant from zero. Furthermore, when using a different dummy variable for 
different types of government, they also do not find any evidence of the effect 
of minority governments as claimed by Edin and Ohlsson (1991). Moreover, 
the authors also claim that the original Roubini and Sachs index contains 
coding errors. Similarly, De Haan and Sturm (1997) and De Haan et al. (1999) 
do not find evidence supporting the relationship between the type of 
government in power and government debt growth, also when using a sample 
with a geographical coverage which is quite comparable to that of Roubini and 
Sachs (1989) but over different timeframes (1982-1992 and 1979-1995, 
respectively). Using a larger and more diverse sample of 57 countries during 
1970-1990 and the long-term average public sector balance as the dependent 
variable, Woo (2003) also does not find a significant effect neither when using 
the Roubini-Sachs index nor when testing specifically for the minority 
government effect claimed by Edin and Ohlsson (1991). Thus, the evidence 
linking the type of government to fiscal outcomes is overall, very weak.  
On the other hand, some evidence supporting the government fragmentation 
hypothesis has been found when using the number of parties in government 
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or similar measures, as the explanatory variable. For instance, De Haan et al. 
(1999) find that the number of parties in government has a significant impact 
on government debt growth. This was confirmed by Franzese (2002) for a 
similar sample of OECD countries but over a longer timespan (1956-1990), 
although the effect is found to be significant only at moderate and high levels 
of debt45. In their single-country study on around 300 Flemish municipalities 
during 1977-2000, Ashworth et al. (2005) also find some support for the 
relationship between the number of coalition partners and municipal debt, but 
the evidence is significant only when the coalition comprised two parties, but 
not for bigger coalitions. In contrast, using a panel discrete choice model for 
20 OECD countries during 1973-2003, Mierau et al. (2007) find that the 
occurrence of a fiscal adjustment, involving a notable improvement in the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance, is not significantly influenced by the 
effective number of political parties in government. This result, which 
challenges the ‘war of attrition’ model, was found to apply both in the case of 
rapid as well as gradual adjustments.  
Studies using more complex measures than the crude number of coalition 
partners to operationalise government fragmentation present mixed results. 
For example, using data for only eight EU countries during 1970-1990, 
Balassone and Giordano (2001) do not find a significant effect on the budget 
deficit when measuring the degree of concentration of power within 
government with the share of votes accruing to the party with the relative 
majority within the coalition. There is a similar lack of evidence also in their 
country by country analysis, except in the case of Italy. Padovano and Venturi 
(2001) confirm the significant relationship for Italy in their single-country study, 
using a measure of the relative parliamentary size of the members in the 
governing coalition.  On the other hand, Huber et al. (2003) use a voting power 
approach to measure government strength and power dispersion within 
government in 21 OECD countries during 1970-1999 and find a significant 
effect on the change in the debt ratio but only in a smaller sample of their 
                                                          
45 On the other hand, at low levels of debt (below 30% of GDP), Franzese (2002) finds that a 
larger number of parties in a coalition government actually results in lower debt growth and 
argues that this is due to disagreement within government on the introduction of new debt-
financed spending programmes.  
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study. Furthermore, in line with Ashworth et al. (2005), they find that the effect 
is conditional on the composition of the coalition, with the deficit being higher 
when the coalition is made up of equally strong partners than in those where 
there is one dominating party. 
Some studies have also tested the effect of political polarisation within the 
coalition on fiscal outcomes. Using measures of the relative number of 
ministers from a political party and the ideological differences (on a left to right 
wing scale) between parties in the coalition, Volkerink and De Haan (2001) 
find a significant impact on the budget balance for 22 OECD countries during 
1971–1996. But similar evidence for ideological differences within the 
governing coalition was not found by neither Franzese (2002) nor Ashworth et 
al. (2005), whilst likewise, Mierau et al. (2007) find that the likelihood of fiscal 
adjustment is not significantly affected by political fragmentation. On the other 
hand, supporting evidence was found by Elgie and McMenamin (2008) for their 
sample of OECD countries for 1975-2004, when using an alternative measure 
of ideological differences within government based on rural, regional and 
religious dimensions. Thus, overall, the empirical evidence linking the type of 
government to fiscal outcomes remains rather weak, also when allowing for 
the ideological complexion of the coalition.  
2.3.1.2 Cabinet size 
As highlighted earlier, an alternative interpretation of government 
fragmentation involves the size of cabinet: a large cabinet creates a fiscal 
commons problem as individual spending ministers demand a larger budget, 
to please their constituencies, and possibly also for the prestige of 
commanding a larger amount of resources, without taking into account the full 
burden of taxation financing these outlays.  
A first contribution testing for the effect of cabinet size on fiscal outcomes was 
by Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999): measuring coalition size by the number of 
parties in the coalition and cabinet size by the number of ministers in cabinet, 
the budget deficit was found to be significantly affected by the cabinet size, but 
not by the coalition size in their sample of 20 OECD countries during 1960-
1995. Subsequently, Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Perotti and 
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Kontopoulos (2002) both largely confirm these findings for a broadly similar 
sample of countries over a somewhat shorter timeframe, starting from around 
1970. Volkerink and De Haan (2001) use a more refined measure of cabinet 
size which excludes the finance and/or budget ministers and the prime 
minister, since they are not generally concerned with spending administrations 
but rather take responsibility for the overall budget46, and they also account for 
the share of ministers coming from each political party. Ricciuti (2004) uses a 
similar measure for cabinet size in a study capturing a comparable sample of 
OECD countries during 1975-1995. A significant impact on the budget balance 
was found for the number of spending ministers but not for fractionalization 
within the government (defined as the probability that picking at random two 
members, they belong to different political parties). Meanwhile, studies by Woo 
(2003) and Elgie and McMenamin (2008), covering a larger number of and 
more diverse countries, have confirmed the effect of cabinet size on the budget 
balance, in particular for developed or OECD countries. The former uses the 
total number of ministers as a measure of cabinet size whereas the latter apply 
the more refined measure by Volkerink and De Haan (2001). Finally, 
confirming evidence for the influence of the number of spending ministers on 
the budget deficit was also found by Wehner (2010a) when using a relatively 
large sample comprising 58 countries during 1975-1998 and adopting a 
careful operationalisation of the cabinet size variable47.  
On the other hand, Mulas-Granados (2003) presents weaker evidence for the 
EU15 countries during 1970-2001: cabinet size - measured as in Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002) - only had a significant effect on the change in the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance during the earlier part of the sample period 
(1970-1995). Moreover, Mierau et al. (2007) do not find any evidence linking 
the number of spending ministers on the likelihood of fiscal adjustment. 
                                                          
46 Wehner (2010a: 633) also criticises the count of ministerial portfolios in Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002), arguing that it is highly selective and excludes a number of important 
ministries.  
47 Wehner (2010a) also links the two concepts of government fragmentation – coalition 
governments and cabinet size - and finds that the fiscal impact of a large cabinet size is 
increasing with partisan fragmentation of cabinet (measured by the portfolio shares of the 
political parties represented in cabinet). On this basis, it is suggested that single party cabinets 
may be able to mitigate the fiscal impact of a large number of spending ministers, but the 
supporting evidence is not very robust. 
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Overall, thus the evidence points to a stronger link between an executive 
interpretation of government fragmentation, based on cabinet size, and fiscal 
outcomes than for government partisan fragmentation. However, the measure 
of cabinet size is not precise in some of the studies (Wehner 2010a). In 
addition, as highlighted by Eslava (2011), the issue of causality needs to be 
further explored in this branch of the literature, since a society’s fiscal 
preferences may also be reflected in the size of cabinet, whilst previous fiscal 
outcomes and budget consolidation efforts may also affect the number of 
spending ministers. 
2.3.1.3 Government ‘weakness’ 
Different types of government differ not only in the degree of fragmentation but 
also in other characteristics, such as durability. In particular, coalition and 
minority governments tend to have short terms of office which, by reducing 
incentives for members of government to cooperate in budgetary decision-
making, can also affect fiscal outcomes (Roubini and Sachs 1989). When the 
type of government is used as an explanatory variable, it is difficult to 
distinguish empirically between the effects of these two different 
characteristics. A branch of the literature has specifically assessed the effect 
of the length of tenure of office to the budget deficit bias, based on a ‘weak’ 
government hypothesis. This rather ambiguous concept has also been 
examined in terms of government’s majority size in parliament as well as 
whether it faces a solid opposition in parliament. Importantly, this set of studies 
is not derived theoretically from the common pool problem or ‘war of attrition’ 
models, since the government characteristics of interest are fundamentally 
different from the notion of government fragmentation. Nevertheless, there is 
a notable set of works which test this ‘weak government’ hypothesis. 
One of the first of these studies, by Grilli et al. (1991), found that average 
government duration had a significant effect on the net debt ratio in their 
sample of 18 OECD countries during 1970-1989. De Haan and Sturm (1994) 
show similar results for EEC countries during the 1980s, when using frequency 
of government changes as the political explanatory variable. However, De 
Haan et al. (1999) find that such evidence is not robust across different 
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measures of the debt ratio. Furthermore, more recently, Ricciuti (2004) 
presents contrasting results, with government duration (measured through a 
simple dummy variable to capture changes in government) not having a 
significant effect on the government balance. 
Other studies have operationalised government ‘weakness’ through the size 
of government’s majority in parliament. A large parliamentary majority 
weakens the influence of any partner in the coalition and the threat of not 
continuing to support government is less effective, which facilitates control 
over spending demands by coalition partners. However, the findings are not 
that robust. Whilst both Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Elgie and 
McMenamin (2008) find that the size of government’s majority (proxied by the 
number of seats in excess of those needed for a simple majority) is negatively 
related to the budget deficit, the results are sensitive to changes in the sample. 
Moreover, Ricciuti (2004) and Mierau et al. (2007) do not find any supporting 
evidence for the influence of the majority size on the budget balance and on 
fiscal adjustments, respectively.  
Government’s position in parliament is also affected by the composition of the 
opposition: a solid opposition can present a united front against government 
and resist redistribution of the fiscal burden from the government’s 
constituencies to its own, thus making delayed fiscal stabilisation more likely; 
the government may also be more susceptible to concede to spending 
requests from the opposition side, as the threat to its majority in parliament is 
more credible. However, empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is 
weak. Whilst Padovano and Venturi (2001) find a significant effect on budget 
deficits in Italy, when using a Herfindhal index to capture the number of political 
parties in opposition, Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Woo (2003) do not 
find supporting evidence in their broader samples48. 
                                                          
48 Both use measures of the fragmentation of parliament, rather than specifically for the 
opposition, as explanatory variables. Volkerink and De Haan (2001) use a measure which 
captures the share of parliamentary seats as well as the ideological complexion of the political 
parties represented in parliament, whilst Woo (2003) uses a measure based on the probability 
that two randomly chosen legislators belong to different parties. 
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Summing up, there are difficulties to operationalise the ‘weak’ government 
hypothesis and the empirical evidence is not very strong, both when proxied 
by its durability as well as by government’s strength in parliament. 
2.4 Deficit bias in a monetary union 
In the previous Sections, different sources of the deficit bias characterising 
governments at the national level have been discussed. But participation in a 
monetary union may further aggravate this tendency, as the costs of borrowing 
by national governments are not completely contained within that country. 
Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010) extend the model in Velasco (2000) to include 
the partial international transfer of a country’s debt burden in a monetary union, 
so that the deficit bias results not only from a domestic common pool problem 
but also from an international debt externality.  
De Grauwe (2009) explains what these negative international externalities 
entail. Firstly, the increasing recourse to the capital markets by one (large) 
country, can drive the monetary union’s interest rate upwards, thus increasing 
the debt servicing costs in other parts of the EA as well49. Since fiscal 
expansions can lead to inflationary pressures, this may lead to a tightening of 
monetary policy by the ECB, which in turn would have a contractionary effect 
on all the members of the EA. The higher interest rate may possibly deter 
investment, thus affecting also long-term economic growth. Increased 
borrowing by a large EA member state may also attract substantial capital 
inflows, leading to an appreciation of the Euro, thus harming the EA’s 
competitiveness and growth (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2012).  
Another spillover effect involves interference with the conduct of monetary 
policy in the EA: facing increased borrowing costs, a financially hard-pressed 
government may put pressure on the ECB to relax its monetary policy stance, 
                                                          
49 If capital markets work efficiently, each country in the EA would face a different interest rate, 
reflecting the specific risk premium on its government debt, but financial integration in the EA 
implies that spillovers to the financial system of other countries are likely. Heavy government 
borrowing by one country and the possibility of default may also have more general contagion 
effects on other countries within EMU. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – The Political Economy of Budget Deficits 
 
  36 
 
thus jeopardising its independence50 (De Grauwe 2009). Whilst the country 
concerned would benefit from an erosion of the real value of its outstanding 
debt, the inflationary consequences, for instance on competitiveness, would 
be felt throughout the EA.  
Finally, if the country concerned faces the threat of default, the other members 
may decide to step in and bailout it out, rather than face a systemic collapse 
of the banking system, which would result following a run on that country’s 
debt (Beetsma 2001). This constitutes the most obvious channel in which 
excessive borrowing by one country can lead to adverse spillovers on the rest 
of the monetary union, as the costs of the debt bailout are shared among all 
the member states. In view of this risk, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a ‘no 
bailout’ clause (Article 125, TFEU), prohibiting the Eurosystem and all other 
public institutions, including national governments, from providing direct 
support to other EA governments. However, this provision was not credible as 
evidenced clearly during the EA sovereign debt crises51. Such an implicit 
bailout guarantee implies that financial markets do not work efficiently and the 
risk premium of the country with excessive borrowing would be lower, as part 
of the risk of default is transferred to the other EA members which are expected 
to bail it out in case of financial difficulties. It also leads to moral hazard as 
individual countries would have less incentive to be fiscally disciplined, 
knowing that if facing default, they will be rescued by a bailout (Beetsma 2001).  
These different types of externalities all imply that part of the costs of 
excessive borrowing by a EA country are borne by the other member states, 
but each country considers only the costs which it incurs. Consequently, these 
externalities aggravate the tendency towards deficit-financing which arises 
from domestic political factors. 
 
 
                                                          
50 The direct monetisation of government debt by the ECB, or any central bank of EA countries, 
is specifically prohibited by Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) 2012.  
51 For a discussion on how the no-bail out clause was circumvented during the EA sovereign 
debt crises, see for example Baldwin and Wyplosz (2012).  
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2.5 Summary 
In this Chapter, the literature on the political economy of budget deficits has 
been reviewed, focusing on two alternative theoretical approaches: that where 
the motivation behind government borrowing results from the incumbent trying 
to improve its chances of remaining in office; and that involving government 
fragmentation and a fixed common pool of resources. Both approaches are 
characterised by conflicts of interests: between the interests of the incumbent 
and that of voters; and within government, reflecting conflict between groups 
within the same society, respectively. Furthermore, besides the deficit bias 
arising from these domestic political conflicts, the tendency for deficit financing 
in the EA is intensified due to international debt externalities, which imply that 
part of the cost of a country’s debt burden is borne by the other member states.  
At the national level, the incumbent’s incentive to manipulate the budget to 
increase the likelihood of re-election results in an electoral budget cycle. Whilst 
the concept of fiscally-illuded voters in the early models was overly simplistic, 
the model was subsequently adapted to combine rational voters with imperfect 
information. In these models, the electoral budget cycle results from 
competency signalling by the incumbent and is more likely to occur when 
budget transparency is weak. This allows electoral fluctuations in the budget 
to occur even when voters are ‘fiscal conservatives’, sanctioning incumbents 
in elections for running budget deficits.  
The presence of an electoral budget cycle in European countries has been 
confirmed by various studies, capturing different time periods, using different 
specifications for the electoral variable, adopting different econometric 
techniques and allowing for a varied range of economic and political factors. 
Supporting evidence has also been found in single-country studies focusing 
on a few EA member states. Thus, the constraints imposed by the SGP do not 
seem to have prevented national governments from using fiscal expansions to 
increase the likelihood that they remain in office. 
The other theoretical approach for the tendency of deficit-financing reviewed 
in this Chapter involves distributive conflicts within government over a common 
pool of resources (including future taxation necessary to finance current public 
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spending). The effect on borrowing is intensified the more fragmented is the 
government.  This approach can also explain why some countries take longer 
to implement fiscal stabilisation than others.  
Empirical testing of the common pool model faces difficulties to operationalise 
the concept of government fragmentation, which can take different forms. A 
set of studies uses crude dummy variables to indicate different types of 
governments, but the link to fiscal outcomes is weak and these studies have 
been subject to considerable criticism. Furthermore, such proxies may be 
capturing other government characteristics, besides fragmentation. For 
example, coalition governments are characterised by partisan fragmentation, 
but they also tend to suffer from short tenures and in the case of minority 
governments, they have a ‘weak’ position in parliament as well. On the other 
hand, some evidence has been found, also for European countries, when 
government partisan fragmentation has been measured using the number of 
coalition partners or other more complex measures of the power of different 
members of the coalition. There is also some evidence supporting the 
influence of government fragmentation on fiscal outcomes when an executive 
interpretation, through cabinet size, is applied. But in these studies, the 
measure of cabinet size adopted is not always defined precisely and there may 
also be endogeneity issues.  
Other empirical studies have tested for the effect of government ‘weakness’ 
on the budget balance and government borrowing. This ‘weak’ government 
hypothesis is fundamentally different from the notion of government 
fragmentation and involves characteristics such as government durability 
(measured by the length of tenure of office), the size of its majority in 
parliament and the composition of the opposition. However, evidence 
supporting this hypothesis is rather limited.  
In conclusion, this literature review has identified different motivations 
explaining why governments resort to deficit-financing and excessive 
borrowing and the contexts where such incentives are more likely to occur. 
Whilst there is strong evidence for the influence of the timing of elections on 
the budget balance in European countries, the findings relating to the effect of 
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political factors are less robust, also reflecting problems to accurately 
operationalise particular government characteristics. In the next Chapter, a 
simple model of the budgetary process in EA countries is presented which 
incorporates the incentives facing the relevant stakeholders and the resulting 
manifestation of the deficit bias is explained. Subsequently, budget institutions 
are introduced in the model to explain how the distortions implied by this 
tendency for government borrowing can be mitigated.
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3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter proposes a simple model characterising the budget process in 
EA countries, focusing on two main actors – the executive and the legislature. 
The model draws heavily on von Hagen (1992), Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999) and Wehner (2010b), with the graphical diagrams used to illustrate the 
model reflecting considerably the latter’s work. In the first Section of the 
Chapter, the interaction between the executive and the legislature during the 
different stages of the budgetary process are described. Subsequently, the 
incentives faced by the actors during the different phases of the budgetary 
process are discussed. These reflect the two different theoretical approaches, 
discussed in the previous Chapter, namely, different fiscal preferences 
between the incumbent and voters; and heterogenous fiscal preferences 
within government itself. For each phase of the budgetary process, the model 
is extended to analyse in more detail legislative budgeting, specifically its 
power relative to the executive and implications for fiscal discipline. This part 
of the model, which is centred more on the role of the legislature, draws heavily 
on Wehner (2010b) but focuses on how legislative budgeting can affect the 
fiscal balance, rather than the size of the overall budget (level of public 
spending). Finally, budget institutions are introduced in the model and a 
discussion follows on their effect on the decisions taken by the actors during 
the different phases of the budgetary process, focusing on implications on the 
deficit bias. 
This model is used as a basis to develop the composite indices capturing the 
quality of budget institutions and legislative budgetary power, which are 
presented in the following two Chapters. Furthermore, from the model, 
hypotheses are derived regarding the relationship between the quality of 
budget institutions and legislative budgetary power and fiscal discipline. These 
are tested empirically in Chapter 6, whilst further investigation of this 
relationship is carried out through the case study analysis presented in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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3.2 A simple model of the budgetary process in EA countries 
In the simple model presented in this Chapter, the executive and the 
legislature take the main budgetary decisions. Other stakeholders, such as 
trade unions, employers’ representatives and other lobby groups, who can 
also affect the budgetary process are not included in the model. Rather, their 
fiscal preferences are assumed to be incorporated in those of the two main 
actors in the model. In order not to miss out on important conflicts within the 
executive, in contrast to Wehner (2010b), the executive is not modelled as a 
unitary actor throughout the budgetary process. Rather, the executive is 
composed of spending ministers and the finance minister (or treasury/budget 
minister) who presides over financial resources. For simplicity, the role of the 
head of government in the budgetary process is assumed to be taken over by 
the finance minister, since as explained further on, they face the same 
incentives.  
On the other hand, the legislature is first considered as a unitary actor which 
negotiates with the executive on the draft budget. Subsequently, when the 
focus of the discussion shifts to legislative budgetary power, a simple 
distinction is made between two groupings within the legislature: those 
members of parliament that support the government and those that oppose it, 
since they face different political incentives. Including additional political 
groupings would imply more complex modelling but would not add more 
diverse incentives within the legislature for the purpose of this model52. As in 
Wehner (2010b), interaction between the executive and particular legislators 
and dynamics between different chambers in the legislature are not 
considered in the model. This simplification facilitates the analysis and makes 
it easier to focus on the relative power of the executive and the legislature in 
the budgetary process, without affecting the main results. 
                                                          
52 The model is based on a parliamentary system, since this is the prevalent system in EA 
countries (Inter-American Development Bank 2015). However, it can be applied to presidential 
systems. Since in the latter, independence between the executive and legislative branches of 
government is more distinct, all legislators would be considered as having the same incentives 
as the opposition group in parliamentary systems. 
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For EA countries, the CION and Ecofin are other important stakeholders in the 
national budgetary process. However, for simplicity, these are not included as 
separate actors in the model. Rather, their influence on the national budgetary 
process is modelled through the constraints imposed on the national budget 
which emanate from the supra-national SGP rules.   
In the model, the budgetary process comprises the formulation, approval and 
implementation stages, as shown in Figure 3.1. In the first stage, the executive 
prepares a draft budget. During this stage, spending ministers bargain with the 
finance minister over the size and composition of the budget. The legislature 
does not have a key role during the budget preparation: as in Wehner (2010b), 
the task of drafting the budget is delegated to the executive. This is a realistic 
assumption since few legislatures in developed countries have the relevant 
formal powers or the required technical competence to formulate their own 
comprehensive budget proposal (Schick 2002). 
 
 
In the second stage, the executive presents its budget proposal to the 
legislature. This draft budget constitutes the executive’s common position as 
conflicts within the executive would have been resolved during the first stage 
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of the budgetary process. Rather, the second stage involves negotiation 
between the executive and the legislature, with the latter having a critical role 
during this phase of the budgetary process. The legislature can approve the 
executive’s draft budget without amendments, propose amendments and 
approve an amended budget or reject the budget proposal. When examining 
the role of the legislature in more detail, a distinction is made between the 
group of legislators supporting the government and those opposing it, since, 
as discussed further on, these face different political incentives which affect 
their stance on the draft budget proposed by the executive.  
In the third stage of the budgetary process, the executive implements the 
budget which has been approved by the legislature. Further modifications of 
the budget law by the executive during budget implementation may be 
possible, so that in effect, the implemented budget can differ from that 
approved by the legislature. Thus, strong legislative budgetary power during 
the approval stage can be undermined if the budget law is not binding and the 
executive has the power to modify the budget from that approved and align it 
more closely to its original draft (Alesina et al. 1999). During the budget 
execution phase, the incentives of spending ministers and the finance minister 
differ once again - hence they are modelled separately. On the other hand, 
both legislators supporting the executive and those opposing it face the same 
incentives, that of ensuring that the implemented budget reflects that 
approved: thus, the legislature is modelled as a unitary actor during this stage 
of the budgetary process. 
Reflecting the focus of this study – on the implications of budget institutions on 
fiscal discipline - in the model, the budgetary process simply involves decisions 
over the size of the budget balance (as a ratio to the GDP)53, rather than 
choices on the composition of spending or on the sources of government 
                                                          
53 In the model, the outcome of the budgetary process is the budget balance as a ratio to GDP. 
Implications on other indicators of fiscal discipline are not considered. Thus, the budget 
balance is assumed to be directly reflected in the level of government indebtedness, with a 
budget deficit increasing the level of debt by a corresponding amount, and vice-versa for a 
budget surplus. However, in practice, the annual change in government debt may not be 
exactly equal to the budget deficit/surplus, due to stock-flow adjustments. In the empirical 
analysis, presented in Chapter 6, alternative fiscal indicators are considered, including the 
annual change in the government debt ratio to GDP. 
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revenue. The budget balance is derived from the difference between total 
public spending and total revenue. For simplicity, in the model, spending 
consists of public goods and services, which improve public welfare, and 
transfers to the public. The public benefits from higher public spending 
immediately (or in a relatively short time) and as the executive seeks political 
support from the public, higher public spending also improves the executive’s 
utility. Similarly, legislators favour higher public spending because this 
increases the public’s utility and hence also their chances of re-election. All 
public spending is paid out of a general revenue fund, which, for simplicity, is 
assumed to consist solely of tax revenue. As in the model proposed by 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999), a higher tax burden lowers public welfare 
since the tax system creates a deadweight loss, which increases with the level 
of taxation. This excess burden of taxation is mostly felt in the medium to long 
term as taxpayers adjust their behaviour to changes in tax incentives or net 
asset returns. Government can also finance its spending by borrowing from 
capital markets. Taxpayers are assumed to be partly non-Ricardian, so that 
deficit financing allows the shifting of part of the tax burden to finance higher 
spending on future taxpayers. Since the actors participating in the budget 
process (spending ministers, finance minister and the legislators) all face 
electoral uncertainty, they discount the future at a rate which is larger than the 
real interest rate. However, the government faces an inter-temporal budget 
constraint, where the present value of all public spending must equal the sum 
of current and future (tax) revenue including deadweight losses and thus the 
public debt does not grow without bound.  
3.2.1 Incentives faced by actors in the budgetary process 
The incentives of spending ministers and the legislature in the model reflect 
electoral considerations as well as the fiscal commons problem54. In particular, 
the latter affects the behaviour of spending ministers during both the budget 
formulation stage and the implementation stage, whilst legislators are similarly 
                                                          
54 The model presented in this Chapter explains how conflict within government results in a 
budget deficit bias. It can similarly be applied to explain situations of delayed fiscal 
stabilisations (as in the ‘war of attrition’ model, described in Section 2.3 of the previous 
Chapter).  
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affected during the budget approval stage. However, legislators also face 
different political incentives during the approval stage, depending on whether 
they come from political parties forming part of government or from parties in 
opposition. Finally, all actors in the legislature and in the executive, including 
also the finance minister, have incentives to spend more and finance this 
expenditure through borrowing during electoral periods, in order to increase 
the likelihood of re-election.    
Thus, in the model, the utility of spending ministers increases with a higher 
budget allocation because they enjoy the full benefits, in terms of constituency 
support and political success, of higher public spending, but they do not take 
full account of the burden of taxation to finance the increased outlays, since 
the cost falls on the general public55. Moreover, higher spending which is 
deficit-financed, rather than through current taxes, is a preferable option since 
the cost of debt falls on future generations, thus allowing the appropriation of 
more resources. However, this is limited by the government solvency condition 
(Velasco 2000), so that in the model, higher current spending is partly financed 
by increased current taxation and partly through borrowing.  
On the other hand, the finance minister is not generally concerned with 
spending administrations but rather takes responsibility for the overall budget 
and the overall economic welfare. Thus, compared to line ministers, the 
finance minister is more likely to take into account the full tax burden of current 
spending decisions and also to discount less the future cost of deficit financing. 
Consequently, the finance minister generally prefers a lower level of spending 
compared to line ministers, so as restrain the level of present and future 
taxation. This applies also to the prime minister (or head of government), who 
is similarly held accountable by voters for the general economic, financial and 
budgetary situation in the country. To keep the model simple, the preferred 
position of the finance minister is assumed to be of a balanced budget. 
                                                          
55 As discussed in the previous Chapter, the common pool resource problem is accentuated 
when spending ministers come from different political parties, as in the case of coalition 
governments.  
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Changing this assumption, to a small budget surplus or a small budget deficit, 
would not significantly alter the results.  
Like spending ministers, legislators also face a fiscal commons problem since 
they can favour their constituency and increase their chances of re-election 
through higher spending, whose costs fall on the general public or future 
generations, depending on how it is financed. As discussed in the previous 
Chapter, the common pool problem intensifies as the number of decision 
makers increases. Since the number of members in a legislature is higher than 
the number of spending ministers in cabinet and legislatures also contain more 
parties than the executive, the common pool problem is accentuated in the 
legislature (von Hagen 2002)56. Thus, in the model, the legislature prefers 
higher spending, than the executive and during the approval stage, it proposes 
amendments to the draft budget to this effect, which imply a larger budget 
deficit. 
However, within the legislature, members also face political consequences 
from proposing amendments to, or rejecting, the draft budget. This is 
particularly the case in parliamentary systems, where rejecting the executive’s 
budget proposal may be considered as a vote of no confidence in the 
government, leading to its demise57. Members of the legislature coming from 
political parties supporting the government would be reluctant to propose 
amendments to the draft budget if this can lead to the fall of government, 
because this would imply the risk of losing their role in government and 
possibly also their parliamentary seat, if fresh elections are held. On the other 
hand, legislators coming from opposition parties are more willing to propose 
amendments to the executive’s draft budget, since this can weaken the 
government, increasing their chances of forming part of a new government. 
                                                          
56 The model in this Chapter presents a simplification of the heterogenous fiscal preferences 
of different political parties, represented in parliament and/or in cabinet. For instance, 
members of parliament may be elected on a low public spending/fiscal discipline mandate and 
they could also form part of government. However, the general tendency is that elected 
officials prefer higher outlays, which results in a deficit bias.  
57 This does not apply to presidential systems, as legislators and the executive are elected 
separately. Thus, legislators are more likely to press for amendments to the executive’s 
budget proposal, whilst, on its part, the executive tends to accommodate more such proposed 
amendments in order to secure the safe passage of the budget in the legislature. 
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Finally, in the model, the incentives faced by the actors in the budgetary 
process are not constant over time, but vary over the electoral cycle, reflecting 
the theoretical approach involving conflict between the incumbent and voters, 
discussed in the previous Chapter. As elections approach, the benefit of higher 
spending which accrues to spending ministers and legislators increases as 
favouring constituencies can have an immediate effect on their re-election 
chances. Consequently, they tend to discount more the future costs of 
financing such outlays. Before elections, even finance ministers may become 
more concerned with their electoral chances and discount more the future tax 
burden of financing higher current spending. 
3.2.2 Budget formulation 
In the model, the budget formulation phase is characterised by conflict and 
negotiations between the finance minister and spending ministers. Figure 3.2 
depicts hypothetical preferred budget balance positions for spending ministers 
and the finance minister. The preferred positions of the finance minister are 
given by the 45° line (BB), where total spending (S) = total taxation (T) and the 
budget is balanced. Suppose that the ideal point for the finance minister is F, 
where the level of tax revenue is T0 and total spending is S0 ((T0 - S0) = 0). On 
the other hand, line ministers prefer a higher level of spending and with 
taxation at T0, their preferred position would involve a budget deficit, say point 
SM on line Def (where (T0 - S1) < 0). The greater the extent of the fiscal 
commons problem and the more that ministers discount the future, the greater 
would be the distance between their preferred position (line Def) and the 45° 
(balanced budget) line58. As shown by von Hagen (1992) and subsequently 
also Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999), the equilibrium outcome of unrestricted 
negotiations to resolve these conflicts during the budget formulation stage 
would be higher than optimal total spending. In the figure, this is depicted as 
                                                          
58 The preference lines of actors involved in the budgetary process are depicted as parallel 
lines in order to portray a neat graphical representation. However, the same conclusions would 
be derived if the preference lines had different slopes (implying that the preferred budget 
balance varies with the level of taxation): any preference line above the 45° line implies a 
budget deficit (taxation < spending) whilst any preference line below it represents a budget 
surplus (taxation > spending). 
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point SM, involving a budget deficit, rather than the preferred balanced budget 
by the finance minister at point F.  
During the electoral period, ministers have greater incentives to spend more 
and to finance this expenditure through borrowing. In Figure 3.2, this is shown 
as a shift in the preferred position of spending ministers from SM to SMe (on 
line Defe), implying that unrestricted negotiations during the budget formulation 
stage would result in a larger budget deficit (since S1e > S1, and taxation is 
assumed to remain unchanged at T0). This tendency for larger budget deficits 
during electoral times is exacerbated since even the finance minister may be 
tempted to spend more during electoral periods: his/her preferred position 
shifts from F to Fe (on line Defe’) which involves a budget deficit (since S0e > 
T0). After elections, when the benefits of favouring constituencies through 
higher spending are not so immediate, the preferred positions of spending 
ministers and finance ministers shift back to SM and F, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Budget formulation - preferred budget positions of spending ministers 



























Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework – A Simple Model of the Budgetary 
Process in EA Countries and Implications of Budget Institutions 
 
  50 
 
3.2.3 Budget approval 
The outcome of the budget formulation stage is the executive’s draft budget, 
which is then presented to the legislature for approval. This stage of the 
budgetary process is thus characterised by conflict between the executive and 
the legislature. In Figure 3.3, suppose that the executive proposes a draft 
balanced budget (point E on line BB), with taxation at T0 and equal to 
spending, S0. However, the legislature prefers a higher level of spending (S1) 
and for the same level of taxation, its preferred position would be L1 on line 
Leg1, implying a budget deficit ((T0 - S1) < 0). If the legislature has unrestricted 
amendment powers (ignoring other de facto constraints), it will seek to amend 
the executive’s budget proposal, so that the approved budget is a budget 
deficit at point L1, rather than the balanced budget at point E. During electoral 
periods, the preferred position of legislators shifts upwards temporarily to L1e, 
implying that unrestricted legislative amendment powers would result in even 
higher spending (S1e > S1) and thus a larger budget deficit. 
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This analysis is now extended to provide a more detailed analysis of the 
legislature’s role during the budget approval stage. Firstly, the consequences 
of rejecting the budget, namely the political implications and reversionary 
budgets are examined. In addition, the assumption of the legislature as a 
unitary actor is removed and a distinction is made between the legislators 
coming from political parties supporting government and those coming from 
opposition parties. 
3.2.3.1 Political implications of rejecting the budget 
Although the legislature may have formal powers to amend the budget, its 
members (or at least some of them) may opt not to avail themselves of these 
powers, since failure to approve the budget has political implications, which 
can be severe if this is considered as a vote of no confidence in the 
government. von Hagen (1992) identifies two opposing effects of the 
possibility of rejecting the budget. On the one hand, if rejecting the budget can 
lead to the fall in government, the executive is more likely to pre-empt the 
legislature’s amendment requests in order to ensure that the budget is 
approved. On the other hand, members of the legislature coming from political 
parties supporting the government would be more reluctant to propose 
amendments to the draft budget if this can lead to the demise of government. 
These two different effects have contrasting implications for legislative 
budgetary power, with the former increasing the legislature’s influence in the 
budgetary process, whilst the latter reduces it. They also have differing 
consequences for fiscal discipline: since the legislature is assumed to be more 
affected by the fiscal commons problem than the executive, the fiscal balance 
is expected to be worse if the executive gives in to expected amendments to 
its budget. According to von Hagen (1992), although the combined effect of 
these two different implications is ambiguous, the latter effect is assumed to 
prevail. However, in the model presented in this Chapter, it is postulated that 
the effect depends on the type of government.  
In the case of a single-party majority government, members of parliament 
supporting the government would be reluctant to propose amendments to the 
executive’s draft budget and since they have a majority in parliament, this 
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would be approved without any amendments. On the other hand, with a 
minority government, the government requires the support of opposition 
parties to obtain legislative approval for its budget. Thus, to ensure safe 
passage of the budget law, the executive pre-empts amendments by the 
legislature: in Figure 3.3, this is shown as the executive foregoing its ideal 
budget E and proposing a budget close to L1, implying a higher level of public 
spending and a budget deficit. In contrast, in the case of a coalition 
government, members of parliament coming from political parties forming part 
of the coalition would be more likely to support the executive’s draft if their 
party risks being left out of the coalition government following the demise of 
the government in office. On the other hand, if a political party forming part of 
the coalition perceives that its role in government could be stronger if the 
current coalition breaks up (for instance, because it expects greater political 
support if new elections are held), its legislators are more likely to press for 
budget amendments and the executive may try to pre-empt their preferences 
by accommodating them in its budget proposal. Thus, it is not possible to 
derive a direct general correlation between the political implications of rejecting 
the budget in coalition governments and legislative budget amendments in the 
case of a coalition government.  
3.2.3.2 Reversionary budgets59 
The reversionary budget is the outcome that takes effect when a previous 
budget has expired but a new one - either the executive proposed budget or 
the legislature’s ideal budget or some compromise between the two positions 
- has not yet been approved. It thus affects the bargaining positions of the 
legislature and the executive during the budget approval stage. In most 
countries, there are formal rules governing such circumstances, generally 
specified in the constitution or the organic budget law, and generally three 
broad reversionary scenarios are possible: zero spending, last year’s 
approved budget or the executive’s draft budget (Wehner 2010b). The 
consequences of non-approval of the budget are most severe under the 
scenario of zero spending since this involves government shutdown. The 
                                                          
59 This part of the model draws heavily on Wehner (2010b). 
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second scenario of last year’s approved budget involves less disrupting 
consequences but still results in inconveniences as new policy measures or 
investment projects cannot be initiated. Finally, reverting to the executive’s 
budget proposal eliminates the adverse impacts of non-approval of the budget, 
but in the process, strengthens substantially the relative position of the 
executive vis-à-vis the legislature. Combined with the case where the 
legislature does not have any amendment powers but can only approve or 
reject the draft budget, this effectively implies that the outcome will always be 
the executive’s proposal (E in Figure 3.4).  
On the other hand, with the other reversionary scenarios, the executive may 
be willing to depart from its ideal budget E and concede to the legislature’s 
proposed amendments, as long as the legislature’s preferred budget (L) is 
preferable to the reversionary outcome (R). This would be the case if the 
consequences of not approving the budget are very severe, as in the case of 
a government shutdown. Thus, legislative budgetary power would be 
strengthened in this case. But in other reversionary scenarios, the outcome 
cannot be determined so clearly, because it depends on whether the 
legislature’s threat of non-approval of the budget is credible, which in turn 























Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework – A Simple Model of the Budgetary 
Process in EA Countries and Implications of Budget Institutions 
 
  54 
 
depends on whether the reversionary outcome is closer to the legislature’s 
ideal budget than the executive’s proposal (Wehner 2010b).  
Supposing that the reversionary budget is R60, the executive would prefer the 
legislature’s amended budget at point L than the reversionary outcome ((E – 
L) < (E – R)). However, the executive would still not concede to the 
legislature’s amendments in this case because the legislature’s threat of not 
approving the budget is not credible: the legislature prefers the executive’s 
proposal rather than the reversionary outcome ((L – E) < (L – R)). On the other 
hand, consider the case where the legislature’s preferred budget is L’, i.e. the 
legislature prefers a smaller budget (lower level of taxation) than the executive, 
and the reversionary outcome involves severe consequences (R’). In this 
case, the executive would also prefer the amended budget rather than the 
reversionary outcome ((E – L’) < (E – R’)). But in this case, the legislature’s 
threat of not approving the budget is credible ((L’ – E) > (L’ – R’)). Thus, the 
executive would accommodate the proposed amendments and the approved 
budget would be L’. If as expected the reversionary outcome involves a smaller 
budget than the executive’s proposal (i.e. R is located to the south or 
southwest of E), the reversionary budget implies stronger legislative budgetary 
power only if the preferred position of the legislature involves a smaller budget 
(lower level of taxation) than the executive (i.e. L is located to the northeast of 
E). But as discussed earlier, this is not the legislature’s ideal position in the 
model presented in this Chapter. 
3.2.4 Budget implementation 
During the implementation stage of the budget, further changes to the 
approved budget may take place. A certain degree of flexibility enables the 
executive to respond to unforeseen developments. For instance, if the 
economic scenario deteriorates and tax revenue is lower than projected, the 
possibility for the executive to cut spending during budget implementation can 
ensure that the fiscal balance position is not impacted adversely. Similarly, the 
possibility to re-allocate expenditures within the overall budget envelope, after 
                                                          
60 This implies a smaller budget than the executive’s proposal, which is generally the case, for 
example if the reversionary budget is based on the previous year’s allocations. 
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the budget has been approved by the legislature, can be beneficial from a 
fiscal discipline perspective, because funds can be shifted to new spending 
requirements, whilst ensuring that the overall expenditure level is not 
exceeded. In contrast, executive flexibility to increase spending during budget 
execution can undermine fiscal discipline, since, being affected by the fiscal 
commons problem, spending ministers are prone to make demands for larger 
outlays and to overrun their budget appropriations (von Hagen 1992). In Figure 
3.2, if the approved budget is at point F, with an aggregate spending level of 
S0, during budget implementation, line ministers would try to exceed their 
budgetary allocations to their preferred level, S1, implying a budget deficit at 
point SM.  
On the other hand, any type of executive flexibility during the budget 
implementation stage can weaken legislative budgetary power, since this 
implies that the budget approved by the legislature is not binding. In particular, 
if the approved budget (point L1 in Figure 3.3) differs substantially from the 
executive’s draft budget (point E), during implementation, the executive may 
try to realign the budget more closely to its original proposal, by cutting, 
cancelling or postponing expenditure approved by the budget law. Legislative 
budgetary power would still be weakened if the executive only has authority to 
shift funds from one budget item to another: in this case, the actual 
implemented budget would not reflect the spending priorities decided upon in 
the approved budget. 
3.3 Implications of budget institutions 
Different forms and characteristics of budget institutions affect the roles of the 
executive and the legislature during the budgetary process and can also 
impose constraints on their decision-making, with implications on the size of 
the budget balance. In particular, budget institutions which involve more 
centralisation in decision-making induce actors to take a more comprehensive 
view of the budget, thus addressing the common pool resource problem and 
resulting in more fiscal discipline. This typically involves assigning strong 
decision-making powers to the finance minister and restricting the legislature’s 
budgetary amendment powers. Alesina and Perotti (1999) refer to this 
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approach as ‘hierarchical’ budget institutions and note that, whilst contributing 
to more fiscal restraint, this approach restricts the representation of different 
interests during the budgetary process. An alternative form of fiscal 
governance is the ‘contracts’ approach, where fiscal discipline is achieved 
through strong commitment by actors, with similar decision-making powers, to 
fiscal rules or medium-term budgetary targets (von Hagen and Harden 1995; 
Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999)61. This type of commitment, especially if it is 
enshrined in law, can also restrict the possibility for the incumbent to 
manipulate fiscal policy in order to improve re-election chances, thus 
addressing electoral budget cycles.   
Different characteristics which influence the quality of budget institutions, 
including legislative budgeting, are hereby introduced in the model to explore 
how they affect the choices made by the different actors during the three 
stages of the budgetary process. Four main categories of budget institutions 
are considered: numerical fiscal constraints; procedural rules which govern the 
budgetary process; budget transparency and independent fiscal councils. A 
description of these categories follows, together with a discussion of how these 
institutional characteristics can address the electoral budget cycle and the 
common pool resource problem. In the following Sections, where relevant, the 
discussion also captures aspects of legislative budgeting. 
3.3.1 Numerical fiscal constraints 
Numerical fiscal constraints involve a rule-based approach to instil fiscal 
discipline, involving fiscal rules and/or MTBFs. Fiscal rules (such as balanced 
budget rules) set formal, often legal, limits on the budget. The most 
widespread definition of fiscal rules is that by Kopits and Symansky (1998: 2):  
“a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an indicator 
of overall fiscal performance”62.  
EA countries are subject to supra-national fiscal rules under the SGP, with the 
‘corrective’ arm of the Pact requiring that the budget deficit and the 
                                                          
61 These two different forms of fiscal governance are discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.1 
of the next Chapter. 
62 This definition is also used by the CION (2017b) for its fiscal rules strength index. 
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government debt (as a ratio of GDP) should not exceed 3% and 60%, 
respectively, whilst the ‘preventive’ arm requires the achievement of the MTO 
which generally constitutes a close to balanced budget position in cyclically-
adjusted terms. As discussed in Chapter 1, following the reforms implemented 
after the Great Crisis, EA countries are also required to have national fiscal 
rules in place, which reflect the SGP provisions63. In their model for a monetary 
union setting, Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010) rationalise supra-national fiscal 
rules, such as the SGP, since they can mitigate both the domestic deficit bias 
and the international negative externalities64. EA countries are also required 
to have a MTBF in place and to annually present their medium-term budgetary 
plans in their SPs65. Whilst there is not a broadly used definition, the CION 
(2017c) uses the following definition for its MTBF index:  
“those fiscal arrangements that allow government to extend the horizon for 
fiscal policy making beyond the annual budgetary calendar”. 
Fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary targets aim to achieve fiscal 
discipline by limiting the budgetary choices faced by the executive and the 
legislature during the different phases of the budgetary process. However, 
fiscal rules have been criticised as limiting short-run discretion to respond to 
unexpected economic shocks at the cost of attaining long-term fiscal discipline 
(Wyplosz 2005). Alesina and Passalacqua (2015) argue that instilling flexibility 
in the rules is problematic66 and thus, a balanced budget rule may be a 
second-best solution when large political distortions would result in a budget 
which is very distant from optimal fiscal policy. Another set of issues 
surrounding numerical budget constraints is the difficulty to enforce them, with 
the result that governments either circumvent the rules through creative 
                                                          
63 As provided in Articles 5-8 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU. This obligation was reinforced 
through Article 3 of the Fiscal Compact, contained within the TSCG, which requires that the 
annual structural budget (defined as the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and 
temporary measures) of EA countries must be in balance or surplus, with a lower limit of a 
deficit of 0.5% of GDP. 
64 See Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. 
65 As provided in Articles 9-11 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU. 
66 For instance, the rigidity of the fiscal rules can be reduced by including escape clauses, but 
their definition can affect both the stringency and the enforceability of the rule. Another 
approach is to define the rules in cyclically adjusted terms – but the measurement of the 
cyclical adjustment is subject to different interpretations and different methods of calculation 
(Alt et al. 2014). 
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accounting practices (Eslava 2011) or simply de facto ignore them. Indeed, 
referring to the recurrent breaches of the SGP by various EA countries, 
Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) highlight that fiscal rules are insufficient to 
bring about fiscal discipline.  
Commitment is thus critical for the effectiveness of numerical fiscal constraints 
to achieve fiscal discipline. Budgetary decision-makers are more likely to abide 
by the constraints implied by fiscal rules and MTBFs if these have been self-
imposed (Wyplosz 2012). This is particularly relevant for EA countries since 
the SGP is a supra-national fiscal rule and the requirement to introduce 
national fiscal rules was also centrally-mandated. The involvement of the 
legislature in numerical budgetary constraints can contribute to more 
‘ownership’ of these rules and thus enhance their credibility. Thus, for 
instance, according to Lienert’s (2010) technical notes and manual on the role 
of the legislature in the budget process, it is a good practice for the legislature 
to either endorse the executive’s MTBF or adopt its own. This can also 
broaden the base of political support for the budgetary strategy, which is 
particularly important during periods of fiscal retrenchments. Similarly, the 
legislature could be entrusted with the responsibility to monitor fiscal rules (for 
instance, by being the responsible entity to decide on escape clauses, if 
applicable). Likewise, the involvement of the legislature in SGP procedures is 
likely to increase their ‘national ownership’. Such involvement of the legislature 
in fiscal rules, MTBFs or SGP procedures, is thus modelled as more binding 
fiscal constraints.  
During the budget formulation stage, numerical budgetary constraints involve 
a ‘top-down’ approach, with the starting point being the limitation, imposed by 
the fiscal rule, MTBF or SGP provisions, and this determines the feasible 
ministerial spending allocations. This contrasts with the ‘bottom-up’ approach 
of unconstrained negotiations within the executive, where the resulting 
balance in the draft budget reflects the aggregation of the total spending 
requests from all ministries. In Figure 3.5, assuming exogenous taxation at T0, 
the latter is depicted as a budget deficit at point B1, with aggregate spending 
at S1 ((T0 – S1) < 0). On the other hand, suppose that the numerical fiscal 
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constraint targets a balanced budget. This would constrain spending to S0, 
resulting in a balanced budget at point B ((T0 - S0) = 0). 
The existence of fiscal rules and MTBFs (including SGP provisions) can also 
limit the scope of legislative amendments during the budget approval stage. 
Thus, suppose that in Figure 3.3, the executive presents a draft budget which 
targets a balanced budget (at point E) which satisfies the requirements of the 
numerical budget constraints in place. Although the legislature’s preferred 
position is at point L1 (or L1e during electoral periods), it may be reluctant to 
propose amendments involving higher spending and a budget deficit because 
these would breach the requirements of these constraints. Similarly, during 
budget implementation, numerical fiscal constraints can curtail the possibility 
of spending overruns by line ministries, thus limiting deviations between the 
actual budget executed and that approved by the legislature. Of course, the 
effectiveness of the numerical budget constraints to instil fiscal discipline in the 
different stages of the budgetary process depends on their enforceability and 
credibility, which as discussed earlier can be strengthened, for instance, 
through legislative involvement in the relevant procedures. 
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3.3.2 Procedural rules which govern the budgetary process 
As highlighted earlier, procedural rules which centralise decision-making 
powers in the budgetary process also contribute to address the common pool 
resource problem. During the formulation stage of the budgetary process, a 
strong finance minister can restrain the demands of spending ministers. 
Characteristics of the delegation approach during the budget preparation 
stage include bilateral negotiations between the finance minister and the line 
ministers (rather than negotiations taking place in full cabinet), the imposition 
of budget ceilings on the initial spending requests of line ministers and the final 
and ultimate decision-making power by the finance minister to resolve or settle 
disputes.  With these characteristics in place, in Figure 3.5, the preferred fiscal 
position of the powerful finance minister, at point B, implying a balanced 
budget, becomes binding and spending requests by line ministers would be 
limited to S067.  
During the budget approval stage, an important institutional characteristic 
concerns the extent of the legislature’s formal power to amend the executive’s 
budget proposal. The fiscal commons problem faced by legislators can be 
limited by restricting the power of the legislature to amend the draft budget 
proposed by the executive. Legislative budgetary amendment powers are 
generally enshrined in a country’s legislation, or even in its constitution, and 
can range from no power at all (the legislature can only approve or reject the 
executive’s proposal) to unfettered amendment powers (the legislature can 
increase or cut the budget or move funds around without any legal 
constraints). But in many countries, amendment powers are restricted, for 
instance through budget balance or total spending constraints68 (Wehner 
2010b). 
                                                          
67 As explained earlier, during electoral periods, the finance minister’s preferred budget 
balance shifts upwards to a deficit position (on line Defe’ in Figure 3.2), so that in the model, 
there is an electoral budget cycle with the delegation approach, but not with binding numerical 
fiscal constraints. 
68 In practice, rigidity of some budget components, such as the public wage bill, pensions and 
other social benefits and debt servicing costs further limit the scope of legislative budgetary 
amendments (Wehner 2010b). The conclusions of the following analysis concern only the 
non-predetermined part of the budget. 
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Assuming that in Figure 3.6, the executive draft budget proposal is a balanced 
budget at point E ((T0 - S0) = 0) and that the legislature’s ideal budget is point 
L, thus implying a budget deficit ((T0 - S1) < 0). With unrestricted amendment 
powers (ignoring other de facto constraints), the approved budget would be L. 
But if amendment powers are constrained, say the legislature can only 
propose amendments which keep the budget balance unchanged (deficit 
constraint), its ideal budget L is not a feasible option. If the legislature prefers 
to keep revenue unchanged at T0, it will have to accept the executive’s 
proposal, with lower spending than its preferred position (S0 < S1). In order to 
increase spending to its preferred level (S1), this has to be compensated with 
higher revenue (T1) at point L’, where the budget is also balanced ((T1 - S1) = 
0). Other feasible options for the legislature are any points on line BB. 
However, such restrictions on legislative amendment powers may not involve 
a hard budget constraint, if the legislature can cover spending increases with 
unrealistic revenue, for instance through more optimistic economic forecasts 
(Wehner 2010b). In Figure 3.6, the legislature proposes L’, but the increase in 
revenue from T0 to T1 does not materialise, so that the actual budget balance 
is a deficit at point L ((T0 - S1) < 0). 
On the other hand, if the restriction requires that the total spending level in the 
draft budget is not exceeded, the legislature can propose amendments to the 
executive budget which shift spending among different categories but it cannot 
increase the total amount of spending beyond S0. Thus, in effect, the 
legislature would approve the proposed budget at point E, but perhaps with a 
different expenditure composition than that proposed by the executive. 
Similarly, if amendment powers are limited to spending cuts only, the 
legislature would approve the draft budget (point E), since this is closest to its 
ideal point L. Thus, restrictions involving total spending involve harder budget 
constraints than those targeting the budget balance. 
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Other relevant institutional characteristics in the budget approval stage 
concern the degree of centralisation in the voting procedure and in the 
structure of parliamentary committees dealing with the budget. The sequence 
of voting can affect the extent to which the fiscal commons problem prevails in 
the legislature. More fiscal restraint is likely if the legislature first debates and 
votes on the overall budget size and then, within this constraint, discusses and 
votes on the individual budget items; rather than if it debates and votes on the 
budget on an item by item basis, possibly followed by a general vote on the 
budget as a whole. Similarly, a centralised parliamentary committee structure 
dealing with the budget can have a role akin to that of the finance minister 
within cabinet. The costs of financing larger budgetary outlays are more likely 
to be taken into account when there is a single budget committee which 
considers and decides on proposals by sectoral committees, compared to a 
scenario where such a budget committee either does not exist or has limited 
powers to restrain spending requests by sectoral committees. These 
institutional characteristics thus reduce the common pool resource problem in 
the legislature. In Figure 3.6, this is represented by a downward shift in the 
preferred budget of the legislature (from line Def to closer to line BB).  
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Finally, an important characteristic of budgetary procedures during the budget 
implementation stage concerns the degree of executive flexibility to change 
the budget from that approved by the legislature. This can involve executive 
power to cut or increase spending and to transfer funds among different 
budget line items. Such flexibility can also be implemented through 
supplementary or corrective budgets at the end of the fiscal year, by putting 
spending items off-budget or by financing them through contingent liabilities. 
Whilst executive power to change the budget during the implementation phase 
weakens legislative budgetary power, the effect on fiscal discipline depends 
on the type of flexibility, as discussed below.  
In Figure 3.7, suppose that the balanced budget E has been approved by the 
legislature and that due to unexpected adverse economic developments, 
actual revenue falls short of the projected T0 but rather is at T1. If spending is 
unchanged at its approved level of S0, the actual budget (A) would imply a 
deficit ((T1 - S0) < 0). But if the executive can cut spending from S0 to SI, it 
would be able to restore a balanced budget (at point A’, where ((T1 - S1) = 0). 
Alternatively, suppose that due to unexpected developments, more spending 
is required on a specific budget item than that approved by the legislature. If 
the executive has power to transfer funds from one budget item to another, it 
can increase spending on this sector, whilst decreasing the allocation on other 
items, thus ensuring that the total spending remains unchanged at S0 and the 
budget remains balanced at point E. Without this flexibility, the executive would 
either have to forego higher spending on this priority item or else incur higher 
total spending (say, S2), implying an actual budget deficit at point A’’ ((T0 - S2) 
< 0). 
On the other hand, executive authority to increase spending during budget 
implementation, over and above the appropriated amount which had been 
authorised by the legislature, can result in worse fiscal outcomes. Suppose 
again that the approved budget was a balanced budget at point E, implying 
total spending of S0, but that the sum of all the original spending requests by 
line ministers (during the budget formulation stage) was at S2. During the 
execution of the budget, spending ministers will try to increase their budget 
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allocations beyond the approved appropriations, to their original preferred 
spending level S2, and with taxation unchanged at T0, this implies a budget 
deficit ((T0 – S2) < 0) at point A’’. As in the budget negotiation phase, such 
powers can be restricted through a delegation approach, where a powerful 
finance minister curtails the possibility for spending ministers to exceed the 
budget allocations approved by the legislature spending overruns, so that 
spending is limited to the approved amount S0. Provisions which make the 
budget law more binding – for instance by limiting the use of supplementary 
budgets, as suggested by Lienert (2010) - can also have similar effects.  
Executive flexibility to increase spending during budget implementation can 
also be curtailed through legislative provisions which either prohibit this 
possibility or impose limitations, for instance by applying thresholds. 
Legislative authorisation for off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities, 
whilst strengthening legislative budgetary power, through more control over 
the budgetary process, also contributes to fiscal discipline since it implies a 
more comprehensive budgetary system. On the other hand, whilst requiring 



























Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework – A Simple Model of the Budgetary 
Process in EA Countries and Implications of Budget Institutions 
 
  65 
 
legislative approval for any appropriations over and above the approved 
amounts increases legislative budgetary power, particularly if approval is 
required ex-ante rather than ex-post, the effect on fiscal discipline is not 
straightforward as it depends on how close the actual budget is to the 
legislature’s ideal point. For instance, in Figure 3.7, suppose that the 
legislature’s ideal budget is at point A’’ but the executive’s draft budget E had 
been approved.  In this case, the legislature would be willing to approve 
overruns resulting in a higher expenditure level (between S0 and S2) since the 
revised budget would be closer to its preferred budget (A’’). Thus, requiring 
legislative authorisation for increases in expenditure beyond that in the 
approved budget strengthens legislative budgetary power but may not be 
effective to discourage spending overruns. Furthermore, the political context 
is also relevant, as with a minority government, legislative debate on 
divergences from the approved budget tend to be more intensive, compared 
to a majority parliament context, where the process can merely involve a 
‘rubber stamping’ exercise (Gaspard et al. 2016). 
3.3.3 Budget transparency 
The budget process and the budget documentation itself are very complex and 
thus budget transparency is an important aspect of budget institutions. Alt and 
Lassen (2006a: 532) define budget transparency as: 
“the amount, relevance, accessibility, and comprehensibility of timely 
information that becomes available to voters”,  
whilst the OECD (2002: 7) provides an alternative, but broadly similar 
definition:  
“the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and systematic 
manner”.  
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the information asymmetry between the 
incumbent and voters increases the likelihood of electoral budget cycles. 
Conversely, budget transparency makes it easier for voters to assess the full 
costs of financing higher spending and reduces their confusion regarding the 
current and future tax burden necessary to finance higher spending (Alesina 
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and Perotti 1996). Furthermore, budget transparency can also contribute to 
address the common pool resource problem, for instance, by making the costs 
of financing the different spending requests by line ministries clearly visible to 
all actors during the budget formulation stage. Similarly, during the approval 
stage, the aggregate implications of budget amendment proposals by 
legislators would be discerned easily. In addition, a high degree of 
transparency during budget execution can contribute to the earlier detection 
of slippages from budgetary targets. Finally, budget transparency can also 
contribute to enforce fiscal rules, as it limits the possibility of circumventing 
such numerical budgetary constraints (Alesina and Perotti 1996)69. Alesina 
and Passalacqua (2015) provide different examples of practices which 
governments can use to obfuscate the budget, including over-optimistic 
budgetary projections and keeping items off-budget. They also identify 
different means of how budget transparency can be improved, namely through 
rules and regulations of how the budget should be prepared, organised and 
implemented or through IFIs, as discussed in the next Section.  
In the model, a high degree of budget transparency implies that the costs of 
financing higher spending become more visible and this is reflected in a 
downward shift of the preference line of spending ministers and the legislature 
(from line Def closer to line BB, in Figures 3.5 and 3.6). Similarly, more 
transparency during the budget implementation phase can contribute to 
contain requests for additional spending by line ministers, whilst potential 
slippages from the fiscal targets can be addressed earlier: thus, the actual 
budget is more likely to be closer to the target (point E in Figure 3.7, rather 
than point A’’). 
                                                          
69 This has been confirmed theoretically by Milesi-Ferretti (2004) in an analysis of the effect of 
fiscal rules with weak budget transparency when governments can misreport fiscal data. 
Furthermore, von Hagen and Wolff (2006) and Alt et al. (2014) examine this empirically, using 
stock-flow adjustments (a statistical residual term which reconciles the increase in government 
debt with the budget deficit) or specific components of the stock-flow adjustment, respectively, 
as a proxy for creative accounting. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) find persistent and large 
adjustments in the EU15 during 1980-2003, in particular after the SGP became effective in 
1997; whilst Alt et al. (2014) similarly find that fiscal gimmickry increases with weak budget 
transparency in a similar sample of countries during 1990-2007. 
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A high degree of budget transparency can also address the information 
asymmetry between the executive and the legislature, thus contributing to 
strengthen legislative budgetary power. For instance, comprehensive and 
clear budgetary documentation and better access to budgetary information 
improve the legislature’s capacity to engage with and influence the budget. 
3.3.4 Independent fiscal institutions 
Key characteristics of IFIs are their non-partisan and independent nature and 
their mandate to publicly assess government’s fiscal policy and fiscal 
performance. Thus, the IMF (2013) defines fiscal councils as: 
“a permanent agency with a statutory or executive mandate to assess publicly 
and independently from partisan influence government’s fiscal policies, plans 
and performance against macroeconomic objectives related to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, short-medium term macroeconomic stability, 
and other official objectives”.  
The OECD adopts a similar but more concise definition:  
“independent public institutions with a mandate to critically assess, and in some 
cases provide non-partisan advice on fiscal policy and performance” (von Trapp 
and Nicol 2017: 1),  
whilst the CION (2017d) additionally specifies their functions in its definition, 
as follows:  
“monitoring compliance with fiscal rules, production or endorsement of 
macroeconomic forecasts for the budget, and/or advising the government on 
fiscal policy matters”. 
IFIs address the deficit bias at source, by taking part of the budgetary decision-
making process out of the political arena and delegating it to an independent 
institution (Wierts 2008). An advantage of IFIs, when compared to numerical 
budgetary constraints, is that they can combine short-run discretion, when 
there are unexpected developments, with a long-term commitment to fiscal 
sustainability (Wyplosz 2002). IFIs can contribute to strengthen other aspects 
of budget institutions, for instance by increasing the reputational costs of 
breaching fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary targets. Importantly, fiscal 
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councils can also improve budget transparency, for instance by producing or 
endorsing the macroeconomic forecasts that underpin the budgetary 
projections (Ayuso-i-Casals et al. 2009). Another contribution that fiscal 
councils can make to the budgetary process is through independent analysis 
and assessments of the government’s fiscal stance, whereby voters’ 
awareness about the consequences of certain fiscal policy paths is improved, 
thus addressing information asymmetries between politicians and voters 
(Debrun et al. 2012)70. However, as highlighted by Alesina and Passalacqua 
(2015), the effectiveness of fiscal councils depends heavily on their 
independence. 
Since IFIs contribute to improve budget transparency, in the model, their 
influence on the budgetary process is similarly depicted as a shift in the fiscal 
preferences of spending ministers and the legislature, from a budget deficit 
position closer to a balanced budget. Furthermore, in the EA, fiscal councils 
have an important role to produce or endorse the macroeconomic forecasts 
underpinning the budget71. Suppose that in Figure 3.5, realistic 
macroeconomic and revenue forecasts imply taxation equal to T0, but the 
budget shows tax revenue at T1. This can be reconciled with a higher level of 
spending (S1), whilst still showing a balanced budget target, at point B2 ((T1 – 
S1) = 0). However, if the additional revenue does not materialise (actual 
revenue is T0 rather than T1), the actual budget would be in deficit, at point B1 
((T0 - S1) < 0). The risk of over-optimistic forecasts can be mitigated by 
entrusting IFIs to endorse or even produce the macroeconomic forecasts 
underpinning the budget, and even more if their role extends also to the 
budgetary projections.  
                                                          
70 These tasks involve an advisory role for the fiscal council. Whilst there is an appealing 
analogy with how independent central banks have addressed the inflation bias, the transfer to 
budgetary power to a fiscal council is more challenging given the fundamental democratic 
principle that the budget is a prerogative of governments under the control of parliament 
(Wierts 2008). For further discussion on the merits of fiscal councils and challenges in 
delegating fiscal policy authority, see Wyplosz (2008). 
71 Article 4(4), of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 requires that national medium-term fiscal plans 
and draft budgets shall be based on macroeconomic forecasts which are either produced or 
endorsed by an independent body. 
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Fiscal councils can also contribute to strengthen legislative budgetary power, 
either indirectly through more budget transparency, which can bridge the 
information asymmetry with the executive, or more directly by providing 
support through its technical expertise, especially if it is institutionally attached 
to the legislature. 
3.4 Summary and hypotheses 
This Chapter has presented a simple model of the budgetary process in EA 
countries, capturing the formulation, approval and implementation stages. 
Using graphical analysis, the interaction within the executive and between the 
executive and the legislature during the different stages of the budgetary 
process have been explained. Within the legislature, a distinction has also 
been made between the political groupings supporting the government and 
those opposing it. The incentives behind the behaviour of these different actors 
reflect political economy theories which explain the tendency of governments 
to run budget deficits, namely the common pool resource problem and the 
electoral budget cycle, as discussed in the previous Chapter. Political 
incentives also motivate the behaviour of the two different groups of legislators 
during the budget approval process.  
Using this model, it has been shown that unrestricted negotiations between 
spending ministers and the finance minister during budget preparation leads 
to budget deficits, which will be larger during election time. Similar 
consequences result if the legislature has unrestricted powers to amend the 
budget during the approval stage and also if, during implementation, line 
ministries can increase spending beyond the appropriations approved in the 
budget law. 
Introducing budget institutions in the model, it has been shown that numerical 
budget constraints can contribute to address the deficit bias through a 
commitment approach. This applies both to fiscal rules and MTBFs introduced 
at the national level, as well as supra-national rules, such as the requirements 
of the SGP which apply to the EA countries. However, their effectiveness to 
instil fiscal discipline in the budgetary process depends on the enforceability 
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of such constraints. Legislative involvement in these rules and frameworks, 
including the SGP provisions, can increase the ‘ownership’ and credibility of 
these constraints. 
As regards the procedural rules which govern the budgetary process, a strong 
finance minister can address the common pool resource problem during both 
the budget preparation and implementation stages. Restrictions on the power 
of the legislature to amend the budget proposed by the executive are also 
expected to contribute to more fiscal discipline, with the effect being stronger 
if there is a spending constraint rather than a budget balance constraint. 
Procedures whereby the legislature first votes on fiscal aggregates and then 
on specific appropriations, as well as a centralised parliamentary budget 
committee structure can also contribute to have more fiscal restraint during the 
budget approval stage. During budget implementation, measures which make 
the budget law more binding can contribute towards more fiscal discipline if 
they restrain increases in spending beyond the approved appropriations. In 
contrast, greater flexibility for the authority to decrease or cancel spending or 
shift funds from one budget item to another can lead to smaller budget deficits, 
as it enables the executive to respond to unexpected developments without 
breaching the fiscal targets.  
Budget transparency can also result in more fiscal discipline by narrowing the 
information asymmetry between voters and the incumbent, thus reducing the 
possibility that the latter manipulates the budget to increase its re-election 
chances. It can also contribute towards a more comprehensive view of the 
budget to all the actors involved in the budgetary process, thus diminishing the 
fiscal commons problem. Budget transparency can also strengthen other 
aspects of budget institutions, for instance by reducing the possibility of 
circumventing numerical budgetary constraints. Similar results can also be 
obtained through the establishment of independent fiscal councils. The latter 
can also have an important role to ensure that the budgetary projections are 
not overly optimistic. 
Thus, in conclusion, numerical fiscal constraints, a strong finance minister, 
restrictions on legislative budget amendment powers and other procedures 
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which result in more centralised decision-making during the budgetary 
process, as well as budget transparency and fiscal councils are all expected 
to result in more fiscal discipline. Based on these institutional characteristics, 
the concept of the quality of budget institutions is operationalised in the next 
Chapter by constructing a relevant composite index. Furthermore, the 
following hypothesis can be derived from the model, which is tested in the 
empirical analysis presented in Chapter 6, and further investigated through a 
case study analysis in Chapter 7:  
Null Hypothesis I0: The overall quality of budget institutions does not have any 
influence on the budget balance. 
Hypothesis I: An improvement (a worsening) in the overall quality of budget 
institutions results in smaller budget deficits or larger budget surpluses (larger 
budget deficits or smaller budget surpluses).  
As regards legislative budgetary power, the legislature has a key influence on 
the budget during the approval stage. Unrestricted amendment powers 
obviously imply a stronger role for the legislature. However, political 
motivations could undermine such power if the vote on the budget is 
considered as a vote of confidence in the government, particularly for single 
party majority governments. On the other hand, this would strengthen the 
legislature’s influence in the case of minority governments, whilst for coalition 
governments, the effect depends on the electoral prospects of individual 
political parties. Legislative budgetary power is also affected by the 
reversionary budget, i.e. the outcome if the budget is not approved before the 
start of the fiscal year. The position of the legislature is obviously weakened if 
the reversionary budget involves a reversal to the executive’s proposal, whilst 
it is strengthened if the reversionary budget has very severe consequences, 
as in the case of a government shutdown. Other less extreme cases of 
reversionary budgets generally do not increase the legislature’s influence 
because its threat of not approving the budget would not be credible.  
In the model, the legislature does not have a significant role in the budget 
formulation stage, but this can be strengthened through involvement in 
numerical budgetary constraints. Meanwhile, during the budget 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework – A Simple Model of the Budgetary 
Process in EA Countries and Implications of Budget Institutions 
 
  72 
 
implementation phase, all types of executive flexibility which make the 
approved budget law less binding weaken legislative budgetary power. 
Furthermore, a higher degree of budget transparency and the establishment 
of a fiscal council can reduce the information asymmetry between the 
legislature and the executive and thus also facilitate its involvement in the 
budgetary process. These different characteristics form the basis of the 
composite index for legislative budgetary power, which is presented in Chapter 
5. 
Finally, the impact of legislative budgetary power on fiscal discipline is quite 
complex. A stronger budgetary role for the legislature emanating from 
unrestricted amendment powers, severe consequences of the reversionary 
budget as well as from requiring legislative authorisation for the executive to 
cut or re-allocate spending during the implementation phase, is associated 
with larger budget deficits. On the other hand, improved fiscal outcomes are 
expected if legislative budgetary power reflects involvement in numerical fiscal 
constraints, including SGP provisions, a more binding budget law (by 
discouraging the use of supplementary budgets) and a more comprehensive 
budgetary process (by requiring legislative authorisation for off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities). The influence of legislative budgetary 
power on fiscal discipline is thus uncertain and depends on the specific 
characteristics of legislative budgeting. It is tested empirically in Chapter 6 on 
the basis of the following hypothesis, which reflects the prevailing view in the 
literature, but which is being contested in this study:  
Null Hypothesis II0: Overall, legislative budgetary power does not have any 
influence on the budget balance. 
Hypothesis II: Stronger (weaker) legislative budgetary power results in larger 
budget deficits or smaller budget surpluses (smaller budget deficits or larger 
budget surpluses). 
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4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, as a response to the sovereign debt crises in the 
EA, various reforms to the SGP were implemented between 2010 and 2013, 
namely through two legislative packages (the ‘Six-Pack’ and the ‘Two-Pack’) 
and the Fiscal Compact. These reforms not only resulted in a stricter supra-
national fiscal governance framework for EA countries, but also introduced 
common requirements for budget institutions at the national level.  
Thus, a directive comprised within the ‘Six-Pack’ involved common 
requirements, for instance, concerning the forecasts underpinning the budget, 
MTBFs and budget transparency72. An important development was through 
the Fiscal Compact, which required signatory countries to introduce in their 
national legislation fiscal rules restricting the budget deficit and introducing 
debt brakes, which reflect the SGP provisions, as well as corrective 
mechanisms in case of deviations from these rules73. Furthermore, the ‘Two-
Pack’ included, amongst others, requirements for the setting up of 
independent fiscal councils at the national level, with the responsibility to 
generate or endorse the macroeconomic forecasts underpinning the budget 
and to monitor compliance with the national fiscal rules introduced by the 
Fiscal Compact74.  
Motivated by the subsequent wave of reforms to budget institutions in various 
EA countries, this Chapter assesses the quality of budget institutions in EMU. 
It also identifies main differences across the EA member states and compares 
the quality of budget institutions in the EA before and after the Great Crisis. 
The specific research questions which this Chapter aims to address are the 
following: 
- What is the overall quality of budget institutions in the EA and what are 
the main differences across the member states? 
- How has the quality of budget institutions changed in the EA following 
the Great Crisis? 
                                                          
72 Council Directive 2011/85/EU. 
73 Articles 3 and 4, TSCG 2012. 
74 Articles 4 and 5, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013. 
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The analysis is carried out by constructing a composite numerical index. This 
index contributes to the literature by providing a recent and comprehensive 
measure of the quality of budget institutions for all the 19 EA member states. 
In particular, the index captures reforms implemented since the Great Crisis 
and it has a broad scope which also includes the characteristics of fiscal 
councils, since these now constitute part of the required institutional set-up in 
EA countries. In addition, to address the second research question, an index 
is also produced to measure the quality of budget institutions before the Crisis.  
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows: the next Section provides a 
review of the literature which measures the quality of budget institutions, whilst 
also discussing different forms of fiscal governance; subsequently, the 
methodology applied in this study is described, including the selected 
variables, the data sources and the approaches applied to construct the index 
and carry out the comparative analysis; finally the results are presented and 
discussed and a summary of the results and conclusion closes off the Chapter. 
4.2 Literature review: measuring the quality of budget 
institutions 
Since the early nineties, various studies have produced composite numerical 
indices to measure the quality of budget institutions. These indices capture 
and synthesize a wide range of qualitative information about various aspects 
of the institutional arrangements in the different stages of the budget 
process75.  
Focusing on quality of budget institutions indices for European countries76, the 
first comprehensive index was produced by von Hagen (1992) for the twelve 
countries which were members of the EEC at the time. Subsequently, 
Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) have constructed comparable indices for the 15 
                                                          
75 Most of these studies have also assessed the impact of the quality of budget institutions, as 
measured through these indices, on fiscal outcomes. A review of these empirical analyses is 
presented in Section 6.2.1 in Chapter 6. 
76 Examples of quality of budget institutions indices with a different geographical coverage 
include those by Alesina et al. (1999) and Filc and Scartascini (2004) for Latin American 
countries; Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) for low- and middle-income countries; and Bleaney (2010) 
and Gollwitzer (2011) for African countries. In addition, Schaechter et al. (2012) construct a 
fiscal rules index for a large sample of diverse countries. 
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countries that were members of the EU before 2004 (EU15) for different time 
periods (1990-91, 2000-1 and 2004). The coverage of indices of budget 
institutions was extended to the 10 CEECs which became EU members in 
2004 and 2007 by Gleich (2003), Yläoutinen (2004), Fabrizio and Mody (2006) 
and Hallerberg et al. (2009). More recently, the indices in Olden et al. (2012) 
cover ten south eastern European countries, including Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia, which acceded to the EU in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Some 
studies compile indices which focus on specific aspects of budget institutions, 
rather than a measure of their overall quality. In particular, the CION (2017e) 
produces indices covering only MTBFs, fiscal rules and the scope of the tasks 
discharged by fiscal councils for the 28 countries that were members of the 
EU in 2018 (EU28). Debrun and Kumar (2007a) and Maltritz and Wüste (2015) 
use CION data to compile fiscal council indices, for the EU15 and for the 27 
countries that were members of the EU before 1 July 2013 (EU27) countries, 
respectively. More recently, Horvath (2018) also produces fiscal council 
indices, measuring their potential for effective scrutiny, for a sample of 20 EU 
countries. Table 4.1 presents a list of the main indices capturing the quality of 
budget institutions in European countries developed in the literature. 
These indices generally capture the quality of budget institutions through 
procedures governing the budgetary process (namely the role of the finance 
minister and legislative amendment powers), numerical fiscal constraints and 
budget transparency77. The budget institutions index in von Hagen’s (1992)’s 
seminal paper includes all these characteristics and provided the basis for 
several indices developed in subsequent studies. However, there is some 
variation in the scope of the indices. For instance, the index developed by 
Gleich (2003), and subsequently followed by Fabrizio and Mody (2006), does 
not include the budget transparency dimension, whilst the index in Olden et al. 
(2012) does not capture the strength of the finance minister in the budget 
process. Meanwhile, Yläoutinen (2004) develops separate indices which cover 
in a detailed manner different aspects of budget institutions (including 
connectedness between the EU’s fiscal surveillance mechanisms and annual 
                                                          
77 Alt and Lassen (2006b) and subsequently Benito and Bastida (2009) provide indices 
focusing exclusively on budget transparency. 
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budgets), but does not construct a measure for the overall quality of budget 
institutions. It is notable that the only quality of budget institutions index which 
includes fiscal councils is that by Darvas and Kostyleva (2011). 
Table 4.1: Quality of budget institutions indices for European countries  
Author Date Sample Scope of index Data sources 
von Hagen 1992 12 EEC 
countries 
1991 - structure of budget negotiations;   
- long-term budgetary constraints;  
- parliamentary process to approve the 
budget; 
- executive flexibility during budget 
implementation; 
- fiscal transparency. 
information on national 
budgetary procedures 




Gleich 2003 10 CEECs 1998-
2000 
- structure of budget negotiations;   
- long-term budgetary constraints;  
- parliamentary process to approve the 
budget; 




ministries of finance, 
central banks, 
parliaments 
Ylӓoutinen 2004 10 CEECs 2003 separate indices capturing the following 
dimensions:  
- structure of budget negotiations;   
- multi-annual fiscal frameworks (similarity 
between pre-accession fiscal document 
and annual budget);  
- parliamentary process to approve the 
budget; 
- role of finance minister during budget 
implementation; 
- attributes of parliamentary committees. 
Detailed qualitative information on other 









2006 10 CEECs 1997, 
2003 
- structure of budget negotiations; 
- long-term budgetary constraints;  
- parliamentary process to approve the 
budget; 
- executive flexibility during budget 
implementation. 
various secondary 
sources, including the 
IMF, Gleich (2003) 
and Ylӓoutinen (2004)  
Debrun and 
Kumar 
2007 EU15 2005 fiscal councils index capturing their 
mandate and tasks, their independence 
and potential influence on the budgetary 
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Table 4.1: Quality of budget institutions indices for European countries (cont.) 
Author Date Sample Scope of index Data sources 
Hallerberg 
et al. 
2007 EU15 1990-91, 
2000-1, 
2004 
- structure of budget negotiations;   
- long-term budgetary constraints;  
- parliamentary process to approve the 
budget; 









2009 EU15  1990-91, 
2000-1, 
2004 
- structure of budget negotiations;   
- long-term budgetary constraints;  
- parliamentary process to approve the 
budget; 
- executive flexibility during budget 
implementation 
- budget transparency; 









2009 10 CEECs 1998-
2000, 
2003 
- structure of budget negotiations;   
- long-term budgetary constraints;  
- parliamentary process to approve the 
budget; 





Ylӓoutinen (2004) and 














- fiscal rules; 
- medium-term expenditure framework; 
- multi-annual expenditure estimates; 
- parliament budget amendment powers; 
- independent fiscal council; 
- carryover of unused funds to next fiscal 
year; 
- quality of external audit. 
OECD budget reviews 
and the OECD 
International Database 
of Budget Practices 
and Procedures 
(2007/2008) 






-  understanding the scale and scope of 
fiscal challenge; 
- developing a credible fiscal consolidation 
strategy; 
- implementing the consolidation strategy. 
various secondary 
sources, including 
information from IMF 
Maltritz and 
Wüste 










three separate indices capturing the 
following dimensions:  
- fiscal rules index; 
- MTBF index 




Horvath 2018 20 EU 
countries 
2015 two fiscal councils indices capturing their 
mandate, resources, access to 
information, influence and relationship with 
stakeholders 
questionnaires by 
author and by CION to 
national fiscal councils  
Note: 
1 fiscal rules index 1990-2016; MTBF index 2006, 2008-2016; scope of IFIs index 2015-16 (all indices are updated 
annually) 
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The index which provides the most recent and broad measure of the overall 
quality of budget institutions with the largest coverage of EA countries is that 
by Darvas and Kostyleva (2011). The results of this study show overall, budget 
institutions in the EA were of a medium quality, with limited variation among 
the member states78. Austria, Netherlands and Ireland had the highest scores 
in the index, whilst Italy, Greece and Belgium were the weakest performers. 
Finally, it is relevant to point out that most of the data for these indices was 
generated from questionnaires to national experts, or from databases (for 
example, the OECD’s International Budget Practices and Procedures 
Database and the CION’s fiscal governance databases) which in turn were 
constructed from data generated from surveys to national authorities. Whilst 
having the advantage of capturing both budgetary procedures specified in law 
as well as other ‘de facto’ procedures, participants may portray budgetary 
procedures in their country to be better than they are in reality. In order to 
address this potential bias, in various studies, the authors corroborated such 
data with information from national legislation and other secondary sources. 
Furthermore, the construction of composite indices involves various 
assumptions, such as regarding the weight of the different individual 
characteristics and whether they are substitutes to each other, which are not 
based on any theoretical foundation. However, the ranking of the budgetary 
institutions indices was found to be quite robust to variations in the weighting 
of institutional scores or to alternative aggregation methods (for instance in 
Gleich 2003 and Hallerberg et al. 2007). 
4.2.1 Forms of fiscal governance  
As explained in the previous Chapter, two main forms of budget institutions 
can be distinguished, both of which can be effective to internalise the common 
pool externality. In the delegation approach, budgetary decision making is 
delegated to a powerful finance minister and legislative amendment power is 
limited. On the other hand, in the contracts approach, a group of agents with 
similar decision-making rights (generally being political parties in a coalition 
                                                          
78 The median index score value was 2.7 (out of a maximum of 4) and the scores for the EA 
countries ranged from 1.9 to 3. 
Chapter 4: The Quality of Budget Institutions in the Euro Area 
 
  80 
 
government) negotiate and commit themselves to numerical targets for 
budgetary aggregates for a multi-year period (von Hagen and Harden 1995; 
Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) linked the form of fiscal governance to the 
type of government. They argued that partners in a coalition government would 
be reluctant to delegate budgetary decision making to a finance minister, who 
may use the budget appropriations to favour the constituency of its political 
party at the expense of others. Thus, they postulated that the delegation 
approach is more appropriate for countries with single-party majority 
governments, whilst the contracts approach is more suitable for countries with 
a coalition government. Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) further elaborated that 
the contracts approach may be particularly suitable when there is considerable 
ideological dispersion among the political parties forming the coalition.  
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) tested their hypothesis for the EU15 during 
1981-1994, by developing separate indices for the delegation and contracts 
approaches, using the different dimensions in von Hagen’s (1992) quality of 
budget institutions index and classifying the countries under the two different 
forms of fiscal governance. The delegation index comprises dimensions such 
as the dominance of the finance minister in the drafting and implementation 
stages of the budget, limitations on parliamentary amendments and the costs 
of a failure by the legislature to approve the budget. On the other hand, the 
contracts index captures characteristics such as the stringency, 
comprehensiveness, time horizon and degree of political commitment to the 
fiscal targets. Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) provide an updated classification 
of these two distinct indices for the same sample of countries for 1985-2004, 
whilst Yläoutinen (2004) and Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010) similarly 
classify the ten CEECs which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The findings of 
these studies show that most countries had the expected form of fiscal 
governance, largely based on the type of government which prevailed during 
the period under consideration. Furthermore, the contracts approach was 
more prevalent among both the EU15 and the CEECs, reflecting the fact that 
most of these countries have coalition governments. However, these results 
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are based on small samples which mostly comprise countries with coalition 
governments. 
A controversial corollary of the link between the form of fiscal governance 
adopted by a country and its type of government is that the SGP, with its 
reliance on numerical fiscal constraints, is more appropriate for countries that 
adopt a similar rules-based approach in their domestic budget process (i.e. 
countries that have coalition governments) than in those countries that rely on 
a delegation form of fiscal governance (i.e. countries with single-party majority 
governments or coalitions consisting of closely aligned political parties)79.  This 
has become more relevant for EA countries in view of the rules-based 
approach of the common requirements for national budget institutions that 
were introduced following the Crisis, as described in Section 4.1. 
4.2.2 Contribution to the literature 
Although various indices of the quality of budget institutions have been 
developed for EU countries, most of these studies cover either the EU15 or 
the ten CEECs, rather than all the present 19 EA member states80. On the 
other hand, other indices with a broader coverage of EU countries (Maltritz 
and Wüste 2015; European Commission 2017e; Horvath 2018) focus on 
specific institutional characteristics and thus do not provide a single overall 
measure of the quality of budget institutions. This Chapter thus contributes to 
the literature by producing a comparable index of the overall quality of budget 
institutions for all the EA member states. It is relevant to focus on the budget 
institutions in EA countries since they are governed by a common supra-
national fiscal framework and thus, it is pertinent to analyse any differences in 
their budget institutions. 
Furthermore, the constructed index presented in this Chapter constitutes a 
recent measure of the quality of budget institutions in the EA, which captures 
                                                          
79 See, for example, von Hagen (2002), Hallerberg (2004), Annett (2006), Hallerberg et al. 
(2007, 2009)  and Hodson (2009). 
80 Only Darvas and Kostyleva (2011) include all the 19 EA countries in their study. However, 
their sample has a broader geographical coverage and the EA member states are categorised 
in two different groups: non-OECD central, eastern and south eastern European countries and 
OECD (including non-European countries). The focus of their research is to compare the 
performance of the first group using the OECD group as a benchmark.  
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reforms to budget institutions implemented since the Great Crisis. In contrast, 
the most recent measures of the overall quality of budget institutions for EA 
countries refer to 2004 data (Hallerberg et al 2009) and 2007-08 (Darvas and 
Kostyleva 2011). In this context, this Chapter also assesses how the budget 
institutions in EA countries have changed since the Great Crisis, by 
constructing and comparing indices for the quality of budget institutions for the 
pre- and post-crisis period.   
Finally, the constructed index presented in this Chapter also contributes to the 
literature by providing a more comprehensive coverage of the overall quality 
of budget institutions in EA countries. Most notably, it includes a sub-index for 
the formal powers and organisational capacity of fiscal councils81, which, as 
noted earlier, have become a more prominent aspect of budget institutions in 
the EA, with their establishment and functions being regulated by the ‘Two-
Pack’ legislation. In addition, in the constructed index, the connectedness 
between the supra-national SGP rules and the national MTBF and annual 
budget is also captured; the structure of parliamentary committees dealing with 
the budget is taken into account in the budget approval stage; and budget 
implementation and budget transparency are also measured more broadly 
than in most previous studies.  
4.3 Methodology: constructing a composite index to measure 
the quality of budget institutions in the EA 
Following the prevalent approach in this branch of the literature, this Chapter 
measures the quality of budget institutions in the EA by constructing a 
composite numerical index. The research presented in this Chapter is 
descriptive: it assesses the quality of budget institutions in the EA, compares 
it across the 19 member states and also analyses how national budget 
institutions have changed since the Great Crisis. This Section starts by 
discussing the pros and cons of using composite indices as well as the 
philosophy underpinning this research design. Subsequently, the process of 
                                                          
81 Darvas and Kostyleva (2011) also capture fiscal councils in their index, but they only 
measure whether an independent fiscal council is in place or not.  
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constructing the composite index is described, whilst a discussion on the 
relevant ethical issues concludes this Section. 
4.3.1 Research design: a composite index to measure the quality of 
budget institutions in the EA 
An advantage of composite indices is that by combining indicators on different 
themes into a single measure, they can “summarise complex or multi-
dimensional issues” (Saisana et al. 2005: 307). In this manner, composite 
indices reduce the complexity of multi-dimensional phenomena since it is 
easier to interpret one single figure rather than trying to identify a common 
trend from many different indicators (Nardo et al. 2005). As discussed in 
Section 4.2, there is vast and established literature using composite indices to 
measure the overall quality of budget institutions82. In this regard, composite 
indices provide a practical and efficient way of summarising qualitative 
information on institutional characteristics and of measuring the complex 
nature of budgetary procedures. The use of a composite index also facilitates 
the comparative analysis of budget institutions across EA countries. 
Furthermore, the index can be easily used as an explanatory variable in 
empirical analysis examining the relationship between the quality of budget 
institutions and fiscal discipline83. 
However, a composite indicator’s advantage of combining a large amount of 
data on different dimensions into a single number can lead to “simplistic policy 
conclusions” (Saisana et al. 2005: 308). Thus, as recommended in the OECD 
and Joint Research Centre, European Commission’s (2008) handbook on 
constructing composite indicators, the analysis of the results based on the 
overall scores of the constructed index is complemented with a more detailed 
analysis based on the different sub-indices, so as to decompose the aggregate 
results and identify the contribution of different institutional characteristics. 
                                                          
82 Composite indices are also widely used to monitor and benchmark country performance in 
a broad range of other policy areas, for example, the Global Competitiveness Index (World 
Economic Forum), the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) and the 
Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme), amongst many 
others. 
83 Indeed, the quality of budget institutions index presented in this Chapter and the legislative 
budgetary power index developed in the next Chapter constitute the institutional explanatory 
variables in the empirical model estimated in Chapter 6. 
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4.3.1.1 Philosophy of research  
The research presented in this Chapter is carried out from a post-positivist 
paradigm, reflecting its quantitative approach. The ontological position which 
is adopted is a realist one, where it is assumed that the external world has an 
existence which is independent of the human mind and where knowledge is 
fallible, with research aiming to improve interpretations of reality, which are 
approximations of the real world (Blaikie 2007). This is because we can only 
know reality through our perceptions and conceptions. Thus, in this research, 
our understanding of the ‘true’ quality and characteristics of budget institutions 
is tentative and this study constitutes a progressive step in the building of 
knowledge on the characteristics of budget institutions in EA countries. 
Associated with this realist ontology, the epistemological position adopted in 
this part of the study is empiricism, where knowledge construction is based on 
evidence. This is reflected in the emphasis on quantification in the construction 
of a numerical composite index to capture the qualitative characteristics of 
budgetary institutions. A post-positivist view of empiricism is adopted, whereby 
the generation of knowledge involves a cautious process of trial and error 
which is constrained by the possibilities of observation and experimentation 
(Greetham 2006). Thus, it is recognised that the constructed index involves a 
certain degree of abstraction and only constitutes an ‘approximate’ numerical 
measure of the complex reality of budget institutions. In addition, there may be 
problems with the quality of the data and other measurement problems. 
Recognising these difficulties, efforts are made to establish reliability and 
validity in the methods used and the conclusions that are derived, particularly 
by testing the robustness of the composite indicator to alternative approaches 
in its construction. 
4.3.2 Research methods: constructing the composite index  
This Section first outlines the variables selected to capture the main 
characteristics of budgetary institutions which are included in the constructed 
index. This is followed by a discussion on the data sources used. This Section 
then proceeds to explain how the composite index is constructed. A discussion 
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on the approaches used to check its robustness and to analyse the results 
closes off this Section. 
4.3.2.1 The selected variables 
The constructed composite index does not aim to capture every potential 
relevant characteristic of budget institutions, as this would make the analysis 
unmanageable. Rather, key dimensions of budget institutions in EA countries 
are identified, being guided by the literature and the model of the budgetary 
process presented in the previous Chapter. The constructed index draws on 
existing indices of budget institutions, namely Yläoutinen (2004) and 
Hallerberg et al. (2009), being among the more comprehensive and recent 
indices for EU countries found in the literature, as well as the European 
Commission’s (2016a, 2016b) MTBF and fiscal rules strength indices. It 
comprises seven sub-indices, covering the formulation, approval and 
implementation stages of the budgetary process and, as shown in Figure 4.1, 
it captures the four main categories of budget institutions identified in Chapter 
3 - numerical fiscal constraints, procedural rules governing the budgetary 
process, budget transparency and independent fiscal councils. The specific 
indicators captured by the different sub-indices of the constructed index are 
described below, thus extending the discussion presented in Section 3.3 of the 
previous Chapter, and are presented in detail in Table AI of Appendix I. 
Furthermore, the main elements of similarity as well as main differences 
between the constructed index and the indices by Yläoutinen (2004) and 
Hallerberg et al. (2009) and the European Commission’s (2016a, 2016b) 
indices are also highlighted. 
The first sub-index concerns the MTBF and captures the characteristics of 
national MTBFs, which all EA countries are obliged to have in place84. 
Furthermore, similarly to Yläoutinen (2004), it also measures the 
connectedness between the national budgetary process and the EU 
surveillance framework. The national MTBF component is largely based on 
the European Commission’s (2016a) MTBF index and considers the 
framework to be more binding, the more it is connected to the annual budget 
                                                          
84 Article 9, Council Directive 2011/85/EU. 
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targets, if it is discussed or presented in the national parliament and the 
stronger is the monitoring and enforcement of its targets. However, differently 
from the CION’s index, it also considers the years since the framework has 
been in place, since it may take some time for actors in the budgetary process 
to adjust their behaviour to such constraints. The scoring scale applied is also 
different. The supra-national component of this sub-index captures the links 
between the SP and the national MTBF and annual budget documents as well 
as the relationship between their respective fiscal targets.   
 
Differently from Yläoutinen (2004) and Hallerberg et al. (2009), the constructed 
index includes a fiscal rules sub-index. This sub-index also draws heavily on 
the European Commission’s (2016b) fiscal rules strength index. However, 
rather than measuring the characteristics of all fiscal rules in place, this sub-
index adopts a simpler approach by focusing on the fiscal rule with the largest 















Source: Figure drawn by author 
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coverage of the general government sector85. The scope of the rule is 
considered, since it is more difficult to circumvent fiscal rules that cover more 
fiscal operations; as well as its binding nature, including the statutory or legal 
base, flexibility to set or revise objectives, monitoring and enforcement 
provisions and media visibility. In addition, the effectiveness of the fiscal rule 
is also expected to increase over time. At the same time, a second component 
of the fiscal rules sub-index simply captures whether other different types of 
rules exist (balanced budget rules, debt rules and revenue or expenditure 
rules) and their coverage of the general government sector. 
The third, fourth and fifth sub-indices of the quality of budget institutions index 
concern procedural rules which govern the different stages of the budgetary 
process, with the first two drawing considerably on Yläoutinen (2004) and 
Hallerberg et al. (2009). The third sub-index captures the ‘strength’ of the 
finance minister vis-à-vis line ministries during the budget formulation stage 
and considers characteristics which are typical of the delegation approach, 
namely the imposition of ceilings on spending ministers’ initial requests; the 
nature of negotiations over budget allocations and the ultimate decision-
making power to settle disputes. 
The fourth sub-index concerns the budget approval stage and captures the 
legislature’s formal powers to amend the draft budget and whether these 
amendment powers are restricted or not86. As explained in Section 3.3.2 of the 
previous Chapter, restricted powers are considered to contribute to more fiscal 
discipline, with spending constraints involving more binding restrictions than 
budget balance constraints. This sub-index also captures other characteristics 
relating to the degree of centralisation in the budget approval process, namely 
whether the legislature first votes on the total budgetary aggregates before 
voting on specific appropriations and the parliamentary committee structure 
dealing with the budget. 
                                                          
85 The implicit assumption is that there is decreasing marginal benefit of adopting multiple 
fiscal rules. This assumption is also reflected in the European Commission’s (2016b) fiscal 
rules strength index, through the weights attached to additional rules. 
86 This component is less comprehensive than the respective sub-indices in Ylãoutinen (2004) 
and Hallerberg et al. (2009); a broader measure of legislative amendment powers is included 
in the legislative budgetary power index, presented in the next Chapter. 
Chapter 4: The Quality of Budget Institutions in the Euro Area 
 
  88 
 
The fifth sub-index relates to the budget implementation stage. Whereas the 
indices by Yläoutinen (2004) and Hallerberg et al. (2009) focus specifically on 
the role of the finance minister during budget execution, the constructed index 
provides a more comprehensive assessment of the executive authority to cut, 
transfer or increase spending during budget implementation, as well as some 
information on the use of supplementary budgets. Specifically, the degree of 
flexibility is measured by whether the relevant power applies to all types of 
spending or only to certain categories; the application of thresholds and the 
required approval. Reflecting the discussion in Section 3.3.2 of the previous 
Chapter, executive discretion to cut, cancel or re-allocate spending is 
considered as contributing positively to the quality of budget institutions, whilst 
executive power to increase spending may lead to less fiscal discipline. 
The sixth sub-index constitutes a broad measure of budget transparency, 
including the comprehensiveness of budget documentation; the public 
availability of budgetary information, including on the budgetary forecasts; and 
the comprehensiveness of the budget approval process, specifically whether 
legislative authorisation is required for off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities87. On the other hand, budget transparency is not included in 
Yläoutinen (2004), whereas Hallerberg et al. (2009) focus more on the budget 
document itself and include a subjective assessment of the overall 
transparency of the budget process. 
The seventh and last sub-index involves a distinct feature of the constructed 
index since it captures both the formal powers as well as the organisational 
capacity of fiscal councils. As in Horvath (2018), the selected characteristics 
were largely inspired by the OECD’s (2014) recommended principles for IFIs, 
including, amongst others, independence and non-partisanship, mandate, 
resources, access to information and communication. Furthermore, since 
building up a reputation by fiscal councils takes time (Calmfors and Wren-
Lewis 2011), as in the case of numerical budgetary constraints, established 
                                                          
87 The frequency of publication of budgetary data is another relevant indicator of budget 
transparency. However, it is not included in this sub-index because EA countries are subject 
to very specific common requirements in this respect (Article 3, Council Directive 2011/85/EU). 
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IFIs are considered to have a stronger influence on the budgetary process 
than younger institutions. 
4.3.2.2 Data sources 
The main sources of data used to construct the quality of budget institutions 
index are the OECD budgeting practices and procedures database, the 
CION’s fiscal governance databases as well as the IMF’s fiscal councils 
dataset. The first two datasets are generated through questionnaires to budget 
directors and officials in national capitals. On the other hand, the IMF’s dataset 
is mainly produced from secondary sources (Debrun et al. 2013). The use of 
this vast secondary data provides cost and time savings, whilst its reliability is 
enhanced by the availability of detailed information on the methodology used 
to generate the data in the respective websites of the three institutions. 
Furthermore, the use of the OECD and CION data enable a comparison of the 
characteristics of budget institutions in EA countries over time, since OECD 
surveys on budget procedures and practices are available for 2007 and 
201288, whilst CION data is available annually for recent years (see Table 4.1). 
As shown in Table AI in Appendix I, the OECD database is the main source of 
data for the sub-indices capturing the formulation, approval and 
implementation stages of the budgetary process as well as for budget 
transparency. On the other hand, the CION’s databases for MTBFs and fiscal 
rules (CION 2016a, 2016b) provide more detailed information on these 
institutional characteristics, whilst the IMF Fiscal Councils dataset 2015 
constituted a more updated source of information on fiscal councils. This 
secondary data is all available online89. Additionally, other data from the 
CION’s fiscal governance databases was obtained in May 2016 following 
requests via email to the relevant officials in the Directorate-General for 
                                                          
88 OECD data is also available for 2003, but it is not included in this study since this predates 
the date of EU membership of some EA countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Slovenia, Slovakia). 
89 The IMF Fiscal Councils dataset 2015 is no longer available online as it was replaced with 
a more updated vintage in April 2017, which is available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/council/. The CION data has also been updated but the 
data used to compile the index is still available (European Commission 2017b, 2017c), being 
marked as ‘old methodology’. 
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Economic and Financial Affairs (DG Ecfin)90. This constitutes unique, detailed 
information on the budgetary process in the EA countries, which is being used 
for the first time in the compilation of budget institutions indices. 
Since the geographical coverage of the OECD’s database does not include 
the four non-OECD EA countries (Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta), 
matching data for these member states was generated by requesting officials 
in national authorities (namely budget directors or officials from fiscal councils, 
parliamentary budget offices or parliamentary budget committees) to respond 
to the relevant questions of the OECD survey. Information on the structure of 
budget negotiations in all EA countries was also obtained from questionnaires, 
as this was not otherwise available91.  
Secondary sources - namely finance ministries, parliamentary and fiscal 
councils websites, legal texts and official documents - were used to address 
some gaps in the IMF fiscal councils dataset and also to corroborate the 
data92.  A detailed list of the various secondary sources used for each country 
is presented in Table AII in Appendix I. The data to generate the quality of 
budget institutions index was compiled during May-December 2016, with the 
cut-off date being 31st December 201693. Given the various data sources used, 
different components in the constructed index refer to 2012 for data obtained 
from the OECD database, to 2014 for data from the CION’s fiscal governance 
databases and the IMF fiscal councils dataset and to the second half of 2016 
                                                          
90 This concerned the connectedness of the SP with the national budgetary process for the 
quality of budget institutions index, as well as other data which was used to compile the 
legislative budgetary power index (see Section 5.3.1 of the next Chapter). 
91 The questionnaire also comprised questions on legislative budgeting. Since it constitutes a 
more important data source for the legislative budgetary power index, it is discussed in Section 
5.3.1 of the next Chapter.  
92 Information generated from interviews was also used to corroborate data for Malta. This 
interview data constitutes an important input in the case study on budget institutions in Malta, 
presented in Chapter 7. 
93 This study does not include the updated data published subsequently by the CION and the 
IMF in the first half of 2017 (available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/fiscal-governance-eu-member-states_en;  
and https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/council/, respectively). This updated data by the CION 
(2017b, 2017c, 2017d) includes new MTBF and fiscal rules indices, as well as a new index 
covering the scope of IFIs. The rankings for EA countries for fiscal rules and MTBFs are quite 
similar when comparing the ‘old’ indices, used to compile the quality of budget institutions 
index, and these ‘new’ indices - Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 1 for the fiscal rules 
index for 2005-15 and of 0.8 for the MTBF index for 2006 and 2008-15, although recent years 
exhibit more variation. 
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for the primary data generated through questionnaires. The resulting index 
aims to capture the new fiscal governance framework in the EA following the 
Great Crisis, which started to be introduced as from 201194 and is labelled as 
the ‘post-crisis’ index95. Whilst the OECD data pertains to 2012, this largely 
concerns aspects of budget institutions which were not directly affected by the 
common EA requirements. On the other hand, reforms concerning MTBFs, 
fiscal rules and fiscal councils entered into force in 2013 and these 
characteristics are captured in the index by the more recent CION and IMF 
data sources.  
In order to assess the developments in budget institutions in EA countries 
since the Great Crisis, a quality of budget institutions index was also produced 
for the ‘pre-crisis’ period, mostly referring to 2007. This index was compiled 
using only the OECD, CION and IMF secondary data sources96. Thus, it has 
a more limited geographical coverage as data for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Malta is not available in the OECD 2007 dataset97. Furthermore, 
some differences between the 2007 and 2012 OECD questionnaires and in 
the annual CION questionnaire also limit the comparability of the two indices. 
In addition, due to lack of available information and also reflecting the fact that 
most fiscal councils in EA countries were set up after the Great Crisis, the pre-
crisis IFI sub-index constitutes a much simpler measure, capturing only 
whether a fiscal council was in place in 2007 and for how long it had been 
established. However, despite these differences, a comparison of the two 
indices still permits the identification of major institutional budgetary reforms 
implemented during the period under review. 
4.3.2.3 Constructing the index 
Given the “inescapable subjectivity” (Cherchye et al. 2007: 111) involved in 
the construction of composite indices, this Section follows Freudenberg 
                                                          
94 With Council Directive 2011/85/EU, whereas the and the ‘Two-Pack’ Regulations entered 
into force in 2013. 
95 It is recognised that the sovereign debt crisis in the EA was still ongoing with bail-outs to 
Spain and Cyprus in 2012 and 2013, respectively and the third bailout to Greece in 2015. 
96 Some of the required data from the CION databases is not available for 2007 and in these 
cases, the earliest available data pertaining to 2009 and 2010 is used. 
97 These countries were not members of the OECD at the time - Estonia joined in 2010.  
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(2003)’s recommendations for transparency and provides a detailed account 
of the methodology applied and the choices made to construct the quality of 
budget institutions index. At a general level, the building of this index followed 
technical guidelines in the handbook on composite indicators published by the 
OECD and Joint Research Centre, European Commission (2008).  
The scoring scheme applied to the different characteristics of budget 
institutions has a range between zero and ten, as in Alesina et al. (1999); with 
zero indicating the least favourable and ten indicating the most favourable, 
from the perspective of their contribution to fiscal discipline. The maximum 
score of ten was equally distributed over the range of possible responses for 
each variable. Details on the scoring system for the different indicators 
included in each sub-index are provided in Table AI in Appendix I.  
To construct the index, equal weights were assigned to the seven sub-indices, 
as shown in Table 4.2. This approach, which follows previous studies, has the 
advantage of simplicity and reflects the fact that there is no theoretical or 
empirical basis for assigning more importance to particular institutional 
characteristics.  
Table 4.2: Quality of budget institutions index – weighting structure 
Sub-index Weight 
1. Medium-term budgetary frameworks/targets 0.14  
 National MTBF  0.50 
 Connectedness of Stability Programme with national MTBF and annual budget  0.50 
2. Fiscal rules 0.14  
 Fiscal rule with the largest coverage of the general government sector  0.671 
 Other fiscal rules in place  0.33 
3. Structure of budget negotiations within the executive 0.14  
4. Structure of the parliamentary process leading to the approval of the budget law 0.14  
5. Flexibility of budget execution 0.14  
6. Budget transparency 0.14  
7. Independent fiscal institutions 0.14  
 Formal powers of the fiscal council  0.50 
 Organisational and technical capacity of the fiscal council  0.50 
Note: 
1 When measuring the scope of the rule, the coverage of general government finances is assigned a weight of 
0.50, whilst the accounting system and exclusions from the rule; and the years since it has been in place each 
have a weight of 0.25. 
Source: Produced by author 
Chapter 4: The Quality of Budget Institutions in the Euro Area 
 
  93 
 
A similar approach of assigning equal weights was generally adopted within 
the sub-indices98, except for the fiscal rules sub-index. In this case, similarly 
to the European Commission’s (2016b) fiscal rules strength index, diminishing 
marginal benefit is assumed for additional rules and a larger weight was 
assigned to the fiscal rule with the largest coverage of the general government 
sector. Establishing an appropriate weighting method is subject to 
considerable debate in the literature on the construction of composite 
indicators (Saisana et al. 2005). Thus, the sensitivity of the country rankings 
for the index scores to alternative weighting schemes is assessed. This is 
carried out by using Spearman rank correlations, as in Alesina et al. (1999). 
Another important methodological choice in the construction of a composite 
index involves decisions regarding the aggregation form. Following previous 
studies, the seven weighted sub-indices were aggregated using a linear 
additive approach99. This assumes full and constant compensability among 
the different sub-indices (Nardo et al. 2005). For instance, a strong finance 
minister during budget negotiations can compensate for weak fiscal rules or 
MTBFs, which is consistent with the concept of different forms of fiscal 
governance (delegation or contracts approaches), as discussed in Section 
4.2.1.  
The index of the quality of budget institutions, I, was thus constructed as 
follows: first, for each of the seven sub-indices: 
Dj = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  
where Dj is the score for each sub-index j; xi is the score of the variable i100 





                                                          
98 But to address the few gaps in the data, the score for the respective sub-index for the 
countries concerned was computed on the basis of the available information, with the weights 
being adjusted accordingly. 
99 A multiplicative approach is not suitable since countries can have scores of zero for one or 
more of the variables considered, whilst a non-compensatory multi-criteria analysis is more 
appropriate when the composite index comprises highly different dimensions (Nardo et al. 
2005). 
100 Variable i refers to the components comprised in each sub-index, as described in Table AI 
in Appendix I, with N representing the number of components comprised in each sub-index.  
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and 0<wi<1 and i=1,2, …N.  
A similar computation is carried out to calculate the composite indicator: 
I = ∑ 𝐷𝑗𝑤𝑗
7
𝑗=1  
where Dj is the score of the sub-index j and wj = 0.14, as shown in Table 4.2. 
4.3.2.4 Analysis of the results 
The scores for the quality of budget institutions index were analysed using 
descriptive statistics. Elements of strength as well as weaknesses in the 
quality of budget institutions were identified on the basis of the mean and 
median score values and country frequencies, whilst the extent of diversity 
among the EA countries was measured by the standard deviation and the 
range of the score values.  Country rankings were also used to analyse the 
results, with countries grouped into three categories: the top score category 
(top quartile), the medium score category (second and third quartiles) and the 
low score category (bottom quartile)101. This analysis using descriptive 
statistics is carried out for the seven different sub-indices as well as for the 
overall quality of budget institutions index. A similar approach is adopted in the 
comparison of the pre- and post-crisis indices, whilst data constraints which 
limit the comparability of the two indices are highlighted when presenting the 
results. 
In the analysis of the findings, a distinction is made between EA countries that 
experienced sovereign debt crises and other members of the monetary union. 
This classification is based on an objective criterion, namely whether countries 
have received financial assistance from EU mechanisms. The ‘bailed-out’ 
countries thus comprise Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and 
Spain102.  
Finally, in view of the rules-based approach which characterises the EA fiscal 
governance framework, the analysis of the results was extended further by 
                                                          
101 In the graphical presentation of the results, a ‘traffic light’ colour scheme is applied with 
green, amber and red indicating the top, medium and low score categories, respectively.  
102 Latvia received assistance from the EU balance of payments assistance programme in 
2008 before it joined the EA. Financial assistance to the other countries was provided between 
2010 and 2015. Further details are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance_en. 
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decomposing the constructed quality of budget institutions into two separate 
indices to capture the delegation and contracts approaches. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.1, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) and more recently, Yläoutinen 
(2004), Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) and Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010) 
have similarly developed indices to measure these two alternative forms of 
fiscal governance. To compile these indices, equal weights were assigned to 
the different components, which were aggregated using a linear additive 
method. 
4.3.3 Ethical Issues 
The quality of budget institutions index is mainly based on secondary data 
which is publicly available and its use does not involve any particular ethical 
issues. As regards the detailed data which was obtained directly from CION 
services, no specific restrictions on its use were imposed, except the 
requirement to acknowledge its source. 
Primary data generated through a questionnaire to national authorities was 
mainly used for the four non-OECD EA countries, as well as for the component 
relating to the structure of budget negotiations within the executive for all EA 
countries. The relevant ethical issues concerning this questionnaire are 
discussed in the next Chapter, since it constitutes the main source of data for 
the legislative budgetary power index. 
4.4 Results: the quality of budget institutions in the EA 
This Section first presents the results for the seven sub-indices and then for 
the overall scores for the quality of budget institutions index. This is followed 
by a comparison between the bailed-out countries and the other EA member 
states and an analysis of developments since the Great Crisis. Finally, the 
findings are applied to determine the prevalent form of fiscal governance 
(delegation and contracts approach) in the EA countries. Tables AIII and AIV 
in Appendix I present the detailed results for the post-crisis quality of budget 
institutions index and for the pre-crisis index, respectively. 
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4.4.1 The quality of budget institutions index: results at a sub-index level 
Table 4.3 shows the main results for the post-crisis quality of budget 
institutions index and for the different sub-indices. The findings are ranked 
according to the scores for the overall index, with countries grouped into top, 
medium and low score categories. Meanwhile, Table 4.4 presents key 
descriptive statistics for the seven sub-indices and their main components. 
Overall, EA countries fare quite strongly in the MTBF sub-index (Figure 4.2), 
with mean and median values of around 7. Reflecting the obligation to have a 
national MTBFs in place, overall EA countries perform particularly well in the 
national MTBFs component103. 
The main elements of strength of national MTBFs in the EA concern the 
existence of co-ordination mechanisms for all levels of general government 
prior to setting the medium-term budgetary targets (found in 16 countries) and 
the involvement of national parliament (through a vote in ten countries and 
presentation of the MTBF in another eight countries). On the other hand, there 
is scope to make MTBFs more binding since a fixed framework which connects 
the MTBF with the annual budget targets exists in only nine countries whilst 
well-defined actions in case of deviations from plans and regular monitoring of 
medium-term targets are found in only eight countries.
                                                          
103 Being largely based on the CION’s MTBF index, the country rankings in this component 
are also quite similar (Table AV in Appendix I). 





Table 4.3: Quality of budget institutions index – results (post-crisis data) 
 Top score category Medium score category Low score category 
 ES FR SI AT IE DE LV NL IT EL LT EE CY SK PT FI LU BE MT 
Overall index 
 
7.8 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.2 5.0 
1. MTBF 
 
8.3 7.7 8.3 9.2 5.8 7.1 5.0 7.5 7.9 6.9 5.2 5.0 7.5 6.0 7.1 7.1 4.8 6.7 6.3 
2. Fiscal rules 
 
8.6 7.9 3.3 6.1 8.0 6.8 6.8 7.5 8.0 5.4 5.5 4.4 4.2 6.7 5.7 4.6 6.9 5.4 5.7 




5.8 9.2 7.5 9.2 8.3 8.3 7.5 9.2 10.
0 
7.5 7.5 8.3 6.7 5.6 7.5 7.5 4.7 8.3 
4. Budget approval 
 
8.3 8.3 8.3 2.5 3.3 3.3 5.0 1.7 4.2 6.7 5.0 5.0 4.2 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.3 1.7 0.0 
5. Budget execution 
 
6.5 5.8 6.9 7.7 6.6 6.7 5.6 4.1 3.8 5.7 6.9 6.6 7.2 6.6 6.7 3.9 6.1 6.7 6.1 
6. Budget transparency 
 
 
6.6 6.9 6.1 7.7 8.4 9.3 8.8 8.9 6.9 4.9 9.2 9.6 5.7 6.8 4.8 8.3 7.8 4.0 3.7 
7. IFIs 
 
6.4 6.1 5.8 6.4 5.5 5.2 5.4 7.5 3.9 4.2 3.9 4.6 4.7 5.6 6.6 5.6 2.2 7.2 5.3 
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 Table 4.4: Quality of budget institutions sub-indices - descriptive statistics (post-
crisis data) 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Range 
1. Medium-term budgetary framework/targets 6.8 7.1 1.3 4.8 - 9.2 
National MTBF 7.9 8.3 1.4 5.0 – 10.0 
Connectedness between Stability Programme and 
national budgetary process 
5.7 5.8 2.2 1.7 – 10.0 
2. Fiscal rules 6.2 6.1 1.5 3.3 – 8.6 
Fiscal rule with the largest coverage of the general 
government sector 
6.9 7.1 1.4 4.4 – 9.6 
Other fiscal rules in place 4.4 4.3 3.0 0.0 – 10.0 
3. Structure of budget negotiations within the 
executive 
7.8 7.5 1.4 4.7 – 10.0 
4. Structure of the parliamentary process leading to 
the approval of the budget law 
4.2 3.3 2.4 0.0 – 8.3 
5. Flexibility of budget execution 6.1 6.6 1.1 3.8 – 7.7 
Executive authority to cut, cancel or rescind spending 
once the budget has been approved by the legislature 
6.5 7.8 3.4 0.0 – 10.0 
Possibility for line ministers to re-allocate funds within 
their own budget envelope 
6.1 7.5 1.3 2.4 – 10.0 
Executive authority to increase spending after the budget 
has been approved by the legislature 
5.1 4.4 2.5 2.5 – 10.0 
Supplementary budgets 6.8 5.0 2.6 3.3 – 10.0 
6. Budget transparency 7.1 6.9 1.8 3.7 – 9.6 
Legislative authorisation of off-budget expenditures and 
contingent liabilities 
7.1 10.0 3.7 0.0 – 10.0 
Comprehensiveness of budget documentation 6.7 6.5 1.5 4.3 – 9.0 
Public availability of budgetary information and 
methodologies 
7.4 6.7 2.4 3.3 – 6.7 
7. Independent fiscal institutions 5.3 5.5 1.3 2.2 – 7.5 
Formal powers of independent fiscal institutions 5.1 5.3 1.1 2.5 – 6.6 
Organisational/technical capacity of independent fiscal 
institutions 
5.5 5.1 2.2 1.8 – 10.0 
Source: Results are produced by author 
Meanwhile, EA member states fare less strongly regarding the connectedness 
of the SP with the national budgetary process, with average score values of 
around 6. In particular, although in practice the targets in the SP and the 
national MTBF and annual budget are the same (in 12 and 14 countries, 
respectively), this is generally not backed by a legal obligation. It is also 
notable that there is also more variation among the EA countries in this 
component of the MTBF sub-index. 
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Figure 4.2: Sub-index 1 - Medium-term budgetary framework/targets (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Although fiscal rules constitute a requirement for EA countries, the average 
score values for the second sub-index are at around 6. The country rankings, 
which are presented in Figure 4.3, are quite robust to changes in the weights 
assigned to the two components comprised in this sub-index and are also quite 
similar to those with the CION’s fiscal rules strength index (see Table AVI in 
Appendix I). 
Figure 4.3: Sub-index 2 – Fiscal rules (post-crisis data) 
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The strength of the fiscal rule with the largest coverage is reflected in the fact 
that it is based on a legal act in 14 EA countries and on a constitutional basis 
in three other countries, whilst the targets are binding with no margin for 
adjusting the objectives included in the fiscal rule in 14 countries.  On the other 
hand, there is scope to improve the effectiveness of fiscal rules since 
enforcement is delegated to an independent body in only nine countries and 
automatic correction mechanisms in case of non-compliance are found in only 
four countries. Similarly, only nine member states reported high media visibility 
for the fiscal rule. It is also noted that fiscal rules with broad coverage of the 
general government sector (more than 50%) are a relatively recent 
phenomenon in eleven EA countries, being introduced after 2010. Moreover, 
whilst 16 EA countries have more than one fiscal rule in place, these additional 
rules generally have a narrow scope, applying to regional and local 
government and/or the social security sector. 
The quality of the institutional framework governing the budget negotiations 
phase (Figure 4.4) is overall good, with a median value of 7.5.  
Figure 4.4: Sub-index 3 – Structure of budget negotiations within the executive (post-
crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Sixteen EA countries impose budget ceilings on the initial total expenditure 
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countries have coalition governments (Döring and Manow 2016), budget 
negotiations take place bilaterally between the finance minister and the 
spending ministers in only six countries and similarly the final decision-making 
power to resolve or settle disputes is centralised (at the Prime Minister or 
Minister of Finance level) in only six countries. 
In contrast, the quality of budget institutions in the budget approval stage is 
generally weak in EA countries, with a low median score value of around 3. As 
shown in Figure 4.5, there is a high degree of disparity among the member 
states.  
 
Figure 4.5: Sub-index 4 – Structure of the parliamentary process leading to the 
approval of the budget law (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
In most EA countries, legislatures have the power to amend the draft budget 
presented by the executive, with nine EA countries having unrestricted 
powers. Restricted amendment powers apply in eight countries, whilst the 
legislature can only approve or reject the draft budget, but not amend it, in the 
remaining two countries. Furthermore, there is a general lack of centralisation 
with the legislature voting first on the total amount of expenditure before voting 
on specific appropriations in only four countries. This constitutes an area for 
possible policy reform in the budget approval phase, without constraining the 
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legitimacy of the budgetary process. On the other hand, a positive institutional 
feature in the budget approval stage is a centralised parliamentary budget 
committee structure, which is found in thirteen EA countries. This facilitates a 
comprehensive view of the budget during the approval stage, similar to the 
role of the finance minister during the budget preparation stage. 
Turning to the budget implementation stage, the average score values for the 
fifth sub-index is around 6 and the variation within the EA is quite contained, 
as shown in Figure 4.6. Executive authority to cut or cancel spending and for 
line ministers to re-allocate funds within their own budget envelope is quite 
strong, which facilitates adjustment to unforeseen developments during 
budget implementation. On the other hand, in EA countries, the executive also 
has some power to increase spending and to use supplementary budgets104, 
which make it easier to sanction expenditure slippages. The prevalent 
restrictions to the executive’s authority to implement changes to the approved 
budget include allowing such changes for some categories of spending only, 
requiring approval - either from the finance ministry, government or the 
legislature - and to a lesser extent by applying thresholds. 
Figure 4.6: Sub-index 5 – Flexibility of budget execution (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
                                                          
104 A proxy relating to the top reason why supplementary budget/s are necessary was used 
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Meanwhile, the level of budget transparency in the EA (Figure 4.7) is good, 
with average score values of around 7. Twelve EA countries require legislative 
authorisation for all or most existing off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities. In addition, overall, budget documentation includes a wide range of 
information, whilst there is also good public availability of budgetary 
information and methodologies in most EA countries. Nevertheless, there is 
scope for more transparency to distinguish new expenditure measures in 
budget documentation (which is always done in only six countries) and to 
make publicly available a comprehensive annual financial plan for all levels of 
government, long-term perspectives on total revenue and expenditure, 
citizens’ budget and citizens’ budget guide (explaining the budget process and 
the actors involved) (which are made publicly available in only nine or less 
countries). 
Figure 4.7: Sub-index 6 – Budget transparency (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Finally, independent fiscal councils are not a particularly strong feature of 
budget institutions in the EA, with average score values for the last sub-index 
of around 5.5. A similar performance is noted for both formal powers as well 
as the organisational and technical capacity of IFIs. The country rankings, 
shown in Figure 4.8, are quite similar to those using Horvath’s (2018) fiscal 
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also to those obtained when applying an alternative (multiplicative) method to 
aggregate the formal and organisational capacity components of this sub-
index105 (Tables AVII and AVIII in Appendix I). 
Figure 4.8: Sub-index 7– Independent fiscal institutions (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
In terms of formal powers, the independence of IFIs is generally ensured in 
legal and operational terms (in 18 out of a total of 22 institutions106) and 
through the right to select, employ and pay staff (in 14 councils). On the other 
hand, other characteristics contributing to the independence of fiscal councils 
could be improved, namely safeguards on the budget (in place in only eight 
institutions) and membership (re-appointment of the governing/high-level 
members is prohibited in only six institutions; and only nine IFIs have only 
academics and policy experts as their members). In addition, few fiscal 
councils involve parliament in the appointment and dismissal of their members. 
Meanwhile, whilst most fiscal councils have a relatively broad mandate, 
                                                          
105 A certain degree of both formal powers and organisational/technical capacity is required 
for fiscal councils to influence the budgetary process, which implies that the full substitutability 
assumed by the linear additive approach may not be plausible. However, this method was 
applied to aggregate the two components of the IFI sub-index for simplicity and to be 
consistent with the methodology applied to aggregate the different sub-indices into the overall 
index.  
106 Belgium and Germany have two IFIs in place, whilst the second fiscal council in Slovenia 
was established but not operational by the cut-off date of December 2016. All other EA 
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forecasts are produced in only seven IFIs, whilst a comply and explain 
requirement exists in only five countries. 
As regards organisational and technical capacity, strong characteristics 
concern access to budgetary information and the number and range of public 
reports produced. On the other hand, most fiscal councils face constraints due 
to their relatively small size (having only up to twenty staff in 12 countries). In 
addition, most are relatively young institutions, with 15 councils being 
established since 2010107. 
4.4.2 The quality of budget institutions index: results for the composite 
index 
Overall, EA countries have budget institutions of medium quality (Table 4.5 
and Figure 4.9), with average score values for the composite index of around 
6. There is a low degree of variation among the member states. Similar results 
for the EA countries are found in Darvas and Kostyleva (2011) and likewise 
Austria and the Netherlands have high scores in the index whilst Belgium has 
a low score. However, there are differences in the rankings of other 
countries108. The robustness of the results was also tested by considering 
alternative weighting structures (Table AIX in Appendix I) and the country 
rankings were found to remain quite similar (Table AX in Appendix I). 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
The median values for the different sub-indices (Figure 4.10) indicate that, in 
general, EA countries fare more strongly in terms of MTBFs and the structure 
of budget negotiations. They also perform quite well in terms of fiscal rules, 
flexibility of budget execution and budget transparency. On the other hand, 
                                                          
107 In one country, a second IFI was established, whereas in the other 14 member states, the 
set-up of an IFI was a new institutional development. 
108 The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the two indices (for the EA countries) is only 
0.3, which can reflect the different time periods covered as well as the broader scope of the 
constructed index.  
Table 4.5: Quality of budget institutions index – descriptive statistics (post-crisis 
data) 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Range 
All EA countries 6.2 6.3 0.7 5.0 – 7.8 
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they fare poorly in the budget approval stage, and fiscal councils are also 
rather weak. 
Figure 4.9: Quality of budget institutions index (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
   Figure 4.10: Quality of budget institutions index and its sub-indices (post-crisis data) 
 
    Source: Results are produced by author 
 
The variation among EA countries for the overall index scores is rather 
contained, but, as shown Figure 4.10, there is more disparity at a sub-index 
level. There is most variation in the sub-index concerning the budget approval 
process, which is not covered by the EA fiscal governance framework. In this 
sub-index, the standard deviation is 2.4.  In the other sub-indices, the extent 
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of variation is found also for those characteristics which are subject to common 
requirements at an EA level, namely the MTBF, fiscal rules and IFI sub-
indices. This shows that even when common EA requirements apply, national 
governments do not adopt the same model for the dimension of budget 
institutions concerned. Rather, there is variation among the EA countries in 
the quality of different aspects of budget institutions, including in the strength 
of their numerical budgetary constraints and in their fiscal councils. 
Furthermore, it is noted that in various countries, weak scores in some sub-
indices are compensated by higher scores in other sub-indices. For example, 
within the top score category, France has a lack of centralisation in the 
structure of budget negotiations within the executive, but then has a very 
centralised structure of the budget approval process, whilst the opposite is the 
case for Austria, Ireland and Germany. The remaining two countries in the top 
score category (Spain and Slovenia) fare strongly in both sub-indices. Also 
within the group of high score countries, Slovenia as well as Austria have 
relatively weak fiscal rules but strong MTBFs, whereas the opposite is the case 
for Ireland whilst the other countries perform similarly in both sub-indices. 
These findings show substitutability between the different dimensions of 
budget institutions109, providing further indication that there can be different 
models for achieving good quality budget institutions and not necessarily a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ form of fiscal governance.  
These findings contrast with the general thrust of a more homogenous fiscal 
governance framework based on common requirements for all EA countries, 
particularly since the Great Crisis. On the other hand, it is consistent with 
arguments by Wyplosz (2012) and Hallerberg (2011), who drawing on the 
experience with fiscal frameworks in a number of countries, emphasise the 
need for local ownership of fiscal frameworks and for different approaches to 
fiscal governance, depending on a country’s specific institutional 
characteristics. Furthermore, Kopits (2012: 156), based on a review of the 
experience with fiscal frameworks in countries such as the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, criticises the centrally-mandated rules-
                                                          
109 This supports the assumption of substitutability inherent in the linear aggregation method 
used in the construction of the composite index. 
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based approach to fiscal governance, which has been increasingly applied in 
the EA, and argues that effective fiscal frameworks are “home-grown and 
home-owned” and supported by broad political ownership. The requirements 
for all EA countries to introduce fiscal rules and MTBFs and to establish fiscal 
councils ignore the diversity in the political system and institutional set-up of 
the different countries. Furthermore, being imposed supra-nationally, they may 
also suffer from a lack of national ownership, which can affect their 
effectiveness to achieve fiscal restraint. 
4.4.3 Quality of budget institutions in bailed-out and other EA countries 
In view of the expected influence of the quality of budget institutions on fiscal 
discipline, it is relevant to compare the scores for the constructed index for the 
bailed-out countries to those for the other EA member states. As shown in 
Table 4.6, the results do not show a marked difference in the overall quality of 
budget institutions between these two groups of countries, with very close 
average score values. Furthermore, it is notable that the EA country with the 
maximum score in the quality of budget institutions index is Spain, whilst 
Ireland is also in the top score category and all the other bailed-out countries, 
except Portugal, have medium quality budget institutions (Figure 4.9). 
Meanwhile, within the group of other EA countries, focusing on the member 
states with a relatively sound public finance position (as reflected in an 
average budget surplus during 2012-15), Germany has a top score in the 
quality of budget institutions index, whilst Estonia and Luxembourg are in the 
medium and low score categories, respectively. These findings constitute a 
crude indication of a weak relationship between the quality of budget 
institutions and fiscal performance110. 
At a sub-index level, the bailed-out countries and the other EA member states 
also fare quite similarly. The average score values are very close for the 
MTBF, fiscal rules, flexibility of budget execution and fiscal council sub-indices. 
Budget transparency is the only institutional characteristic where bailed-out 
countries fare worse than the other members of the EA. On the other hand, 
they have higher mean and median values for the budget formulation and 
                                                          
110 This relationship is analysed in more in-depth in Chapter 6. 
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budget approval sub-indices111. Furthermore, the variation among the 
countries included in these two groups is also quite similar both for the overall 
index and also for most of the sub-indices. 
 
Table 4.6: Quality of budget institutions in bailed-out1 and other EA countries – 
descriptive statistics (post-crisis data) 












Quality of budget 
institutions 
6.5 6.1 6.3 6.2 0.7 0.6 5.7 - 7.8 5.0 - 6.9 
1. MTBF 6.8 6.8 7.0 7.1 1.2 1.3 5.0 – 8.3 4.8 – 9.2 
2. Fiscal rules 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.1 1.7 1.4 4.2 – 8.6 3.3 – 8.0 
3. Budget 
negotiations 
8.6 7.5 8.8 7.5 1.7 1.2 5.6 – 10.0 4.7 – 9.2 
4. Budget approval 5.1 3.7 4.6 3.3 2.0 2.5 3.3 – 8.3 0.0 – 8.3 
5. Budget execution 6.4 6.0 6.5 6.6 0.6 1.3 5.6 – 7.2 3.8 – 7.7 
6. Budget 
transparency 
6.5 7.3 6.1 7.7 1.7 1.9 4.8 – 8.8 3.7 – 9.6 
7. IFIs 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.5 0.9 1.4 4.2 – 6.6 2.2 – 7.5 
Note:  
1 The bailed-out countries comprise Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
 
4.4.4 Quality of budget institutions: comparison of pre- and post-crisis 
indices 
Whilst, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, data constraints limit the direct 
comparability of the pre- and post-crisis quality of budget institutions indices, 
the average score values indicate some overall improvement in the EA during 
the period under review (from around 5 to 6). On the other hand, the degree 
of variation among EA countries has remained broadly unchanged at a low 
level (Table 4.7).   
As shown in Figure 4.11, the improvement in the quality of budget institutions 
appears to be across the board, with a higher score in the quality of budget 
institutions index by almost all countries in the sample (except in Belgium).  
The most marked increases were recorded in Greece, Ireland and Spain, all 
bailed-out countries, with their ranking position improving considerably. This 
                                                          
111 This reflects the prevalence of the delegation form of fiscal governance among the bailed-
out countries, as per findings presented in Section 4.4.5 (see Table 4.10). 
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shows that the overall good quality of budget institutions in the bailed-out 
group of countries, as discussed in the previous Section, is a relatively recent 
development, reflecting reforms implemented as part of the conditions to their 
bail-outs, as specified in their respective economic adjustment 
programmes112. Reforms in these three countries mainly involved fiscal rules, 
IFIs and the structure of budget negotiations during the formulation stage, as 
well as MTBFs in the case of Greece. In contrast, Portugal registered a more 
modest increase in its overall score113. Other countries with notably higher 
scores in the post-crisis index are France and Italy. 
Table 4.7: Pre- and post-crisis quality of budget institutions indices – descriptive 
statistics (post-crisis data) 

















Quality of budget 
institutions 
5.2 6.3 5.1 6.3 0.8 0.7 3.6 – 6.3 5.2 – 7.8 
1. MTBF 5.2 6.8 5.4 7.1 1.9 1.3 0.8 – 8.3 4.8 – 9.2 
2. Fiscal rules 3.4 6.2 3.8 6.1 1.6 1.5 0.0 – 5.5 3.3 – 8.6 
3. Budget 
negotiations 
6.8 7.8 6.3 7.5 1.7 1.7 5.0 – 10.0 4.7 – 10.0 
4. Budget approval 4.6 4.3 3.3 3.3 2.7 2.5 0.0 – 8.3 1.7 – 8.3 
5. Budget execution 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.5 1.2 1.2 4.5 – 8.6 3.8 – 7.7 
6. Budget 
transparency 
7.0 7.0 7.3 6.9 1.6 1.6 3.1 – 10.0 4.0 – 9.3 
7. IFIs 2.1 5.3 0.0 5.5 3.8 1.3 0.0 – 10.0 2.2 - 7.5 
Notes:  
1 Sub-indices 1, 2 and 7 refer to all the 19 EA countries. On the other hand, sub-indices 3-6 (and thus also the quality 
of budget institutions index) refer only to the 14 EA countries (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, EL, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SK, SI and 
ES) for which pre-crisis data is available. The respective descriptive statistics for the post-crisis period also cover the 
same 14 EA countries and hence, differ from those presented earlier.  
2 Pre-crisis data refers to 2007 for all indices, except for sub-index 1 which comprises data pertaining to 2009 and 
2010. Post-crisis data refers to 2014 for sub-indices 1, 2 and 7; and to 2012 for sub-indices 3-6. 
3 Sub-indices 2 and 4 are fully comparable for the pre- and post-crisis periods, but data constraints limit the 
comparability of sub-indices 1, 3, 5, 6 and in particular, sub-index 7 (since most IFIs were set up after 2007). As a 
result, the pre- and post-crisis quality of budget institutions indices are also not directly comparable. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Overall, for the EA countries in the sample, almost all the dimensions of the 
quality of budget institutions contributed to the overall improvement in the 
composite indicator over the period under review. However, the better quality 
                                                          




113 Due to data constraints, the pre-crisis quality of budget institutions index cannot be 
compiled for the other two bailed-out countries – Cyprus and Latvia. 
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of budget institutions in the EA was largely spurred by the common EA 
requirements introduced following the Great Crisis. In particular, as shown in 
Figure 4.12, the largest improvements involved the fiscal councils and fiscal 
rules sub-indices. Nine countries in the sample set up new IFIs during the 
period under review114, whilst the improvement in fiscal rules reflects both the 
introduction of new fiscal rules as well as reforms extending the scope of 
existing rules and making them more binding. The common EA requirements 
also affected MTBFs, but a more modest increase was registered in the 
median value of the relevant sub-index. 
Similarly, some improvement is also noted for the budget formulation and 
implementation stages. In the budget formulation stage, this mainly reflects 
reforms by seven countries to introduce budget ceilings or more stringent 
ceilings on the initial spending requests of line ministers, whilst there is more 
executive flexibility, both to cut, cancel and shift spending as well as to 
increase it. On the other hand, the structure of the budget approval process 
was more resistant to change, whilst the findings suggest a slight deterioration 
of budget transparency. 
Figure 4.11: Pre- and post-crisis quality of budget institutions indices, by country 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
 
                                                          













AT BE FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NL PT SK SI ES
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Chapter 4: The Quality of Budget Institutions in the Euro Area 
 
  112 
 
Figure 4.12: Pre- and post-crisis quality of budget institutions indices and sub-
indices, median values 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
4.4.5 Forms of fiscal governance in the EA 
The common EA requirements for national budget institutions involve a rules-
based approach. Hence, it is relevant to assess whether this form of fiscal 
governance is more prevalent among the EA countries. To carry out this 
analysis, the constructed index was decomposed into two separate indices 
capturing the delegation and contracts approaches (described in Section 
4.2.1). Similarly to Yläoutinen (2004), the delegation approach index 
comprises the strength of the finance minister during budget negotations and 




                                                          
115 The sequence of the voting procedure and the parliamentary budget committee structure, 
within the approval stage, are not included in the delegation index as they concern more the 
degree of centralisation of decision-making within parliament rather than the relative strength 
of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive. Furthermore, in the implementation stage, flexibility 
for line ministers to reallocate funds within their own budget envelope and restrictions on 
executive authority to increase spending and on the use of supplementary budgets are not 
included as they imply less power for the finance minister.  













































Table 4.8: Delegation and contracts indices – results (post-crisis data) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
Delegation index 
 
5.4 4.5 8.2 7.1 2.5 6.3 5.1 9.3 8.9 6.2 3.6 4.2 5.4 5.5 4.2 4.8 5.6 7.3 8.3 
Contracts index 
 
7.1 6.0 5.3 6.5 6.5 7.6 7.2 5.9 6.7 7.0 7.3 6.1 5.9 5.7 8.5 5.9 6.9 5.9 7.9 
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On the other hand, as shown in Table AXI in Appendix I, the contracts index 
includes national MTBFs116 and fiscal rules as well as budget transparency 
and IFIs, since the latter two characteristics can contribute towards stronger 
numerical budgetary constraints. This contracts index is considerably broader 
in scope than that in Hallerberg et al. (2009), in particular by including budget 
transparency and fiscal councils. The results for the constructed delegation 
and contracts indices are shown in Table 4.8, whilst descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 4.9. 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Overall, in the EA, budget institutions are stronger in terms of characteristics 
typical of the contracts approach, as reflected in the higher average score 
values117. There is also more variation among EA countries in the scores for 
the delegation approach. This prevalence of the contracts approach among 
EA countries is expected since, as discussed further on, most member states 
have coalition governments. 
However, at a country level, the identification of the form of fiscal governance 
cannot be clearly defined because various countries have quite similar scores 
for the two indices. Thus, whereas Yläoutinen (2004) and Hallerberg et al. 
(2009) categorise a country’s form of fiscal governance on the basis of its 
score for the respective delegation and contracts indices118, in this study, the 
                                                          
116 The connectedness between the SP and the national budgetary process is not included in 
the contracts index, since all EA countries are required to prepare a SP and hence this 
characteristic is relevant to countries with both forms of fiscal governance. 
117 As noted in Section 4.2.1, Hallerberg et al. (2009) and Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010) 
present similar results. 
118 These studies also show similarly high rankings in both indices for some countries - France, 
Ireland and Greece in Hallerberg et al. (2009) and Slovenia in Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 
(2010). However, overall, the country rankings in the two indices differ from those presented 
in this Section, reflecting not only differences in the institutional characteristics included in the 
indices but also the different timeframes.   
Table 4.9: Delegation and contracts indices - descriptive statistics (post-crisis data) 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Range 
Delegation index 5.9 5.5 1.9 2.5 – 9.3 
Contracts index 6.6 6.5 0.8 5.3 – 8.5 
Chapter 4: The Quality of Budget Institutions in the Euro Area 
 
  115 
 
difference in ranking in the two indices is used to establish more clearly the 
predominant form of fiscal governance: 
Rankdifference = Rankdelegation – Rankcontracts 
where  
Rankdelegation is the country ranking in the delegation approach index 
Rankcontracts is the country ranking in the contracts approach index 
Rankdifference > 0 indicates a predominantly contracts approach 
Rankdifference < 0 indicates a predominantly delegation approach 
Rankdifference = 0 indicates a ‘hybrid’ approach (similar ranking in the delegation and contracts 
indices) 
 
On the basis of these criteria, the Netherlands and Latvia clearly have a 
contracts approach, whereas Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia evidently adopt a 
delegation approach. Other EA member states have forms of fiscal 
governance which are closer to either of these two approaches, as shown in 
Figure 4.13. However, Portugal, Italy, Slovakia, Spain and Belgium rank 
similarly in the two indices, suggesting a ‘hybrid’ form of fiscal governance. In 
particular, Spain has top scores in both the delegation and contracts indices. 
Thus, whilst the SGP and the common EA requirements reflect a rules-based 
approach, on the assumption that: 
“the Scandinavian and Dutch frameworks should be an example for all 
countries” (Hallerberg 2011: 136),  
in several EA countries, the role of the finance minister remains crucial to attain 
fiscal discipline. 
It is also pertinent to note that within the group of bailed-out countries, only 
Latvia has a contracts approach, whilst the others have a delegation or hybrid 
form of fiscal governance. There is more diversity among the other group of 
countries. Similarly, countries with the top scores in the quality of budget 
institutions index adopt different approaches to their budget institutions and 
this applies also to the medium and low score categories.  
The resulting form of fiscal governance in each EA country has then been 
compared to the expected approach based on their type of government, as 
hypothesised by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) and discussed in Section 
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4.2.1. Following the approach adopted by Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010), 
a simple distinction is made between single-party majority governments and 
coalition or single-party minority governments119. The results are shown in 
Table 4.10. 
Figure 4.13: Delegation and contracts indices – difference in country ranking (post-
crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
However, in contrast to previous findings for the EU15 (Halleberg et al. 2007, 
2009) and for the CEECs (Yläoutinen 2004; Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 2010), 
the findings show a discrepancy between the actual and the expected form of 
fiscal governance in various EA countries. Out of the 16 EA countries which 
had mostly a coalition type of government during 2012-15, only seven have a 
predominantly contracts approach120 and similarly, among the three countries 
which mostly had a single-party majority government during the period under 
review, only one had a predominantly delegation form of fiscal governance. 
                                                          
119 Yläoutinen (2004) and Hallerberg et al. (2009) use a more sophisticated approach, based 
on various indicators of the political and electoral system 
120 Greece and Portugal shifted from a single-party majority government in previous years to 
a coalition or single-party minority government during period under review. Excluding them 
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Table 4.10: Factors influencing the form of fiscal governance in the EA 
EA country Type of government during 
2012-20151,2, 3 
Expected form of 
fiscal governance 
based on type of 
government 
Size of country 
– based on 
population size4 
Actual form of 
fiscal 
governance 
Austria Coalition Contracts Large Contracts 
Belgium Coalition Contracts Large Hybrid 
Cyprus Mostly coalition (single-party 
minority in 2012 and first part of 
2013) 
Contracts Small Delegation 
Estonia Coalition Contracts Small Delegation 
Finland Coalition Contracts Small Contracts 
France Coalition Contracts Large Contracts 
Germany Coalition Contracts Large Contracts 
Greece Coalition (technocrat 
government in 2011-12) 
Contracts Large Delegation 
Ireland Coalition Contracts Small Delegation 
Italy Coalition (technocrat 
government in 2011-12) 
Contracts Large Hybrid 
Latvia Coalition Contracts Small Contracts 
Lithuania Coalition Contracts Small Contracts 
Luxembourg Coalition Contracts Small Delegation 
Malta Single-party majority Delegation Small Delegation 
Netherlands Coalition Contracts Large Contracts 
Portugal Mostly coalition (single-party 
minority in last part of 2015) 
Contracts Large Hybrid 
Slovakia Single-party majority Delegation Small Hybrid 
Slovenia Coalition Contracts Small Delegation 
Spain Mostly single-party majority 
(single-party minority in 2015) 
Delegation Large Hybrid 
Notes: 
1 Data on cabinets in EA countries is from Parliaments and governments database (Döring and Manow 2016). 
2 The post-crisis data for budget institutions refers to 2012-16. 
3 All EA member states are parliamentary systems, except CY and LT which have presidential systems. 
4 Countries with a population of 5.5 million (which corresponds to the 50% percentile for the EA countries) or less 
are considered as small countries. Data is from Eurostat (2018a). 
Source: Döring and Manow (2016); Eurostat (2018a); other results are produced by author 
 
On the other hand, the results suggest that the form of fiscal governance 
adopted by a country may be influenced by its size. Distinguishing between 
small and large countries on the basis of the population size (as described in 
Table 4.10)121, out of the 10 small EA countries, six adopt a delegation 
approach, whilst only three adopt a contracts approach and one adopts a 
hybrid approach. This prevalence of the delegation approach among small EA 
countries is notable given the increased influence of the rules-based approach 
                                                          
121 There is no consensus on the definition of a small state and other criteria that are used 
include territory size and the size of the economy. Any benchmark applied is arbitrary – for 
further discussion, see, for example, Thorhallson and Wivel (2006) and Randma-Liiv (2002). 
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on budget institutions following the reforms implemented since the Great Crisis 
and also since it contrasts with the expected form of fiscal governance based 
on the type of government in most of these countries. Certain characteristics 
of small states’ public administration, for instance, the limited availability of 
human resources, the importance of personal contacts and the greater 
influence of politicians (Randma-Liiv 2002; Sarapu 2010) facilitate the 
centralisation of the budgetary process through a powerful finance minister, 
which is typical of the delegation form of fiscal governance. However, there is 
scope to analyse further this relationship in future research work. 
 
4.5 Summary of results and conclusions 
This Chapter presents a broad and comparable composite index for the quality 
of budget institutions in the 19 EA countries, which captures institutional 
reforms implemented after the Great Crisis. The results show that overall EA 
countries have medium quality of budget institutions. The findings do not show 
a clear distinction in the overall quality of budget institutions between the 
bailed-out countries and the other EA member states. Indeed, all the bailed-
out countries, except Portugal, have top or medium scores in the composite 
index; whilst the other member states feature in all three score categories. 
Similarly, at a sub-index level, the average scores are quite similar for the two 
groups of countries.  
In general, EA countries fare more strongly in terms of MTBFs and the 
structure of budget negotiations. The quality of fiscal rules, procedures during 
budget implementation and budget transparency are also quite good. On the 
other hand, the structure of the parliamentary process to approve the budget 
constitutes the poorest dimension of budget institutions and overall, fiscal 
councils are also quite weak. The analysis of the findings at a sub-index level 
has identified main elements of strengths as well as weaknesses in budget 
institutions for the EA. For instance, there is scope for stronger enforcement 
of national MTBFs and fiscal rules; more connectedness between the SP and 
the national budgetary process; a top-down approach for parliamentary voting 
in the budget approval stage; less executive flexibility to increase spending 
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during budget implementation and increased independence and a 
strengthening of the organisational capacity of fiscal councils. 
Whilst data constraints limit the comparability of the pre- and post-crisis 
indices, there are indications of an overall improvement in the quality of budget 
institutions during the period under review. This is reflected in the performance 
of almost all EA countries, with the most marked improvements being 
registered by bailed-out countries (Greece, Ireland and Spain), reflecting 
conditions imposed as part of their financial assistance programmes. 
Furthermore, the major changes to budget institutions during the period under 
review involved a notable strengthening of fiscal rules and fiscal councils. 
Thus, they were largely triggered by the common EA requirements introduced 
after the Great Crisis, rather than more broad-based reforms driven by a 
national policy agenda. 
Whilst the degree of variation in the scores for the quality of budget institutions 
index among EA countries is quite limited (both for the pre- and post-crisis 
periods), there is more variation at a sub-index level. There is also 
considerable variation among the member states in the specific characteristics 
of each institutional dimension. These findings indicate that there can be 
different models for achieving good quality budget institutions, rather than a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ form of fiscal governance. It is noteworthy that there is 
considerable variation across EA countries also in the strength of their MTBFs, 
fiscal rules and fiscal councils, despite the thrust for more homogenous budget 
institutions through common requirements for all EA countries. This supra-
nationally imposed apporach to reform budget institutions ignores the diversity 
in the political system and institutional set-up of the different countries. 
Furthermore, being imposed supra-nationally, these common institutional 
requirements are less likely to be effective due to a lack of national ownership, 
as argued by Kopits (2012).  
Finally, as regards different forms of fiscal governance, despite the rules-
based nature of the SGP and of the common EA requirements introduced 
since the Great Crisis, a notable number of countries have a predominantly 
delegation form of fiscal governance, whilst some other member states have 
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a hybrid system, comprising elements of the two approaches. This further 
shows the limits of centrally-mandated reforms to national budget institutions.  
Moreover, in contrast to previous studies, evidence of a strong relationship 
between the type of government in a country and its form of fiscal governance 
is not found. Rather, the results suggest that the size of the country may be a 
more important determinant of the form of fiscal governance adopted, with the 
delegation approach being more prevalent among the small EA countries. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on a specific aspect of budget institutions, namely the 
budgetary power of national legislatures in the EA. As discussed in the 
previous Chapter, the literature on budget institutions has generally 
considered strong legislative budgetary powers, especially amendment 
powers, as conflicting with fiscal discipline. However, as highlighted in Chapter 
1, the legislature, as the representative body of the people, has a key role to 
ensure that budgetary decisions are democratically legitimate. Furthermore, 
other aspects of legislative budgeting may actually contribute to more fiscal 
discipline, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
In the EA, achieving democratic legitimacy to budgetary decisions is more 
challenging and complex, because whilst budgetary decisions are taken at a 
national level, these are subject to the SGP’s supra-national constraints. The 
latter are beyond the national parliaments’ span of control, thus limiting their 
powers to scrutinise and control budgetary policy (Crum 2018). At the same 
time, the CION, despite its key role in the implementation of the SGP, lacks 
the democratic mandate to pass judgement on national budgetary policy, 
whilst measures or sanctions imposed on a country by a majority decision of 
finance ministers in Council also lack democratic legitimacy since ministers 
are only accountable to the electorate in their home country (Beukers 2013). 
Indeed, voters can only sanction their national governments, but not the EU 
institutions or governments of creditor countries that are prescribing their 
budgets (Crum 2013).  
This fundamental conflict, in political terms, between the supra-national fiscal 
rules and the democratic principle for national parliaments’ authority to 
approve the budget (Krogstrup and Wyplosz 2009), has been exacerbated 
with the tightening of the SGP following the Great Crisis and the increased 
surveillance of budgetary policies by EU institutions. At the same time there is 
no effective scrutiny at the European level. Whilst the European Parliament 
had an important role in the legislative process leading to the ‘Six-Pack’ and 
‘Two-Pack’, its role in the implementation of the SGP has remained marginal 
(Crum 2018). The reforms to the EU economic governance framework since 
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the Crisis have resulted in new provisions for economic dialogue between the 
European Parliament and other EU institutions as well as with national 
parliaments, but otherwise, the European Parliament’s powers have not been 
strengthened (Dawson 2015). This dialogue process122 is of an informative 
and consultative nature and the European Parliament does not have any 
power to intervene in the implementation of the SGP, leaving it in a “rather 
passive, receptive position” (Crum 2018: 276).  
In this context, both the European Commission’s (2014a) review of the 
implementation of the ‘Six-Pack’ and the ‘Two-Pack’ as well as its 
communication on completing EMU (European Commission 2017a) call for 
more involvement of national parliaments to ensure the democratic 
accountability and legitimacy of the EU’s economic governance. This reflects 
the principle that democratic control and accountability should take place at 
the level at which decisions are taken (Crum 2018) – i.e. at the national level 
for budgetary decisions. 
However, to date, attempts to involve national parliaments in the SGP 
procedures have been very modest. Whilst governments are encouraged to 
do so, this is not mandatory and the only specific requirements are that the SP 
must indicate whether it has been presented to and approved by parliament, 
and whether the Council Opinion on the previous Programme and any relevant 
warnings, recommendations or decisions by EU institutions have been 
discussed in parliament (Council of the European Union 2017: 3, 19). 
Furthermore, the reforms to the EA fiscal governance framework have not 
provided for increased involvement of national parliaments in the SGP, except 
for the provisions relating to economic dialogue, referred to above. Rather, 
they entail stricter rules and stronger central monitoring and enforcement by 
EU institutions, which have further constrained the role and relevance of 
national parliaments in the budgetary process. In particular, the ‘Two-Pack’ 
                                                          
122 Article 3, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 and Article 15, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 
provide for more economic dialogue between national parliaments and the European 
Parliament, whilst Article 13 of the TSCG also provides for inter-parliamentary co-operation 
between the European Parliament and national parliaments. However, these processes are 
outside the scope of this thesis: as highlighted in Chapter 1, the European Parliament does 
not have an effective influence in the implementation of the SGP and thus its role is not 
considered in this study. 
Chapter 5: Legislative Budgetary Power in the Euro Area 
 
  124 
 
requires that the executive’s draft budgets are vetted by the CION123, which 
limits the relevance of the legislature’s role to discuss, amend and approve the 
budget124. Furthermore, the SGP reforms also require that the national 
budgetary cycle follows a common timeline125, which may also constrain the 
possibility for legislative involvement in the respective procedures. For 
example, in a study on the European Semester, Hallerberg et al. (2011) found 
that the tight timeframe available as regards the SP constrained the ability of 
the six countries in their sample to involve their national parliaments. Similarly, 
Dawson (2015) notes how the possibility for national parliaments to react to 
the CION’s opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plan is constrained by the tight 
timeframes involved126. 
In view of these challenges, this Chapter aims to gain an understanding of the 
budgetary role of national legislatures in EA countries. In particular, this 
Chapter aims to address the following research questions: 
- What is the budgetary power of national legislatures in the EA and what 
are the main differences across the member states? 
- How has legislative budgetary power changed in the EA following the 
Great Crisis? 
Legislative budgetary power is measured through a composite numerical 
index, which provides a recent and comprehensive measure of legislative 
budgetary power for all the 19 EA member states. The index captures effects 
of the reforms to the EA’s fiscal governance framework on legislative 
budgetary power. Furthermore, the index has a broad scope and captures the 
role of the legislature throughout the budgetary process, including the 
                                                          
123 Articles 6 and 7, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013. 
124 The possibility that the CION presents its opinion on the draft budget to the national 
parliament (and similarly for its recommendations under the EDP, (Article 11, Regulation (EU) 
No 473/2013)) is not being implemented. In fact, in its Communication on steps towards 
completing EMU, the European Commission (2015b: 15) proposes to “give more life to the 
right recognised in the ‘Two-Pack’ to convene a Commissioner”. 
125 The national medium-term fiscal plans and the SPs must be made public by 30 April, whilst 
the draft budget should be public by 15 October and the budget for the forthcoming year should 
be approved and adopted by 31 December (Article 4, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013). 
126 The CION is required to publish its opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plans by 30 November 
(Article 7, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013), whilst the budget must be approved by parliament 
by the end of the year. 
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formulation, approval and implementation stages, as well as its involvement in 
the implementation of the SGP. Other novel features of the index concern the 
legislature’s involvement in fiscal rules and its relationship with the fiscal 
council. Moreover, the different institutional characteristics are measured in 
considerable detail, thus providing a comprehensive estimate of legislative 
budgetary power and the index also uses unique data on certain aspects of 
legislative budgeting, generated through questionnaires to national authorities. 
Finally, an index for the pre-crisis period is also constructed in order to address 
the second research question. 
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows: the next Section presents a 
review of the literature which measures legislative budgetary power; this is 
followed by a discussion on the methodology applied, including the selected 
variables, the data sources and the approaches applied to construct the index 
and carry out the comparative analysis; finally, the results are presented and 
discussed and the Chapter ends with a summary of the results and 
conclusions. 
5.2 Literature review: measuring legislative budgetary power 
In their literature review on the fiscal scrutiny function of parliaments 
worldwide, Gaspard et al. (2016) note that the role of legislatures to scrutinise 
public finances has not been sufficiently researched in neither the literature on 
parliament nor on public finances. The role of the legislature in the budgetary 
process is captured, to some extent, in the literature on budget institutions, 
reviewed in the previous Chapter. But these studies have a broader scope and 
capture only particular aspects of legislative budgeting. On the other hand, 
studies which focus on legislative budgeting and analyse it in a more 
comprehensive manner are scarce.  
5.2.1 Legislative budgeting in the literature on budget institutions 
The quality of budget institutions indices, reviewed in the previous Chapter, 
capture legislative budgeting mainly through its role in the budget approval 
stage. As shown in Table 5.1, these indices thus consider characteristics such 
as whether any restrictions apply to legislative amendments to the executive’s 
Chapter 5: Legislative Budgetary Power in the Euro Area 
 
  126 
 
draft budget; whether an amendment can cause the fall of the government; 
reversionary budgets and whether government can call a vote of confidence 
when the vote of the budget takes place127.  
Table 5.1: Legislative budgeting in the quality of budget institutions indices for 
European countries 
Author Date Sample Characteristics of legislative budgetary power included 
in the index 
von Hagen 1992 12 EEC 
countries 
1991 - legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget  
- whether legislative amendments to the budget can cause 
the fall of the government  
- reversionary budget 
- time available for budget scrutiny 
- whether and how legislature is informed on budget 
implementation 
- authorisation function of the legislature for changes to the 
budget during implementation 
Gleich 2003 10 CEECs 1998-
2000 
- relative budgetary power of the upper house vis-à-vis the 
lower house in the legislature 
- legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget 
- whether legislative amendments to the budget can cause 
the fall of the government  
- reversionary budget 
- veto right of the president in the budgetary procedure 
- authorisation function of the legislature for changes to the 
budget during implementation 
Ylӓoutinen 2004 10 CEECs 2003 Index capturing the parliamentary process to approve the 
budget: 
- whether the legislature can propose the annual budget 
independently from the government 
- legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget 
- whether legislative amendments to the budget can cause 
the fall of the government 
- whether government can call a vote of confidence when the 
budget vote takes place 
- the degree of party discipline in budget votes 
- estimation of the total size of legislative budgetary 
amendments 
- time available for budget scrutiny 
- reversionary budget 
 
Qualitative information on: 
- veto right of the president in the budgetary procedure 






                                                          
127 Several of these indices also include whether parliament first votes on the budget size and 
then on its composition. However, this characteristic is more relevant for its contribution to 
fiscal discipline, rather than for legislative budgetary power. 
Chapter 5: Legislative Budgetary Power in the Euro Area 
 
  127 
 
Table 5.1: Legislative budgeting in the quality of budget institutions indices for 
European countries (cont.) 




2006 10 CEECs 1997, 
2003 
- legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget  
- whether legislative amendments to the budget can cause 
the fall of the government  
- whether government can call a vote of confidence when the 
budget vote takes place 
- reversionary budget 
- veto right of the president in the budgetary procedure 
- authorisation function of the legislature for changes to the 
budget during implementation 
Hallerberg 
et al. 
2007 EU15 1990-91, 
2000-1, 
2004 
- legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget 
- whether legislative amendments to the budget can cause 
the fall of the government 
- authorisation function of the legislature for changes to the 
budget during implementation 
Hallerberg 
et al. 
2009 EU15 1990-91, 
2000-1, 
2004 
- legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget 
- whether legislative amendments to the budget can cause 
the fall of the government 
- authorisation function of the legislature for changes to the 
budget during implementation 
- comprehensiveness of budget document presented to the 
legislature 
- whether the budget is included in one document 
Hallerberg 
et al. 
2009 10 CEECs 1998-
2000, 
2003 
As in Gleich (2003) 
Darvas and 
Kostyleva 










- legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget 






- legislative power to amend the executive’s draft budget 
- whether parliament approves all new contingent liabilities 
- whether a budget orientation debate and vote takes place 
- authorisation function of the legislature for changes to the 








Fiscal rules index: 
- whether monitoring and enforcement of the fiscal rule is 
carried out by an independent body (including parliament) 
- legislative authorisation for government to change the 
target of the fiscal rule2 
MTBF index: 
- involvement of the legislature in the preparation of the 
medium-term budgetary plans (presentation or vote) 
Notes:  
1 fiscal rules index 1990-2016; MTBF index 2006, 2008-2016 (all indices are updated annually) 
2 This characteristic was introduced in the fiscal rules index based on ‘new’ methodology published in 2017. 
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Moreover, presidential veto rights in the budget approval stage are also 
considered by Gleich (2003), Ylӓoutinen (2004) and Fabrizio and Mody 
(2006). Most of the indices also include the authorisation function of parliament 
for budget changes during the implementation stage, whilst other aspects of 
the legislature’s role in monitoring budget performance are taken into account 
by von Hagen (1992) and  Ylӓoutinen (2004). In contrast, few indices consider 
the role of the legislature during the budget formulation stage: Olden et al.’s 
index (2012) captures whether a budget orientation debate and vote takes 
place in the legislature; the European Commission’s (2017e) indices measure 
parliament’s role vis-à-vis the medium term fiscal strategy and fiscal rules, 
whilst Ylӓoutinen (2004) also considers whether parliament can propose the 
annual budget independently from the executive. Legislative budgetary 
organisational capacity is included in only some of the indices and only in a 
limited manner: von Hagen (1992) and Ylӓoutinen (2004) include the time 
available for budget scrutiny whilst Hallerberg et al. (2009) capture the 
comprehensiveness of the budget document presented to the legislature. 
5.2.2 The literature on legislative budgeting  
The literature on legislative budgeting is scarcer and less established than that 
on the quality of budget institutions. Moreover, most of the available research 
on legislative budgeting is descriptive and comprises a number of single-
country studies128. Coombes (1976) provides one of the first comparative 
studies on six European countries. More recently, Krafchik and Wehner (1998) 
carry out a structured comparison of legislative budgeting in Australia, 
Germany, India and the United Kingdom, whilst LeLoup and Ferfila (2003) 
compare legislative budgeting in Hungary and Slovenia and Stapenhurst and 
Imbeau (2017) present a survey of legislative finance committees in 
Francophone countries. Larger comparative studies, covering around 30 
countries, are found in Schick (2002) and Wehner (2004), with the former 
focusing on legislative budget amendment powers, whereas the latter 
developed broader typologies of legislative budgeting. Santiso (2005) 
                                                          
128 Recent examples of country studies on legislative budgeting for EA countries include 
Leston-Bandeira (1999) on Portugal; Wehner (2001) on Germany; Forestiere and Pelizzo 
(2004, 2008) on Italy; and Djouldem (2017) on France. 
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developed similar categories for legislative budgeting for around 20 Latin 
American countries. 
Few studies have developed quantitative measures of legislative budgetary 
power, namely Lienert (2005), Wehner (2006, 2010b) and Rίos et al. (2018)129. 
As shown in Table 5.2, the legislative budgetary indices by the former two 
authors are both based on survey-based data from the OECD/World Bank and 
cover around 30 countries. Whilst Lienert’s (2005) index includes the 
legislature’s involvement in the medium-term budget strategy, Wehner’s 
(2006, 2010b) index is broader in scope and also distinguishes between formal 
legislative budgetary powers and its organisational capacity. Furthermore, 
Wehner (2006, 2010b) assumes that a certain degree of both formal powers 
and organisational capacity is required for the legislature to influence the 
budget process, but Lienert (2005) assumes substitutability between all the 
institutional characteristics. Recently, Kim (2015) has developed further 
Wehner’s (2006, 2010b) index by using an alternative weighting structure, 
based on the analytic hierarchy process130 and applying it to a broader and 
more diverse sample of 60 countries.  
Finally, Rίos et al.’s (2018) legislative budgetary oversight index covers 75 
countries and uses data from the Open Budget Survey by the International 
Budget Partnership. Like in Lienert (2005), this index also captures the role of 
the legislature during budget preparation and it includes some institutional 
characteristics which are similar to the other indices, but it focuses more on 
aspects concerning budget transparency and its measure of the legislature’s 





                                                          
129 A few indices with a broader scope also capture some aspects of legislative budgeting: for 
example, Fish (2006) in a parliamentary power index for 25 post-communist countries; and 
Lavielle et al. (2003) in a budget transparency index for ten Latin American countries. 
130 This technique extracts expert opinion on different attributes by means of systematic 
pairwise comparisons (OECD and Joint Research Centre - European Commission 2008). 
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Table 5.2: Legislative budgetary power indices 
Author  Date Sample Scope of index Data Sources 
Lienert 2005 2003 28 
countries 
- whether legislature approves the medium-
term budget strategy  
- legislative power to amend the executive’s 
draft budget 
- time available for budget scrutiny 
- technical support to the legislature through a 
specialized budget advisory/research 
organization 
- authorisation function of the legislature for 
changes to the budget during implementation  
OECD/World Bank 
(2003) survey on 












- legislative power to amend the executive’s 
draft budget 
- reversionary budget 
- authorisation function of the legislature for 
changes to the budget during implementation 
 
Organisational capacity: 
- time available for budget scrutiny 
- committee capacity 
- access to budgetary information (proxied by 
existence and size of specialised budget 
research units within the legislature) 
OECD/World Bank 
(2003) and OECD 
(2007) surveys on 
budget practices and 
procedures 




Same dimensions as in Wehner (2010b) OECD/World Bank 
(2007, 2008) survey 




interviews with public 
officials in charge of 
finance and expert 
opinions conducted by 




2018 2009 75 
countries  
- involvement of the legislature during the 
budget preparation phase (whether executive 
holds consultations on budget priorities) 
- time available for budget scrutiny 
- legislative committee scrutiny of 
macroeconomic and fiscal framework 
presented in the budget 
- public hearings by legislative committees on 
individual budgets of central government 
administrative units 
- comprehensiveness of budgetary 
information 
- legislative power to amend the executive’s 
draft budget 
- authorisation function of the legislature for 
shifts of funds between administrative unit 
- timing of legislative approval of 
supplemental budgets and of expenditure of 
contingency funds or similar funds 
- legislative scrutiny of audit reports 
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All these indices show considerable variation in the degree of legislative 
budgetary power among the countries included in their respective samples, 
with a broad range in the country scores, also among the EA member states 
included in these studies131. Such diversity has been largely attributed to 
whether a country has a presidential or parliamentary system, and to other 
political factors, namely minority governments and party discipline.132 
Finally, it is relevant to point out that these indices of legislative budgetary 
power all measure legislative influence over the budget through its institutional 
characteristics, rather than through direct measures of its policy influence. 
However, strong legislative budgetary power does not necessarily result in a 
strong influence over the budget. For instance, using OECD survey data, 
Schick (2002) and Wehner (2004) find that although some OECD countries 
had considerable formal amendment powers, most countries typically made 
either no changes or only minor adjustments to the executive’s draft budget. 
However, data limitations can constrain the possibility of measuring this direct 
legislative policy influence. Furthermore, besides amendments to the draft 
budget, legislative policy influence can involve informal contacts between 
legislators and the executive and anticipatory behaviour by the executive 
during budget formulation, as discussed in Chapter 3, which is even more 
difficult to quantify. 
5.2.3 Contribution to the literature 
This Chapter contributes to the scant literature on legislative budgeting by 
providing a recent, comprehensive and comparable measure of legislative 
budgetary power for all the 19 current members of the EA. The few available 
legislative budgetary power indices do not include all the EA countries, whilst 
at the same time they include also other countries which are more diverse. 
There is more analytical relevance in analysing differences in legislative 
budgetary power among the EA member states, since they are subject to a 
common supra-national fiscal governance framework.  
                                                          
131 Results by country for Rίos et al. (2018) are not publicly available. 
132 For further discussion on these issues, see Lienert (2005), Wehner (2010b) and Rίos et al. 
(2018) 
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The constructed index provides a more comprehensive measure of legislative 
budgeting, including in the implementation of the SGP. In this manner, this 
Chapter extends the literature on legislative budgeting to the supra-national 
level and provides a link between the literature on legislative budgeting and 
the literature on the SGP. The constructed index also has a broader scope as 
regards the legislature’s role in the formulation, approval and implementation 
stages of the national budget. In particular, it captures the involvement of the 
legislature in fiscal rules as well as the relationship of the legislature with IFIs, 
which are now prominent features in budget institutions in EA countries, but 
are not included in any of the existing indices. Other novel features of the index 
include the institutional strength of parliamentary budget committees, 
legislative authority regarding off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities as well as a wider measure of access to budgetary information. 
Moreover, different components of legislative budgeting are measured in a 
detailed manner, thus providing a more complete measure of legislative 
budgetary power than existing indices. In addition, the index involves unique 
data on certain aspects of legislative budgeting, generated from 
questionnaires to national authorities. 
Finally, the data used to compile the index pertains to 2012 or later and thus, 
it provides a more recent measure of legislative budgetary power in EA 
countries, which also captures repercussion of the reforms to the EA’s fiscal 
governance framework implemented since the Great Crisis. 
5.3 Methodology: constructing a composite index to measure 
legislative budgetary power in the EA 
As in the previous Chapter, the research design adopted to measure 
legislative budgetary power involves the construction of a composite index. 
The research is descriptive and provides an assessment of legislative 
budgetary power in the EA, together with a comparative analysis of the 
member states and of developments since the Great Crisis.  
The implications of using composite indices to measure budget institutions, as 
well as the philosophy underpinning this research design have been discussed 
in Section 4.3.1 of the previous Chapter. Thus, this Section focuses on 
Chapter 5: Legislative Budgetary Power in the Euro Area 
 
  133 
 
differing aspects concerning the specific methods applied to construct the 
legislative budgetary power index and concludes by discussing the relevant 
ethical issues. 
5.3.1 Research methods: constructing the composite index 
The following discussion starts with a description of the variables chosen to 
capture the main characteristics of legislative budgetary power. Subsequently, 
the data sources used are identified and the aggregation method used to 
construct the index is discussed. This is followed by a discussion on the 
approaches used to check the robustness of the index and to carry out the 
comparative analysis.  
5.3.1.1 The selected variables 
It would not have been feasible to include every potentially relevant 
characteristic in the legislative budgetary power index. Rather, variables were 
selected, drawing on and further developing the existing indices by Lienert 
(2005), Wehner (2006, 2010b) and Rίos et al. (2018). In particular, the 
constructed index draws heavily on the index developed by (Wehner 2006, 
2010b), being the most comprehensive measure of legislative budgetary 
power available, and similarly distinguishes between formal powers and 
organisational capacity. However, as highlighted earlier (Section 5.2.3), the 
index provides a more comprehensive measure of legislative budgetary power 
throughout the budgetary process and also captures the legislature’s 
involvement in the implementation of the SGP procedures.  
Figure 5.1 presents the structure of the legislative budgetary power index. The 
first main component relates to formal power, which in turn comprises the 
involvement of the legislature in the national budgetary process and in SGP 
procedures. These two components are measured through six and three sub-
indices, respectively. The second component concerns organisational 
capacity and includes five sub-indices. The specific indicators used to capture 
these different characteristics of legislative budgetary power index are 
described below and are presented in detail in Table AXII in Appendix II.  
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The first two sub-indices relating to the legislature’s formal powers in the 
national budgetary process relate to its involvement in numerical budgetary 
constraints. As discussed in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3, this can contribute to 
wider ownership and improved credibility and effectiveness to instil fiscal 






















Source: Figure drawn by author 
Sub-index I: Formal legislative budgetary power 
Sub-index IA: Involvement of legislature in national 
budgetary process 
Sub-index IB: Involvement of legislature in 
SGP procedures 
Sub-index IA1: Involvement of legislature in 
MTBF 
Sub-index IA2: Involvement of legislature in 
fiscal rules 
Sub-index IA3: Legislative budgetary 
amendment powers 
Sub-index IA4: Reversionary budget 
 
Sub-index IA5: Legislative authorisation for 
changes to the budget during 
implementation 
Sub-index IA6: Legislative authorisation of 
off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities 
Sub-index IB1: Discussion of SGP 
documents in the legislature 
Sub-index IB2: Discussion of SGP 
documents in legislative committees 
Sub-index IB3: Legislature informed 
on implementation of excessive deficit 
procedure 
Sub-index II1: Time available for budget 
scrutiny 
Sub-index II2: Characteristics of legislative 
budget committees 
Sub-index II3: Specialised budget research 
office 
Sub-index II4: Access to budgetary 
information 
Sub-index II5: Relationship of legislature 
with IFI 
Sub-index II: Legislative budgetary organisational capacity 
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discipline. The first sub-index captures the legislature’s role vis-à-vis the 
national MTBF, specifically to establish its objectives or targets, to monitor 
respect of the targets in the annual draft budget and whether the MTBF is 
presented to the legislature and whether there is a vote. The second sub-index 
measures the legislature’s involvement in fiscal rules133, namely whether it is 
in charge of monitoring and enforcing compliance to the fiscal rule and whether 
a corrective plan is presented to the legislature in case of non-compliance. 
The third sub-index includes the most prominent aspect of legislative 
budgetary power, namely its formal amendment powers. As discussed in 
Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3, the influence of the legislature over the budget is 
obviously greater with unfettered powers than with restricted powers134, whilst 
a spending constraint is more restrictive than a budget deficit constraint, since 
with the former the legislature can only reallocate spending across different 
line items. However, such amendment powers may not be availed of if 
rejecting the draft budget is considered as a vote of no confidence in the 
government135. Furthermore, the sub-index also includes whether parliament 
can propose the annual budget independent from the government as well as 
executive veto powers. The fourth sub-index also concerns the budget 
approval stage and involves the reversionary budget, with legislative 
budgetary power being strongest when no spending can be carried out if the 
budget is not approved and weakest when there is reversion to the executive’s 
draft budget136. 
The fifth sub-index captures executive flexibility during budget implementation. 
Such authority undermines legislative amendment power during budget 
approval. Thus, the application of restrictions on such power, through 
                                                          
133 This is measured only vis-à-vis the fiscal rule with the largest coverage of general 
government finances. 
134 However, stronger amendment powers conflict with fiscal discipline. Thus, the scoring 
scheme applied to legislative amendment powers is different than that used in the quality of 
budget institutions index (see Section 4.3.2 of the previous Chapter). 
135 As discussed in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3, the effect on legislative budgetary power 
depends on the type of government. The scoring scheme applied reflects the case of single-
party majority government, since the effect with coalition governments is uncertain, whilst 
minority governments tend to be rather short-lived. 
136 Other reversionary budgets between these two extreme positions are considered as 
intermediate scenarios and assigned a score accordingly, since, as explained in Section 3.2.3, 
the implications for legislative budgetary power depend on the relative budgetary preferences 
of the legislature and the executive.  
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thresholds and required approval by the legislature are considered as 
improving legislative budgetary power during the implementation stage137, with 
the requirement of ex-ante approval contributing more strongly than when only 
ex-post approval is required.  
The last sub-index relating to the legislature’s formal powers in the national 
budgetary process concerns legislative authorisation for off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities, which implies more comprehensive 
legislative control over the budget. It also contributes towards more budget 
transparency and provides another example of how legislative budgetary 
power can contribute towards fiscal discipline. 
As regards the legislature’s role in the implementation of the SGP, the 
following procedures are considered: the SP, which comprises medium-term 
budgetary targets and constitutes a core element in the SGP’s preventive arm; 
the EDP, which sets ceilings on the budget balance and government debt; and 
the Draft Budgetary Plan (DBP), which, as discussed in Section 5.1, 
constitutes a more recent addition to the SGP and involves direct scrutiny by 
the CION before the budget is approved by the national parliament138. Drawing 
on Hallerberg et al. (2011), the involvement of the legislature in the different 
aspects of the SGP is measured by whether the relevant national and EU 
documents are presented to and/or discussed in the legislature. In the case of 
the SP, account is also taken of whether a vote is taken, whilst for the EDP, 
the sub-index also captures whether the legislature is kept informed on the 
implementation of the relevant Council’s recommendations. The legislature is 
expected to have more influence if it is involved before a document is sent to 
the EU institutions and before a relevant Council meeting. Similarly, due to its 
                                                          
137 In contrast, executive authority to cut, cancel or re-allocate spending is considered to 
improve the quality of budget institutions, whilst power to increase spending weakens it (see 
Section 4.3.2 of the previous Chapter). Hence, the scoring schemes applied in the two indices 
are different. Furthermore, in the legislative budgetary power sub-index, higher scores are 
assigned only if legislative authorisation is required, whereas the scoring scheme used in the 
quality of budget institutions index considered all types of authorisation (including from the 
finance ministry or government). Finally, the data available on supplementary budgets only 
concerns the top reason for their use, which is considered as relevant for the quality of budget 
institutions index but not to measure legislative budgetary power, and thus this variable is not 
included in the index measuring the latter. 
138 For Estonia and Luxembourg, only the SP and the DBP are considered in this sub-index, 
since both countries have never been subject to an EDP. 
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specialised expertise, involvement at a budget committee level is expected to 
result in more effective engagement of the legislature in the implementation of 
the SGP. 
Despite extensive formal powers, a legislature may still not be able to influence 
the budget, due to transaction costs in legislative decision making (Wehner 
2010b). Thus, the last five sub-indices measure the legislature’s budgetary 
organisational capacity139. This includes whether the legislature has sufficient 
time to scrutinise the budget and the characteristics of a specialised budget 
committee. Adequate access to good quality budgetary information is also 
important, as otherwise it is difficult for the legislature to analyse and monitor 
the budget (von Hagen 1992; Krafchik and Wehner 1998). The asymmetry of 
budgetary information between the executive and the legislature can also be 
addressed through the establishment of an independent and non-partisan 
fiscal analysis capacity within the legislature (Lienert 2010), which is captured 
by the third organisational sub-index. Furthermore, in line with Lienert’s (2010) 
suggestions for good practice, the fourth organisational capacity sub-index 
captures the comprehensiveness of budget documentation and the public 
availability of budgetary information. Additionally, this sub-index also includes 
whether the legislature is informed on implementation of the budget, the timely 
availability of an audited year-end fiscal report and whether this is discussed 
in the legislature. The last organisational capacity sub-index measures the 
relationship of the legislature with IFIs. Using case studies involving five EU 
countries, Fasone and Griglio’s (2013) have shown that fiscal councils can 
strengthen parliaments’ ability to undertake scrutiny and oversight of the 
budget by providing it with another source of budgetary information, 
independent from the executive. This sub-index thus captures the interaction 
of the two institutions during the budget preparation stage and whether reports 
by the IFIs are submitted to the legislature. Additionally, characteristics relating 
to the accountability of fiscal councils are captured through the legislature’s 
                                                          
139 Some of these aspects, namely the structure of parliamentary budget committees and 
access to budgetary information are also included in the quality of budget institutions index, 
as explained in Section 4.3.2 of the previous Chapter. 
Chapter 5: Legislative Budgetary Power in the Euro Area 
 
  138 
 
power to summon the IFI’s leadership and its involvement in their appointment 
and dismissal procedures140. 
5.3.1.2 Data sources 
The secondary data sources used to compile the legislative budgetary power 
index are the same as those used for the quality of budget institutions index, 
namely the OECD budgeting practices and procedures database and the 
CION’s fiscal governance databases, with a minor input from the IMF Fiscal 
Councils Dataset. On the other hand, primary data, generated from a 
questionnaire to national authorities, features more prominently in the 
legislative budgetary power index. Table AXII in Appendix II shows the main 
data sources used to compile the different sub-indices comprised in the 
legislative budgetary power index. Other secondary sources used in the 
compilation of the index are included in Table AII in Appendix I. 
Like Lienert (2005) and Wehner (2006, 2010b), the OECD budgeting practices 
and procedures database constitutes an important source of data for the 
constructed index, but more recent data (2012) is used. This source has been 
primarily used to compile the sub-indices relating to budget approval and 
implementation as well as some aspects of organisational capacity. As for the 
quality of budget institutions index, matching data for the four non-OECD EA 
countries (Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta) was obtained through a 
questionnaire directed to relevant national authorities141. On the other hand, 
the CION’s databases (including some data which is not available online, as 
described in Section 4.3.2 of the previous Chapter) have been primarily used 
in the sub-indices relating to the legislature’s involvement in MTBF and fiscal 
rules as well as some aspects relating to SGP procedures and organisational 
capacity, whilst the IMF’s data was used in the sub-index relating to the 
relationship of the legislature with the IFI. Meanwhile, primary data has been 
used to compile various elements relating to the legislature’s involvement in 
SGP procedures as well as some organisational capacity characteristics. This 
                                                          
140 The latter is included as one of the OECD’s (2014) principles for IFIs. 
141 The questionnaire also comprised questions on the structure of budget negotiations (see 
Section 4.3.2 of the previous Chapter) and on other aspects of legislative budgeting (as 
discussed further on), which were directed to all EA countries. 
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unique data was generated through a questionnaire to national authorities in 
all the 19 EA countries.  
Another legislative budgetary power index, mostly referring to 2007, was 
compiled in order to assess developments since the Great Crisis. As for the 
pre-crisis quality of budget institutions index, this index is compiled using only 
secondary data and has more limited geographical coverage (it excludes 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta). Some differences in the pre- 
and post-crisis OECD and CION databases limit the comparability of the pre- 
and post-crisis indices. In particular, the pre-crisis index does not include 
neither the involvement of the legislature in the SGP142 nor the relationship of 
the legislature with the IFI, whilst certain characteristics are also measured in 
less detail. Despite these differences, the comparison of the pre- and post-
crisis indices permits the identification of key changes to legislative budgetary 
power during this period.  
A discussion on the questionnaire used to generate data for the post-crisis 
legislative budgetary power index is presented below. A detailed discussion 
on the secondary data sources used has been provided in Section 4.3.2 of the 
previous Chapter. 
5.3.1.3 Questionnaire 
A single questionnaire was directed to the national authorities of each EA 
country, comprising questions relating to legislative budget budgetary power 
as well as the quality of budget institutions. The questionnaires to non-OECD 
EA countries also included the relevant questions from the OECD 2012 budget 
practices and procedures survey, to create matching data to that available for 
                                                          
142 Thus, an analysis of developments regarding the involvement of national parliaments in 
the implementation of the SGP since the Great Crisis cannot be carried out. Nevertheless, it 
is relevant to note that the 21st bi-annual report by the Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC 2014) reports increasing 
scrutiny by national parliaments since 2011. Based on a review of procedures in France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Germany, Fasone (2015) presents similar findings. However, Crum 
(2018) points out that the increased scrutiny generally involves low level of accountability 
through information, consultation and debate.  
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the OECD countries. A sample copy of the questionnaire for the two groups of 
countries is provided in Appendix II143. 
The first potential participants were contacted towards the end of June 2016, 
through an email, which informed them briefly on the aims of the research and 
to which a copy of the questionnaire (as a Microsoft Word document) and the 
participant information sheet (a copy of which is provided in Appendix II) were 
attached144. Initially, the budget directors (or equivalent designation) in each 
EA country were targeted, but in view of the very limited response, the 
questionnaire was subsequently sent simultaneously to two participants from 
a reserve list, comprising officers from national fiscal councils, parliamentary 
budget offices and parliamentary budget committees. Contact details were 
obtained mainly from the websites of the entities concerned. Reminders were 
sent as necessary and other potential participants were contacted if response 
was not forthcoming, including country representatives in the Economic Policy 
Committee145 as well as the embassy in Malta for one country where response 
was still not forthcoming despite several potential participants being contacted.  
Table 5.3: Responses to the questionnaire 
Organisation Number of responses 
Budget Offices/Ministries of Finance 5 
Fiscal Councils 7 (and 1 partial response) 
Parliamentary Budget Offices 3 
Parliamentary Budget/Finance Committees 7 
Economic Policy Committee members 1 
Country embassy in Malta 1 
Total number of responses 24 (and 1 partial response) 
Source: Produced by author 
In total, 60 potential participants were contacted during the second half of 2016 
and by the end of the year, a response to the questionnaire had been received 
from all the 19 EA countries. As shown in Table 5.3, twenty-four fully 
completed questionnaires were received together with one partial response, 
                                                          
143 Where possible, information was obtained from secondary sources. Thus, the actual 
questionnaire sent to participants in the different countries differs from this sample. 
144 The questionnaire was drawn in English - although it is not a first language for many of the 
participants, it constitutes a working language in the EA. 
145 This committee contributes to the work of Ecofin and the CION, including in the area of the 
quality of public finances. More information is available at: https://europa.eu/epc/home_en. 
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implying a response rate of around 40%. Responses from two participants 
were received from six countries146 and in these cases, the answers from the 
more relevant institution for the question concerned was used to compile the 
index, whilst also taking into account the overall coherence and detail provided 
in the responses.  
5.3.1.4 Constructing the index and comparative analysis 
A similar approach as that applied for the quality of budget institutions index 
(as described in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4) was applied to construct the 
legislative budgetary power index and to check the robustness of the results. 
The scoring scheme for the different indicators included in the legislative 
budgetary power index is presented in Table AXII in Appendix II, whilst the 
weighting structure is shown in Table 5.4.  
As in the quality of budget institutions index and also reflecting the approach 
used in most other legislative budgetary power indices, equal weights are 
generally assigned to the different components, with few exceptions. In 
particular, within formal powers, more importance is assigned to the 
involvement of the legislature in the national budgetary process than to its 
involvement in the SGP, since the latter provides an indirect effect on the 
budget. Furthermore, in the amendment powers sub-index, less weight is 
attached to whether the legislature can propose a budget independently from 
the executive and to executive veto power, since these are relatively 
uncommon characteristics in EA countries. As regards discussion of SGP 
documents, more importance is assigned to whether such discussion takes 
place in the legislature than to its timing, whilst in the parliamentary committee 
sub-index, the centralised nature of the budget committee is deemed more 
important than the length of tenure of its members and its power to summon 
witnesses. Robustness tests were carried out to assess the sensitivity of the 
country rankings to alternative weighting structures, including Kim’s (2015) 
scheme based on expert opinions. 
 
                                                          
146 Belgium, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. 
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Source: Produced by author 
 
A major difference in the approach used to construct the legislative budgetary 
power index, compared to the quality of budget institutions index, concerns the 
aggregation method. For the legislative budgetary power index, a blended 
additive and multiplicative approach, as in Wehner (2006, 2010b), is used, 
whilst a linear additive method was adopted for the quality of budget 
institutions index (see Section 4.3.2 of the previous Chapter). Formal 
legislative budgetary powers and organisational capacity were aggregated 
using a multiplicative approach, thus assuming that a certain degree of both is 
required for the legislature to influence the budgetary process, whilst 
substitutability is assumed within the different sub-indices of both formal 
powers and organisational capacity. 
 
Table 5.4: Legislative budgetary power index – weighting structure 
Sub-index Weight 
I. Formal legislative budgetary power 0.50   
IA. Involvement of legislature in national budgetary process  0.67  
 IA1. Involvement of legislature in MTBF   0.17 
 1A2. Involvement of legislature in fiscal rule   0.17 
 1A3. Legislative budgetary amendment powers1   0.17 
 1A4. Reversionary budget   0.17 
 1A5. Legislative authorisation for changes to the budget during implementation   0.17 
 1A6. Legislative authorisation of off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities   0.17 
IB. Involvement of legislature in SGP procedures2  0.33  
 IB1. Discussion of SGP documents in the legislature   0.33 
 1B2. Discussion of SGP documents in legislative committees   0.33 
 1B3. Legislature informed on the implementation of Council’s recommendations to 
end the excessive deficit situation in the country 
  0.33 
II. Legislative budget organisational capacity 0.50   
 II1. Time available for budget scrutiny  0.20  
 II2. Characteristics of legislative budget committees3  0.20  
 II3. Specialised budget research office  0.20  
 II4. Access to budgetary information  0.20  
 II5. Relationship of legislature with IFI  0.20  
Notes: 
1 When measuring amendment powers, formal authority to amend the budget and whether a vote on the budget 
constitutes a vote of confidence in the government are assigned a larger weight (0.33 each) than whether 
parliament can propose the annual budget independent from the executive and whether the executive has veto 
power (0.17 each) because the latter two characteristics are not that common among EA countries. 
2 In the respective variables, more weight is assigned to whether a document is discussed in the legislature (0.67) 
than to the timing of the discussion (0.33). 
3 A larger weight is assigned to the structure of parliamentary committees dealing with the budget (0.50) than to 
the members’ length of tenure and to the power to summon witnesses (0.25 each). 
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Thus, for each sub-index, D: 
Dj = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  





and 0<wi<1 and i=1,2, …N.  
The different relevant sub-indices are then aggregated into involvement of the 
legislature in the national budgetary process (IN); involvement of the legislature 
in the SGP (IS) and the legislature’s organisational budgetary capacity (IO), 
using a similar computation, with 
N=6 for IN; N= 3 for IS and N=5 for IO. 
The formal powers sub-index, IF, is then compiled as follows: 
IF = wNIN + wSIS 
 where wN = 0.67 and wS = 0.33, as described in Table 5.4. 
Finally, formal powers, IF, and organisational capacity, IO, are aggregated into 
the legislative budgetary power index, IL, with: 
IL = ∏ 𝐼𝑘
𝑂
𝑘=𝐹   
The analysis of the results for the legislative budgetary power index follows 
the same approach adopted for the quality of budget institutions index (see 
Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4). But additionally, the country rankings for the 
legislative budgetary power and quality of budget institutions indices are also 
compared. This provides a preliminary test for whether legislative budgetary 
power conflicts with fiscal discipline, which is examined in more depth in the 
econometric analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
 
 
                                                          
147 Variable i refers to the components comprised in each sub-index, as described in Table 
AXII in Appendix II, with N representing the number of components comprised in each sub-
index.  
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5.3.2 Ethical issues 
This Section focuses on ethical issues concerning the generation of data by 
the questionnaire, whilst ethical issues concerning the secondary data sources 
have been discussed in Section 4.3.3 of the previous Chapter.  
Approval to carry out the questionnaire was granted by the Chair of the 
Humanities, Social and Health Science Research Ethics Panel at the 
University of Bradford on 17th June 2016148. The procedures followed to carry 
out the questionnaire and to generate and store the primary data are in line 
with the requirements specified in the ethics application form (a copy is 
provided in Appendix II).  
When first contacted, participants were sent an information sheet (see 
Appendix II) which informed them about the aims and nature of the research, 
as well as confidentiality issues, whilst also explaining that filling out and 
returning the questionnaire would indicate their consent to participate in the 
research. Participants were also informed that they could respond only 
partially or not at all to the questionnaire and that they could withdraw their 
participation at any time, even after they have submitted their responses to the 
questionnaire. 
The participants in the questionnaire do not constitute particularly vulnerable 
individuals and the questions do not concern sensitive information, but rather 
factual information on the budget process. Nevertheless, filling up the 
questionnaire could have constituted an inconvenience to the high-ranking 
participants, since it is rather long and time-consuming, especially that directed 
to non-OECD countries. To alleviate this problem and reduce the response 
burden, country information was also sought from other secondary sources 
and where this was available, the questionnaires were adjusted accordingly. 
Furthermore, the participants were mostly contacted during June-August 
2016, thus avoiding known busy periods relating to the presentation of the 
draft budgets in October.  
                                                          
148 This also covered the carrying out of interviews with key stakeholders in the budgetary 
process for the case study on Malta, which is presented in Chapter 7. 
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Due to the high-ranking status of the participants, the responses to the 
questionnaire are confidential. Although it was not possible to gather the data 
through completely coded collection techniques, the participants are not 
named or otherwise identified in this thesis, nor in other fora where the 
research results will be disseminated or published. Furthermore, the data 
generated through the questionnaires is stored securely and separately from 
the participants’ names and contact details, with access to this information 
restricted to the author. 
5.4 Results: legislative budgetary power in the EA 
The presentation of the results for the legislative budgetary power index 
follows the same structure as that applied for the quality of budget institutions 
index (Section 4.4 of the previous Chapter). First, the findings at a sub-index 
level are discussed, followed by the results for the overall index. Elements of 
strengths and weaknesses for legislative budgetary power in the EA are thus 
identified and the extent of variation among the member states is also 
assessed. Subsequently, legislative budgetary power in the bailed-out 
countries is compared to that in the other EA member states. This is then 
followed by a comparison of the pre- and post-crisis legislative budgetary 
power indices149. Finally, an analysis of the correlation between legislative 
budgetary power and quality of budget institutions is presented. The 
robustness of the results is assessed, mainly by comparing the findings to 
those using alternative methodologies. The detailed results for the post-crisis 
legislative budgetary power index are provided in Table AXIII in Appendix II, 
whilst Table AXIV shows the results for the pre-crisis index. 
5.4.1 The legislative budgetary power index: results at a sub-index level 
The country scores for the legislative budgetary power index and its main 
components are presented in Table 5.6. The countries are ranked according 
to their overall scores and grouped into three categories, comprising the top, 
                                                          
149 This comparison cannot be carried out for legislative involvement in the SGP procedures 
as comparable data (mostly generated from the questionnaire to national authorities) is not 
available for the pre-crisis period. 
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second and third, and bottom quartiles, respectively. The key descriptive 
statistics for the different sub-indices are presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Legislative budgetary power sub-indices - descriptive statistics (post-
crisis data) 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Range 
I. Formal legislative budgetary power 4.3 4.2 1.0 2.4 – 6.0 




2.9 0.8 2.2 – 5.2 
IA1. Involvement of legislature in MTBF 2.9 2.5 2.1 0.0 – 6.3 
IA2. Involvement of legislature in fiscal rules 1.2 0.0 2.1 0.0 – 6.7 
IA3. Legislative budgetary amendment powers 5.8 6.4 2.2 1.7 – 10.0 
IA4. Reversionary budget 6.5 6.7 2.1 0.0 – 10.0 
IA5. Legislative authorisation for changes to the budget 
during implementation 
3.0 2.2 2.0 0.8 – 6.7 
IA6. Legislative authorisation of off-budget expenditures and 
contingent liabilities 
7.1 10.0 3.7 0.0 – 10.0 
IB. Involvement of legislature in SGP procedures 6.4 7.3 2.6 1.3 – 9.6 
IB1. Discussion of SGP documents in the legislature 5.2 4.9 2.2 0.5 – 8.8 
IB2. Discussion of SGP documents in legislative committees 7.0 8.0 3.1 0.0 - 10.0 
IB3. Legislature informed on implementation of EDP 7.1 8.3 3.2 3.3 – 10.0 
II. Legislative budgetary organisational capacity 5.9 5.9 1.5 2.4 – 8.3 
II1. Time available for budget scrutiny 5.0 5.0 3.3 0.0 – 10.0 
II2. Characteristics of legislative budget committees 7.9 8.5 2.5 0.0 – 10.0 
II3. Specialised budget research office 2.9 0.0 3.8 0.0 – 10.0 
II4. Access to budgetary information 7.7 7.5 1.0 5.3 – 9.0 
II5. Relationship of legislature with IFI 6.0 6.3 2.3 1.9 – 10.0 



















Source: Results are produced by author
Table 5.6: Legislative budgetary power index – results (post-crisis data) 
 Top score category Medium score category Low score category 
 FR LT FI AT NL CY ES DE EL IT EE PT IE LV LU BE SI SK MT 
Overall index 
 
4.2 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 0.6 
I. Formal powers 
 
5.3 6.0 4.6 5.7 5.9 4.4 3.6 4.6 4.9 3.5 4.2 4.2 4.5 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.9 2.9 2.4 
IA. National budgetary 
process 
 
3.8 5.2 2.2 4.0 4.1 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 4.1 2.6 4.1 2.6 3.1 3.4 2.5 3.4 2.9 2.9 
IB. SGP procedures 
 
8.2 7.6 9.2 9.0 9.6 8.3 5.4 8.2 9.3 2.4 7.3 4.4 8.5 5.3 4.3 5.2 4.9 2.8 1.3 
II. Technical capacity 7.9 6.0 7.2 5.8 5.4 6.7 8.3 6.4 5.9 7.9 6.6 6.4 5.1 5.7 5.4 4.6 3.5 4.5 2.4 
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5.4.1.1 Involvement of legislature in national budgetary process 
Overall, formal legislative power in the national budgetary process is rather 
weak, with average score values of around 3 and with a maximum score of 
just 5.2, as shown in Figure 5.2. Legislative budgetary power is particularly 
weak in the budget formulation stage and also during budget implementation 
(Figure 5.3).  
Whilst all EA countries are required to have in place MTBFs which guide the 
annual budget targets, involvement of the legislature in this aspect is weak, 
with median values of just 2.5. In particular, parliament (in conjunction with 
other entities) is involved in setting the MTBF targets or objectives in only six 
EA countries and it is involved in monitoring respect of the relevant budgetary 
targets in only two countries. More active involvement in this regard would 
contribute to increase legislative ownership of the MTBF, thus enhancing its 
credibility. On the other hand, in line with Lienert’s (2010) recommendation for 
legislatures to endorse the medium-term budgetary targets, the MTBF is 
discussed in parliament in sixteen EA countries, but there is a vote in only nine 
of them. 
Figure 5.2: Sub-index IA - Involvement of legislature in national budgetary process 
(post-crisis data) 
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Figure 5.3: Sub-index IA - Involvement of legislature in national budgetary process 
and its sub-indices (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Legislative involvement in fiscal rules is even weaker, with the legislature 
(together with other institutions) in charge of monitoring compliance with the 
fiscal rule in only one country and of enforcing it in only two countries.  
In contrast, legislative budgetary power is stronger in the budget approval 
stage, as reflected in an average score value of around 6 for the respective 
sub-index. The country rankings are robust to tests using an alternative 
weighting structure for the different variables included in this sub-index, as 
shown in Table AXV in Appendix II. Formal legislative amendment powers are 
unrestricted in nine EA countries, whilst at the other extreme, the legislature 
can only approve or reject the draft budget in only two countries. Amendment 
powers are subject to a deficit constraint or other restrictions in eight countries. 
However, in twelve EA countries, including six with unrestricted formal 
amendment powers, a vote on the budget is considered as a vote of 
confidence in the government. Constraints on amendment powers through 
executive veto power are less widespread in the EA, being present in only 
three countries (all of which have restricted formal amendment powers). 
The reversionary budget involves government shutdown in only two countries. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3, this can strengthen legislative 
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budgetary power by inducing the executive to accept its amendments. At the 
other extreme, in two countries, if the budget is not approved in time, the 
executive’s budget proposal takes effect (albeit only for a limited period in one 
of them), thereby weakening their unrestricted formal legislative amendment 
powers150. In the remaining 15 EA countries, the reversionary budget involves 
more intermediate outcomes, such as the previous year’s budget takes effect 
for a limited period or other interim measures are voted upon by the legislature.  
Furthermore, legislative amendment powers are weakened by its general lack 
of control during budget implementation. In fact, the median value for the 
relevant sub-index is only around 2. It is also pertinent to note that 
considerable executive flexibility during budget implementation also weakens 
legislative budgetary powers in the three EA countries where unrestricted 
legislative amendment powers are not limited in practice by the vote on the 
budget being considered as a vote of confidence for the government or 
reversionary budgets. More countries apply restrictions, such as limiting such 
flexibility to certain spending categories and applying thresholds for spending 
increases, than for cuts or cancellation of expenditures and similarly for 
requirements for legislative authorisation. Moreover, the executive has even 
more flexibility to re-allocate spending among different budget items. The 
executive can circumvent legislative control over budget implementation by 
putting items off-budget or through contingent liabilities. However, EA 
countries score rather highly in the sixth sub-index, with legislative 
authorisation required for all or most existing off-budget expenditures and 
contingent liabilities in twelve EA countries. 
As shown in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.3, although the degree of variation in the 
overall measure of formal legislative power vis-à-vis the national budgetary 
process is quite low, there is more diversity among EA countries at a sub-index 
level. For instance, within the top score category, Austria and Portugal have 
strong amendment powers but weak legislative control during budget 
implementation, whereas Italy and the Netherlands fare more strongly in the 
latter characteristic, whilst Lithuania has relatively strong powers both during 
                                                          
150 In these two countries, amendment powers are also weakened by a vote on the budget 
being considered as a vote of confidence in the government. 
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the approval and the implementation stages. This suggests that EA countries 
adopt different approaches to legislative budgeting151, which is also 
corroborated by the weak correlation among the six different sub-indices 
(Table AXVI in Appendix II). Thus, in the EA, there does not seem to be a 
reinforcement of legislative budgetary power through different dimensions. In 
particular, as also noted previously, amendment powers tend to be weakened 
by executive flexibility during budget implementation.  
5.4.1.2 Involvement of legislature in SGP procedures 
As regards the second component of formal legislative budgetary powers, 
overall in the EA, legislatures are quite well engaged in the SGP procedures, 
with a median score value for the respective sub-index of around 7, as shown 
in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. This should contribute towards more ‘ownership’ by the 
national parliaments of the supra-national fiscal requirements. 
 
Figure 5.4: Sub-index IB - Involvement of legislature in SGP procedures (post-crisis 
data) 
 




                                                          
151 Similar results were found for the quality of budget institutions index, as discussed in 
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Figure 5.5: Sub-index IB - Involvement of legislature in SGP procedures and its sub-
indices (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
The average score values for the sub-index capturing discussion of SGP 
documents in the legislature is around 5. The country rankings are robust to 
alternative weighting schemes in respect of the timing component in this sub-
index (see Table AXVII in Appendix II).  The SP is presented and discussed in 
parliament in 14 EA countries, but there is a vote in only two countries. 
Moreover, whilst in 12 to 16 countries, the legislatures discuss the opinions, 
recommendations or decisions by EU institutions on the different SGP 
procedures, such discussion takes place before the relevant Council meeting 
in only around three to four countries, which again shows limited scope for 
legislative influence. A report by the European Parliament (2014) based on 
survey responses from national parliaments of 15 EA countries presents 
broadly similar findings regarding voting on the SP and the timing of the 
parliamentary debate.  
On the other hand, there is a good level of engagement with SGP documents 
at a parliamentary committee level. Seven countries discuss all the documents 
considered in this sub-index regularly in their budget or finance parliamentary 
committee, which should contribute towards more connectedness between the 
respective SGP procedures and the national budgetary process. Overall, 
legislatures in the EA are also kept well informed on the implementation of the 
EDP recommendations. In eight countries, the legislature is informed 
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automatically on a regular basis on the implementation of Council’s EDP 
recommendations.  
As shown in Figure 5.5, there is a high degree of variation among the EA 
countries as regards legislative involvement in SGP procedures. The extent of 
diversity is similarly high also at a sub-index level. Thus, strong engagement 
in the SGP by legislatures in EA countries is reflected in the different 
components and similarly for weak involvement by legislatures in the SGP. 
5.4.1.3 Legislative budgetary organisational capacity 
The findings suggest that overall, legislatures in the EA tend to have adequate 
organisational capacity, with an average score value of around 6. Although, 
as shown in Figure 5.6, the three countries with the highest scores (Spain, 
France and Italy) all constitute large member states, a country’s small size 
does not necessarily impose a constraint on legislative budgetary 
organisational capacity, as indicated by the relatively good performance of 
Cyprus and Estonia, for example. In general, the stronger aspects of 
organisational capacity in the EA relate to budget committees and access to 
budgetary information, whilst the weakest aspect concerns specialised budget 
research office (Figure 5.7).  
Figure 5.6: Sub-index II - Legislative budgetary organisational capacity (post-crisis 
data) 
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Figure 5.7: Sub-index II - Legislative budgetary organisational capacity and its sub-
indices (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Eleven countries allow two months for budget scrutiny, which corresponds to 
the minimum suggested period by Lienert (2010). This timeframe also broadly 
corresponds to the minimum period provided by the common budgetary 
timeline for EA countries152. Four countries allow more time, with a maximum 
of four months, whilst the other countries allow less (just one month).  
In general, EA countries have relatively strong and centralised parliamentary 
budget committees and the country rankings are robust to alternative 
weighting structures applied to the different components included in this sub-
index (see Table AXVIII in Appendix II). Thirteen countries have a budget or 
finance committee which co-ordinates the whole budgetary process. This 
centralised structure facilitates legislative budgetary influence, whilst also 
contributing towards a more comprehensive view of the budget, as reflected 
in the fourth sub-index of the quality of budget institutions index. In the EA, the 
development of expertise of budget committees is facilitated through the 
generally long tenures of its members: of four years or more or equal to the 
electoral term in 16 countries. In addition, all the budget committees in place 
                                                          
152 Article 4, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 specifies that the draft budget must be published 
by 15th October and the budget must be approved by 31st December. The countries that 
reported a shorter time for budget scrutiny had not yet abided to these requirements (data 
refers to 2014). 
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have the power to request witnesses and to question ministers or senior civil 
servants. Malta stands out among the EA countries as being the only one 
without a parliamentary budget committee.   
Although a specialised budget research office can address the legislature’s 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive as regards budget information (Anderson 
2009), eleven countries do not have such a unit in place, whilst the existing 
offices tend to be rather small, with half of them having less than ten staff. It is 
pertinent to note that in two countries, the specialised budget research office 
also constitutes their IFI. In some countries, the lack of a specialised budget 
research office seems to be compensated by a strong budget committee 
structure, for instance, in Germany and a few small EA countries (Estonia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovenia).   
On the other hand, legislatures in EA countries tend to address the information 
asymmetry vis-à-vis the executive, through direct good access to budgetary 
information, as reflected in average score values of around 7.5 in the fourth 
organisational capacity sub-index153. Furthermore, in 17 countries, the 
legislature is informed automatically on the implementation of the budget and 
explanations of deviations from the budget are provided, which should 
facilitate its role to monitor budget execution. Timely scrutiny of the budget 
post-implementation is also facilitated as the audited year-end fiscal report is 
released within six months of the end of the fiscal year in 13 EA countries and 
this is discussed in the legislature in all but one member state. 
Legislatures in EA countries generally have a fairly good relationship with fiscal 
councils154, as reflected in average score values of around 6 for the last 
organisational capacity sub-index155. In 16 EA countries, reports by the IFI are 
submitted to the legislature and these generally constitute an important input 
in legislative budget debates. Furthermore, in 14 member states, the 
                                                          
153 There is a degree of overlap between this sub-index and the sixth sub-index in the quality 
of budget institutions index. A detailed assessment of the findings regarding budget 
transparency is provided in Section 4.4.1 of the previous Chapter. 
154 Some of the characteristics included in this sub-index are also captured by the IFI sub-
index of the quality of budget institutions index, with the relevant results being discussed in 
Section 4.4.1 of the previous Chapter. 
155 The IFI is attached to the legislature in three countries, all having top scores in this sub-
index. 
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legislature and/or its budget or finance committee summons the IFI’s 
leadership at least once a year. IFIs thus constitute an alternative source of 
budgetary information and technical expertise in EA countries, which is 
particularly relevant when a specialised budget research office is not in place. 
There is also good interaction during the budget planning stage, with the 
national parliament auditioning the fiscal council in ten countries. On the other 
hand, democratic accountability of IFIs could be strengthened since the 
legislature is not involved in the appointment and/or dismissal procedures for 
their governing members in around 10 countries. There is potential to 
strengthen legislative budget organisational capacity through more effective 
and cooperative relationships with fiscal councils but this is not yet properly 
exploited since in many countries, IFIs constitute relatively recent institutional 
developments (Fasone 2015).  
As shown in Figure 5.7, variation among the EA countries is generally wider 
for the individual sub-indices than for the aggregate measure of organisational 
capacity. Thus, similarly to the finding for formal legislative power vis-à-vis the 
national budgetary process, there seems to be a tendency for EA countries to 
derive their budget organisational capacity through different institutional 
approaches, reflecting their national institutional, social and political context. 
On the other hand, access to budgetary information seems to constitute an 
important element in most legislatures. 
5.4.2 The legislative budgetary power index: results for the composite 
index 
At just below 3, the average score values for the composite index show 
relatively weak legislative budgetary power in the EA. The degree of variation 
among the countries is rather low, with a standard deviation of 0.9 and a range 
between 0.6 and 4.2 (Table 5.7 and Figure 5.8). Due to the few EA countries 
having presidential systems, robust conclusions on whether this is important 
for legislative budgetary power cannot be derived from the sample156.  
                                                          
156 Lithuania and Cyprus have presidential systems (Inter-American Development Bank 2015) 
and have top and medium scores in the legislative budgetary power index, respectively. 
Estonia, whose president is elected by parliament, is also in the medium score category.  
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Table 5.7: Legislative budgetary power index - descriptive statistics (post-crisis 
data) 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Range 
All EA countries 2.6 2.8 0.9 0.6 – 4.2 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Figure 5.8: Legislative budgetary power index (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
It is pertinent to note that the rather low country scores reflect the multiplicative 
method used to aggregate the formal powers and organisational capacity sub-
indices, which emphasises high or low scores obtained in either of the two 
components. However, using an alternative linear additive approach to 
aggregate these two sub-indices would still show relatively weak legislative 
budgetary power in the EA and rather low variation among the member states, 
whilst the country rankings would also not be affected substantially (see 
Tables AXIX, AXX and AXXI in Appendix II). The results are also robust when 
tested using different weighting structures, based on that using expert opinion 
in Kim’s (2015) index and involving different assumptions regarding legislative 
involvement in the national budgetary process and in the implementation of 
the SGP. Tables AXXII and AXXIII in Appendix II present these different 
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Figure 5.9 shows that the overall weak legislative budgetary power mainly 
reflects formal legislative power in the national budgetary process, rather than 
a lack of legislative involvement in SGP procedures or in organisational 
capacity. Furthermore, the legislature’s role in the national budget seems to 
be weak across the EA countries, whereas on the other hand, there is more 
diversity among the member states as regards involvement in the 
implementation of the SGP and in legislative budget organisational capacity. 
It is also relevant to note that there is a negative, albeit weak, correlation 
between the two aspects of formal powers (Table AXXIV in Appendix II), which 
weakens the legislature’s potential to ensure connectedness between the 
national budgetary process and the supra-national fiscal framework. Finally, 
organisational capacity is more malleable and can be reformed more easily 
than formal powers which tend to be enshrined in a country’s legislation or 
even its constitution (Wehner 2010b). Indeed, the findings indicate that some 
legislatures may be countering their limited formal powers through strong 
organisational capacity. Italy and Spain constitute two clear examples in this 
respect.  
Figure 5.9: Legislative budgetary power index and its sub-indices (post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
5.4.3 Legislative budgetary power in bailed-out and other EA countries 
As in the comparison of the quality of budget institutions in bailed-out countries 
and other EA member states (presented in Section 4.4.3 of the previous 
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Chapter), likewise the results for legislative budgetary power do not show a 
marked difference among the two groups of countries.  
 
Table 5.8: Legislative budgetary power in bailed-out1 and other EA countries – 
descriptive statistics (post-crisis data) 














2.7 2.5 2.8 2.8 0.3 1.1 2.2 – 3.0 0.6 – 4.2 
I. Formal legislative 
budgetary powers 
4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 0.5 1.2 3.6 – 4.9 2.4 – 6.0 




2.9 3.4 2.7 3.4 0.6 0.8 2.5 – 4.1 2.2 – 5.2 
IAB. Involvement of 
legislature in SGP 
procedures 







6.1 5.8 1.1 1.6 5.1 – 8.3 2.4 – 7.9 
Note:  
1 The bailed-out countries comprise Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
As shown in Table 5.8, the average score values for the composite index are 
quite close and there also are not major differences at a sub-index level. On 
the other hand, there is less diversity in legislative budgetary power among the 
group of bailed-out countries, particularly for formal legislative involvement in 
SGP procedures and in organisational capacity. It is also notable that the 
minimum score for legislative involvement in the SGP is markedly higher for 
the bailed-out group, probably due to the relatively more prominent profile of 
SGP requirements in these countries. 
 
5.4.4 Legislative budgetary power: comparison of pre- and post-crisis 
indices 
Table 5.9 presents pre- and post-crisis indices for legislative budgetary power 
and its main components. Whilst, as discussed in Section 5.3.1, due to data 
constraints, caution should be exercised when comparing the two indices, the 
results do not indicate any marked changes in overall legislative budgetary 
power since the Great Crisis. On the other hand, there seems to have been 
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some weakening of legislative budgetary power vis-à-vis the national 
budgetary process during the period under review, whereas the results 
indicate a slight strengthening of legislative budgetary organisational 
capacity157. Meanwhile, the extent of variation among the EA countries has 
remained broadly unchanged. These findings contrast with the claim made by 
Posner and Park (2007: 6-7) for a recent “resurgence of legislative roles and 
responsibilities in budgeting”, albeit this was based on a small sample of 
OECD countries and for an earlier timeframe. 
Table 5.9: Pre- and post-crisis legislative budgetary power indices – descriptive 
statistics 




















2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 – 5.0 1.3 – 4.2 
IA. Involvement 









5.5 6.0 5.4 5.8 1.6 1.4 3.3 – 9.0 3.5 – 8.3 
Notes:  
1 The legislative budgetary power index and its components refer only to the 14 EA countries (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, 
EL, IE, IE, LT, LU, NL, PT, SK, SI and ES) for which pre-crisis data is available. The respective descriptive statistics 
for the post-crisis period also cover the same 14 EA countries and hence, differ from those presented earlier. 
2 Pre-crisis data refers mostly to 2007, but some of the data for legislative involvement in the national budgetary 
process pertains to 2008 and 2010. Post-crisis data generally refers to 2012, but some of the data for legislative 
involvement in the national budgetary process pertains to 2014. 
3 Data constraints limit the comparability of the sub-indices for the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
The weakening of legislative power in the national budgetary process mainly 
reflects less control over executive flexibility during budget implementation, as 
shown in Figure 5.10. In addition, it is notable that despite the increased 
emphasis on numerical budgetary constraints since the Great Crisis, 
legislative involvement in MTBFs has decreased whilst that in fiscal rules has 
remained unchanged at a very low level. No marked changes were registered 
for the other aspects of formal legislative power, which is expected since 
                                                          
157 It is not possible to make a similar comparison for the involvement of the legislature in the 
SGP since the corresponding post-crisis index largely involves primary data. 
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certain aspects, such as amendment powers and reversionary budgets tend 
to be enshrined in a country’s constitution (Wehner 2010b). 
 
Figure 5.10: Pre- and post-crisis involvement of legislature in national budgetary 
process sub-indices, median values 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Figure 5.11: Pre- and post-crisis legislative budgetary organisational capacity sub-
indices, median values 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 5.11, the improvement in legislative 
budget organisational capacity158 mainly reflects the set up of specialised 
budget research offices in four countries, which is in line with the trend found 
                                                          
158 As highlighted in Section 5.3.1, the pre-crisis organisational capacity sub-index does not 
include the aspect relating to the relationship of legislature with IFI. 
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by Kim (2015) in his global sample, as well as improved access to budgetary 
information. On the other hand, the results show that the structure of 
parliamentary budget committees has become less centralised. 
 
Figure 5.12: Pre- and post-crisis legislative budgetary power indices, by country 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Meanwhile, Figure 5.12 shows that, at a country level, legislative budgetary 
power strengthened in eight member states, whilst it worsened in the other six 
countries in the sample. These developments were underpinned by weaker 
formal legislative budgetary power in all countries, but mixed results for 
organisational capacity. In particular, a notable strengthening of legislative 
budgetary power is noted in Greece and Ireland. On the other hand, the 
findings indicate a considerably weaker performance in both formal powers 
and organisational capacity in Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
The results for the pre-crisis legislative budgetary power index were compared 
to those in previous studies where country scores are available, namely 
Lienert (2005), Wehner (2010b) and Kim (2015), which refer to a similar 
timeframe. However, adjusting the sample to have the same geographical 
coverage, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient with Lienert’s (2005) 
index is around 0.6, but very close to zero with the indices by Wehner (2010b) 
and Kim (2015) (Table AXXV in Appendix II). These differences reflect the 
considerably broader scope of the constructed index which affects the 
comparability with these indices. 
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5.4.5 Legislative budgetary power and quality of budget institutions 
The last part of the analysis of legislative budgetary power concerns its 
relationship with quality of budget institutions. Figure 5.13 suggests a positive 
association. However, it is relevant to note that there is some degree of overlap 
in the two indices (details of the areas of overlap are presented in Table AXXVI 
in Appendix II). The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the two indices 
is positive, although not statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
correlation coefficient is negative but close to zero for the legislative 
amendment powers sub-index (Table AXXVII in Appendix II). These findings 
indicate that certain aspects of legislative budgeting may be complementary, 
rather than conflicting with fiscal discipline, as discussed in Section 3.3 of 
Chapter 3. However, the relationship between legislative budgetary power and 
the budget balance is tested more rigorously in the empirical analysis 
presented in the next Chapter. 
Figure 5.13: Quality of budget institutions and legislative budgetary power indices 
(post-crisis data) 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
5.5 Summary of results and conclusions 
This Chapter presents a comprehensive composite index measuring 
legislative budgetary power in the 19 EA countries. The index captures the 
role of the legislature throughout the formulation, approval and implementation 
stages of the budgetary process. It also distinguishes between formal 
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legislative budgetary powers and budgetary organisational capacity and 
covers both the legislature’s role in the national budgetary process as well as 
its involvement in the implementation of SGP procedures. Moreover, the index 
uses unique primary data, generated through questionnaires to national 
authorities in the EA member states, as well as secondary data, to provide a 
recent measure of legislative budgetary power, including effects of the reforms 
to budget institutions implemented since the Great Crisis.  
The results show that overall, legislatures in EA countries have relatively weak 
budgetary power. This applies in particular to formal legislative power vis-à-
vis the national budgetary process. On the other hand, countries fare better as 
regards legislative involvement in the implementation of SGP procedures. 
Overall legislative budgetary organisational capacity is also quite good, with 
some EA countries performing quite strongly in this regard, possibly to 
maximise the use of their limited formal budgetary powers. The results also 
show a similar degree of legislative budgetary power in both bailed-out 
countries as well as the other member states. 
In terms of the national budgetary process, generally, legislatures in EA 
countries have relatively strong amendment powers and they have 
comprehensive control over the budget through required legislative 
authorisation for off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities. 
Reversionary budgets also generally contribute to strengthen legislative 
budgetary power. However, legislative budgetary power is weakened by a lack 
of legislative control during budget implementation. Furthermore, the 
legislature’s role vis-à-vis the MTBF and fiscal rules is marginal, despite the 
importance of numerical budgetary constraints in the EA fiscal governance 
framework, especially since the Great Crisis. These characteristics diminish 
the democratic legitimacy of the national budgetary process. 
As regards the legislature’s involvement in SGP procedures, the relevant 
documents are generally discussed in the legislature, although its influence 
could be improved through more timely discussion. There is also a relatively 
high level of engagement of budget parliamentary committees and legislatures 
in EA countries are also generally kept quite well informed on the 
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implementation of the EDP. These characteristics can contribute to increased 
‘ownership’ by national parliaments of the supra-national fiscal framework. 
Overall, organisational capacity does not seem to be a major constraint for 
strong legislative budgetary influence in the EA. In particular, budget 
committees are quite strong and there is good access to budgetary 
information. Legislatures also have a fairly close relationship with fiscal 
councils, which can provide information and technical support, particularly 
since few have specialised budget research offices in place. The time for 
budget scrutiny also seems to be generally adequate. 
The results show limited diversity in the degree of overall legislative budgetary 
power among the member states and similarly for formal powers in the national 
budgetary process. However, there is more variation at a sub-index level, with 
a particularly wide range of scores for amendment powers, reversionary 
budgets as well as legislative authorisation of off-budget expenditures and 
contingent liabilities. The degree of legislative involvement in SGP procedures 
also varies considerably among the EA member states and there is also 
notable divergence in terms of their legislative budgetary organisational 
capacity. These findings thus indicate that, similarly to the quality of budget 
institutions as discussed in the previous Chapter, EA countries adopt different 
models of legislative budgetary power, emphasising different aspects and 
reflecting their specific national circumstances. 
Whilst taking into account the limited comparability of the pre- and post-crisis 
indices, the findings indicate that overall, legislative budgetary power in the EA 
has remained broadly unchanged since the Great Crisis. In particular, the 
results show weaker formal legislative powers in the national budgetary 
process, particularly during the implementation stage. Furthermore, despite 
the increased emphasis on numerical budgetary constraints during the period 
under review, legislative involvement in both MTBFs and fiscal rules remains 
lacking. On the other hand, the results indicate some strengthening of 
legislative budgetary organisational capacity, mainly due to the set-up of 
specialised budget research offices in a few EA countries as well as improved 
access to budgetary information. The recent establishment of fiscal councils 
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in various member states provides potential to improve legislative access to 
budgetary information and technical expertise. At a country level, the results 
are mixed, with a strengthening of legislative budgetary power during the 
period under review in eight countries, mainly reflecting strengthened 
organisational capacity, whereas formal powers were weaker in all the 
countries in the sample.  
Finally, a comparison of the results for the post-crisis legislative budgetary 
power and quality of budget institutions indices shows complementarity 
between the two, suggesting that legislative budgeting could contribute to 
fiscal discipline. However, this relationship is examined more rigorously in the 
next Chapter. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The previous two Chapters presented a descriptive analysis of budget 
institutions in the EA. This Chapter, together with the subsequent one, 
examine their influence on fiscal discipline159. Despite the fiscal restraint that 
the obligations of the SGP aimed to achieve, persistent budget deficits and 
high levels of government debt have characterised the monetary union since 
its launch in 1999. As shown in Figure 6.1, whilst the Great Crisis had a huge 
fiscal impact, the lack of fiscal restraint was not limited to this period, with the 
EA average budget balance being in deficit throughout the period under 
review. Similarly, the government debt ratio exceeded the 60% benchmark 
since 1999, rising to around 90% in recent years. 
Figure 6.1: General government budget balance in the EA 
 
Source: European Commission (2018b) 
 
These average fiscal indicators for the EA mask considerable country 
differences. Drawing on Wyplosz (2012), who presents a similar analysis for 
20 OECD countries during 1960-2011, Table 6.1 shows the annual budget 
balance for the 19 EA countries during their membership in the monetary 
union160. Several EA countries had budget deficits which exceeded the 3% of 
                                                          
159 As pointed out in Chapter 1, in this study, the concept of fiscal discipline is operationalised 
through measures of the budget balance, with a smaller budget deficit or a larger budget 
surplus implying more fiscal discipline. 
160 For the recent members of the EA, data is presented from their accession to the EU in 
2004, since they were aiming to adopt the Euro as soon as possible. 
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GDP benchmark for one-third or more of the period under review. This 
performance, which is neither limited to the years since the Great Crisis nor to 
the bailed-out countries (see, France and Italy for example) indicates that a 
tendency for a deficit bias, as discussed in Chapter 2, is present in at least 
some of the EA member states. 
Figure 6.2: General government debt in the EA 
 
Source: European Commission (2018b) 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2018b) 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
AT -2.6 -2.4 -0.7 -1.4 -1.8 -4.8 -2.5 -2.5 -1.4 -1.5 -5.3 -4.4 -2.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.7 -1.0 -1.6 -0.7
BE -0.6 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -1.8 -0.2 -2.8 0.2 0.1 -1.1 -5.4 -4.0 -4.1 -4.2 -3.1 -3.1 -2.5 -2.5 -1.0
FI 1.7 6.9 5.0 4.1 2.4 2.2 2.6 3.9 5.1 4.2 -2.5 -2.6 -1.0 -2.2 -2.6 -3.2 -2.8 -1.8 -0.6
FR -1.6 -1.3 -1.4 -3.1 -4.0 -3.6 -3.3 -2.4 -2.6 -3.3 -7.2 -6.9 -5.2 -5.0 -4.1 -3.9 -3.6 -3.4 -2.6
DE -1.7 0.9 -3.1 -3.9 -4.2 -3.7 -3.4 -1.7 0.2 -0.2 -3.2 -4.2 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.3
EL -5.8 -4.1 -5.5 -6.0 -7.8 -8.8 -6.2 -5.9 -6.7 -10.2 -15.1 -11.2 -10.3 -8.9 -13.2 -3.6 -5.7 0.6 0.8
IE 2.4 4.9 1.0 -0.5 0.4 1.3 1.6 2.8 0.3 -7.0 -13.8 -32.1 -12.7 -8.0 -6.1 -3.6 -1.9 -0.5 -0.3
IT -1.8 -2.4 -3.4 -3.0 -3.3 -3.5 -4.1 -3.5 -1.5 -2.6 -5.2 -4.2 -3.7 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -2.6 -2.5 -2.3
LU 3.5 5.9 5.9 2.4 0.2 -1.3 0.1 1.9 4.2 3.3 -0.7 -0.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5
NL 0.3 1.9 -0.3 -2.1 -3.0 -1.7 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -5.4 -5.0 -4.3 -3.9 -2.4 -2.3 -2.1 0.4 1.1
PT -3.0 -3.2 -4.8 -3.3 -4.4 -6.2 -6.2 -4.3 -3.0 -3.8 -9.8 -11.2 -7.4 -5.7 -4.8 -7.2 -4.4 -2.0 -3.0
ES -1.3 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 1.2 2.2 1.9 -4.4 -11.0 -9.4 -9.6 -10.5 -7.0 -6.0 -5.3 -4.5 -3.1
CY -3.7 -2.2 -1.0 3.2 0.9 -5.4 -4.7 -5.7 -5.6 -5.1 -9.0 -1.3 0.3 1.8
EE 2.4 1.1 2.9 2.7 -2.7 -2.2 0.2 1.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.7 0.1 -0.3 -0.3
LV -0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -4.2 -9.1 -8.7 -4.3 -1.2 -1.2 -1.5 -1.4 0.1 -0.5
LT -1.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -3.1 -9.1 -6.9 -8.9 -3.1 -2.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.5
MT -4.3 -2.6 -2.5 -2.1 -4.2 -3.2 -2.4 -2.4 -3.5 -2.4 -1.8 -1.1 1.0 3.9
SK -2.3 -2.9 -3.6 -1.9 -2.4 -7.8 -7.5 -4.3 -4.3 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.2 -1.0
SI -2.0 -1.3 -1.2 -0.1 -1.4 -5.8 -5.6 -6.7 -4.0 -14.7 -5.5 -2.9 -1.9 0.0
Notes: 
indicates w hen the country joined the Euro Area (not indicated if the country joined in 1999)
indicates w hen the budget deficit exceeded 3% of GDP
Table 6.1: General government budget balance (% of GDP) - EA countries
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In the simple model presented in Chapter 3, it was shown that budget 
institutions can mitigate such a deficit bias. Thus, the first hypothesis drawn 
out in that Chapter postulates that an improvement in the quality of budget 
institutions results in smaller budget deficits (or larger budget surpluses). On 
the other hand, the impact of stronger legislative budgetary power on fiscal 
outcomes is less straightforward. The second hypothesis adopts the 
mainstream view in the legislature that stronger legislative budgetary power 
results in larger budget deficits (or smaller budget surpluses). However, whilst 
unrestricted amendment powers are expected to conflict with fiscal prudence, 
other characteristics, such as legislative involvement in numerical budgetary 
constraints can contribute to more fiscal restraint.  
The aim of this Chapter is to test empirically these hypotheses. The quality of 
budget institutions and legislative budgetary power indices, developed in the 
previous two Chapters, are used as explanatory variables in this analysis. It is 
relevant to examine the influence of the quality of budget institutions on fiscal 
discipline in the EA in the context of the reforms to the EA’s fiscal governance 
framework implemented since the Great Crisis, with the increased emphasis 
particularly on fiscal rules and fiscal councils. In terms of legislative budgeting, 
given the uncertainty from a theoretical point of view, the impact of legislative 
budgetary power on fiscal performance can only be determined empirically. 
Moreover, it is pertinent to assess whether democratic legitimacy to budgetary 
decisions, through a stronger role for the legislature, can be improved, without 
jeopardising fiscal discipline. 
Thus, this Chapter seeks to address the following research questions: 
- What is the impact of the quality of budget institutions on fiscal discipline 
in the EA? 
- What is the impact of legislative budgetary power on fiscal discipline in 
the EA? 
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows: a review of the literature which 
analyses the impact of budget institutions on fiscal discipline is presented in 
the next Section;  this is followed by a discussion of the methodology applied, 
including the empirical model, the data used and the estimation methods; the 
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findings are then presented and the Chapter ends with a summary of the 
results and conclusions.   
6.2 Literature Review: the impact of budget institutions on 
fiscal outcomes 
There is a vast and established literature testing empirically the relationship 
between budget institutions and fiscal discipline. This Section starts by 
reviewing this literature, focusing on key works with a similar scope to this 
study, i.e. covering European countries161, where the explanatory variable is a 
broad measure of the quality of budget institutions162 and the dependent 
variable involves the budget balance or government debt. Subsequently, the 
few empirical studies, which specifically analyse the impact of legislative 
budgetary power on fiscal outcomes, are also reviewed. 
6.2.1 The impact of the quality of budget institutions on fiscal discipline 
in EU countries 
Following von Hagen’s (1992) seminal contribution, various empirical studies 
have tested the impact of the quality of budget institutions on fiscal discipline 
in EU countries. Table 6.2 presents key features and results of these empirical 
works. 
Given their geographical focus, most of these works cover small samples, 
ranging from 10 to around 15 countries, whilst the recent works by Nerlich and 
Reuter (2013) and Maltritz and Wüste (2015) capture the EU27. In terms of 
timeframes, most of the studies cover around 10-15 years, with the works 
focusing on the CEECs generally having even shorter timeframes. Only 
                                                          
161 Examples of similar empirical studies with a different geographical scope include Stein et 
al. (1998) and Alesina et al. (1999) for a sample of around 20 Latin American countries; Filc 
and Scartascini (2004) for around 20 developing countries; Gollwitzer (2011) for 40 African 
countries and Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) for a broader sample of around 70 low-income 
countries. The results of these studies generally show that the quality of budget institutions 
has a positive and significant impact on the fiscal balance.  
162 However, recent studies capturing more than one institutional characteristic, which use 
CION fiscal governance indices, are also reviewed, since these indices are similarly used as 
explanatory variables in one of the extensions to the main empirical model, presented in 
Section 6.4.3. Other studies focusing only on individual characteristics of budget institutions 
in EU countries include European Commission (2006); Debrun et al. (2008); Wierts (2008) 
and Bergman et al. (2016) for fiscal rules and Debrun et al. (2012, 2013) for fiscal councils. 
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Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009), De Haan et al. (2013), Nerlich and Reuter 
(2013) and Maltritz and Wüste (2015) have longer timeframes, of around 
twenty years. 
Table 6.2: Main empirical studies on the quality of budget institutions and fiscal 
discipline in EU countries 
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Table 6.2: Main empirical studies on the quality of budget institutions and fiscal 
discipline in EU countries (cont.) 
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These studies generally use composite indices capturing the overall quality of 
budget institutions as their main explanatory variable163. As discussed in 
Section 4.3.1, these indices constitute a convenient way of capturing the 
quality of budget institutions in empirical analysis since they combine and 
synthesize a vast amount of qualitative information on the most relevant 
aspects of budget institutions into a single numerical variable. However, at the 
same time, this advantage also presents challenges, since they may be 
                                                          
163 In fact, several of these studies are also reviewed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. On the other 
hand, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) and Nerlich and Reuter (2013) use dummy variables 
to indicate the presence of specific institutional characteristics. 
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offsetting elements and thus it is difficult to draw out conclusions on specific 
institutional features. To address this problem, Gleich (2003), Yläoutinen 
(2004) and Mulas-Granados et al. (2009) also use different sub-indices for 
specific budgetary characteristics. On the other hand, Debrun and Kumar 
(2007a), Maltritz and Wüste (2015) and Nerlich and Reuter (2013) capture a 
rather narrow view of budget institutions, by focusing only on fiscal rules and 
fiscal councils, and in the latter case also MTBFs. Meanwhile, Hallerberg and 
von Hagen (1999), Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009), Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 
(2010) and De Haan et al. (2013) distinguish between the two different forms 
of fiscal governance – the delegation and contracts approaches (as described 
in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4). 
The budget balance as a ratio to GDP, either in nominal terms or cyclically 
adjusted, is the most widely used dependent variable in these studies. The 
primary balance and the change in the government debt ratio are also used in 
some of the studies. The former is more under the direct control of current 
policymakers since it excludes interest payments which reflect past 
borrowings, whilst the latter may constitute a more comprehensive measure 
of fiscal activity. 
The empirical models estimated in these studies range from a simple bivariate 
model in von Hagen (1992) and Gleich (2003) to more complex models 
incorporating a range of control variables. Most models are broadly based on 
that adopted by Roubini and Sachs (1989) and include economic and political 
control variables, but there are notable differences in the specific variables 
included as well as their measurement. The real GDP growth rate and the 
unemployment rate (or change thereof) are the most commonly used macro-
economic control variables. Some studies also include measures of the debt 
servicing costs and the debt level (or its lag) as a proxy for the inter-temporal 
budget constraint to which the budget balance must react. In terms of political 
determinants, the most commonly used variables capture government 
durability, government fragmentation or type of government (single-party 
majority, coalition or minority governments), the timing of elections and 
partisanship (generally on a left-right spectrum). The models also differ in 
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terms of whether they are static or dynamic in nature, with most including a 
lagged dependent variable to account for slow adjustment in the fiscal 
outcome. 
Almost without exception164, the reviewed empirical studies find that the quality 
of budget institutions, as measured by their respective indices, has a 
statistically significant positive impact on the fiscal balance (and a negative 
effect when the dependent variable is the change in the debt ratio). However, 
results are less robust for specific institutional characteristics. For instance, 
whilst Yläoutinen (2004) finds that all the three sub-indices relating to the 
different stages of the budgetary process have significant coefficients, Gleich 
(2003) does not find significant results for largely similar sub-indices and for 
the same sample of countries. In addition, confirming evidence is found for the 
influence of fiscal rules but not for fiscal councils in Debrun and Kumar (2007a) 
and Maltritz and Wüste (2015). Finally, using different indices for the 
delegation and contracts approach and estimating their model separately for 
sub-samples of countries depending on their form of fiscal governance, 
Hallerberg et al. (2007) and Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010) present some 
supporting findings, but De Haan et al. (2013) do not find comparable 
evidence. It is also pertinent to note that the problem of small sample size is 
exacerbated in the latter group of studies, particularly for the group of countries 
with a delegation approach. 
A lack of time-series data for the budget institutions variables constitutes a 
major constraint in this branch of the literature. Indeed, a few studies only have 
one data reading for the institutional explanatory variable of interest and thus 
either use cross-sectional analysis (for example, von Hagen 1992; Gleich 
2003) or combine fixed budget institutions throughout the period of analysis 
with time-series fiscal data (for instance, Yläoutinen 2004). Some studies have 
two or three data readings for their budget institutions variable, obtained from 
similar surveys carried out at periodic intervals or by combining survey 
generated data with other secondary information. On the other hand, Debrun 
                                                          
164 Yläoutinen (2004) does not find a significant effect for the 10 CEECs during the period of 
their political and market economy transition (1994-1998). But Gleich (2003) finds confirming 
evidence for the same sample of countries also for this period. 
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and Kumar (2007a), Nerlich and Reuter (2013) and Maltritz and Wüste (2015) 
have time series data from the CION’s fiscal governance databases, but as 
highlighted earlier, these do not constitute a comprehensive measure of 
budget institutions. Most of the studies with time-variation in their budget 
institutions variables exploit the panel nature of their data, with some using 
fixed effects to estimate separately the effect of institutional factors from other 
country specific effects. Fabrizio and Mody (2006) also include time dummies 
in their empirical model to capture effects that are common to all countries in 
their sample in a particular year. Some of these panel data models are also 
dynamic in nature, which requires the use of more complex estimation 
techniques (see for example, Nerlich and Reuter 2013). 
This branch of empirical studies also faces the possibility of endogeneity, 
which is widely acknowledged in the literature itself. Debrun and Kumar 
(2007b) explain that incumbents may use budgetary institutions as a signal of 
their commitment to fiscal discipline. In this case, a change in fiscal 
preferences results in a simultaneous strengthening of budget institutions and 
an improvement in public finances. Calmfors (2012) refers to Sweden after the 
financial crisis in the early 1990s as an example. Nevertheless, the problem of 
endogeneity has not been really resolved mainly due to the scarcity of good 
quality instruments for budget institutions variables (Fabrizio and Mody 2006; 
Debrun and Kumar 2007a)165. Various studies carry out tests for endogeneity 
and generally have concluded that this does not constitute a problem in their 
empirical analysis. Fabrizio and Mody (2006) and Nerlich and Reuter (2013) 
use Arellano-Bond, Keviet-bias or Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond procedures, 
but the reliability of these tests is limited in small samples; whilst Maltritz and 
Wüste (2015) run a simple panel regression with fiscal rules as the dependent 
variable on the lagged budget balance. On the other hand, various studies 
basically circumvent the endogeneity problem by adopting the working 
assumption that budget institutions are pre-determined, at least in the short to 
medium term, since they are costly and complex to change. Fabrizio and Mody 
                                                          
165 Only Hallerberg et al. (2007) and Debrun and Kumar (2007a) instrumentalise their budget 
institutions variables. The former use the institutional setting and the debt level in the first 
reading of their data, whilst the latter instrumentalise the fiscal rules index with exogenous 
political variables and their fiscal councils index. 
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(2006), Nerlich and Reuter (2013) and De Haan et al. (2013) explicitly explain 
such assumptions in their empirical analysis. 
6.2.2 The impact of legislative budgetary power on fiscal outcomes 
A few of the empirical studies reviewed in the previous Section attempt to 
disentangle the effect of legislative budgeting, mainly amendment powers, 
from other institutional characteristics. Using a sub-index to capture the budget 
approval stage, Gleich (2003), Fabrizio and Mody (2006) and Mulas-Granados 
et al. (2009) confirm the view that strong legislative budgetary amendment 
powers conflict with fiscal discipline. In contrast, using a more comprehensive 
measure for the role of the legislature in the budget approval process, 
Yläoutinen (2004) does not find comparable results. Helland (2000) also does 
not find confirming evidence when using a sub-index from von Hagen’s (1992) 
budget institutions index for a slightly different sample of countries during 
1978-1995.  
Meanwhile, very few studies use comprehensive measures of legislative 
budgetary power166 to examine the influence of legislative budgetary power on 
fiscal outcomes167. In a cross-sectional analysis of 28 OECD countries during 
2001-05, Wehner (2010b) finds that an increase in legislative budgetary power 
results in higher levels of public spending. When testing for the separate effect 
of the different aspects of legislative budgeting, the amendment powers sub-
index was found to have a significant effect. Moreover, the relevance of 
amendment powers was confirmed when this constituted the only institutional 
explanatory variable in a cross-sectional analysis for a larger and more diverse 
sample of 80 countries during 1990-98. In another study covering 57 countries 
during 1975-98, Wehner (2010c) further finds that restrictions on legislative 
                                                          
166 The legislative budgeting indices referred to in this Section are described in Section 5.2.2 
of the previous Chapter. 
167 Other studies examined the fiscal implications of specific legislative budgeting 
characteristics. These include Heller (1997, 2001), Bradbury and Crain (2001) and Ricciuti 
(2004), who find conflicting results for the impact of the size of the legislature and bicameralism 
on the aggregate level of government spending. From a different perspective, using a unique 
dataset for Sweden dating from 1921, Wehner (2013) finds evidence of an electoral cycle for 
parliamentary amendments to executive spending proposals. 
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amendment powers can moderate the impact of partisan fragmentation in the 
legislature on the budget deficit. 
Giuriato et al. (2016) use Wehner’s (2010b) index to assess the impact of 
legislative budgetary power on forecast errors in the budget balance for 13 EU 
countries during 1999-2013. Using a panel data model, with fixed (time) 
effects, they find that stronger legislative budgetary powers negatively 
influence the fiscal forecast accuracy, which they attribute to executive 
strategic behaviour, whereby it presents more favourable economic and fiscal 
forecasts when anticipating legislative amendments or possibly even the 
rejection of the proposed budget.  
Finally, Rίos et al. (2018) use their legislative budgetary oversight indicator to 
assess simultaneously its impact on the budget balance and on budget 
transparency. Using a cross-sectional analysis covering 85 countries, they find 
a negative and significant relationship with the budget balance, but a positive 
effect on budget transparency.  
6.2.3 Contribution to the literature 
Although the impact of the quality of budget institutions on fiscal discipline in 
EU countries has been examined extensively, this study still makes a relevant 
contribution to the literature. Firstly, in contrast to existing studies, it focuses 
on the current 19 EA member states. Whilst this poses a constraint in terms of 
sample size, it results in more analytical relevance since all the countries 
included in the study are subject to the same EA fiscal governance framework. 
Secondly, this Chapter presents a recent empirical analysis which captures 
reforms implemented since the Crisis. In contrast, the most recent similar 
empirical studies for the overall quality of budget institutions - Hallerberg and 
Yläoutinen 2010 and De Haan et al. 2013 - refer to 2007 and 2009, 
respectively. Finally, using the quality of budget institutions index as an 
explanatory variable implies a broader institutional measure, as described in 
Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4.  
This Chapter also makes an important contribution to the understudied topic 
of the impact of legislative budgeting on fiscal outcomes. In fact, only Wehner 
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(2010b) and Rίos et al. (2018) analyse the influence of legislative budgetary 
power on the budget balance, with the former focusing only on the effect of 
amendment powers. Furthermore, the legislative budgetary power index 
constitutes a comprehensive measure of legislative budgetary influence 
throughout the budgetary process, as discussed in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. 
It also constitutes a recent measure of legislative budgeting, whereas the 
indices used in comparable empirical studies refer to 2007 (Wehner 2010b) or 
2009 (Rίos et al. 2018) data. Finally, this Chapter provides a focused 
geographical scope, capturing all the EA member states. This contrasts with 
the larger, but diverse samples in Wehner (2010b) and Rίos et al. (2018), 
which were mainly determined by the coverage of their data sources. These 
samples include the United States which can distort the analysis, since the 
decisive influence of its Congress over the budget is probably unique (Wehner 
2010b). 
It is also pertinent to note that the use of these indices permits some time-
variation in the institutional explanatory variables, since two data readings are 
available, as explained in Sections 4.3.2 and 5.3.1 of Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively. 
6.3 Methodology: empirical analysis – budget institutions and 
fiscal discipline in the EA 
Whilst the previous two Chapters involve descriptive research, this Chapter 
comprises explanatory research on the impact of the quality of budget 
institutions and legislative budgeting on fiscal discipline. Using an empirical 
model, the following two hypotheses, derived in Chapter 3, are tested:  
Null Hypothesis I0: The overall quality of budget institutions does not have any 
influence on the budget balance. 
Hypothesis I: An improvement (a worsening) in the overall quality of budget 
institutions results in smaller budget deficits or larger budget surpluses (larger 
budget deficits or smaller budget surpluses). 
Null Hypothesis II0: Overall, legislative budgetary power does not have any 
influence on the budget balance. 
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Hypothesis II: Stronger (weaker) legislative budgetary power results in larger 
budget deficits or smaller budget surpluses (smaller budget deficits or larger 
budget surpluses).  
This Section presents the empirical model as well as the estimation methods 
applied. But first, the philosophy underpinning the research presented in this 
Chapter together with the ethical issues involved are discussed. 
6.3.1 Philosophy of research and ethical issues 
Reflecting its quantitative approach and similarly to the research presented in 
the previous two Chapters, the empirical analysis presented in this Chapter is 
carried out from a post-positivist paradigm. The ontological position adopted 
in this Chapter is similarly a realist one, where our understanding of the ‘true’ 
relationship between budget institutions and fiscal discipline in the EA is 
tentative, with this empirical analysis contributing to the knowledge on this 
topic. The analysis involves the hypothetico-deductive method and applies the 
falsification principle in respect of the two null hypotheses presented earlier, 
by seeking to find statistically significant relationships between the institutional 
variables and the fiscal discipline indicator. 
The epistemological position associated with the realist ontology adopted in 
this study is a post-positivist view of empiricism, where the relationship 
between budget institutions and fiscal discipline can only be known imperfectly 
and the generation of knowledge is constrained by data availability and data 
measurement problems. Thus, different specifications of the empirical model 
and estimation methods are used to test the robustness of the results. 
As regards ethical implications of the research presented in this Chapter, there 
are no additional issues regarding the quality of budget institutions and the 
legislative budgetary power indices than those outlined in Sections 4.3.3 and 
5.3.2 of Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Furthermore, secondary data is used 
to compile the other variables used in this empirical analysis: this data is 
publicly available online and its use does not involve any particular ethical 
issues. 
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6.3.2 The Empirical Model 
The empirical analysis involves a panel data model which, compared to a 
cross-sectional approach, has the advantage of a significantly larger sample 
size. It thus allows controlling for the effect of other determinants of fiscal 
outcomes. The sample covers a ten-year period from 2006 to 2015. Although 
not all the current EA countries were members of the monetary union 
throughout this period, the recent members that joined the EU in 2004 were 
preparing for Euro adoption during the period under review. Whilst the total 
number of observations in the sample is not very large, it is broadly 
comparable to that in other panel data studies by Debrun and Kumar (2007a), 
Mulas-Granados et al. (2009), Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010) and Giurato 
et al. (2016). Furthermore, the timeframe in this study matches closely that of 
the institutional indices168, thus providing for more analytical relevance169.  
The use of the quality of budget institutions and legislative budgetary power 
indices introduces some time-variation in the institutional explanatory 
variables, although this is limited to two data readings: the pre- and post-crisis 
indices. This requires the assumption that the indices are unchanged for some 
years170. This does not constitute an ideal dataset, but De Haan et al. (1999), 
Fabrizio and Mody (2006), Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009), Hallerberg and 
Yläoutinen (2010) and De Haan, et al. (2013) have worked with similar data 
constraints.  
The panel data multivariate regression model takes the following general form:  
FISCALit = β0 + β1ECONit + β2POLit + β3PRESSUREit + β4INDEXit + μi + νt + ɛit 
where: 
FISCALit refers to the fiscal indicator for countryi in yeart; 
                                                          
168 As discussed in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4, the post-crisis institutional indices refer to data 
for 2012, 2014 and 2016, whilst the data included in the pre-crisis indices pertains mainly to 
2007.  
169 In contrast, Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) and De Haan et al. (2013) have larger samples 
with fiscal data from the mid-1980s, but their first institutional data readings refer to 1991. 
170 The post-crisis indices are applied from 2012 to 2015, whilst the pre-crisis indices are 
applied from 2006 to 2011. As explained in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4, due to data constraints, 
it was not possible to generate pre-crisis indices for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Malta and hence the data for these countries is limited to 2012-2015. 
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β0 is a common intercept term for all the countries and for all years in the 
sample; 
ECONit refers to a vector of economic control variables; 
POLit refers to a vector of political control variables; 
PRESSUREit refers to a vector of control variables capturing the pressure on 
governments to carry out fiscal consolidation; 
INDEXit refers to the budget institutions indices for countryi in yeart;  
μi refers to the unobservable time-invariant country-specific error term;  
νt refers to the unobservable time effect; and 
ɛit refers to the remaining stochastic disturbance term. 
As regards the dependent variable (FISCALit), the budget balance as a ratio 
to GDP is the main indicator of fiscal discipline used in the empirical analysis. 
The budget balance for the general government sector171 is used since this is 
the relevant concept for the EA’s fiscal governance framework and provides a 
harmonised definition for all the EU countries. Furthermore, the general 
government budget balance can capture potential substitution effects across 
different government sectors (Hallerberg et al. 2007). Nonetheless, to check 
the robustness of the results, alternative models are estimated with other fiscal 
indicators used in the literature, namely the primary budget balance, cyclically-
adjusted budget balance and the change in the government debt ratio. By 
excluding interest payments, the primary budget balance constitutes a better 
measure of the current fiscal stance and is more under the control of 
government than the inflexible cost of past borrowings (Alesina et al. 1999; 
Fabrizio and Mody 2006). Meanwhile, the cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
filters the impact of fluctuations in the economic cycle and thus provides a 
better measure of discretionary fiscal policy (Debrun and Kumar 2007a; 
                                                          
171 In the European System of Accounts (ESA) 2010 (paragraph 2.111), the general 
government sector comprises central, state and local government and social security funds 
(Eurostat and European Commission 2013). 
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Nerlich and Reuter 2013)172. Finally, by capturing transactions which are off-
budget, the annual change in the government debt ratio can constitute a more 
comprehensive measure of fiscal activity. The data for these fiscal indicators 
is from the CION’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs’ 
(DG Ecfin) annual macro-economic database (AMECO). A more detailed 
description of the fiscal indicators used in the empirical analysis and their 
respective data sources is provided in Table AXXVIII in Appendix III. 
The choice of the control explanatory variables was guided by the empirical 
studies reviewed in Section 6.2 and more generally, by the literature on the 
political economy of budget deficits, reviewed in Chapter 2. Given the sample 
size involved, in order to safeguard degrees of freedom, the selected control 
variables constitute key economic and political determinants of fiscal 
outcomes together with proxies for the pressure faced by governments to 
implement fiscal consolidation. A description of these variables together with 
their relevant data sources are included in Table AXXVIII in Appendix III, whilst 
Tables AXXIX and AXXX present descriptive statistics for the different 
variables used in the empirical analysis and correlation coefficients, 
respectively. 
The economic control variables used in the model (ECONit) are the real GDP 
growth rate and the unemployment rate, being widely used macroeconomic 
indicators. These variables capture the effects of economic fluctuations on the 
fiscal balance. Economic growth improves the budget balance, through 
automatic stabilisers, whilst a high unemployment rate results in a worsening 
of the fiscal position.  
Drawing on the discussion in Chapter 2, the selected political control variables 
(POLit) aim to capture the effect of the electoral cycle, government 
fragmentation and government ‘weakness’173. A simple dummy variable 
indicates whether legislative elections were held in the country concerned in a 
                                                          
172 Since the measurement of the cyclically adjusted budget balance is subject to considerable 
uncertainty, two alternative measures, both estimated by the CION are used:  one based on 
the production function (potential GDP) and one based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter method 
(trend GDP). 
173 Following the arguments presented in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2, a partisan variable, to 
capture the ideology of the government in office, is not included in the model. 
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particular year. Reflecting the discussion on the electoral budget cycle in 
Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, this is expected to have a negative effect on the 
budget balance. Meanwhile, rather than using a dummy variable to indicate 
the type of government, which as discussed in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2 can 
be problematic, two separate indicators are used to capture the effect of 
government fragmentation174 and ‘weakness’. The first indicator is a 
fractionalisation index, which measures the probability that two 
parliamentarians picked at random from among the government parties are 
from different political parties175. Reflecting the common pool resource 
problem discussed in Chapter 2, the coefficient of this index is expected to be 
negative. Meanwhile, government weakness is proxied by government’s 
margin of majority in parliament. A stronger majority strengthens the 
executive’s power vis-à-vis that of the legislature, which in the simple model 
on the budgetary process presented in Chapter 3, contributes to more fiscal 
discipline. 
The third group of control variables (PRESSUREit) aim to capture the pressure 
that governments face to implement fiscal consolidation. The lagged 
government debt ratio to GDP provides a proxy for the long-term fiscal 
sustainability to which the budget balance reacts. Additionally, the model 
includes also a dummy variable to capture whether a country was subject to a 
financial assistance programme in a particular year, since these included 
specific fiscal consolidation targets176. A priori, both the coefficients of the 
lagged debt ratio177 and the bail-out dummy are expected to be positive.  
As pointed out earlier, the explanatory variables of interest are the quality of 
budget institutions and the legislative budgetary power indices (INDEXit). The 
                                                          
174 The indicator used captures the number of political parties within government, since data 
is more accessible than that for the number of spending ministers.  
175 This indicator is easier to interpret than an alternative Herfindahl index (used by Fabrizio 
and Mody (2006), for example) which computes the sum of squared seat shares of all parties 
in government. 
176 Further details on the economic adjustment programmes for the bailed-out EA countries is 
available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-
coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance_en. 
177 A high debt ratio implies increased fiscal sustainability risks, which put pressure on 
governments to implement fiscal consolidation (for instance, to avoid potential downgrades by 
sovereign credit rating agencies). This effect is assumed to offset the direct effect of increased 
interest payments due to a higher debt level.  
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model is first estimated with each index included separately and then with both 
indices. Whilst the use of composite indices as explanatory variables facilitates 
the empirical analysis, as discussed in Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4, such 
aggregate measures may mask offsetting elements, making it difficult to draw 
conclusions on specific institutional characteristics. This is particularly relevant 
for the legislative budgetary power index, where legislative amendment 
powers are expected to lead to less fiscal discipline, whereas other aspects of 
legislative budgeting may have opposite effects. Thus, an alternative 
specification of the model, with an indicator of legislative amendment power178, 
as an explanatory variable, is also estimated. On the other hand, all the 
different components of the quality of budget institutions index are expected 
to have a positive effect on the budget balance. Nevertheless, an alternative 
specification of the model is also estimated, with a narrower scope focusing 
on important aspects of budget institutions in the EA fiscal governance 
framework, namely MTBFs, fiscal rules and fiscal councils. The European 
Commission’s (2017b, 2017c) fiscal rules strength and MTBF indices are used 
as explanatory variables, together with a simple dummy variable to indicate 
the presence of an IFI. Debrun and Kumar (2007a), Nerlich and Reuter (2013) 
and Maltritz and Wüste (2015) use similar data from the CION’s fiscal 
governance databases, but their sample is not limited to the members of the 
EA. An important advantage of this alternative model specification is that it 
uses an almost complete timeseries dataset for the explanatory institutional 
variables179. This avoids the restrictive assumption in the main model due to 
only two data readings for the constructed indices. 
As shown in Table 6.2, various studies adopt a dynamic specification of the 
empirical model, thus implying that a shock to the fiscal dependent variable 
persists.  On the other hand, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
                                                          
178 This captures whether the legislature has such powers and whether any restrictions apply. 
In Table AXII (in Appendix II), this corresponds to the second indicator in the legislative budget 
amendment powers sub-index (IA3).  
179 The MTBF index is available for 2006 and annually from 2008 to 2015; in 2007 it is assumed 
to remain unchanged at the 2006 level. The fiscal rules strength index is available annually 
for 2006-2015. The IFI dummy variable was compiled annually for the 2006-15 period using 
data from the IMF Fiscal Councils database 2015. A similar full timeseries for legislative 
budgeting variables is not available. 
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as one of the explanatory variables increases the complexity of estimating the 
panel data model and can produce biased and inconsistent estimates when 
using the standard fixed effects especially in short panel datasets due to the 
so-called Nickell (1981) bias180. Methods using generalised methods of 
moments (GMM) estimators, by Arellano and Bond (1991) or Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), were developed for dynamic 
panels where the time dimension is small and the number of cross sections is 
large (Roodman 2006).  When the number of cross-sectional units is small, 
these estimators can be severely biased and imprecise (Bruno 2005). Thus, 
given the number of observations available, the main model presented in this 
Chapter involves a static specification, although for completeness, results from 
a dynamic form are also presented. 
Similarly to the approach adopted in Chapters 4 and 5, the empirical analysis 
is extended by distinguishing between the bailed-out countries and other EA 
member states. The main empirical model is estimated separately for the two 
geographical sub-samples to assess whether the impact of budget institutions 
on the fiscal balance differs between these two groups of countries. However, 
the results from these estimates should be considered as only providing 
suggestive indications, due to the very small number of countries in the bailed-
out group181. 
6.3.3 Estimation methods 
The first step in estimating the panel data model involved determining whether 
to estimate it using a pooled, fixed or random effects approach. Pooled OLS 
ignores the cross-section and time-series nature of the panel data, which can 
result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the coefficients (Baum 2006). 
Formal tests using the restricted F test provided in the fixed effects regression 
results (Baltagi 2013) show that pooled OLS is not appropriate (see Appendix 
                                                          
180 For further details, see for example, Baum (2006).  
181 In contrast to some studies reviewed in Section 6.2.1, the empirical analysis presented in 
this Chapter does not distinguish between countries with a delegation or contracts form of 
fiscal governance. Firstly, very few countries in the sample are expected delegation states 
(i.e. with a single-party majority government) and secondly, the results presented in Section 
4.4.5 of Chapter 4 show that some EA countries do not adopt one distinct form of fiscal 
governance.  
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III). In addition, random effects models assume that the country-specific effects 
constitute random drawings from a larger sample (Gujarati and Porter 2009). 
This is not a tenable assumption since the sample involves the set of EA 
countries. In addition, time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity, such as 
social and cultural factors, are likely to influence the characteristics of budget 
institutions and legislative budgeting, which suggests that the country-specific 
error term would be correlated with the regressors, further indicating a fixed 
effects model (Baum 2006). This was formally confirmed using the Mundlak 
(1978) test182 (see Appendix III). 
Whilst these tests suggest a one-way fixed effects model, the presence of 
cross-sectional dependence in the errors183 (see Appendix III) can lead to 
misleading statistical inference (Pesaran 2006). Whilst Driscoll and Kraay 
corrected standard errors are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional 
dependence and also correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, this 
estimation model assumes that the common unobserved factors are 
uncorrelated with the regressors and furthermore this approach is robust when 
T is large (Hoechle 2007). Similarly, Pesaran’s (2006) common correlated 
effects estimator for static panel data with strictly exogenous regressors 
applies for panel data models with medium to large N and T (Pesaran, 2006). 
In view of these constraints, the model is estimated using a simple two-way 
fixed effects model with country and time dummies. Fabrizio and Mody (2006) 
use a similar approach to estimate their panel data model for the 10 CEECs 
over a relatively short timeframe (1997-2003). This two-way fixed effects 
model does not solve all the problems of heteroscedasticity, auto-correlation 
and cross-sectional dependence. However, time dummies can account for 
common shocks to all countries in a given year, although cross-sectional 
correlations are constrained to be the same for all units (Hoechle 2007). In 
                                                          
182 In contrast to the usual Hausman test, the Mundlak (1978) test is robust in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2010). The results of the tests for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are also presented in Appendix III.  
183 Although this tends to be more of an issue in macro panels on countries with long time 
series (Baltagi 2013), it could also result from strong interdependence between countries due 
to economic and financial integration (De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006). It can thus constitute a 
concern for panels composed of EA countries. 
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view of these limitations, results for the model estimated using alternative 
methods are also presented. 
6.4 Results 
In order to provide a general indication of the relationship between the quality 
of budget institutions and the budget balance, and similarly for legislative 
budgetary power, this Section starts by displaying scatterplots in Figures 6.3 
and 6.4, respectively.  
Contrary to the general findings in the literature, there does not seem to be a 
strong positive relationship between the overall quality of budget institutions 
and the budget balance during the 2012-15 period. Countries with high scores 
in the quality of budget institutions index (most notably, Spain as well as 
France, Ireland and Slovenia) perform poorly in terms of their average budget 
balance. On the other hand, countries such as Malta and Belgium have very 
weak budget institutions but fare better in terms of their fiscal position. 
Furthermore, the fiscal balance of countries with similar quality of budget 
institutions varies considerably (for example, Germany and Slovenia).  
Figure 6.3: Quality of budget institutions and budget balance 
Source: Average budget balance from European Commission’s (2017f) Ameco online 
database; quality of budget institutions index produced by author 
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Meanwhile, whilst the literature suggests a conflict between legislative 
budgetary power and fiscal discipline, Figure 6.4 shows no specific 
relationship between the relevant index and the budget. Indeed, there is a wide 
disparity in the average fiscal balance of countries with similar scores in the 
legislative budgetary power index (for instance, Germany and Spain). At the 
same time, countries with very different rankings in terms of legislative 
budgetary power have a similar fiscal performance (for example, Netherlands 
and Malta).  
Figure 6.4: Legislative budgetary power and budget balance 
 
Source: Average budget balance from European Commission’s (2017f) Ameco online 
database; legislative budgetary power index produced by author 
 
The relationship between budget institutions and the budget balance is 
analysed in a more in-depth manner through a panel data model. This Section 
thus proceeds by first discussing the results of the two-way fixed effects model, 
with the constructed indices for quality of budget institutions and legislative 
budgetary power as the main explanatory variables. Subsequently, the 
robustness of the findings is tested and finally, results from extensions of the 
main model are presented. 
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6.4.1 Results of the panel data analysis: main model 
The main model includes country fixed effects, which capture time-invariant 
social, political and other country-specific determinants of the budget balance, 
as well as year dummies to control for common shocks to all EA countries. 
The model is estimated in a step-wise manner, starting with the economic 
control variables and then adding sequentially the political control variables, 
the variables related to the pressure to implement fiscal consolidation. Finally, 
the quality of budget institutions and legislative budgetary power indices are 
included in the model, first individually and then jointly. Table 6.3 presents the 
results of this model. 
As expected, stronger real GDP growth is associated with an improved fiscal 
balance, whilst the unemployment rate exerts a negative effect. However, only 
the unemployment rate has a significant influence when the institutional 
variables are included in the model. 
Turning to the political determinants of the budget balance, in contrast to the 
findings in the literature reviewed in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2, as well as most 
of the empirical studies reviewed in Section 6.2.1, the results do not provide 
any evidence of an electoral budget cycle. This could be due to the different 
period covered in the analysis, with electoral manoeuvring possibly being more 
difficult to implement during and in the aftermath of the Great Crisis. The other 
political variables also do not exert a significant effect on the fiscal balance. 
Furthermore, whilst the coefficient of the variable capturing parliamentary 
majority has the expected sign, the coefficient of the government 
fragmentation variable is positive, which contrasts with the predictions of the 
common pool resource theory184. De Haan and Sturm (1994), Hallerberg and 
von Hagen (1999), Debrun and Kumar (2007a) and Nerlich and Reuter (2013) 
have also found a lack of significance for their government fragmentation 
variables (using different proxies). But, as discussed in the broader literature 
                                                          
184 The coefficients are similarly not significant when government fragmentation is measured 
by a Herfindahl index and when a simple dummy variable to indicate the type of government 
(single party majority or coalition/minority government) is used - both based on data from 
Döring and Manow (2016). 
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review in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2, there is some empirical evidence 
supporting the fragmented and weak government hypotheses. 
 
Table 6.3: Results of the main model  
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Country fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Constant -0.259 -2.866 -4.029* -10.25 -6.079 -11.22* 
 (0.862) (0.136) (0.021) (0.076) (0.051) (0.046) 
R2 0.482 0.491 0.509 0.543 0.531 0.551 
F 25.55 36.28 327.8 2765.0 1399.9 56230.1 
Observations 190 190 190 146 146 146 
  p-values in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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On the other hand, consistent with the findings by Debrun and Kumar (2007a), 
De Haan et al. (2013), Nerlich and Reuter (2013) and Maltritz and Wüste 
(2015)185, the lagged government debt ratio was found to have a significant 
positive effect on the budget balance, although the impact is small in 
magnitude. In contrast, the coefficient of the bailout dummy is neither 
statistically significant nor does it have the expected positive sign.  
Focusing on the determinants which are of most interest, the quality of budget 
institutions index has the expected positive effect on the fiscal balance, but it 
is not statistically significant. This corroborates the analysis of the scatterplot 
presented in Figure 6.3, but contrasts with the findings of a robust relationship 
in the literature reviewed in Section 6.2.1. The different findings could reflect 
the broader scope of the quality of budget institutions index, as explained in 
Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4, as well as the more recent time period covered 
(2006-15), which includes the impact of the Great Crisis and its aftermath. In 
particular, as discussed in Section 4.4.4, the improvement in the quality of 
budget institutions during the period under review largely reflected reforms to 
comply with the EA common requirements for fiscal rules and fiscal councils, 
rather than more broad-based reforms spurred by a national policy agenda. 
This thrust for a more homogenous rules-based form of fiscal governance at 
the national level, which was supra-nationally mandated, could imply less 
political commitment to the constraints imposed by these reforms (Kopits 
2012, Wyplosz 2012). This has implications for their effectiveness to bring 
about fiscal discipline.  
As regards legislative budgetary power, the coefficient of the relevant 
constructed index is also positive and not statistically significant. Its magnitude 
is also smaller than that for the quality of budget institutions index. Whilst 
confirming the analysis based on the scatterplot in Figure 6.4, this result does 
not support the general view in the budget institutions literature of a conflict 
between more democratic budgetary procedures and fiscal discipline. It also 
differs from the findings in the few available empirical studies using legislative 
                                                          
185 However, De Haan et al. (2013) and Maltritz and Wüste (2015) use the debt level in year 
t. 
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budgeting indices, reviewed in Section 6.2.2, which report that legislative 
budgetary power is associated with higher public spending levels (Wehner 
2010b), less fiscal forecast accuracy (Giuriato et al. 2016) and worse fiscal 
balances (Rίos et al. 2018). These divergent results could reflect differences 
in the dependent variables used, in the timeframe covered by the analysis and 
importantly, in the more comprehensive measure of legislative budgetary 
power used, which also includes institutional characteristics that can 
contribute to fiscal discipline, as discussed in Section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5.  
6.4.2 Robustness tests 
The first robustness test carried out involves using different fiscal indicators as 
dependent variables. Subsequently, the main model is also estimated by 
applying different econometric approaches. A dynamic specification of the 
model is also estimated and finally, tests for potential endogeneity bias due to 
reverse causality are carried out. 
6.4.2.1 Different fiscal indicators as dependent variables 
Table 6.4 shows the results of the main model with different fiscal indicators 
as dependent variables: the primary budget balance, cyclically adjusted 
balance and the annual change in the government debt ratio, all referring to 
the general government sector and measured as a ratio to GDP. 
 
The main results are largely confirmed in the different model specifications. 
There is a positive relationship between the quality of budget institutions index 
and all the fiscal balance indicators and a corresponding negative relationship 
when the dependent variable is the annual change in the government debt 
ratio. The coefficient of the quality of budget institutions index is generally not 
significant, except (at the 10% level) with the cyclically adjusted budget 
balance (based on potential GDP). Meanwhile, the different specifications also 
show that similar signs for the coefficient of the legislative budgetary power 
index, but the relationship is not significant, except when the change in the 
debt ratio is used as the dependent variable. Its coefficient is also generally 
smaller than that for the quality of budget institutions index. 
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Country fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Constant -11.220* -9.366 -16.320* -18.190** -14.460* -16.340** 29.340** 
 (0.046) (0.091) (0.010) (0.004) (0.018) (0.007) (0.002) 
R2 0.551 0.569 0.419 0.544 0.468 0.601 0.723 
F 56230.1 3059.7 6733.3 401.5 5570.7 442.5 353.1 
Observations 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
As regards the influence of the economic control variables, the negative effect 
of the unemployment rate on the fiscal position is also confirmed, though the 
coefficient is not always significant when using cyclically-adjusted fiscal 
indicators. On the other hand, the sign of the coefficient of real GDP growth is 
not consistent and is statistically significant only in some models. Meanwhile, 
the lagged debt ratio exerts a significant positive pressure on the fiscal position 
in all models, whilst the sign of the coefficient of the bailout dummy is contrary 
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to a priori expectations in all models and is not significant, except with the 
change in the debt ratio. Finally, political factors are not important 
determinants of fiscal outcomes in any of the models. Only the margin of 
majority has consistently the expected sign and it obtains statistical 
significance when the dependent variable is the change in the debt ratio.  
6.4.2.2 Alternative estimation methods 
Given the limitations and difficulties to estimate the empirical model (as 
discussed in Section 6.3.3), Table 6.5 presents the results when the main 
model is estimated using pooled OLS, random effects, fixed effects, first-
differencing186 and fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay corrected standard 
errors. 
Overall, the positive influence of the institutional variables on the budget 
balance is confirmed. The quality of budget institutions is always positively 
associated with the budget balance and the relationship is also significant with 
some estimation methods. On the other hand, the coefficient of the legislative 
budgetary power index is positive with all estimators except first-differencing, 
and it is sometimes statistically significant. Its coefficients are generally smaller 
in magnitude than that for the quality of budget institutions index. 
Meanwhile, there are some differences as regards the influence of the control 
variables when using alternative estimation methods. In terms of the economic 
control variables, whilst the unemployment rate consistently has a negative 
and significant impact on the budget balance, the positive influence of real 
GDP growth is not always significant. As regards the political control variables, 
the positive influence of the margin of majority is confirmed and furthermore, 
the effect is significant with some estimation methods. On the other hand, both 
the coefficients of the government fragmentation variable and the election 
dummy are never significant and the sign of the former is also inconsistent. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of the bailout dummy is always insignificant and 
generally has a negative sign, whilst the lagged government debt ratio has a 
significant positive effect on the fiscal balance with the two-way fixed effects 
                                                          
186 Estimating the model using first-differencing is more efficient than the fixed effects 
estimator when the error term is serially correlated (Wooldridge 2010). 
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and first-differencing estimators but its coefficient is very close to zero and not 
significant with the other estimation methods. 
 
Table 6.5: Results of the main model using different estimation methods 






























































































       
Government 





























































       
Country fixed 
effects 
yes no no yes yes yes 
       
Time dummies yes no no no no no 
       
Constant -11.22* -14.04** -15.88*** -17.69**  -17.69** 
 (0.046) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)  (0.004) 
R2 0.551 0.480  0.352 0.220  
F 56230.1 77.29  87.20 39.28 193.3 
Observations 146 146 146 146 127 146 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Note: 
1 The model involves first-differenced variables. Although the variables in this model differ, the coefficients are 
presented in the same table for ease of comparison. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
6.4.2.3 Dynamic specification of the model 
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, given the sample size involved, the estimation 
of a dynamic specification of the model involves considerable challenges. 
Nevertheless, for completeness, Table AXXXI in Appendix III shows the 
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results of a dynamic form of the main model187. This model is estimated using 
the Arellano and Bond difference GMM, since this uses less instruments than 
the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond system GMM188.  
The results show that the coefficient of the lagged budget balance is highly 
significant. However, there are some divergences from the results presented 
earlier. As regards the institutional variables, the quality of budget institutions 
remains positively associated with the budget balance in the dynamic 
specification, but it is not statistically significant, in contrast to some of the 
static versions of the model. There is a more conspicuous contrast in the 
influence of legislative budgetary power, with a negative, albeit still 
insignificant, coefficient in the dynamic specification of the model. 
Furthermore, the statistical significance of the economic control variables 
differs, whilst the coefficients of the government fragmentation and bailout 
dummy variables have the expected signs in the dynamic specification, 
although both remain insignificant. The magnitude of the coefficients also 
differs considerably between the static and dynamic versions of the model, 
with marked differences noted for the coefficient of the quality of budget 
institutions index. 
6.4.2.4 Endogeneity bias due to reverse causality 
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, potential endogeneity bias, due to possible 
feedback from fiscal developments onto budget institutions, can constitute a 
challenge when analysing the relationship between institutions and fiscal 
outcomes, but there are difficulties to address this problem in practice. 
However, this problem of reverse causality could be limited in this study since, 
as shown in Section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4, reforms to budget institutions during 
the period under review mainly reflected the introduction of new common EA 
                                                          
187 This excludes the lagged government debt ratio from the explanatory variables because 
the dynamic specification of the main model does not satisfy the Arellano and Bond tests 
concerning the presence of autocorrelation. When the lagged debt ratio is excluded from the 
model, these tests are satisfied at the 10% level when using the two-step estimator, whilst the 
Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions are also met. 
188 For a discussion on the problems of a large number of instruments with these GMM 
estimators, see Roodman (2009). 
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requirements for fiscal rules and fiscal councils and can thus be considered as 
exogenous. 
Nevertheless, drawing on Maltritz and Wüste (2015), a formal simple test for 
reverse causality is carried out by regressing the institutional indices on the 
lagged budget balance in a simple panel setting189. The results (presented in 
Table AXXXII in Appendix III) show there is no Granger causality from the 
lagged budget balance neither to the quality of budget institutions index nor to 
the legislative budgetary power index. This confirms that the endogeneity 
problem does not seem to be so important in this study190.  
6.4.3 Extensions to the main model 
The first extension to the main model involves distinguishing between the 
bailed-out countries and the other EA member states, building on a similar 
comparison carried out for the quality of budget institutions and legislative 
budgetary power indices in Section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4 and Section 5.4.3 of 
Chapter 5, respectively. The main model is estimated separately for the two 
sub-samples. The second extension to the main model involves examining the 
influence of specific institutional characteristics on the budget balance.  
6.4.3.1 Budget institutions and fiscal disciple in bailed-out and other EA 
countries 
Table 6.6 presents the results for the group of bailed-out countries and the 
other EA member states, as well as for the whole sample. In view of the very 
small sample size for the bailed-out group, the discussion focuses on 
comparing the results for the non bailed-out countries with those for all the EA 
member states.  
 
                                                          
189 Another test for potential endogeneity bias involves using dynamic panel estimators and 
including suitable lags of the levels of the endogenous variables as instruments (Baum 2006). 
However, this approach could not be applied due to the sample size (number of instruments 
exceeds the number of groups). 
190 For completeness, the same regressions with changed roles are also estimated. The 
results, presented in Table AXXXIII in Appendix III, show that both the quality of budget 
institutions index and the legislative budgetary power index exert a positive effect on the 
budget balance, but only the former is significant (at the 10% level). These results are largely 
similar to those obtained with the main two-way fixed effects static model.  
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Table 6.6: Results of the main model for the bailed-out countries and other EA member 
states 
Dependent variable = general government budget balance % of GDP 
Explanatory variables all EA countries Bailed-out countries Other EA countries 
% Change in real GDP 0.008 -0.101 0.167 
 (0.935) (0.637) (0.114) 
    
Unemployment rate -0.447** -0.470* -0.308 
 (0.003) (0.039) (0.144) 
    
Legislative election held 0.028 -1.101 0.052 
 (0.917) (0.263) (0.802) 
    
Margin of majority 2.263 4.692 -0.020 
 (0.559) (0.688) (0.995) 









    








    
Bailout dummy variable1 -1.328 -0.813  
 (0.553) (0.794)  
    

















    
Country fixed effects 
 
Time dummies 
yes yes yes 
 yes yes yes 
    
Constant -11.22* 3.822 1.035 
 (0.046) (0.658) (0.865) 
R2 0.551 0.664 0.610 
F 56230.1 . . 
Observations 146 44 102 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: 
1 The years when the bailed-out countries requested financial assistance and when they exited their respective 
programmes differs and hence, the bailout dummy variable is retained in the model for the sample of bailed-out 
countries.   
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
There are notable differences in the sign of some coefficients, as well as their 
significance and magnitude. In particular, both the unemployment rate and the 
lagged debt ratio lose significance in the sub-sample. Meanwhile, whilst 
remaining statistically insignificant, the coefficient of the margin of majority 
variable is much smaller in size, whilst the effect of government fragmentation 
turns negative, in line with a priori expectations. In this context, it is relevant to 
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note that coalition governments are more prevalent among the non bailed-out 
countries191. 
Turning to the institutional variables, the coefficients of the quality of budget 
institutions index remains positive and insignificant in the sub-sample, but its 
magnitude is notably smaller. Legislative budgetary power also has an 
insignificant influence in the sub-sample, but whereas its influence is positive 
for all EA countries, the coefficient is close to zero for the group of non bailed-
out member states. These results indicate that the weak relationship between 
budget institutions and the budget balance is not solely conditioned by the 
greater instability in the bailed-out EA countries during the period under 
review. 
6.4.3.2 Specific institutional characteristics and fiscal discipline 
As explained in Section 6.3.2, two alternative specifications to the main model 
are estimated to focus the analysis on particular institutional characteristics. 
The first alternative model involves replacing the institutional indices with the 
European Commission’s (2017b, 2017c) fiscal rules strength and MTBF 
indices together with a simple dummy variable to capture the presence of an 
independent fiscal council. The second alternative model uses an indicator for 
legislative budget amendment powers instead of the more comprehensive 
legislative budgetary power index. These variants of the main empirical model 
are similarly estimated using two-way fixed effects, with the budget balance to 
GDP ratio as the dependent variable. 
As shown in Table 6.7, the influence of the control variables is quite similar to 
that in the main model, except for the election dummy and the government 
fragmentation variable, which remain insignificant, but have the expected 
negative sign. Meanwhile, the MTBF and fiscal rules indices have a positive 
and significant effect (at the 5% and 10% level, respectively) on the budget 
balance. On the other hand, the coefficient of the IFI dummy is negative and 
                                                          
191 Out of the thirteen non bailed-out countries, only Malta and Slovakia had single-party 
majority governments (and only during the post-crisis period in Slovakia), whereas within the 
bailed-out group, Greece, Portugal and Spain had this type of government particularly during 
the pre-crisis period. 
Chapter 6: Budget Institutions and Fiscal Discipline in the Euro Area – 
Empirical Analysis 
 
  201 
 
not significant. Debrun and Kumar (2007a), Nerlich and Reuter (2013) and 
Maltritz and Wüste (2015), who also use the CION’s fiscal governance indices 
as explanatory variables, find broadly similar results for fiscal rules and fiscal 
councils. 
 
Table 6.7: Results of the two-way fixed effects model with the European Commission 
MTBF and fiscal rules strength indices and an IFI dummy variable  
Dependent variable = general government budget balance % of GDP 
Explanatory variables Main model Alternative Model 1 
% Change in real GDP 0.008 0.081 
 (0.935) (0.227) 
   
Unemployment rate -0.447** -0.274* 
 (0.003) (0.035) 
   
Legislative election held 0.028 -0.281 
 (0.917) (0.214) 
   
Margin of majority 2.263 5.403 
 (0.559) (0.214) 
   
Government fractionalization Index 0.547 -0.881 
 (0.814) (0.620) 
   
Government debt ratio in year t-1 0.066** 0.035 
 (0.005) (0.069) 
   
Bailout dummy variable -1.328 -2.109 
 (0.553) (0.279) 
   
Quality of budget institutions index 1.463  
 (0.110)  
   
Legislative budgetary power index 0.646  
 (0.256)  
   
European Commission MTBF index  3.391* 
  (0.012) 
   




   
IFI dummy variable  -0.678 
  (0.430) 
   
Country fixed effects yes yes 
   
Time fixed effects yes yes 
   
Constant -11.22* -7.072** 
   
 (0.046) (0.007) 
R2 0.551 0.569 
F 56230.1 . 
Observations 146 190 
 p-values in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
The lack of influence by IFIs may reflect the fact that they constitute a relatively 
recent institutional development. In fact, the findings presented in Section 
4.4.4 of Chapter 4 show that in various EA countries, they are young 
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institutions, being established after the Great Crisis in response to the EA 
common requirements. Thus, they may have not yet become well-integrated 
in the countries’ institutional framework, with implications for their influence on 
the budgetary process. Begg (2017) reaches similar conclusions on the 
effectiveness of fiscal councils, based on a qualitative analysis of their 




Table 6.8: Results of the two-way fixed effects model with legislative budgetary 
amendment powers 
Dependent variable = general government budget balance % of GDP 
Explanatory variables Main Model Alternative model 2 
% Change in real GDP 0.008 0.022 
 (0.935) (0.815) 
   
Unemployment rate -0.447** -0.475** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
   
Legislative election held 0.028 -0.034 
 (0.917) (0.899) 
   
Margin of majority 2.263 1.807 
 (0.559) (0.603) 
   
Government fractionalization index 0.547 0.922 
 (0.814) (0.657) 
   
Government debt ratio in year t-1 0.066** 0.071** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
   
Bailout dummy variable -1.328 -0.879 
 (0.553) (0.712) 
   
Quality of budget institutions index 1.463 1.946 
 (0.110) (0.086) 
   
Legislative budgetary power index 0.646  
 (0.256)  
   
Legislative amendment powers indicator  -0.640 
  (0.108) 
   
Country fixed effects yes yes 
   
Time dummies yes yes 
   
Constant -11.22* -7.090 
 (0.046) (0.208) 
F 56230.1 5338.1 
Observations 146 146 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
In the second alternative model (Table 6.8), there are no major changes in the 
influence of the control variables, except that the coefficient of the election 
dummy is negative, but still insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient of the 
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quality of budget institutions index remains positive and it is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Meanwhile, as expected, the coefficient of the 
legislative budget amendment power indicator is negative, although it 
marginally fails to achieve significance at the 10% level. This shows that the 
negative influence of amendment powers on the budget balance can be offset 
by other aspects of legislative budgeting. 
 
6.5 Summary of results and conclusions 
This Chapter presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
budget institutions and the budget balance, using a two-way fixed effects panel 
data model. The results show a positive relationship between the quality of 
budget institutions and the budget balance, but the influence is not strong. 
These findings are largely confirmed when using alternative measures of the 
fiscal balance as the dependent variable and also when applying different 
estimation methods. Thus, the null hypothesis that changes in the quality of 
budget institutions do not affect the budget balance cannot be strongly refuted. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the quality of budget institutions and 
the budget balance is also weak for the group of EA countries that have not 
been bailed-out. These findings contrast with the evidence of a robust 
relationship between quality of budget institutions and fiscal discipline found in 
previous empirical studies. Moreover, the results from an alternative model 
using more specific institutional explanatory variables show that numerical 
budgetary constraints have a significant impact on the budget balance, but 
confirming evidence was not found for fiscal councils. 
Different explanations can be put forward to interpret these findings. The lack 
of influence of fiscal councils may reflect the fact that they are a relatively 
recent institutional development in various EA countries and it may take time 
for these councils to establish credibility and influence on the budgetary 
process. This may also affect the influence of the overall quality of budget 
institutions index on the budget balance in the main model, since a novel 
feature of this index is that it also captures IFIs. Furthermore, another 
distinguishing aspect of the empirical analysis presented in this Chapter is the 
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more recent timeframe which includes the Great Crisis and its aftermath. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the wave of reforms to national budget institutions 
during this period was mainly triggered by the EA common requirements for 
fiscal rules and fiscal councils. They thus involved a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
which was imposed supra-nationally, rather than nationally driven broad-
based institutional reforms. Since this can affect the ‘ownership’ of these 
constraints, it may explain the finding that differences in national budget 
institutions were not a very important determinant of fiscal discipline in the EA 
countries during the 2006-2015 period. 
As regards legislative budgeting, the results show that strong legislative 
budgetary power does not necessarily conflict with fiscal discipline, with a 
positive, but weak influence, in most of the models estimated. This result is 
also confirmed when different estimation methods are applied. On the other 
hand, in the group of countries that have not been bailed-out, the influence of 
legislative budgetary power is broadly neutral. Overall, the null hypothesis that 
legislative budgetary power does not influence the budget balance cannot be 
rejected. This contrasts with the mainstream view in the literature and also with 
the results of the few available empirical studies on this topic. These 
differences could reflect the more recent timeframe of the analysis. Moreover, 
the legislative budgetary power index used is more comprehensive, as 
discussed in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. Importantly, the index also captures 
various institutional characteristics which can contribute to more budgetary 
restraint, such as legislative involvement in fiscal rules, MTBFs and SGP 
procedures. In fact, similar to other studies, stronger legislative budget 
amendment powers are associated with a worse budget balance, although the 
relationship is not statistically significant. These results thus show that 
democratic accountability in the budgetary process can be safeguarded 
without jeopardising fiscal discipline, by ensuring a broader involvement of the 
legislature in the different phases of the budgetary process, rather than 
focusing only on amendment powers during the approval stage. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The results of the empirical analysis presented in the previous Chapter show 
an overall positive, but weak, relationship between the quality of budget 
institutions and fiscal discipline. This Chapter provides further examination of 
the relationship between budget institutions and fiscal discipline, using a 
different methodological approach, involving a case study on one of the EA 
countries - Malta. In view of their increased prominence in the EA fiscal 
governance framework, this analysis focuses on fiscal rules and fiscal 
councils. 
In this case study, qualitative methods, namely interviews with key 
stakeholders in the budgetary process, are used, thus avoiding the 
decontextualization which characterises the econometric analysis that is 
generally adopted in this branch of the literature and which was similarly 
presented in the previous Chapter. Through this alternative approach, this 
Chapter aims to understand the causal process through which fiscal rules and 
fiscal councils affect fiscal discipline in Malta. These institutional 
characteristics have been introduced only recently in Malta, to comply with the 
common EA requirements introduced by the reforms to the SGP and the Fiscal 
Compact Treaty: thus, they can be considered as largely exogenous. At the 
same time, Malta’s fiscal performance has been relatively strong in recent 
years: in contrast to other EA Mediterranean countries, it has not suffered from 
a sovereign debt crisis and its fiscal position has strengthened considerably, 
with a budget surplus being recorded since 2016 and the general government 
debt ratio falling to around 50% of GDP in 2018 (European Commission 
2018b). In this context, Malta constitutes an interesting case to understand 
whether and how the introduction of fiscal rules and the establishment of an 
IFI can contribute to more fiscal restraint. Thus, this Chapter aims to address 
the following research question:  
- Have the recently introduced national fiscal rules and fiscal council 
contributed to more fiscal discipline in Malta, and how?  
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The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows192: the next Section describes 
the political, economic and fiscal context for the case study on Malta; 
subsequently, the methodology applied for the case study is discussed, 
including the data sources, the approach used to analyse the data and ethical 
issues involved; the results of the case study are then presented and 
discussed and a summary of the findings concludes the Chapter. 
7.2 Background on Malta and contribution to the literature 
With an area of just 316 square kilometres and a population of around 475,000 
(Government of Malta no date), Malta is the smallest member state of the EU. 
It is located at its southern periphery in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea. 
Malta gained independence from British rule in 1964 and became a republic 
ten years later. It joined the EU in 2004 and adopted the Euro as its currency 
in 2008 (Malta Tourism Authority no date).  
A brief overview of the relevant political and economic context as well of recent 
fiscal developments follows. Subsequently, this Section focuses on budget 
institutions in Malta by presenting the results of a benchmarking exercise for 
the quality of budget institutions index developed in Chapter 4, complemented 
by a review of the very scant literature on Malta’s budget institutions. This 
Section then closes off by outlining the contribution to the literature of the case 
study analysis presented in this Chapter. 
7.2.1 Political and economic context and recent fiscal developments in 
Malta 
Malta is a representative parliamentary democracy, with the prime minister as 
head of government193 (European Commission 2019a). Its political system is 
dominated by the Nationalist and Labour parties, with only these two parties 
being represented in parliament since 1971 (Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe 2017). Partisan rivalry is high and several general 
                                                          
192 The relevant literature underpinning the case study presented in this Chapter is reviewed 
in the context of the theoretical framework based on a simple model of the budgetary process 
in EA countries, presented in Chapter 3, and in the discussion on the quality of budget 
institutions in Chapter 5. 
193 The president, who is not elected, is the head of state, but this role is largely ceremonial.  
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elections were won by a small margin of votes194. As a result, and also 
reflecting the very organised popular base of these political parties, there is a 
near universal turnout of 90% or more for general elections (University of Malta 
no date), even though voting is not compulsory. In this polarised two-party 
majority system, the executive dominates the political system, whilst 
parliament, as an independent institution, is weak (Bulmer 2014). 
Furthermore, Malta adopts a single transferable vote electoral system which 
empowers voters not only to choose the political party which will govern the 
country but also their representatives in parliament by ranking their preferred 
candidates (Cini 2002). The relatively small thirteen districts used for general 
elections facilitate a close and often personal contact between the candidates 
and the voters, which encourages clientilistic competition among the political 
candidates (Bulmer 2014). In this scenario, short-term, electoral 
considerations are more likely to influence fiscal policy making, as also 
acknowledged by the MFIN’s (2013) economic assessment for strengthening 
Malta’s fiscal framework. 
As regards Malta’s economy, this is characterised by a high degree of 
openness195. It is a service-oriented196 economy, based on tourism as well as 
other sectors, such as financial services and online gaming activities 
(Economic Policy Department 2018). Since 2013, economic growth has been 
robust, at around 5% per annum or higher (Eurostat 2018b), whilst 
unemployment has fallen to historically low levels (around 4% in 2017) 
(Eurostat 2018c). 
                                                          
194 Between 1971 and 2008, the difference in the share of first-count votes between the two 
main political parties was on average around 3 percentage points, corresponding to around 
7,500 votes. The gap was narrowest in the 2008 election at just 0.5 percentage points (around 
1,500 votes). In contrast, the Labour Party has won the last two general elections, in 2013 and 
2017, with a historically large margin of around 11 percentage points, corresponding to around 
35,000 votes (University of Malta no date).  
195 Both exports and imports of goods and services amount to over 100% of GDP (Eurostat 
2018b). 
196 Service activities accounted for around 85% of gross value added in 2017 (Economic Policy 
Department 2018). 
Chapter 7: Budget Institutions and Fiscal Discipline – A Case Study on Malta 
 
  209 
 
Supported by the strong economic growth as well as new non-tax revenue 
sources197, Malta’s fiscal balance has improved markedly in recent years 
(Figure 7.1).  
 
Figure 7.1: General government budget balance - Malta 
 
Source: European Commission (2018b) 
 
 
Figure 7.2: General government gross debt - Malta 
 
Source: European Commission (2018b) 
 
                                                          
197 Most notably the Individual Investor Programme, which allows individuals to obtain Maltese 
citizenship in return for major investments in the economy: in 2017, revenues from this scheme 
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Since EU accession, Malta was subject to consecutive EDPs198, but since 
2016, a budget surplus has been recorded, with the MTO of a balanced budget 
in structural terms199 being over achieved (Ministry for Finance 2018a). Figure 
7.2 shows similar developments in the debt trajectory: after exceeding the 60% 
of GDP reference value consistently during 2004-13, the general government 
debt ratio has followed a rapid downward trend, reaching around 50% of GDP 
by 2017. 
7.2.2 Budget institutions in Malta 
Data on the quality of budget institutions in Malta is very scarce, with most of 
the quality of budget institutions indices available capturing either the EU15 
countries or the ten CEECs (see Section 4.2 of Chapter 4). CION’s (2017e) 
fiscal governance databases200, together with Horvath’s (2018) fiscal councils 
indices, constitute recent exceptions201.   
CION’s fiscal governance indices show a marked strengthening of fiscal rules 
in recent years, as well as some improvement in the MTBF for Malta. Among 
the 19 EA countries, Malta’s ranking in the fiscal rules strength index increased 
from around 18th until 2013 to 10th as from 2015, whilst its rank in the MTBF 
index fluctuated between 5th and 6th in recent years, from 8th in 2008. 
Furthermore, Malta’s fiscal council - the Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (MFAC) 
- ranks 4th among the EA member states in terms of the tasks carried out as 
measured by CION’s scope of IFIs index. However, it ranks lower (16th) in 
Horvath’s (2018) broader index which includes also the fiscal councils’ 
organisational capacity and other characteristics.  
Horvath (2018) also reports that Malta’s IFI is among the eight (out of a sample 
of twenty) who lack widespread political support and who are not strongly 
                                                          
198 In 2004-07, 2009-12 and 2013-15 (European Commission 2019b). 
199 The structural balance corresponds to the “cyclically-adjusted budget balance net of one-
off and temporary measures” (Gilles et al. 2013: 7). 
200 CION’s fiscal governance indices reviewed in this Chapter refer to 2016 and are based on 
a new methodology, published in 2017. Hence, they are not comparable to the CION data 
included in the quality of budget institutions index, presented in Chapter 4 and that used in the 
empirical analysis, presented in Chapter 6.  
201 Schaechter et al. (2012) and Maltritz and Wüste (2015) produce indices for fiscal rules and 
fiscal councils, respectively, also for Malta, but the scores for these indices are not publicly 
available. Darvas and Kostyleva (2011) also include Malta in their sample but their budget 
institutions index is based on the OECD’s 2007/8 survey on budget practices and procedures.  
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rooted in national institutions. In addition, based on a qualitative assessment 
of fiscal councils in EU countries, Begg (2017) uses Malta as an example to 
criticise fiscal councils for using qualifying language and ignoring minor 
deviations from fiscal rules in their assessments to give a clean bill of health 
to their respective governments. More generally, in their assessment of the 
influence of politics on public expenditure in Malta, Mullard and Pirotta (2008) 
emphasise the role of the clientelist perspective which characterises Maltese 
politics. They also highlight resource constraints within MFIN and also the 
personal relationships which affect the nature of budget negotiations with 
spending ministries. However, this research refers to 1996-2001 and is thus 
rather dated. 
Given the scant literature on Malta’s budget institutions, a more 
comprehensive assessment is carried out by benchmarking its performance 
vis-à-vis the other EA countries, using the quality of budget institutions index 
developed in Chapter 4.  
7.2.2.1 Quality of budget institutions in Malta 
Malta’s overall score in the quality of budget institutions index of 5, out of a 
maximum of 10, is the lowest among the EA countries. As shown in Figure 
7.3, Malta has the minimum score in the budget approval process, as the 
legislature has unrestricted formal amendment powers, it also does not first 
vote on the total amount of expenditure before voting on specific 
appropriations and furthermore, it is the only EA country without a 
parliamentary budget committee in place. It also has the lowest score for 
budget transparency: in particular, it does not require legislative authorisation 
for off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities. 
On the other hand, Malta has a medium score202 in all the other sub-indices 
comprised in the quality of budget institutions index. It ranks 6th (together with 
three other countries) in the budget negotiations sub-index, showing relatively 
strong characteristics of the delegation form of fiscal governance, in particular 
                                                          
202 In Chapter 4, EA countries were categorised into three groupings according to their scores 
in the quality of budget institutions index (top, medium and low score categories, 
corresponding to the top, second and third, and bottom quartiles, respectively). 
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with bilateral negotiations between MFIN and spending ministries and the 
imposition of budget ceilings on overall spending requests by line ministries. 
Whilst Malta ranks 12th (together with another country) in the budget 
implementation sub-index, this reflects its poor performance in the 
supplementary budget indicator. On the other hand, the finance minister has 
a relatively strong position during budget execution, with medium scores for 
executive authority to cut or cancel spending, but also to increase it, and a top 
score for the possibility of line ministers to re-allocate funds within their own 
budget envelopes. 
 
Figure 7.3: Quality of budget institutions sub-indices – Malta benchmarking exercise 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Furthermore, in the aspects of budget institutions involving common EA 
requirements, namely the MTBF, fiscal rules and IFI sub-indices, Malta ranks 
between 11th and 13th, respectively. Strong aspects of the national MTBF 
include its broad coverage and the monitoring and enforcement of the multi-
annual budgetary targets. On the other hand, the MTBF is not discussed or 
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voted upon by parliament and the connectedness between the SP and the 
annual budget can be improved. Meanwhile, fiscal rules have a broad 
coverage, there is lack of flexibility for revising the objectives and they are 
monitored and enforced by an independent body (the fiscal council). But the 
fiscal rules fare weakly in terms of enforcement and correction mechanisms 
and they have been only recently introduced (in 2014). Turning to Malta’s fiscal 
council, this also constitutes a recent development, being established in 2015. 
Particularly weak features concern the small size of its staff and the fact that it 
does not generate its own forecasts. On the other hand, it performs quite well 
in terms of its independence and also regarding access to information and the 
number and variety of published reports.  
Overall, this analysis shows that Malta has characteristics of the delegation 
approach in the budget formulation and implementation stages. At the same 
time, it fares broadly on par with the average for the EA in terms of the recently 
introduced fiscal rules and fiscal council.  
7.2.3 Contribution to the literature 
The case study on Malta presented in this Chapter contributes to the literature 
on budget institutions in two important manners: firstly, through its 
methodological approach and secondly through its focus on Malta. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the literature on budget institutions is based on a 
quantitative approach, with numerical composite indices to measure the 
quality of budget institutions and regression analysis to assess its influence on 
fiscal discipline. The case study presented in this Chapter provides an 
alternative qualitative methodological approach, which enables a more in-
depth and contextual analysis of how budget institutions affect fiscal discipline. 
Moreover, this Chapter also provides a contribution to the literature on budget 
institutions through its geographical focus. As noted earlier, the literature on 
Malta’s budget institutions is very sparse and some of the few available studies 
are quite dated. Thus, this case study adds to the knowledge on budget 
institutions in the EA, by providing an in-depth analysis on one of the member 
states which has been largely ignored in this branch of the literature. Finally, 
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the case study also involves unique data generated from detailed interviews 
to a broad range of key stakeholders in Malta’s budget process. 
7.3 Methodology: case study on Malta’s budget institutions 
and fiscal discipline 
Like the empirical analysis presented in the previous Chapter, this Chapter 
also involves explanatory research analysing the relationship between budget 
institutions and fiscal discipline. However, it is based on a different 
methodological approach involving a qualitative case study. The research 
presented in these two Chapters complement each other and together they 
provide a more thorough analysis of the phenomenon of interest. Thus, whilst 
the previous Chapter provides estimates of the causal effect of budget 
institutions on the budget balance for the EA, the case study analysis is 
focused on Malta and aims to understand the causal mechanisms involved, 
taking into account the broader political and institutional context within which 
the budgetary process takes place. 
This Section starts by presenting the case study approach, justifying the focus 
on Malta and discussing the philosophy underpinning this research 
component. Subsequently, the research methods used to compile the case 
study are explained, namely interviews and documentary evidence. This is 
followed by a discussion on the thematic coding approach used to analyse the 
data, whilst a review of the ethical issues involved closes off the Section. 
7.3.1 Research design: case study on Malta and philosophy of research 
Robson (2011: 136) defines a case study as  
“a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence”.  
Case studies are appropriate when the research aims to explain how or why 
some phenomenon works (Yin 2009). Hence this research design is applied 
to address the aim of this Chapter, which is to understand how budget 
institutions affect fiscal discipline. 
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Although case studies do not constitute the prevalent approach in the literature 
on budget institutions, their relevance has been noted by, amongst others, 
Alesina and Perotti (1999), Poterba and von Hagen (1999) and more recently, 
Horvath (2018) for fiscal councils. Examples of recent case studies on budget 
institutions in EA countries include Stienlet (2000) and Lebrun (2009) for 
Belgium, with the latter focusing on the role of IFIs, whilst Hauptmeier et al. 
(2007) and Wanna et al. (2010) present case studies on budgetary reforms in 
Ireland, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, amongst others.  
Through case study research, it is possible to acquire a holistic view of the 
phenomenon being studied (Noor 2008) and multiple sources of evidence can 
be used. This enables a process of triangulation and corroboration (Yin 2009). 
The methodological rigour of case study analysis can be assessed on the 
basis of its construct, internal and external validity and its reliability (Yin 2009). 
Table 7.1 shows a similar analysis for the case study presented in this 
Chapter, drawing on the frameworks used by Riege (2003) and Gibbert et al. 
(2008). 
A single case study presents certain analytical disadvantages compared to a 
multi-case design, since it precludes comparative analysis and the replication 
logic cannot be applied (Yin 2009). However, depending on the selection of 
the case, a single case study can still make a significant contribution to 
knowledge and theory (Flyvbjerg 2006). The focus on Malta for this case study 
was motivated by the introduction of national fiscal rules and the establishment 
of an independent fiscal institution in 2014 and 2015, respectively203 and the 
recent positive turnaround in the public finance situation, as shown in Section 
7.2.1. Furthermore, these institutional reforms involve characteristics of the 
contracts approach, whilst Malta has a predominantly delegation form of fiscal 
governance (see Figure 4.13 in Chapter 5). In this context, it is relevant to 
analyse whether and how fiscal rules and the fiscal council are affecting fiscal 
discipline in Malta. Finally, these institutional developments were largely 
triggered by the common EA requirements introduced after the Great Crisis 
and thus can be considered as largely exogenous. As pointed out by Alesina 
                                                          
203 Furthermore, being Maltese, the author is familiar with and has a personal interest in these 
institutional developments. 
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and Passalacqua (2015: 58), such historical case studies characterised by a 
“natural experiment” of exogenous reform constitute a particularly useful 
avenue for research on budget institutions. 
Table 7.1: Assessing methodological rigour in the case study on Malta’s budget 
institutions 
Criteria Aim Measures adopted 
Construct 
validity 
Correct operational variables for the 
theoretical concepts being researched 
Multiple sources of evidence, including interviews with 
different stakeholders in Malta’s budgetary process, 
and documentary evidence 
Clear chain of evidence – detailed explanation of data 
collection process and procedures applied to analyse 
the data; ample citations used to support the analysis1 
Internal 
validity 
Robust causal relationships Comparison of observed patterns in the collected 
evidence to theoretical predictions based on the 
model developed in Chapter 3 
Use of diagrams to assist explanation building 
Seeking rival explanations by taking into account other 
factors that could potentially affect fiscal discipline as 
well as mitigating factors 
External 
validity 
Results account not only for phenomena 
in the setting of the case studied but in 
other settings as well 
Analytical generalisation - from empirical 
observations to theory, instead of 
statistical generalisation - to population 
(Yin 2009: 15) 
Focus on Malta explained and relevant context for 
case study provided 
As suggested by Hays (2004), the data analysis seeks 
to uncover new and unusual interactions between 
budget institutions and fiscal discipline, which could be 
relevant to other EA countries 
Reliability Absence of random error; subsequent 
researchers can reach the same insights 
if they repeat the study and follow the 
same steps 
Transparency – careful documentation of evidence 
and clear research procedures 
 
Note: 
1 It was not possible to enhance construct validity by having the transcripts reviewed and the findings validated by 
academic peers or key participants, due to constraints in the availability of academics in Malta with relevant 
expertise and the busy schedules of interviewees. These constraints also hindered the possibility to carry out 
piloting of the interviews. 
Source: Compiled by author, drawing on Yin (2009), Riege (2003) and Gibbert et al. (2008)  
 
7.3.1.1 Philosophy of research 
Whilst the research presented in the previous three Chapters involves a 
quantitative approach based on post-positivism, the qualitative case study 
research presented in this Chapter adopts a different epistemological position 
based on a realist perspective. Drawing on Sayer (1992), a qualitative causal 
and structural analysis of budget institutions is carried out to identify underlying 
mechanisms and understand their influence on fiscal discipline, within Malta’s 
economic, political and institutional context. This research design is inductive 
in nature and aims to discover and build theory rather than to test theory 
through analytical generalisations (Riege 2003). 
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Moreover, the case study presented in this Chapter constitutes a departure 
from objectivism, which characterised the previous components of this study. 
Whilst not going as far as constructionism, where researchers assign meaning 
and present their own account of reality (Bryman 2016), the ontological 
position behind the case study emphasises the multiple perspectives of the 
different stakeholders in the budgetary process. 
7.3.2 Research methods: data sources and analysis 
This case study uses two main data sources: interviews, which are discussed 
in more detail below, and documentary evidence. Regarding the latter, various 
secondary sources are used, namely fiscal reports and documents published 
by Malta’s MFIN, the MFAC and EU institutions, as well as legislative acts and 
transcripts and minutes of relevant parliamentary sittings204. These documents 
refer to the period from 2013 until the cut-off date for the case study of 30 June 
2018, thus capturing the introduction of the budgetary reforms and the first few 
years of their implementation. A list of all the secondary sources used in the 
case study is provided in Table AXXXIV in Appendix IV. 
7.3.2.1 Interviews 
Interviews constitute one of the most important source of case study 
information (Yin 2009). This case study uses interviews with key high-ranking 
officials and politicians involved in the budgetary process in Malta. The 
participants were selected by purposive sampling, based on their expertise 
and experience on the budgetary process in Malta. Gaining access to such 
elite interviewees205 can be difficult (Mikecz 2012), but this was facilitated by 
the author’s previous career at MFIN206. Furthermore, snowballing techniques 
helped to ensure that the sample is comprehensive. In all, 28 potential 
                                                          
204 Since both Maltese and English are official languages in Malta, most of these documents 
are available in English; quotes from the few documents which are available only in Maltese 
were translated into English by the author. 
205 The interview participants are senior and professional officials and current or former 
members of parliament and hence exhibit characteristics of elite interviewees as defined by 
Harvey (2011) and Mikecz (2012), such as power and ability to exert influence, 
professionalism and high level of skills.  
206 During 1994-2010, the author worked at the Economic Policy Department (EPD), within 
MFIN. 
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participants were invited to participate in the research and the participation 
rate was of around 85%. 
As shown in Table 7.2, the participants involve officials directly involved in the 
budgetary process, namely from MFIN, parliament and the MFAC as well as 
from external stakeholders, namely the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) and the 
CION. At least two participants from each institution were interviewed. These 
participants are senior officials (having at least a grade of Manager or Director) 
or professionals with five or more years working experience. In addition, 
interviews were also held with current or previous members of parliament, 
selected on the basis of their expertise and experience in budgetary matters, 
with equal representation from the two main political parties. This sample of 
24 participants enabled confirmatory data to be obtained for most of the issues 
of interest from more than one participant and resulted in a unique and 
comprehensive dataset. Moreover, the multiple sources used reduce the risk 
of bias, thus improving the validity of the data generated. The interviews were 
held by the author between August and December 2016. All but one interview 
were held face-to-face with the participants in Malta207. As indicated in Table 
7.2, three interviews were held jointly with other participants from the same 
institution on their request: although this could have led to less disclosure, 
given the limited number of potential participants, this option was preferred to 
excluding them from the sample.  
The interviews were semi-structured, thus offering flexibility which was 
important given the diverse background of the participants. At the same time, 
having established general topics for discussion enabled more control during 
the interviews, which can be particularly useful when interviewing elites 
(Odendahl and Shaw 2002). The use of open-ended questions contributed to 
the richness of the data. They are also more appropriate when interviewing 
elites who generally like to articulate their views (Aberbach and Rockman 
2002). The interview questions were derived from the theoretical model of the 
budgetary process developed in Chapter 3 and the literature on budget 
institutions reviewed in Chapter 4. The questions largely concern the role of 
                                                          
207 A telephone interview was held with one participant who is not based in Malta and who 
was not planning to be in Malta in the foreseeable future. 
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fiscal rules and the fiscal council during the three stages of the budgetary 
process, namely budget preparation, approval and implementation. A copy of 
the interview guide is included in Appendix IV.  
 
Table 7.2: Interview Participants 
Institution Number of 
participants 
Identifying code for interviews1 
Ministry of Finance 
- Budget Office 
- Economic Policy Department 
- Permanent Secretary’s Office 
6 MFIN1, MFIN2, MFIN3, MFIN172, 
MFIN19 
Parliament officials 
- Office of the Speaker 
- Office of the Clerk of the House 
6 PARL9, PARL10, PARL123, PARL22 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council 2 MFAC4, MFAC6 
Central Bank of Malta4 
- Economics and Research Department 
2  
 
EXT5, EXT7, EXT135, EXT14, EXT16 European Commission 
- European Representation in Malta 
- Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
4 
Politicians 
- Two ex-members of parliament  
- Two current members of parliament 
(two from the Labour Party, currently in office, and two 
from the Nationalist Party, currently in opposition) 
4 POL8, POL11, POL15, POL21 
Total 24  
Notes: 
1 Participants are identified on the basis of their institution. The number in the code refers to the order in which 
participants were contacted. 
2 Joint interview with two participants. 
3 Joint interview with three participants. 
4 The participants from the CBM requested that their responses are not identified as originating from the Bank and 
hence they were grouped with the participants from CION and identified as external stakeholders. 
5 Joint interview with two participants. 
Source: Produced by author 
 
Most of the interviews were conducted in Maltese208, but they were translated 
and transcribed by the author into the English language. All interviews were 
transcribed from audio-recordings, except two, where the transcripts are 
based on the notes taken during the interviews since the participants involved 
did not grant consent to audio-record the interviews. 
 
                                                          
208 Only four interviews were held in English, three of which involved non-Maltese participants 
from the CION. 
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7.3.2.2 Data analysis: thematic coding 
A thematic coding approach was used to analyse the data compiled for the 
case study. The coding of the data was inductive, emerging from the data, with 
no predefined set of coding categories, and was carried out manually and 
using Microsoft Word. This was manageable given the amount of data involved 
and was preferred since it provided an opportunity for deeper engagement 
with the data, whilst also avoiding the time required to become familiar with 
the software in a specialist computer package. 
The first step in the data analysis process involved disassembling the data 
through “open coding” (Ezzy 2002: 86). The text was analysed line by line, 
meaningful chunks of text were identified and given “descriptive codes” (King 
and Horrocks 2010: 152). Subsequently, “interpretative coding” (Hesse-Biber 
and Leavy 2010: 311) was carried out: this involved an iterative process of 
systematically grouping the data with the same or similar descriptive codes 
and redefining and merging codes under core thematic headings, which have 
general analytical relevance, also outside the setting of the text itself. During 
the coding process, memos were used to record thoughts on the interpretation 
and relationships of the data. Table AXXXV in Appendix IV shows examples 
of how the descriptive codes and the analytical categories were derived from 
the interview data. Finally, the analysed data was re-assembled, with quotes 
from different texts relating to the same analytical category grouped together. 
Patterns in the full dataset were noted, by making comparisons across 
participants, whilst also noting the frequency of occurrences and identifying 
linkages across the themes. Particular attention was applied to ensure that the 
data is internally consistent and to identify any possible negative instances, 
whilst also adopting a critical approach to identify any other potential 
determinants of fiscal discipline. From this data analysis, thematic maps were 
drawn up to develop the research narrative from the identified themes (see 
Figures 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 in Section 7.4).  
Being more subjective, qualitative research requires “reflexive practice”, 
whereby the researcher carries out self-examination on how the findings are 
produced (Mason 1996: 164). The author’s past work experience at the MFIN 
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contributed to an environment of trust and respect during the interviews. At the 
same time, similarly to the experience of Mikecz (2012) when interviewing 
elites in Estonia, the author, being a member of the academic staff of the 
University of Malta since 2010, was considered as an outsider by participants, 
which facilitated a frank and open discussion. 
7.3.3 Ethical issues 
This Section discusses ethical issues concerning the data generated from the 
interviews. The secondary sources used in the case study involve publicly 
available documents and thus do not involve any particular ethical concerns.  
Approval to carry out the interviews was granted by the Chair of the 
Humanities, Social and Health Science Research Ethics Panel at the 
University of Bradford on 17th June 2016209. The procedures specified in the 
ethics application form were followed to carry out the interviews and to 
generate and store the primary data. 
Participants were invited to participate in the research through an email, to 
which the participation information sheet was attached (a copy is provided in 
Appendix IV). Since written consent could have made the interviews more 
official and potentially discouraged participation, instead, verbal informal 
consent was obtained from the participants at the beginning of the interview. 
Before the start of the interview, participants were also asked permission to 
audio-record the interview. 
The participants in the interviews do not constitute particularly vulnerable 
individuals and the data produced does not involve private information. 
However, since the participants involve high-ranking officials and politicians, 
the interviews were held on a confidential basis. It was not possible to gather 
the data through completely coded data collection techniques. Nevertheless, 
the names and official positions of the participants are not revealed and they 
are not otherwise identified, also when disseminating the research results and 
in future publications. Instead, participants were allocated a code, based on 
                                                          
209 This also covered the carrying out of questionnaires to national authorities in the 19 EA 
countries, as discussed in Section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5. A copy of the ethics application form is 
included in Appendix II. 
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their institution (see Table 7.2) and the data generated from the interviews is 
stored securely and separately from the participants’ details. Having at least 
two participants from each institution further reduces the risk that statements 
are attributed to specific individuals. Furthermore, to guarantee confidentiality, 
no reference is made to any potential personal, contextual identifiers and for 
this reason, the transcripts of the interviews are not being included in the 
Appendices. The interviewees were informed about these confidentiality 
issues through the participant information sheet. 
Most interviews took between 45 and 55 minutes, but participants were free to 
speak for longer if they wished, whilst interviews with participants with more 
limited involvement in the budgetary process generally took less time. The 
length of the interviews varied from a minimum of 20 minutes to a maximum 
of one hour and 45 minutes. Given the busy schedules of the participants, the 
time required to participate in the interviews may have constituted an 
inconvenience. Thus, participants were offered flexibility to choose a date and 
time for the interview and also where to hold the interview, with most of them 
preferring to be interviewed at their work office210. 
Finally, although the author had previous working relationships with several 
interviewees, there was no longer any power relationship with the participants 
when the interviewees were held. 
7.4 Results of the case study analysis 
This Section first provides an overview of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 
(Cap.534), which introduced fiscal rules and provided for the establishment of 
the fiscal council. Subsequently, the findings on how fiscal rules and the fiscal 
council affect fiscal discipline are presented and discussed. This discussion 
identifies the main transmission mechanisms involved as well as any 
mitigating and other relevant factors during the budget preparation, approval 
and implementation stages.  
                                                          
210 One interview was held at the author’s office at the University of Malta upon the participant’s 
request. Three participants who worked abroad were interviewed during their work-related 
visits to Malta, with the interviews being held in public places.  
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7.4.1 The Fiscal Responsibility Act 
The enactment of the FRA in 2014 implemented the requirements of the ‘Six-
Pack’ and ‘Two-Pack’ legislations and of the Fiscal Compact Treaty. It 
introduced national fiscal rules targeting the budget balance and the 
government debt ratio. The FRA also provided for the establishment of the 
MFAC, with responsibility, amongst other tasks, to assess the macroeconomic 
and fiscal forecasts prepared by the MFIN and to assess whether the fiscal 
stance is compliant with the fiscal rules and the obligations emanating from 
the SGP211. The members of the MFAC are appointed by the Minister for 
Finance (Article 48(4)), but the FRA includes other provisions to ensure its 
independence, such as requiring a parliamentary resolution for removing 
members of the council from office (Article 50) and through a budgetary 
safeguard (Article 55).  
The Act also provided for the formal establishment of a medium-term fiscal 
plan and a DBP to comply with the relevant SGP provisions. At the same time, 
the FRA also includes other nationally-driven provisions involving more power 
to MFIN during budget negotiations with spending ministries and more control 
over public expenditures during budget implementation; the introduction of a 
contingency reserve as well as improved in-year monitoring and the 
preparation and publication of half-yearly and annual reports by the MFIN, 
which are also required to be assessed by the fiscal council. Table AXXXVI in 
Appendix IV shows the main budgetary reforms introduced by the FRA 
together with the relevant EA requirements, where applicable.  
Subsequently, minor amendments to the FRA were enacted in March 2018212, 
to ensure the full transposition of Council Directive 2011/85/EU (MFIN 2018a). 
Moreover, the enactment of the Government Borrowing and Management of 
Public Debt Act (Cap. 575) in 2017, amongst other provisions, limits 
government’s borrowing to the debt burden implied by the fiscal rules (Article 
                                                          
211 The MFAC was formally set up in January 2015 (Malta Government Gazette 2015, Notice 
no.33). 
212 Act No. VII of 2018, An Act to implement Budget measures for the financial year 2018 and 
other administrative measures. 
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11) and also introduces a legal framework for government guarantees (Articles 
40-52), although the latter has not yet come into effect213. 
7.4.2 The influence of fiscal rules and the fiscal council during budget 
preparation 
The budget formulation stage comprises two important processes: the 
generation of the budgetary forecasts and the setting of the budgetary targets. 
The latter involves negotiations between the MFIN and the spending ministers 
over their budgetary allocations.  
7.4.2.1 Generation of budgetary forecasts 
Overly-optimistic forecasts can delay the implementation of the necessary 
fiscal consolidation measures (Frankel and Schreger 2013), which highlights 
the importance of prudent and realistic budgetary forecasts. The MFIN 
produces two main rounds of forecasts, in Spring – for the SP214 – and in 
Autumn – for the DBP and the annual budget. Whilst the macroeconomic 
forecasts underpinning the fiscal projections are produced by the EPD based 
on their econometric models, the Budget Finance Directorate is responsible 
for the generation of the fiscal forecasts (MFAC 2015a, 2015b). 
The FRA (Article 13(3)(a)) requires that MFIN’s macroeconomic and fiscal 
forecasts are assessed by the MFAC. In this respect, Malta is one of the few 
EA countries that goes beyond the EA obligations which only require that the 
macroeconomic forecasts are endorsed by an independent institution215 
(EXT16 2016, pers. comm., 20 October: 4-5). Reflecting this legal 
requirement, one participant highlighted that: “we cannot afford that our 
forecasts are not endorsed” (MFIN2 2016, pers. comm., 2 September: 9) and 
another interviewee explained that:  
“there were instances where we changed our forecasts after a discussion with 
the fiscal council” (MFIN3 2016, pers. comm., 6 September: 23).  
                                                          
213 Legal Notice 216 of 2017. 
214 As from 2016, the cover page of the Update of the SP clearly indicates that this constitutes 
the medium-term fiscal strategy for Malta, which is required by Article 15 of the FRA. 
215 Article 4(4), Regulation (EU) No 473/2013. 
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Up to now, the MFAC has always endorsed both the macroeconomic and fiscal 
forecasts produced by MFIN216. 
The MFAC assesses the forecasts qualitatively, by reviewing the forecasting 
methodologies applied, analysing the assumptions underpinning the forecasts 
and comparing them with forecasts by other institutions (MFAC 2018a, 2018b). 
Some participants argued that the influence of the MFAC would be stronger if 
it generated its own forecasts, but this is not possible with the available 
resources217 (MFAC4 2016, pers. comm., 7 September: 14; EXT7 2016, pers. 
comm., 26 September: 10). As a young institution, the MFAC’s influence is 
also limited due to its low media visibility (MFAC6 2016, pers. comm., 20 
September: 14). Nevertheless, despite these challenges, overall the 
participants judged positively the work of the fiscal council (for example, EXT5 
2016, pers. comm., 9 September: 5). 
As shown in Figure 7.4218, the fiscal council’s influence on the budgetary 
forecasts is enhanced through interaction with other stakeholders, in particular 
the CION which produces forecasts for all EU countries bi-annually219. As with 
the fiscal council, MFIN adopts a pre-emptive strategy with the CION, 
discussing its forecasts before they are published and trying to avoid any major 
differences between them (MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 25 August: 11). 
Furthermore, the CION notes the forecast assessments and other reports 
published by the fiscal council and also holds meetings with them during their 
forecast missions to Malta (MFAC4 2016, pers. comm., 7 September: 8) and 
this strengthens the influence of the MFAC. Similar effects result from 
                                                          
216 The MFAC’s assessments of the macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts prepared by the 
MFIN during 2015-18 are available at: 
https://mfac.org.mt/en/publications/Pages/Publications.aspx. 
217 In particular, due to the small size of the council: the MFAC consists of a chairperson and 
two council members and employs three economists and an administrative secretary (MFAC 
2018c). 
218 In Figures 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6, the arrows indicate the relevant characteristics of budget 
institutions which affect fiscal discipline, whilst the rounded blue text books indicate the 
underlying transmission mechanisms through which these characteristics affect fiscal 
discipline. Text in red denotes mitigating characteristics/transmission mechanisms. 
219 Further details on the CION’s forecasts are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/economic-performance-and-forecasts/economic-forecasts_en.  
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interactions between the MFAC and other international institutions, namely the 
IMF during its annual Article IV missions220, and credit rating agencies221. 
The additional scrutiny on the forecasts has increased the pressure on MFIN 
to ensure that its forecasts are technically robust: for instance, referring to 
officials from the EPD, a participant noted that “they are also always improving 
their econometric model” (MFAC4 2016, pers. comm., 7 September: 4). 
Personal relationships between officials from MFIN and the MFAC may have 
exacerbated this effect, with one participant stating that the Ministry officials 
want to ensure that their forecasts are endorsed by the MFAC also “for their 
pride” (MFAC6 2016, pers. comm., 20 September: 8). As discussed in Section 
4.4.5 of Chapter 4, personal relationships are a typical characteristic of small 
public administrations. In the local context, this characteristic was also noted 
by Mullard and Pirotta (2008) during budget negotiations between the MFIN 
and spending ministries.  
                                                          
220 During the Article IV missions, an IMF team of economists visits a country to assess 
economic and financial developments. Further information is available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm. 
221 Details of the MFAC’s meetings with officials from the CION and other international 
institutions are available in its Annual Reports (see, for example, MFAC 2017:17). 
Figure 7.4: The influence of the fiscal council – generation of budgetary forecasts 
 
Source: Figure drawn by author 
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Furthermore, various participants argued that the MFAC’s assessments have 
resulted in more prudent assumptions being adopted to generate the forecasts 
(for example, EXT7 2016, pers. comm., 26 September: 14; EXT13 2016, pers. 
comm., 14 October: 5). Participants from MFIN also acknowledged this:  
“when you are being scrutinised, you are more cautious, ensure that the 
assumptions are realistic” (MFIN2 2016, pers. comm., 2 September: 7)   
and it was pointed out that the Ministry is being 
“cautious on two aspects – both on the side of the macro and also in terms of 
elasticities” (MFIN3 2016, pers. comm., 6 September: 26).  
Indeed, a comparison of the MFIN’s and the CION’s forecasts (see Table 
AXXXVII in Appendix IV) shows that these forecasts were very close to each 
other in recent years. 
7.4.2.2 Setting the budgetary targets 
As shown in the timeline presented in Appendix IV, MFIN presents its 
budgetary targets in April in the SP and in Autumn in the DBP and the annual 
budget. Although the annual budget is prepared in a medium-term context and 
there are only minor, if any differences in the fiscal targets (MFIN1 2016, pers. 
comm., 25 August: 4; EXT5 2016, pers. comm., 9 September: 1), as clearly 
stated by one of the participants:  
“the budget exercise is the one that sets the tone for the Stability Programme, 
not the other way round” (EXT5 2016, pers. comm., 9 September: 2)222. 
As shown in Figure 7.5, the process of setting the fiscal targets is influenced 
by both the supra-national (SGP) and national (FRA) fiscal rules as well as by 
the MFAC and the CION, through their assessments of whether the budgetary 
targets comply with the fiscal rules. 
                                                          
222 The FRA only requires that the annual budget is based on the medium-term fiscal plan 
(Article 16(1)). Furthermore, whilst Article 15(1) requires that the medium-term fiscal strategy 
is submitted to parliament, this is neither discussed nor voted upon, with parliament only voting 
on the appropriations for the subsequent year during the budget approval stage (EXT14 2016, 
pers. comm., 19 October: 9-10).  
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A few participants argued that the introduction of fiscal rules in national 
legislation was an important development, with one interviewee commenting 
that:  
“probably the political cost of breaking both the domestic and the EU rules would 
be higher” (EXT5 2016, pers. comm., 9 September: 5). 
 
In this context, it is notable that Article 17(1) of the FRA requires a declaration 
by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance that the annual budget 
presented in parliament is in line with the fiscal rules. However, most 
participants disagreed and highlighted that the fiscal rules in the FRA merely 
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copy the SGP rules, to which Malta had already been subject to (for instance, 
EXT13 2016, pers. comm., 14 October: 4; POL8 2016, pers. comm., 30 
September: 6). Various interviewees further argued that the fiscal rules 
provisions in the FRA are less constraining since they do not include the 
expenditure benchmark even though this is included in the SGP223 (for 
example, MFAC6 2016, pers. comm., 20 September: 5). During the 
parliamentary debates on the FRA (Parliament of Malta 2014a: 639), the 
Minister for Finance had justified this by emphasising that the expenditure 
benchmark: 
“is not a rule but a benchmark which guides and helps to achieve the deficit and 
debt objective”.  
In fact, the MFIN has been resisting pressure by MFAC to have more focus on 
the expenditure benchmark (see Recommendation 6 in Table AXXXVIII in 
Appendix IV, which presents the main MFAC recommendations together with 
the respective response by the MFIN).  
Various participants criticised the complexity of the fiscal rules. In particular, 
the difficulties relating to measuring ex-ante the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance were pointed out, with one participant referring to the lack of structural 
adjustment for 2015 which only became apparent in the first few months of the 
following year, when it was too late to address it (MFIN3 2016, pers. comm., 
6 September: 11). The application of the expenditure benchmark further 
complicates matters (MFAC6 2016, pers. comm., 20 September: 5). Given this 
complexity, the CION applies an element of judgement in its interpretation of 
the rules (MFIN3 2016, pers. comm., 6 September: 12). For example, in its 
assessment of Malta’s 2016 Update of the SP, CION (2016c: 20-21) 
considered the structural adjustment for 2015 and 2016 together, thereby 
avoiding the conclusion of a significant deviation from the adjustment path 
towards the MTO224. This flexible approach adopted by the CION not only 
                                                          
223 Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 specifies that the assessment of progress 
towards the MTO involves an analysis of the growth path of government expenditure 
compared to medium-term potential GDP growth, taking into account discretionary revenue 
measures.  
224 A significant deviation from the adjustment to the MTO would have triggered a warning and 
a recommendation by CION (Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97), which in 
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creates uncertainty but also allows the possibility of political pressure from 
national governments, thus weakening the effectiveness of the supra-national 
fiscal rules. Another example of such flexibility is evident in the decision in 
2016 not to impose fines on Spain and Portugal despite failing to meet their 
budgetary targets under their respective EDPs225. This lack of enforcement of 
EU fiscal discipline has been described as a “Kafkaesque outcome” by Begg 
(2017: R5). 
Nevertheless, the SGP obligations, as also reflected in the national fiscal rules, 
constitute the main consideration for setting the budgetary targets in Malta. 
Thus, one interviewee described these rules as: “very important obligations on 
which we cannot default” (POL21 2016, pers. comm., 28 November: 10). In 
fact, the MFIN adopts a ‘top-bottom’ approach, with the total expenditure 
ceiling derived from the revenue projections (conditional on the 
macroeconomic forecasts) and the budget balance target, which in turn 
reflects the fiscal adjustment that needs to be done to comply with the rules 
(MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 25 August: 10). The resulting envelope for 
aggregate expenditure constitutes the basis for the budgetary negotiations 
between the MFIN and the line ministries. 
The description of these negotiation by participants with spending ministries 
pushing for higher spending and only the MFIN being concerned about fiscal 
discipline implications, show a typical delegation approach scenario. In fact, 
one participant emphasised that: “it was always like this that the Ministry for 
Finance is one against all” (PARL12 2016, pers. comm., 13 October: 44). 
These pressures also reflect the strong electoral competition and personal 
contacts which characterise Malta’s political system, as noted in Section 7.2.1. 
In this context, for the MFIN the fiscal rules are an important form of ‘external 
anchor’ which strengthens its position vis-à-vis spending ministries during the 
budget formulation stage. This is evident when one participant joked that 
without such obligations “the budget deficit would reach 6% year in year out” 
(MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 25 August: 6). On a similar note, some participants 
                                                          
turn would have required the Maltese government to present a corrective plan to parliament 
(Article 13, FRA).  
225 Council Implementing Decisions (EU) 2017/2350 and 2017/2351 in respect of the EDP for 
Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
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argued that the prudent budgetary forecasts are a deliberate strategy by the 
MFIN to reinforce the expenditure ceiling during budget negotiations with the 
spending ministries, with one interviewee explicitly stating that these are 
“serving as a capping on the expenditure side” (MFAC4 2016, pers. comm., 7 
September: 9).  
Meanwhile, the influence of the fiscal rules is strengthened by the 
assessments carried out by the MFAC and CION to determine whether the 
budgetary targets are compliant with the rules.  However, in this respect the 
MFAC only has an advisory role, with Article 13(6) of the FRA only requiring 
that the government takes into account its opinions and recommendations 
when preparing its medium-term fiscal strategy and annual budget. 
Government is required to submit a corrective plan to parliament within two 
months if it does not accept an assessment of the fiscal council, only in the 
case of a significant deviation from the adjustment path towards the MTO 
(Article 13(7), FRA). In all other cases, there is no legal comply and explain 
requirement as clearly pointed out by the Minister for Finance during the 
discussion of the MFAC’s first annual report in parliament’s Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) (Parliament of Malta 2016a: 12):  
“the recommendations are made, but then it is up to the government to decide 
whether to implement them or not”.  
In fact, one participant from the MFAC commented that during meetings held 
with the MFIN to discuss their recommendations: “very often they listen without 
commenting” (MFAC4 2016, pers. comm., 7 September: 8). Although in March 
2018 (after the interviews were carried out), MFIN provided its first official 
response to the MFAC recommendations, only around 30% of the 
recommendations had been fully addressed (see Table AXXXVIII in Appendix 
IV). This lack of influence reflects the fact that the MFAC is a young institution, 
which is not well established in the national institutional framework, as noted 
also by Horvath (2018). A few participants have also highlighted the rather 
conciliatory stance adopted by the fiscal council (for instance, EXT16 2016, 
pers. comm., 20 October: 4) and indeed, as pointed out by Begg (2017), the 
MFAC tends to use appeasing language, like “broadly compliant” and 
“appears to meet the fiscal targets” (for example, MFAC 2015c: 22). 
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Interviewees further argued that given the very favourable economic scenario 
since the set-up of the MFAC in 2015, with the government meeting (and even 
over-achieving) its budgetary targets, the influence of the MFAC still has to be 
tested (EXT13 2016, pers. comm., 14 October: 5; POL11 2016, pers. comm., 
4 October: 11).  
On the other hand, the CION has a stronger influence, as shown by the pre-
emptive strategy adopted by MFIN whereby it discusses the fiscal targets 
bilaterally with the CION before the presentation of the annual budget (MFIN17 
2016, pers. comm., 27 October: 9; PARL22 2016, pers. comm., 9 December: 
2) and by showing willingness to accommodate any concerns by CION:  
“if there are problems, we [the Finance Ministry] would discuss with them [CION] 
and we would see that the budget is made in a way.” (MFIN3 2016, pers. 
comm., 6 September: 4).  
The CION’s influence on the budgetary targets is reinforced through the 
possibility of warnings, recommendations to undertake the necessary actions 
as well as the possibility of sanctions. Although up to now, sanctions have not 
been imposed on any EA member state226, enforcement of the rules can also 
come from softer means, such as the public assessments by the CION, which 
have high media visibility in Malta. In this regard, one participant emphasised 
the “learning experience” during the 2009-2012 EDP, when, following a letter 
from the CION regarding risks to the attainment of the 2012 budgetary target, 
the government had announced additional expenditure cuts in parliament 
(EXT14 2016, pers. comm., 19 October: 26). The opposition had heavily 
criticised this as an imposition by the CION (POL11 2016, pers. comm., 4 
October: 5), thus impinging on national sovereignty in budgetary matters. 
It is also relevant to note, that similarly to the role of fiscal rules, the CION’s 
assessments, together with those by other international institutions, are 
considered as ‘external anchors’ by the MFIN, as clearly stated by the Minister 
of Finance during the discussion of the MFAC’s annual report in the PAC:  
                                                          
226 The decision in 2016 not to impose sanctions on Spain and Portugal (referred to earlier) 
provides a recent example of the difficulty to implement enforcement of the SGP in the EA. 
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“these are all friends of the Finance Ministry because they are all helping it to 
reach its target to reduce the deficit and debt and to have more responsible 
spending. The more help it gets, the better it is because the pressure from within 
government itself and from the citizens is to spend more and collect less taxes” 
(Parliament of Malta 2016a: 11). 
7.4.3 The budget approval stage 
Following the process of budget negotiations within the executive and the 
approval of the draft budget by cabinet, the Minister for Finance presents the 
draft budget in parliament in mid-October227. Subsequently, parliament 
debates the financial estimates for each Ministry and Vote. This discussion 
takes place in plenary228, since as noted in Section 7.2.2, Malta is the only EA 
country without a parliamentary budget committee229. The last stage of this 
parliamentary process230 is the adoption of the budget law – the Appropriation 
Act – which sets maximum ceilings for aggregate expenditure from the 
Consolidated Fund and also for each Ministry and Vote item (PARL9 2016, 
pers. comm., 3 October: 4). The budgetary measures announced in the 
Budget Speech are implemented through another legislation (Act to implement 
the budgetary measures), which is generally debated and voted upon in the 
first few months of the following year. As an example, Table AXXXIX in 
Appendix IV shows the timeline for the process of the presentation, debate 
and approval of the Budget for 2017.  
Although there are no legal restrictions on parliament’s budget amendment 
powers (PARL10 2016, pers. comm., 3 October: 9; PARL12 2016, pers. 
                                                          
227 To comply with the common EA budgetary timeline (Article 4, Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013), since 2016, the presentation of the budget has been anticipated by around three 
weeks (MFIN2 2016, pers. comm., 2 September: 3) to around mid-October. 
228 Specifically, as explained by one of the participants, the budgetary debates take place in 
the Committee of Supply which involves all the members of parliament (PARL10 2016, pers. 
comm., 3 October: 7-8).  
229 The budget is not discussed in other relevant parliamentary committees: the PAC is an 
audit committee with an oversight (ex-post) function (Article 120E of the Standing Orders of 
the House of Representatives); and since its set-up in 2013, the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Committee has not shown interest to discuss budgetary matters (POL15 2016, pers. 
comm., 19 October: 10). 
230 This stage takes place after the presentation of CION’s opinion on the DBPs in the 
Eurogroup (generally in early December). This creates some disjointedness in the 
parliamentary process because the debates on the Ministry votes are completed by early 
November.  
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comm., 13 October: 2), by convention, a vote on the budget, like all money 
bills, is considered as a vote of confidence in the government (PARL10 2016, 
pers. comm., 3 October: 8). Given these implications and the strong 
partisanship in Malta’s two-party political system, members of parliament vote 
strictly along party lines, especially on the budget231, with the draft budget 
proposed by the executive approved without any amendments. As highlighted 
by one interviewee:  
“what the government decides in the budget, it will pass through without any 
problems.” (POL11 2016, pers. comm., 4 October: 8).  
Consequently, the fiscal rules and the fiscal council do not have any direct 
relevance during the budget approval process in parliament. However, there 
is potential for strengthening the fiscal council’s influence in the budgetary 
process through increased interaction with parliament232. In particular, Article 
57 of the FRA provides for hearings of the MFAC by PAC. But these are 
subject to the discretion of the committee’s chair233 and to date only two such 
meetings were held234. 
7.4.4 The influence of fiscal rules and the fiscal council during budget 
implementation 
The fiscal rules and the fiscal council reassume a more direct influence during 
the budget implementation stage (see Figure 7.6). However, there was a broad 
recognition among the participants that the strong economic growth registered 
in recent years has been a key determinant of the improvement in the fiscal 
position (for example, EXT7 2016, pers. comm., 26 September: 6; and EXT13 
2016, pers. comm., 14 October: 3). 
                                                          
231 The only recent exception was when a member of parliament from the government side 
voted against the motion that the House of Representatives resolves into a Committee of 
Supply to consider the financial estimates for 2013. Since the government had only a one-
seat majority in parliament, this motion was not adopted (Plenary sitting No. 536, 10 December 
2012) and subsequently, parliament was dissolved and general elections were held in March 
2013. 
232 As discussed in Section 5.4.1 of Chapter 5, interaction between the fiscal council and 
parliament can also contribute to strengthen the latter’s budgetary organisational capacity. 
233 Article 57 merely provides that the Chairperson of the MFAC should appear before the 
PAC whenever requested to do so. 
234 Meetings Nos. 96 and 101 of 28 June 2016 and 30 January 2017, respectively.  
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During budget execution, the MFIN resumes a key role, to ensure that the 
targets in the approved budget are met. In this regard, one participant felt that 
the political commitment towards the budgetary targets has increased 
following the change in government in 2013 (EXT5 2016, pers. comm., 9 
September: 3). Nonetheless, as in the budget formulation stage, the 
implementation phase is characterised by a typical delegation scenario235, with 
one participant admitting that:  
“the Ministry for Finance always receives requests for new expenditure 
measures” (MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 25 August: 5).  
And similarly, the fiscal rules in the FRA and the SGP constitute ‘external 
anchors’ to reinforce the MFIN’s position vis-à-vis the spending ministries also 
during budget execution. The influence of fiscal rules during budget 
implementation is enhanced by the monitoring carried out by the CION vis-à-
vis compliance with the SGP provisions and from the responsibilities assigned 
to the MFAC by the FRA to monitor fiscal rules (Article 13).   
The FRA introduced provisions which aim to facilitate monitoring of fiscal 
developments, namely the half-yearly report (Article 39) and the annual report 
(Article 41) and the fiscal council is required to assess these reports and issue 
an opinion on them as well as recommendations as necessary (Article 13). A 
participant explicitly stated that the aim of the half-yearly report was to have a 
“good tool that would help us” by putting more pressure on Ministries that are 
over-spending (MFIN17 2016, pers. comm., 27 October: 14-15). Again, this 
shows that the MFIN looks for ‘external anchors’ to strengthen its power over 
spending ministries. But this has been achieved only to a limited extent. Article 
39 of the FRA requires that the half-yearly report is submitted to parliament, 
but this report and the annual report have not been discussed in parliament, 
neither in plenary nor committee level. Parliamentary discussion of these 
reports and of their assessment by the MFAC would also contribute to 
strengthen the influence of the fiscal council. 
                                                          
235 Articles 22-26 of the FRA aim to strengthen MFIN’s control over spending ministries during 
budget execution, but these provisions have not yet been fully implemented (MFIN1 2016, 
pers. comm., 25 August: 13). 
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During budget execution, the CION again has a stronger influence than the 
MFAC. In this context, various participants argued that as a small country, 
Malta has limited leverage in conflicts with CION on budgetary matters, as 
explained very clearly by one of the interviewees:  
“we know that whilst this – the equal treatment – is an important principle, it 
starts to be implemented only when the small [countries] are affected, when it 
Figure 7.6: The influence of fiscal rules and the fiscal council – budget implementation 
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is a large one, then, when it comes to large countries, the equal treatment takes 
on a somewhat different definition” (POL11 2016, pers. comm., 4 October: 16). 
Acceptance of this reality, as also acknowledged by De Grauwe (2010) for 
example, is evident in the decision by the Maltese authorities to include 
additional consolidation measures in the 2016 SP (beyond those included in 
the budget), even though there was uncertainty as to whether the CION would 
decide that there was a significant deviation from the adjustment path to the 
MTO. This is a clear example of the pre-emptive and precautionary approach 
adopted by Malta, as discussed earlier in the context of setting of budgetary 
targets during the budget formulation stage. 
MFIN is thus caught up between the realisation that it must comply with the 
fiscal rules, whilst at the same time facing considerable pressure for increased 
spending by line ministries. In this context, participants emphasised that 
flexibility in budget execution is a critical mechanism for the MFIN to achieve 
its budgetary targets. Thus, one interviewee from the Ministry explained that:  
“it is the budget balance which the Ministry for Finance tries to stick to but not 
the components underpinning the budget balance” (MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 
25 August: 6).  
Similarly, another participant pointed out that:  
“as regards individual items, especially from the expenditure side, they [MFIN] 
revise a lot” (EXT7 2016, pers. comm., 26 September: 14).  
These variations at a budgetary component level are confirmed by the data 
presented in Table XXXX in Appendix IV. Indeed, there were large expenditure 
overruns in 2014 and 2015. On the other hand, tax revenue was consistently 
higher than projected, reflecting the strategy of adopting prudent forecasts, 
which mitigated against the expenditure slippages, as argued by one of the 
participants (EXT7 2016, pers. comm., 26 September: 14). 
The benchmarking exercise presented in Section 7.2.2 also showed that Malta 
has considerable executive flexibility during budget implementation, with a 
medium to high score in the relevant sub-indices. This is provided for in the 
budgetary legal framework. Firstly, the Appropriation Act involves a maximum 
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ceiling for expenditure, rather than committed expenditure and thus MFIN can 
cut, cancel or postpone spending without requiring parliamentary approval 
(PARL10 2016, pers. comm., 3 October: 16). Furthermore, Article 24 of the 
Financial Administration and Audit Act (Cap. 174) allows the Minister of 
Finance (or his delegate) to carry out virements between line items within 
Votes. Articles 23 and 24 of the FRA reinforce such flexibility by requiring that 
new or additional expenditures made during the budget year are financed 
through re-allocation of expenditure either within or across Ministries, whilst a 
contingency reserve was also introduced (Articles 31-38)236. 
Moreover, Article 103 of the Constitution of Malta and Article 25 of the 
Financial Administration and Audit Act (Cap.174) provide for Supplementary 
Estimates, which allow the MFIN to exceed the appropriations approved by 
parliament, both at a Ministry vote level as well at an aggregate level. This 
involves the approval by parliament of a Second Appropriation Act, which 
provides for the excess that has been spent for every Vote, over and above 
the first Appropriation Act. The provisions concerning the reasons for such 
additional expenditures are very broad and during 2014-17, the 
Supplementary Estimates involved between 5% and 13% of the original 
amount in the Appropriation Act for the same year237, with a large number of 
budgetary votes being affected238. Moreover, although the Supplementary 
Estimates are approved by parliament, this takes place immediately after the 
long process of voting and approval of the budget for the following year 
(PARL10 2016, pers. comm., 3 October: 20) and there is no discussion on 
them239. One political participant made a particularly forceful criticism of this 
process:  
                                                          
236 Whilst foreseen to be used only in exceptional circumstances and subject to the approval 
of the Prime Minister and parliament, the small contingency reserve (between 0.1-0.5% of 
GDP in any one year) was used up in its initial year (Parliament of Malta 2015). The 
contingency reserve has become less relevant with the budget surpluses recorded since 2016.  
237 However, as explained by the Minister for Finance during the second meeting of the MFAC 
with the PAC (Parliament of Malta 2017: 10), these amounts do not necessarily correspond to 
total expenditure overruns of the same magnitude as they may be offset by savings in 
expenditure in other Votes. 
238 For example, the Second Appropriation Act for 2016 provided for additional appropriations 
for around one-half of the votes, with increases of over 10% for around a third of them.  
239 As shown in Table AXXXIX in Appendix IV, in 2016, the motions and voting relating to the 
Second Appropriation Act took only around 10 minutes. 
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“If there is one document which in our legislation should really be assigned more 
importance effectively it is the Supplementary Estimates, because there is the 
admission by government of where it went off target” (POL11 2016, pers. 
comm, 4 October: 6).  
Interviewees from MFIN were similarly critical of the Supplementary Estimates 
and pointed out that they weaken the binding nature of the fiscal targets 
(MFIN2 2016, pers. comm., 2 September: 11; MFIN19 2016, pers. comm., 4 
November: 6). However, during the parliamentary debate on the FRA 
(Parliament of Malta 2014b: 10), the Minister for Finance was cautious on 
eliminating this flexibility. Indeed, the FRA did not bring any specific changes 
in this regard and thus, in practice the expenditure ceilings are not binding. 
The need for such flexibility can also explain why the expenditure benchmark 
was not incorporated in the FRA, as pointed out earlier.  
7.5 Summary of results and conclusions 
This Chapter analyses the influence of budget institutions on fiscal discipline 
in Malta, by focusing on fiscal rules and the fiscal council, which were recently 
introduced through the FRA. This is carried out through a qualitative case 
study, using interviews to a broad range of stakeholders, complemented by 
documentary evidence.  
Malta has a predominantly delegation form of fiscal governance, with relatively 
centralised budget negotiations within the executive and a good degree of 
executive flexibility during budget implementation. Nevertheless, the 
institutional features of the recently introduced fiscal rules and fiscal council 
compare well to the EA average. The findings of the case study analysis show 
that these institutional developments are contributing to fiscal discipline but in 
a limited manner. The remarkable improvement in the budgetary situation 
registered during the past few years is strongly attributable to the robust 
economic growth.  
As regards fiscal rules, the provisions in the FRA replicate the SGP and Fiscal 
Compact Treaty obligations and largely rely on the corrective and sanctioning 
mechanisms of the SGP. Moreover, the expenditure benchmark is not 
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included. Thus, the inclusion of the SGP obligations in national legislation 
seems to have had limited influence. 
Nevertheless, overall participants acknowledged that the MFIN is committed 
to the supra-national fiscal rules, reflecting also its context of a small country 
with limited leverage vis-à-vis the CION. The budgetary targets are thus set to 
comply with these obligations and in turn, these determine the expenditure 
ceiling which is the basis for budget negotiations with spending ministries. 
These negotiations are carried out in a typical delegation approach scenario, 
with commitment to fiscal discipline being limited to the MFIN, whilst line 
ministries pressure for larger budget allocations. A similar situation also 
characterises the budget implementation stage, where line ministries demand 
new and additional spending, whilst the MFIN faces pressure to achieve the 
budgetary targets. Importantly, during both the budget preparation and 
implementation stages, the fiscal rules act as an ’external anchor’ to 
strengthen the position of the MFIN vis-à-vis spending ministries.  
Given these spending pressures from line ministries, during budget 
implementation, the MFIN adopts considerable flexibility, with notable variation 
between the projected and actual outcomes at a budgetary component level. 
The legal framework provides significant room for manoeuvre for the MFIN to 
reallocate spending both within and also across Ministries and through the 
Supplementary Estimates also to increase spending beyond that in the 
approved budget, both at line item as well as aggregate levels, with hardly any 
parliamentary oversight. Such flexibility has been retained with the FRA and 
consequently, the expenditure ceilings are not binding.  
As regards the fiscal council, its strongest influence on the budgetary process 
is through its assessment of the macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. Although 
due to resource constraints, the MFAC does not generate its own forecasts, 
being a legal obligation, the endorsement of the forecasts is considered as 
critical by the MFIN. As a result, the relevant technical expertise is being 
improved and importantly, more prudent assumptions are being adopted, 
particularly for tax revenue projections. At the same time, this seems to also 
constitute a deliberate strategy by the MFIN to contain demands by spending 
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ministers and to mitigate against expenditure slippages during budget 
execution. The influence of the fiscal council is further reinforced through other 
institutions, who follow its reports and assessments such as the IMF, credit 
rating agencies and most notably the CION, which regularly generates its own 
forecasts for Malta. The MFIN adopts a pre-emptive and accommodative 
stance with both the MFAC and CION discussing its forecasts before they are 
published and showing willingness to revise them if there are any strong 
concerns.   
On the other hand, the MFAC has weaker influence when assessing whether 
government’s fiscal stance complies with the fiscal rules’ obligations. Here, the 
MFAC has an advisory role and whilst it has issued several recommendations, 
a large part of them remain unaddressed. The influence of the fiscal council is 
constrained since it is a young institution with weak media visibility and 
interaction with parliament is also very limited. A conciliatory tone is noted in 
its assessments and reports and its influence still needs to be tested, when 
the economic and fiscal context is less favourable. In contrast, the CION’s 
assessments vis-à-vis the SGP obligations have a stronger influence, with the 
MFIN adopting a cautious stance and a preventive approach, by discussing 
the budgetary targets before these are published and by adjusting them to 
accommodate concerns by the CION. Furthermore, as for fiscal rules, the 
MFIN considers the assessments carried out by CION, and other international 
organisations, as a help to instil fiscal discipline on spending ministries. Being 
only recently established, the fiscal council does not yet fulfil such a role. 
Summing up, the case study results have revealed different mechanisms how 
fiscal rules and the fiscal council contribute to more fiscal restraint. At the same 
time, these institutional reforms were implemented to comply with the common 
EA requirements and limitations to their influence have also been identified. 
Finally, the findings also show that elements of a rule-based system can be 
complementary to the delegation approach, which contrasts with their 
portrayal in the literature as alternative forms of fiscal governance. 
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The EA sovereign debt crises have clearly shown the grave externalities and 
contagion effects of a lack of fiscal discipline in the member states. Indeed, 
subsequently, the SGP has been considerably tightened. At the same time, 
whilst supra-national fiscal rules have remained at the core of the EA fiscal 
governance framework, this has been complemented with an alternative 
decentralised fiscal discipline mechanism, which recognises the unique 
architecture of Europe’s monetary union, where fiscal policy remains a national 
prerogative. This involved the introduction of common requirements for budget 
institutions in EA countries, mainly involving national fiscal rules and the set-
up of IFIs. 
At the same time, the SGP reforms have further constrained the role and 
relevance of the legislature in the budgetary process, which as the 
representative body of the citizens, has a key role to ensure democratic 
legitimacy of budgetary decisions. Notwithstanding, enhancing democratic 
accountability is a key aspect of the CION’s (2017) roadmap for completing 
EMU. But, at the same time, strong legislative budgetary power is generally 
associated with larger budget deficits. 
Within this context, this thesis assesses the quality of budget institutions and 
legislative budgetary power in the EA and examines their implications on fiscal 
discipline.  
8.1 Summary of key results 
The literature on the political economy of budget deficits shows the tendency 
for governments to run excessive budget deficits and provides explanations 
for this deficit bias. This study focuses on two main branches of this literature, 
that involving opportunistic incumbents who manipulate fiscal policy to 
increase their chances of remaining in office and that based on distributive 
conflicts within government over a common pool of fiscal resources. These 
motivations underpin the budgetary decisions taken by the executive and the 
legislature in the simple model of the budgetary process in EA countries, 
presented in Chapter 3. Graphical representation is used to show the tendency 
to run budget deficits during the budget formulation, approval and 
implementation stages and how this can be mitigated through budget 
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institutions. This can involve a hierarchical (Alesina and Perotti 1999) or 
delegation (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999) approach, where the finance 
minister is assigned strong decision-making powers vis-à-vis spending 
ministers during budget negotiations and execution and legislative budget 
amendment powers during the approval stage are restricted. Another 
approach is a rules-based, contract approach (von Hagen and Harden 1995), 
where fiscal discipline is achieved through strong commitment by all 
stakeholders to numerical budgetary constraints, namely fiscal rules or 
medium-term budgetary targets. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) postulate 
that the delegation approach is more appropriate with a single-party majority 
government, whilst a rules-based approach is more suitable with a coalition 
government. Two other categories of budget institutions are budget 
transparency, which mainly involves better availability of budgetary 
information; and IFIs, with roles, amongst others, to produce or endorse the 
budgetary forecasts and to monitor compliance with the fiscal rules.  
Whilst the legislature is an important decision-maker in the budgetary process, 
it has largely been captured in the literature on budget institutions through its 
role during the approval stage, with a particular focus on its amendment 
powers. But unrestricted amendment powers can be undermined if the vote 
on the budget is considered as a vote of confidence in the government or if 
the reversionary budget involves a reversal to the executive’s proposal 
(Wehner 2010b). Strong legislative budgetary power during budget approval 
can also be weakened by executive authority to modify the budget during 
implementation (Alesina et al. 1999). At the same time, reflecting the fiscal 
commons problem among legislators, strong legislative amendment powers 
are associated with larger budget deficits (von Hagen 2002). However, this 
can be mitigated by having the legislature first voting on fiscal aggregates and 
then on specific appropriations and through a centralised budget committee 
structure. Furthermore, during budget formulation, legislative involvement in 
numerical budgetary constraints, including SGP provisions, can improve their 
ownership and credibility (Lienert 2010), whilst during budget implementation, 
stronger legislative budgetary power, for instance, by limiting the use of 
supplementary budgets and requiring legislative authorisation for off-budget 
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expenditures and contingent liabilities, can also contribute to more fiscal 
restraint. Thus, different aspects of legislative budgeting can have a diverse 
impact on fiscal discipline. 
The analysis presented in Chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis draws on the model 
presented in Chapter 3. It involves four different, but inter-related research 
components. The first two components involve the construction of composite 
indices to measure the quality of budget institutions and legislative budgetary 
power in the EA. To construct these indices, an extensive dataset has been 
created which captures detailed institutional characteristics of the 19 EA 
member states. This dataset uses data from the OECD, the CION and the IMF, 
as well as primary data generated through questionnaires to national 
authorities. The constructed indices are then used as explanatory variables in 
a two-way fixed effects panel data model to assess their effect on the budget 
balance. This constitutes the third research component. Finally, the fourth 
research component comprises a qualitative case study on one of the EA 
member states – Malta – to analyse in more depth whether and how the 
recently established national fiscal rules and the fiscal council affect fiscal 
discipline. This case study uses unique data generated from detailed 
interviews to a broad range of key stakeholders in Malta’s budgetary process.  
Chapter 4 presents a composite index which is used to measure the quality of 
budget institutions in the EA and to examine differences across the member 
states. Key changes following the Great Crisis are also identified by producing 
another index for the pre-crisis period. Various indices have been compiled to 
measure the overall quality of budget institutions in the EA, with key recent 
contributions by Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) for the EU15 and by Gleich 
(2003) and Yläoutinen (2004) for the 10 CEECs. Nevertheless, this index still 
makes a relevant contribution to the literature by providing a comparable 
measure for all the present 19 member states and by capturing reforms 
implemented following the Great Crisis. Furthermore, compared to existing 
indices, the index provides a more comprehensive coverage of the quality of 
budget institutions in EA countries, most notably by capturing also the formal 
and organisational capacity of fiscal councils, whilst the scope of MTBFs, 
budget implementation and budget transparency is also broader.    
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The results show that, overall, budget institutions in the EA are of medium 
quality, with broadly similar results for the group of bailed-out countries and 
also for the other EA member states. In particular, the MTBFs are relatively 
strong and the budget negotiations process is quite centralised. On the other 
hand, the budget approval stage as well as fiscal councils constitute weaker 
institutional elements. Whilst data constraints limit the comparability of the pre- 
and post-crisis indices, there are indications of a general improvement in the 
quality of budget institutions in EA countries during the period under review. 
More marked improvements are generally noted for bailed-out countries, as 
institutional reforms constituted part of the conditions imposed by their 
financial assistance programmes. Moreover, this general improvement largely 
reflected a notable strengthening in fiscal rules and fiscal councils, as a 
response to the common EA requirements introduced after the Crisis, rather 
than more broad-based reforms driven by a national policy agenda.  
The findings also show that whereas the variation in the overall scores for the 
quality of budget institutions index is quite limited, there is more diversity 
among the EA countries in the different institutional characteristics. It is also 
notable that there is considerable diversity also in the institutional aspects 
which are subject to common EA requirements, that is MTBFs, fiscal rules and 
IFIs.  Moreover, countries with high overall scores in the index perform strongly 
in different aspects of budget institutions. These results indicate that there can 
be different models of good quality budget institutions, rather than a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach. This contrasts with the recent thrust for more homogenous 
fiscal governance frameworks in the EA. Furthermore, despite the emphasis 
of a rules-based approach in the EA’s fiscal governance system, some EA 
countries have budget institutions where the finance minister continues to 
have a strong role to instil fiscal discipline. Contrary to the literature, the size 
of the country seems to be a more relevant determinant of the form of fiscal 
governance adopted than its type of government. 
In Chapter 5, a similar approach, using a composite index, is adopted to 
assess legislative budgetary power in the EA and identify main differences 
across the member states as well as changes since the Great Crisis. This 
index makes an important contribution to the scant literature on legislative 
Chapter 8: General Summary and Conclusions 
 
  247 
 
budgeting in the EA. Indeed, legislative budgetary power indices have only 
been developed by Lienert (2005), Wehner (2006, 2010b) and Rίos et al. 
(2018), covering a diverse sample of countries, but not all the EA countries. 
On the other hand, the constructed index provides a recent, comprehensive 
and comparable measure of legislative budgetary power for all the member 
states. As in Wehner (2006, 2010b), it distinguishes between the legislature’s 
formal budgetary powers and its organisational budgetary capacity. But its 
scope is broader as it covers the legislature’s involvement throughout the 
national budgetary process, including the formulation, approval and 
implementation stages, as well as in relation to the SGP procedures. It also 
captures the legislature’s involvement in numerical budgetary constraints and 
its relationship with the fiscal council. 
The results show that overall, legislative budgetary power is quite weak in the 
EA. As for the quality of budget institutions, there are not marked differences 
between the bailed-out countries and the other EA member states. Democratic 
legitimacy is particularly weak in the national budgetary process. Whilst formal 
legislative budget amendment powers are quite strong, these are undermined 
by the fact that the vote on the budget constitutes a vote of confidence in the 
government in several EA countries and also by a lack of legislative control 
during budget implementation. Furthermore, despite the increasing 
importance of numerical budgetary constraints in the EA, legislatures have a 
marginal role in this regard. On the other hand, there is generally good 
legislative engagement in the SGP procedures, though its influence could be 
strengthened through more timely discussion. Moreover, overall in the EA, 
legislative budgetary organisational capacity is quite adequate, with relatively 
strong budget committees and also good access to budgetary information. 
Close links with IFIs, which have been recently established in various EA 
countries, can contribute to strengthen legislative budgetary organisational 
capacity.    
Legislative budgetary power has remained broadly unchanged at low levels 
since the Great Crisis. There has been some strengthening of organisational 
budgetary capacity in some EA countries, reflecting the set up of specialised 
budget research offices and improved access to budgetary information. But 
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formal legislative budgetary powers in the national budgetary process have 
generally weakened, mainly due to less control during budget execution. 
As for the quality of budget institutions index, there is more variation among 
the EA countries in the different components of legislative budgetary power 
than in the overall scores for the composite index. In particular, there is 
considerable diversity as regards amendment powers, reversionary budgets 
and legislative authorisation of off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities. There is also notable variation in the degree of legislative 
involvement in SGP procedures and in legislative budgetary organisational 
capacity. These findings show that there are different models of legislative 
budgeting in the EA, reflecting the countries’ specific political and institutional 
context. 
The quality of budget institutions and the legislative budgetary power indices 
are the main explanatory variables in the empirical analysis presented in 
Chapter 6. This analysis, which covers all the 19 EA countries during 2006-
2015, uses a two-way fixed effects model to test two hypotheses derived from 
the model developed in Chapter 3. The first hypothesis postulates that an 
improvement in the overall quality of budget institutions results in smaller 
budget deficits (or larger budget surpluses); the second hypothesis states that 
stronger legislative budgetary power results in larger budget deficits (or 
smaller budget surpluses).  
There is a vast and established literature testing empirically the relationship 
between the overall quality of budget institutions and fiscal discipline, with 
Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) and De Haan et al. (2013) being among the 
more recent studies for EU countries. The role of the quality of budget 
institutions as an important determinant of the fiscal balance is well established 
in this literature. On the other hand, the literature assessing the relationship of 
legislative budgetary power on fiscal discipline is scarcer, with Wehner (2010b) 
and Rίos et al. (2018) being among the few studies on this topic. Both find that 
legislative budgetary power contributes to less fiscal restraint.   
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 6 constitutes new, recent 
evidence on the effects of the quality of budget institutions and legislative 
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budgetary power on fiscal discipline. Whilst focusing on the 19 EA member 
states constrains the sample size, it provides for more analytical relevance 
since they are all subject to the same supra-national fiscal governance 
framework. Furthermore, by using the composite indices, developed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the analysis uses broad measures of the institutional 
explanatory variables. The use of these indices also permits some time-
variation in the explanatory variables, since two data readings are available, 
for the pre- and post-crisis periods, respectively.  
The results show the expected positive relationship between the quality of 
budget institutions and the budget balance, but, in contrast to the findings in 
the literature, there is not a strong influence. This finding is largely confirmed 
when using alternative fiscal indicators for the dependent variable and when 
using different estimation methods. Similar results are also found when the 
model is estimated for the group of EA countries that have not been bailed-
out. Furthermore, in an alternative model, using as explanatory variables the 
CION’s (2017) fiscal rules strength and MTBF indices together with a simple 
dummy to capture the presence of an IFI, a significant influence was found for 
the numerical budgetary constraints but not for fiscal councils. These results 
could reflect the fact that in various EA countries, IFIs are a recent institutional 
development and more time may be needed for them to establish credibility 
and influence over the budgetary process. Furthermore, the recent reforms to 
budget institutions were largely triggered by the common EA requirements. In 
contrast to nationally-driven reforms, supra-nationally mandated reforms 
typically lack national ownership and political commitment, which impinges on 
their effectiveness to instil fiscal discipline in the budgetary process (Kopits 
2012; Wyplosz 2012). 
The empirical results also indicate that, contrary to the mainstream view in the 
literature on budget institutions and also to the findings in the few available 
legislative budgeting studies, legislative budgetary power does not necessarily 
conflict with fiscal discipline. Whilst, a negative, albeit weak, relationship was 
found between legislative amendment powers and the budget balance, overall 
the null hypothesis that legislative budgetary power does not influence the 
budget balance cannot be rejected. This result can be attributed to the broader 
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scope of the legislative budgetary power index used in this study, which also 
captures institutional characteristics that can contribute to more budgetary 
restraint. This suggests that a broad involvement of the legislature in the 
budgetary process, beyond amendment powers during the budget approval 
stage, could promote democratic accountability without jeopardising fiscal 
discipline. For instance, the comparative analysis carried out in Chapter 5 
shows that there is scope for more legislative involvement in fiscal rules and 
MTBFs, which have become more important constraints on the national 
budget. A top-down voting approach during the budget approval process and 
a centralised parliamentary committee dealing with the budget can similarly 
contribute to more fiscal restraint. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, the relationship between budget institutions and fiscal 
discipline is examined further, using a different methodological approach 
involving a qualitative case study on Malta. This analysis focuses on fiscal 
rules and fiscal councils, which were introduced in 2014 and 2015, 
respectively. Being mainly triggered by the need to comply with the EA 
common requirements, these reforms can be considered as largely 
exogenous, thus providing a valuable opportunity for research on budget 
institutions. The case study uses documentary evidence and interviews with 
24 participants, coming from the MFIN, parliament, the fiscal council, the CBM 
and the CION as well as representatives of the two main political parties. This 
case study contributes to the literature through its alternative qualitative 
approach, which enables an in-depth analysis of how budget institutions affect 
fiscal discipline whilst taking into account Malta’s political and institutional 
context. It also adds to the knowledge on budget institutions in the EA through 
its geographical focus, since Malta hardly features in this branch of the 
literature. 
The findings of the case study clearly show how the supra-nationally mandated 
budget institutions reforms were adapted to country-specific circumstances, 
thus highlighting the importance of context-dependent research. The results 
also provide insight into how fiscal rules and fiscal councils instil more 
discipline in the budgetary process and also show limitations to their influence, 
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with the notable turnaround in Malta’s public finances registered in recent 
years being largely attributed to the robust economic growth registered. 
The national fiscal rules replicate the SGP obligations, but exclude the 
expenditure benchmark, which can constitute a harder budget constraint. 
Furthermore, they largely rely on the SGP’s corrective and sanctioning 
mechanisms. Thus, the introduction of fiscal rules in national legislation was 
not considered as a very important development by most participants. 
Nevertheless, the SGP obligations are the main consideration when setting 
the budgetary targets. This reflects the widely-shared recognition among key 
decision-makers in the budgetary process that, as a small member state, Malta 
has limited leverage vis-à-vis these supra-national rules. For this same reason, 
the CION’s assessments have strong influence on government’s fiscal stance.  
Despite the introduction of national fiscal rules, Malta retains strong elements 
of the delegation form of fiscal governance, with the responsibility for fiscal 
discipline mainly lying with the MFIN. On the other hand, spending ministers 
do not share this political commitment to fiscal restraint and, reflecting the 
strong partisanship and rivalry in Malta’s political system, they put strong 
pressures during both budget negotiations and implementation for larger 
budgetary allocations. The MFIN has adapted to this pressure through 
considerable flexibility on the expenditure side of the budget during budget 
implementation. Indeed, unlike the budget balance targets, the expenditure 
ceilings are not considered as binding. 
Meanwhile, the most evident influence of the fiscal council on the budgetary 
process has been through its assessment of the macroeconomic and fiscal 
forecasts, since their endorsement by the council is a legal requirement. This 
has resulted in the adoption of more prudent forecasts by the MFIN, which 
also serve to cap requests for higher spending during budget negotiations and 
to mitigate against expenditure slippages during budget implementation. The 
fiscal council’s influence is also being reinforced through interaction with other 
international institutions, in particular the CION. On the other hand, reflecting 
its advisory role as well as its low media visibility and weak interaction with 
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parliament, the fiscal council’s influence when assessing government’s fiscal 
stance is quite limited.  
Interestingly, the findings from the case study show that, rather than 
constituting alternative forms of fiscal governance depending on a country’s 
type of government, in Malta, the fiscal rules constitute an ‘external anchor’ 
which reinforces the power of the MFIN during the budgetary process. This 
constitutes another example of how the EA common requirements are 
adapted to the specific institutional context of the country concerned. 
Pronouncements by international institutions, in particular the CION, also fulfil 
a similar role, but as a young institution, this is not yet the case for the fiscal 
council.  
8.2 General conclusions 
Whilst the reforms to the EA fiscal governance framework introduced following 
the Great Crisis recognise the importance of national budget institutions to 
achieve fiscal discipline, they also involve a thrust towards more homogeneity 
in national budgetary frameworks with emphasis on a rules-based approach. 
This contrasts with the emphasis, by Kopits (2012) and Wyplosz (2012), 
amongst others, on the need for budget institutions to be well-adapted to a 
country’s political and social system in order to be effective to achieve fiscal 
discipline. This argument is also reflected, at a more general level, in the 
association between the form of fiscal governance (delegation or contracts 
approach) with a country’s type of government (single-party majority or 
coalition government) (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999).  
The results of this research have indicated that since the Great Crisis, there 
have been notable reforms involving fiscal rules and fiscal councils in various 
member states and this has resulted in a general improvement in the overall 
quality of budget institutions in the EA. However, there remains considerable 
diversity in the specific characteristics of budget institutions among the 
member states and there is significant variation also in the strength of fiscal 
rules and IFIs. The findings also show that there can be different models for 
achieving good quality budget institutions, with varying emphasis on different 
institutional characteristics. Furthermore, the finance minister continues to 
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have a key role to instil fiscal discipline in various EA countries, especially in 
the small member states. The case study on Malta has further shown that the 
rules-based and delegation approaches are not necessarily alternative forms 
of fiscal governance but can also be complementary to each other. Thus, in 
Malta, the fiscal rules and assessments of government’s fiscal stance by 
international institutions (most notably by the CION) strengthen the MFIN’s 
authority to instil fiscal discipline in the budgetary process. These findings thus 
show that despite the push towards a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, there 
remains considerable diversity in the specific composition of national budget 
institutions in EA countries. 
Another key characteristic of the recent reforms to the EA fiscal governance 
framework is that they involved supra-nationally imposed changes to national 
budget institutions. In this regard, Kopits (2012) argues that political 
commitment tends to be lacking when institutional reforms are imported from 
a supra-national authority or international organisation, especially if they are 
seen as an imposition. Wyplosz (2012) similarly points out that political 
commitment to fiscal discipline is more likely when institutional reforms are 
self-imposed by the very politicians that they are designed to constrain. 
Effective fiscal frameworks are those supported by broad-based political 
ownership (Kopits 2012). Fiscal rules are credible if politicians show 
willingness to abide by their constraints, rather than seeking to circumvent the 
rules when they become too limiting. Similarly, fiscal councils can make a 
tangible contribution to fiscal discipline, if politicians are willing to listen to 
them. The results of this study indicate an improvement in the quality of budget 
institutions in the EA since the Great Crisis, but this largely reflects reforms to 
comply with the common supra-national obligations and conditions imposed in 
the financial assistance programmes of bailed-out countries. This centrally-
mandated nature of these institutional reforms has implications for their 
national ‘ownership’, thus affecting their effectiveness to achieve fiscal 
discipline.  
In fact, in contrast to the findings in previous studies, the empirical results 
presented in Chapter 6 show a weak, albeit still positive, relationship between 
the quality of budget institutions and the budget balance in the EA during 2006-
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2015. This may reflect the fact that fiscal council have been only recently 
established in various EA countries and it may take time for them to establish 
influence on the budgetary process. Furthermore, the timeframe of this study 
is more recent and captures the recent reforms to national budget institutions. 
Being triggered by supra-national obligations rather than by a national reform 
agenda, this may have affected the influence of budget institutions on the 
budget balance. The case study on Malta provides further insight into the 
limitations of centrally-mandated institutional reforms. The introduction of fiscal 
rules in national legislation is not considered as a major development in the 
fiscal governance framework by key stakeholders in the budgetary process, 
since Malta was already subject to the same provisions through the SGP. 
Moreover, whilst the MFIN is committed to abide by the fiscal rules in terms of 
the overall budget balance, it adopts flexibility in respect of the different 
budgetary components and in particular, the expenditure ceilings are not 
binding. Furthermore, the legislative changes have not brought about a broad 
political commitment to fiscal discipline beyond the MFIN, with significant 
pressure from spending ministers for larger budgetary allocations during both 
budget negotiations as well as during implementation. Finally, whilst the fiscal 
council has left a mark on the process of generating the budgetary forecasts 
through more prudent assumptions, as a young institution, it is not yet well 
embedded in national institutional arrangements and its influence has been 
more limited when assessing government’s fiscal stance. These findings show 
that imposing the introduction of fiscal rules and the establishment of fiscal 
councils through supra-national requirements is not a panacea for achieving 
fiscal discipline in the EA.   
Besides contributing to more fiscal restraint, budget institutions must also be 
democratic legitimate, since budgetary decisions involve important 
redistribution effects. The shift towards a decentralised fiscal discipline 
mechanism in the EA constitutes a positive step in this direction: in particular, 
the relevant legislations introducing fiscal rules and setting up IFIs were 
introduced through national parliamentary procedures. Nonetheless, 
achieving democratic accountability for budgetary decisions in the EA is 
complex because whilst EA member states retain a certain degree of 
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autonomy on fiscal policy, at the same time national budgetary sovereignty is 
increasingly constrained at the supra-national level by the SGP. This has not 
brought about an increase in relevant parliamentary activity at the European 
level, except for provisions for economic dialogues with national parliaments. 
The European Parliament does not have effective powers to influence national 
budgets and national parliaments remain the main source for democratic 
legitimacy of budgetary decisions in the EA. However, the findings from this 
study show that overall legislatures in the EA have weak powers over the 
national budgetary process. The results also demonstrate that there are 
alternative models for legislative budgeting among the EA member states. 
Thus, whilst taking into account the national political and institutional context, 
based on the results from this study, there is scope for improving the 
democratic legitimacy of budgetary decisions. This can be achieved without 
jeopardising fiscal discipline, for instance, through more legislative 
involvement in fiscal rules and MTBFs, which would also contribute to improve 
ownership of these important constraints on the national budget. More 
centralised voting procedures during the budget approval process as well as 
in the parliamentary committee structure dealing with the budget can similarly 
contribute to more fiscal restraint. As regards the supra-national budgetary 
constraints, the findings show that overall EA legislatures are quite well 
involved in the SGP procedures, but their engagement could be more effective 
if its involvement was more timely. 
The CION’s (2017a) proposals for completing EMU involve ambitious plans 
for a financial, economic and fiscal union and to have more democratic 
accountability through, inter alia a European Minister of Economy and 
Finance. However, achieving progress with these plans is difficult in the 
prevailing political context, with the rise of Eurosceptic parties in various 
European countries and the looming Brexit. There is neither public support nor 
political will for further transfers of national sovereignty to the supra-national 
level. The recent experience with the enforcement of the SGP rules, 
particularly vis-à-vis Spain and Portugal in 2016, also shows that despite the 
strengthening of the Pact, its enforcement on sovereign states remains 
challenging. In this context, a decentralised fiscal governance mechanism 
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constitutes a more realistic and pragmatic approach to achieve fiscal discipline 
in the EA. It is also somewhat less complex to improve democratic legitimacy 
of budgetary decisions through interventions at the national level. However, 
this research has shown that there are limitations to achieve fiscal discipline 
through supra-nationally mandated changes to national budget institutions, 
unless there is political commitment to the relevant budgetary constraints. One 
would expect that the experience of the sovereign debt crises would have 
strengthened political commitment to fiscal discipline. But as a result of the 
prolonged period of austerity and the magnitude of the measures involved, 
popular support for fiscal restraint is lacking. This political environment thus 
constitutes a challenge for both supra-national and national fiscal governance 
frameworks, which implies that the outlook for achieving fiscal discipline in the 
EA is currently quite pessimistic. 
8.3 Areas for further research 
Finally, this thesis concludes by identifying key areas where the research 
hereby presented can be taken further.  
The first area concerns data issues. In particular, a single, comprehensive 
database providing detailed information on budget institutions for all the EA 
countries is lacking. To construct the quality of budget institutions and 
legislative budgetary power indices, different secondary sources as well as 
primary data generated from questionnaires to national authorities had to be 
used. The available data sources are limited either in terms of geographical 
coverage or in terms of scope, covering only specific institutional 
characteristics. Furthermore, only the CION and IMF datasets are updated 
annually, whilst three OECD surveys on budget practices and procedures 
have been conducted to date (2003, 2007 and 2012). It is recognised that the 
generation of frequent and comprehensive data for all the EA countries 
requires significant time and resources. However, the availability of 
comprehensive timeseries data would contribute to improve the econometric 
estimation of the influence of budget institutions and legislative budgeting on 
fiscal discipline. Data constraints also implied that the empirical estimations 
covered only a relatively short time span (2006-2015), which restricted the 
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possibility of using certain econometric techniques. Furthermore, this 
timeframe covers only the first few years of experience with the reformed 
budget institutions. In particular, fiscal councils constitute a new development 
in various EA countries and thus, the results may not have captured their long-
term impact. This could be addressed if a longer time series becomes 
available. This would also make it possible to carry out single-country 
econometric empirical analysis, which would avoid the complexities inherent 
in panel data models and also side-step difficulties due to different political, 
social and institutional aspects that are faced in cross-country studies.  
From this study, specific areas where more in-depth research can be carried 
out can also be identified. In particular, this concerns the role of fiscal councils. 
In the panel data estimations, IFIs have been captured as part of the 
composite index for the quality of budget institutions and through a simple 
dummy variable. As they become a more established component of budget 
institutions, it is relevant to examine more specifically their role to achieve 
fiscal discipline, as well as potential interaction effects with fiscal rules and 
other institutional characteristics. 
Similarly, the relationship between legislative budgeting and fiscal discipline 
constitutes an area for further research, especially given the scant literature 
available on this topic. In this thesis, this relationship has been assessed 
empirically using the composite legislative budgetary power index and by 
using an indicator for legislative amendment powers. But there is scope for a 
more disaggregated assessment focusing on specific dimensions of legislative 
budgeting, especially those that can contribute towards more fiscal restraint.  
Another area which merits further study concerns the choice of the form of 
fiscal governance by different countries. In contrast to the literature’s emphasis 
on the type of government as the main determinant, the results in Chapter 4 
suggest that country size may be a more important factor, with the delegation 
approach being more prevalent among small EA countries. The small sample 
size presents challenges to arrive at robust conclusions in this regard, since 
few member states have a single-party majority government, where the 
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delegation approach would be the expected form of fiscal governance. 
Nevertheless, this is a topic which merits further investigation. 
Finally, there is scope for further research on budget institutions by using 
qualitative case studies. The case study on Malta has provided useful and 
relevant insights on the role of fiscal rules and fiscal councils to instil fiscal 
discipline, as well as their limitations. This alternative methodological 
approach can be pursued further, through case studies for other EA countries, 
thus providing also the possibility of comparative analysis. It can also 
constitute a particularly promising avenue for further research in the areas 












































Aberbach, J.D. and Rockman, B.A. (2002) Conducting and coding elite 
interviews. Political Science and Politics 35(4), 673-676. 
Act XVI of 2013 Appropriation (2014) Act. 
https://parlament.mt/media/37446/act-xvi-appropriation-2014-act.pdf 
Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act XXXIX of 2014 Appropriation (2015) Act 
https://parlament.mt/media/37403/att-xxxix-appropriation-2015-act.pdf 
Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act XL of 2014 Second (2014) Appropriation Act. 
https://parlament.mt/media/37402/act-xl-second-2014-appropriation-act.pdf 
Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act XLI of 2015 Appropriation (2016) Act. 
https://parlament.mt/media/37358/act-xli-appropriation-2016-act.pdf 
Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act XLII of 2015 Second (2015) Appropriation Act. 
https://parlament.mt/media/37357/act-xlii-second-2015-appropriation-act.pdf 
Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act LVII of 2016 Appropriation (2017) Act. Act LVII of 2016 Appropriation 
(2017) Act Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act LVIII of 2016 Second (2016) Appropriation Act. 
https://parlament.mt/media/81825/act-lviii-second-2016-appropriation-act.pdf 
Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act XXX of 2017 Second (2017) Appropriation Act. 
https://parlament.mt/media/92018/act-xxx-second-2017-appropriation-act.pdf 
Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Act No. VII of 2018, An Act to implement Budget measures for the financial 
year 2018 and other administrative measures. 
https://parlament.mt/media/93630/act-vii-budget-measures-implementation-






Aidt, T.S., Veiga, F.J. and Veiga, L.G. (2011) Election results and 
opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle 
model. Public Choice 148(1), 21-44. 
Alejo, L., Galvao, A., Montes-Rojas, G. and Sosa-Escudero, W. (2015) Tests 
for normality in linear panel data models. The Stata Journal 15(3), 822-832. 
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. and Trebbi, F. (2006) Who adjusts and when? On 
the political economy of reforms. National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper Series No. 12049.  
Alesina, A., Carloni, D. and Lecce, G. (2012) The electoral consequences of 
large fiscal adjustments. In Alesina, A. and Giavazzi, F. (editors) Fiscal policy 
after the financial crisis. University of Chicago Press. 531-570. 
Alesina, A., Cohen, G.D. and Roubini, N. (1991) Macroeconomic policy and 
elections in OECD democracies. National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper Series No. 3830. 
Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991) Why are stabilizations delayed? The 
American Economic Review 81(5), 1170-1188. 
Alesina, A, Hausmann, R., Hommes, R. and Stein, E. (1999) Budget 
Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America. Journal of 
Development Economics 59(2), 253-273. 
Alesina, A. and Passalacqua, A. (2015) The political economy of government 
debt. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 
21821. 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1995) The political economy of budget deficits. 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 42(1), 1-31. 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996) Fiscal discipline and the budget process. 
The American Economic Review 86(2), 401-407. 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1999) Budget deficits and budget institutions. In 
Poterba, J.M. and von Hagen, J. (editors) Fiscal institutions and fiscal 






Alesina, A., Perotti, R., Tavares, J., Obstfeld, M. and Eichengreen, B. (1998) 
The political economy of fiscal adjustments. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 1998(1), 197-266.  
Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1990) A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and 
Government Debt. Review of Economic Studies 57(3), 403-414.  
Alt, J.E. and Lassen, D.D. (2006a) Transparency, political polarization, and 
political budget cycles in OECD countries. American Journal of Political 
Science 50(3), 530-550. 
Alt, J.E. and Lassen, D.D. (2006b) Fiscal transparency, political parties, and 
debt in OECD countries. European Economic Review 50(6), 1403-1439. 
Alt, J.E., Lassen, D. and Wehner J. (2014) It isn't just about Greece: 
domestic politics, transparency and fiscal gimmickry in Europe. British 
Journal of Political Science 44(4), 707-716. 
Alt, J.E. and Lowry, R.C. (1994) Divided government, fiscal institutions and 
budget deficits: Evidence from the states. American Political Science Review 
88(4), 811-828. 
Anderson, B. (2009) The changing role of parliament in the budget process. 
OECD Journal on Budgeting 9(1), 37-48. 
Annett, A. (2006) Enforcement and the stability and growth pact: how fiscal 
policy did and did not change under Europe's fiscal framework. International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 116. 
Ashworth, J., Geys, B. and Heyndels, B. (2005) Government weakness and 
local public debt development in Flemish municipalities. International Tax 
and Public Finance 12(4), 395-422.  
Auerbach, A.J. and Gale, W.G. (2009) Activist fiscal policy to stabilize 
economic activity. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 






Ayuso-i-Casals, J. Deroose, S., Flores, E. and Moulin, L. (editors) (2009) 
Policy instruments for sound fiscal policies: fiscal rules and institutions. 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Balassone, F. and Giordano, R. (2001) Budget deficits and coalition 
governments. Public Choice 106(3), 327-349 
Baldwin, R. and Wyplosz, C. (2012) The Economics of European Integration. 
4th edition. McGraw Hill Education. 
Baltagi, B. (2013) Econometric analysis of panel data. 5th edition. John Wiley 
and Sons. 
Baron, D.P. and Ferejohn, J.A. (1989) Bargaining in legislatures. American 
political science review 83(4), 1181-1206. 
Barro, R.J. (1979) On the determination of the public debt. The Journal of 
Political Economy 87(5), 940-971. 
Bastida, F., Beyaert, A. and Benito, B. (2013) Electoral cycles and local 
government debt management. Local Government Studies 39(1), 107-132. 
Battaglini, M. and Coate, S. (2008) A dynamic theory of public spending, 
taxation and debt. The American Economic Review 98(1), 201-236. 
Baum, C.F. (2006) An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. 
Stata press. 
Beetsma, R. (2001) Does EMU need a Stability Pact? In Brunila, A., Buti, M. 
and Franco, D. (editors) The Stability and Growth Pact: The architecture of 
fiscal policy in EMU. Palgrave Macmillan. 23-52. 
Begg. I. (2017) Fiscal and other rules in EU economic governance: helpful, 
largely irrelevant or unenforceable? National Institute Economic Review 
239(1), R3-R13. 
Benito, B. and Bastida, F. (2009) Budget transparency, fiscal performance, 







Bergman, U.M., Hutchison, M.M. and Jensen, S.E.H. (2016) Promoting 
sustainable public finances in the European Union: the role of fiscal rules and 
government efficiency. European Journal of Political Economy 44, 1-19. 
Beukers, T. (2013) The Eurozone crisis and the legitimacy of differentiated 
integration. In De Witte, B., Héritier, A. and Trechsel, A.H. (editors) The Euro 
crisis and the state of European democracy. European University Institute. 7-
30. 
Blaikie, N. (2007) Approaches to social enquiry: advancing knowledge. 2nd 
edition. Polity. 
Bleaney, M. (2010) Budget institutions and fiscal performance in 
Africa. CREDIT Research Paper No. 10/02, The University of Nottingham, 
Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade 
(CREDIT). 
Bove, V., Efthyvoulou, G. and Navas, A. (2017) Political cycles in public 
expenditure: butter vs guns. Journal of Comparative Economics 45(3), 582-
604. 
Brack, N. and Startin, N. (2015) Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the 
margins to the mainstream. International Political Science Review 36(3), 
239-249. 
Bradbury, J.C. and Crain, W.M. (2001) Legislative organization and 
government spending: cross-country evidence. Journal of Public Economics 
82(3), 309-325. 
Brender, A. and Drazen, A. (2005) Political budget cycles in new versus 
established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics 52(7), 1271-1295. 
Brender, A. and Drazen, A (2008) How do budget deficits and economic 
growth affect reelection prospects? Evidence from a large panel of countries. 






Bruno, G. (2005) Estimation and inference in dynamic unbalanced panel 
data models with a small number of individuals. The Stata Journal 5(4), 473-
500. 
Bryman, A. (2016) Social Research Methods. 5th edition. Oxford University 
Press. 
Buchanan, J. and Wagner, R. (1977) Democracy in deficit: The legacy of 
Lord Keynes. Academic Press. 
Bulmer, W.E. (2014) Constrained majoritarianism: Westminster 
constitutionalism in Malta. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 52:2, 
2323-253. 
Buti, M., Jollès, M. and Salto, M. (2019) The euro – a tale of 20 years: The 
priorities going forward. VoxEU Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) Policy Portal.  https://voxeu.org/article/euro-tale-20-years-priorities-
going-forward Accessed 2 February 2019 
Buti, M. and van der Noord. P. (2004) Fiscal Discretion and Elections in the 
Early Years of EMU. Journal of Common Market Studies 42(4), 737-756. 
Calmfors, L. (2012) The Swedish fiscal policy council: watchdog with a broad 
remit. Munich: Centre for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) 
Working Paper No. 3725. 
Calmfors, L. and Wren-Lewis, S. (2011) What should fiscal councils do? 
Economic Policy 26(68), 649-695. 
Castro, V. and Martins. R. (2014) Political cycles and government 
expenditures: Evidence from Portugal. 
http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/PEJ2014/V%C3%ADtor%20Castr
o.pdf Accessed 1 November 2016. 
Chen. D. (2003) Intertemporal excess burden, bequest motives, and the 






Cherchye, L., Moesen, W., Rogge, N. and van Puyenbroeck, T. (2007) An 
introduction to ‘benefit of the doubt’ composite indicators. Social Indicators 
Research 82(1), 111-145. 
Chortareas, G., Logothetis, V. and Papandreou, A.A. (2016) Political budget 
cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities. European Journal 
of Political Economy 43, 1-13. 
Cini, M. (2002) A Divided Nation: Polarization and the Two-Party System in 
Malta. South European Society and Politics 7:1, 6-23. 
Constitution of Malta. 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/downloaddocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=8566 Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Coombes, D.L. (editor) (1976) The power of the purse: the role of European 
parliaments in budgetary decisions. George Allen and Unwin. 
Corsetti, G. (2012) Austerity: Too much of a good thing. A VoxEU.org 
eCollection of views by leading economists. Centre for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR). 
COSAC (2014) Twenty-first bi-annual report: developments in European 
Union procedures and practices relevant to parliamentary scrutiny. Prepared 
by the COSAC secretariat and presented to the LI conference of 
parliamentary committees for union affairs of parliaments of the European 
Union, Athens, 15-17 June 2014. 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0085 Accessed 1 March 2018. 
Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2350 of 9 August 2016 on 
imposing a fine on Portugal for failure to take effective action to address an 
excessive deficit. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-






Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2351 of 9 August 2016 on 
imposing a fine on Spain for failure to take effective action to address an 
excessive deficit. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D2351 Accessed 15 June 2018. 
Council of the European Union (2017) Revised specification on the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format 
and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes (Code of conduct of 
the Stability and Growth Pact). 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9344-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
Accessed 20 May 2018. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A31997R1466 Accessed 1 March 2018. 
Crum, B. (2013). Saving the euro at the cost of democracy? Journal of 
Common Market Studies 51(4), 614-630. 
Crum, B. (2018) Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what 
role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance? Journal of 
European Public Policy 25(2), 268-286. 
Cukierman, A. and Meltzer, A.H. (1989) A political theory of government debt 
and deficits in a neo-Ricardian framework. The American Economic Review 
79(4), 713-732. 
Cusack, T.R. (1999) Partisan politics and fiscal policy. Comparative Political 
Studies 32(4), 464-486. 
Dabla-Norris, E., Allen, R., Zanna, L.F., Prakash, T., Kvintradze, E., Lledo, 
V., Yackovlev, I. and Gollwitzer, S. (2010) Budget Institutions and Fiscal 
Performance in Low-Income Countries. International Monetary Fund Working 






Darvas, Z., De Sousa, C., Hüttl, P., Terzi, A. and Tschekassin, O. (2014) 
Austerity and Poverty in the European Union. Study for the Committee for 
Employment and Social Affairs of the European Parliament. Bruegel. 
http://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/imported/publications/IPOL_STU_2014_518758_EN.pdf 
Accessed 10 January 2019. 
Darvas, Z. and Kostyleva, V. (2011) The fiscal and monetary institutions of 
CESEE countries. Bruegel Working Paper No. 2011/02. 
Dawson, M. (2015) The legal and political accountability structure of ‘post-
crisis’ EU economic governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 53(5), 
976-993. 
Debrun, X., Gérard, M. and Harris, J. (2012) Fiscal policies in crisis mode: 
Has the time for fiscal councils come at last? In 4th annual meeting of OECD 
parliamentary budget officials and independent fiscal institutions, Paris 23-24 
February 2012. OECD. 
Debrun, X., Kinda, T., Curristine, T., Eyraud, L., Harris, J., Seiwald, J. (2013) 
The functions and impact of fiscal councils. International Monetary Fund 
Policy Paper No. 16. 
Debrun, X. and Kumar, M.S. (2007a) The discipline-enhancing role of fiscal 
institutions: theory and empirical evidence. In Ayuso-i-Casals, J., Deroose, 
S., Flores, E. and Moulin, L. (editors) (2009) Policy instruments for sound 
fiscal policies: fiscal rules and institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, 51-88. 
Debrun, X. and Kumar, M.S. (2007b) Fiscal rules, fiscal councils and all that: 
commitment devices, signaling tools or smokescreens? 
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-I-Casals, J. and Kumar, M.S. 
(2008) Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union. 
Economic Policy 23(54), 298-362. 








6c777e0cf2c4819f206fce.pdf Accessed 10 January 2019. 
De Grauwe, P. (2009) Economics of monetary union. 8th edition. Oxford 
University Press. 
De Grauwe, P. (2010) Why a tougher Stability and Growth Pact is a bad 
idea. VoxEU.org - Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Policy 
Portal. https://voxeu.org/article/why-tougher-stability-and-growth-pact-bad-
idea Accessed 1 April 2018. 
De Haan, J., Jong-A-Pin, R. and Mierau, J.O. (2013) Do budgetary 
institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for 
the EU. Public Choice 156(3-4), 423-441. 
De Haan, J., Moessen, W. and Volkerink, B. (1999) Budgetary procedures - 
aspects and changes: new evidence for some European countries. In 
Poterba, J.M. and von Hagen, J. (editors) Fiscal institutions and fiscal 
performance. University of Chicago Press. 265-300. 
De Haan, J. and Sturm, J.E. (1994) Political and institutional determinants of 
fiscal policy in the European Community. Public Choice 80(1), 157-172. 
De Haan, J. and Sturm, J.E. (1997) Political and economic determinants of 
OECD budget deficits and government expenditures: A reinvestigation. 
European Journal of Political Economy 13(4), 739-750.  
De Haan, J., Sturm, J.E. and Beekhuis, G. (1999) The weak government 
thesis: Some new evidence. Public Choice 101(3), 163-176. 
De Hoyos, R.E. and Sarafidis, V. (2006) Testing for cross-sectional 
dependence in panel-data models. The Stata Journal 6(4), 482-496. 
Djouldem, M. (2017) The Evolution of Parliamentary Oversight of Public 
Finance in France. In Stapenhurst, R. and Imbeau, L. (editors) Contemporary 
developments in parliamentary oversight in francophone countries. Ontario: 






Döring, H. and Manow, P. (2016) Parliaments and governments database 
(ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern 
democracies. Development version. http://www.parlgov.org/ Accessed 20 
July 2017. 
Drazen, A. (2000) The political business cycle after 25 years. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Macroeconomics Annual 15, 75-117. 
Drukker, D.M. (2003) Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data 
models. The Stata Journal 3(2), 168-177. 
Economic Policy Department (2018) Economic Survey October 2018. Malta: 
Ministry for Finance. https://mfin.gov.mt/en/The-
Budget/Documents/The_Budget_2019/Economic_Survey_2018.pdf 
Accessed 1 November 2018. 
Edin, P.A. and Ohlsson, H. (1991) Political determinants of budget deficits: 
coalition effects versus minority effects. European Economic Review 35(8), 
1597-1603.  
Efthyvoulou, G. (2011) Political cycles under external economic constraints: 
Evidence from Cyprus. Journal of Economics and Business 63(6), 638-662. 
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012) Political budget cycles in the European Union and the 
impact of political pressures. Public Choice 153(3-4), 295-327. 
Elgie, R. and McMenamin, I. (2008) Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and 
political institutionalisation. Public Choice 136(3), 255-267. 
Eslava, M. (2011) The political economy of fiscal deficits: a survey. Journal of 
Economic Surveys 25(4), 645-673. 
European Central Bank (2008) Address at the ceremony to mark the 10th 
anniversary of the European Central Bank and the European System of 
Central Banks, Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB. 2 June 2008, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2008/html/sp080602.en.html 










Accessed 1 March 2018. 
European Commission (2006) Numerical fiscal rules in the 25 EU member 
states. In Public finances in EMU - 2006, European Economy No. 3. 149-
167. 
European Commission (2014a) Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Economic governance review report on the application of Regulations (EU) 
no. 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011, 1176/2011, 1177/2011, 472/2013 
and 473/2013. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52014DC0905 Accessed 1 March 2018. 
European Commission (2014b) Malta Robust growth outlook. In European 
Economic Forecast Spring 2014, European Economy No. 3. 80-81. 
European Commission (2015a) The Five Presidents' Report: Completing 
Europe's Economic and Monetary Union.  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/five-presidents-report-
completing-europes-economic-and-monetary-union_en Accessed 1 February 
2019. 
European Commission (2015b) Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Central Bank on steps 
towards completing economic and monetary union. 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-600-EN-F1-
1.PDF Accessed 10 May 2018. 
European Commission (2015c) Malta Economic performance remains 
robust. In European Economic Forecast Spring 2015, European Economy 






European Commission (2016a) Medium-term budgetary frameworks 
database MTBF - old methodology. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/medium-term-budgetary-frameworks-
database_en Accessed 1 June 2016. 
European Commission (2016b) Fiscal rules database Fiscal rules database – 
old methodology. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/fiscal-rules-
database_en Accessed 1 June 2016. 
European Commission (2016c) Assessment of the 2016 Stability Programme 
for Malta. https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/assessment-2016-stability-
programme-malta_en Accessed 31 May 2018. 
European Commission (2016d) Malta Strong investment and household 
consumption. In European Economic Forecast Spring 2016, Institutional 
Paper No. 025. 100-101. 
European Commission (2017a) Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European 
Central Bank Further steps towards completing Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union: A Roadmap. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0821 Accessed 1 March 2018. 
European Commission (2017b) Fiscal rules database. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/fiscal-rules-database_en Accessed 1 
March 2018. 
European Commission (2017c) Medium-term budgetary frameworks 
database. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/medium-term-budgetary-
frameworks-database_en Accessed 1 March 2018. 
European Commission (2017d) Independent fiscal institutions. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-
statistics/economic-databases/fiscal-governance-eu-member-
states/independent-fiscal-institutions_en Accessed 1 March 2018. 








fiscal-governance_en Accessed 1 March 2018. 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm 
Accessed 17 April 2017. 
European Commission (2017g) Which EU countries have received financial 
assistance? http://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-
fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-
received-assistance_en Accessed 14 July 2017. 
European Commission (2017h) Malta Solid growth continues. In European 
Economic Forecast Spring 2017, Institutional Paper No. 53. 96-97. 
European Commission (2018a) Euro celebrates its 20th birthday. Press 
release, 31 December 2018. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
6811_en.htm Accessed 28 February 2019. 
European Commission (2018b) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm. 
Accessed 12 June 2018. 
European Commission (2018c) Malta Sustained economic growth. In 
European Economic Forecast Spring 2018, Institutional Paper No. 077. 108-
109. 
European Commission (2018d) European Semester timeline. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-
timeline_en.pdf Accessed 5 June 2018. 
European Commission (2019a) Malta. Communication department of the 
European Commission. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries/member-countries/malta_en Accessed 3 January 2019. 









procedure/closed-excessive-deficit-procedures/malta_en Accessed 3 
January 2019. 
European Parliament (2014) Review of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes by national parliaments within the framework of the European 
Semester. Spotlight on Parliaments on Europe No.2, Directorate for 
Relations with National Parliaments: Brussels, November. 
European Stability Mechanism (2017) Financial Assistance. 
https://www.esm.europa.eu/financial-assistance Accessed 14 July 2017. 
Eurostat (2018a) Population on 1 January. 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pc
ode=tps00001&plugin=1 Accessed 23 February 2018. 
Eurostat (2018b) GDP and main components (output, expenditure and 
income). 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_gdp&la
ng=en Accessed 1 November 2018. 
Eurostat (2018c) Total unemployment rate. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&p
code=tps00203&plugin=1 Accessed 1 November 2018. 
Eurostat and European Commission (2013) European system of accounts 
ESA 2010. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
Ezzy, D. (2002) Qualitative Analysis Practice and Innovation. Routledge. 
Fabrizio, S. and Mody, A. (2006) Can budget institutions counteract political 
indiscipline? Economic Policy 21(48), 689-739. 
Fasone, C. (2015) Taking budgetary powers away from national 






European University Institute Working Papers LAW 2015/37. European 
University Institute. 
Fasone, C. and Griglio, E. (2013) Can fiscal councils enhance the role of 
national parliaments in the European Union? A comparative analysis. In De 
Witte, B., Héritier, A. and Trechsel, A.H. (editors) The Euro crisis and the 
state of European democracy. European University Institute. 264-305. 
Filc, G. and Scartascini, C. (2004) Budget Institutions and Fiscal Outcomes: 
Ten years of inquiry on fiscal matters at the Research Department. In 
Research Department 10th Year Anniversary Conference, Washington D.C. 
17 September 2004. Office of Evaluation and Oversight, Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
Financial Administration and Audit Act (Cap. 174). 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=8692&l=1 Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Fiscal Responsibility Act (Cap. 534). 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=12215&l=1 Accessed 10 April 2018. 
Fish, M.S. (2006) Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies. Journal of 
Democracy 17(1), 5-20. 
Flyvbjerg B. (2006) Five misunderstandings about case-study research. 
Qualitative Inquiry 12(2), 219-245. 
Forestiere, C. and Pelizzo, R. (2004) Does the parliament make a 
difference? The role of the Italian parliament in financial policy. In Pelizzo, R., 
Stapenhurst, R. and Olson, D. (editors) The role of parliaments in the budget 
process. World Bank. 267-277. 
Forestiere, C. and Pelizzo, R. (2008). Dynamics in legislative budgeting in 






Frankel J. and Schreger, J. (2013) Over-optimistic official forecasts and fiscal 
rules in the eurozone. Review of World Economics 149(2), 247-272. 
Franzese, R.J. (1998) Electoral and Partisan Manipulation of Public Debt in 
Developed Democracies, 1956-1990. http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~franzese/EPBCinDebt.pdf Accessed 1 February 2013. 
Franzese, R.J. (2002) The positive political economy of public debt: an 
empirical examination of the OECD postwar experience. http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~franzese/rjf.debt.paper.pdf Accessed 1 February 2013. 
Freudenberg, M. (2003) Composite indicators of country performance: a 
critical assessment. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working 
Papers No. 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/405566708255 Accessed 6 April 
2015. 
Gaspard, H., Khan, S. and Number, T. (2016) The Legislative Fiscal Scrutiny 
Function: Lessons from Canada. In 24th International Political Science 
Association (IPSA) World Congress 2016, Poznan, Poland 25 July 2016. 
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_48332.pdf Accessed 1 
July 2018. 
Gibbert, M., Ruigrok, W. and Wicki, B. (2008) What passes as a rigorous 
case study? Strategic Management Journal 29(13), 1465-1474. 
Gilles, M., Isbasoiu, G.M., Paternoster, D. and Salto, M. (2013) The 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance used in the EU fiscal framework: an 
update. European Commission European Economy Economic Papers No. 
478.  
Giuriato, L., Cepparulo A. and Barberi, M. (2016) Fiscal forecasts and 
political systems: a legislative budgeting perspective. Public Choice 168(1-2), 
1-22. 
Gleich, H. (2003) Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Central and 







Gollwitzer, S. (2011) Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Africa. 
Journal of African Economies 20(1), 111-152. 
Government Borrowing and Management of Public Debt Act (Cap. 575). 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=12680&l=1 Accessed 1 May 2018. 
Government of Malta (no date) About Malta The Maltese Islands. 
https://www.gov.mt/en/About%20Malta/Pages/The%20Maltese%20Islands.a
spx# Accessed 1 November 2018. 
Greetham, B. (2006) Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E. and Pagano, M. 
(1991) Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the 
industrial countries. Economic Policy 6(13), 342-392. 
Gros, D. (2016) The silent death of eurozone governance. Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) Commentaries 19 August 2016. 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/silent-death-eurozone-governance 
Accessed 10 February 2019. 
Guiso, L., Herrera, H., Morelli, M. and Sonno, T. (2018) The populism 
backlash: An economically driven backlash. VoxEU Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (CEPR) Policy Portal. https://voxeu.org/article/populism-
backlash-economically-driven-backlash Accessed 28 February 2019. 
Gujarati, D.N. and Porter, D.C. (2009) Basic econometrics. 5th edition. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Education. 
Hallerberg, M. (2004) Domestic budgets in a united Europe: fiscal 
governance from the end of Bretton Woods to EMU. Cornell University 
Press. 
Hallerberg, M. (2011) Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and 






Hallerberg, M., de Souza, L.V. and Clark, W.R. (2002) Political business 
cycles in EU accession countries. European Union Politics 3(2), 231-250. 
Hallberberg, M., Marzinotto, B. and Wolff, G.B. (2011) How effective and 
legitimate is the European semester? Increasing the role of the European 
parliament. Bruegel Working Paper No. 09. 
Hallerberg, M., Strauch, R. and von Hagen, J. (2007) The design of fiscal 
rules and forms of governance in European Union countries. European 
Journal of Political Economy 23(2), 338-359. 
Hallerberg, M., Strauch, R. and von Hagen, J. (2009) Fiscal governance in 
Europe. Cambridge University Press. 
Hallerberg, M. and von Hagen, J. (1999) Electoral institutions, cabinet 
negotiations and budget deficits in the European Union. In Poterba, J.M. and 
von Hagen, J., (editors) Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance. University 
of Chicago Press. 209-232. 
Hallerberg, M. and Yläoutinen, S. (2010) Political power, fiscal institutions 
and budgetary outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Public 
Policy 30(1), 45-62. 
Harvey, W.S. (2011) Strategies for conducting elite interviews. Qualitative 
Research 11(4), 431-441. 
Hauptmeier, S., Heipertz, M. and Schuknecht, L. (2007) Expenditure Reform 
in Industrialised Countries: A Case‐Study Approach. Fiscal Studies 28(3), 
293-342. 
Hays. P.A. (2004) Case study research. In deMarrais, K. and Lapan, S.D. 
(editors) Foundations for Research Methods of Inquiry in Education and the 
Social Sciences. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 217-234. 
Helland, L. (2000) Fiscal constitutions, fiscal preferences, information and 
deficits: an evaluation of west-European countries 1978-95. In Strauch, R. 
and von Hagen, J. (editors) Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy. Kluwer 






Heller, W.B. (1997) Bicameralism and budget deficits: the effect of 
parliamentary structure on government spending. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 22(4), 485-516. 
Heller, W.B. (2001) Political denials: The policy effect of intercameral 
partisan differences in bicameral parliamentary systems. Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization 17(1), 34-61. 
Hesse-Biber, S.N. and Leavy, P. (2010) The practice of qualitative research. 
2nd edition. Sage Publications. 
Hibbs, D.A. (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy. The American 
Political Science Review 71(4), 1467-1487.  
Hodson, D. (2009) National fiscal institutions and the Stability and Growth 
Pact: are ‘delegation’ states at a disadvantage? In Ayuso-i-Casals, J., 
Deroose, S., Flores, E. and Moulin, L. (editors) (2009) Policy instruments for 
sound fiscal policies: fiscal rules and institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, 149-
172. 
Hoechle, D. (2007) Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-
sectional dependence. The Stata Journal 7(3), 281-312. 
Holland, D. and Portes, J. (2012) Self-defeating austerity? National Institute 
Economic Review 222(1), F4-F10. 
Horvath, M. (2018) EU independent fiscal institutions: an assessment of 
potential effectiveness. Journal of Common Market Studies 56(3), 504-519. 
Huber, G., Kocher, M. and Sutter, M. (2003) Government strength, power 
dispersion in governments and budget deficits in OECD countries. A voting 
power approach. Public Choice 116(3), 333-350.  
Inter-American Development Bank (2015) Database of Political Institutions. 






International Monetary Fund (2013) The functions and impact of fiscal 
councils. https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/071613.pdf Accessed 
1 March 2016. 
International Monetary Fund (2015) Fiscal councils dataset. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/council/ Accessed 15 June 2016. 
International Monetary Fund (2018a) World Economic Outlook October 2018. 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/09/24/world-
economic-outlook-october-2018 Accessed 18 December 2018. 
International Monetary Fund (2018b) Malta 2017 Article IV Consultation - 
Press Release; Staff Report.  
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/01/29/Malta-2017-
Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-45590 Accessed 1 June 
2018. 
Katsimi, M. and Sarantides, V. (2012) Do elections affect the composition of 
fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice 151(1-2), 
325-362. 
Kim, C. (2015) A study on compilation and improvement of indices for 
legislative budgetary institutions: with focus on comparative analysis of 
current institutions in 60 countries. OECD Journal on Budgeting 14(3), 9-37. 
King, N. and Horrocks, C. (2010) Interviews in qualitative research. Sage 
Publications. 
Kontopoulos, Y. and Perotti, R. (1999) Government fragmentation and fiscal 
policy outcomes: Evidence from OECD countries. In Poterba, J.M. and von 
Hagen, J. (editors) Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance. University of 
Chicago Press. 81-102. 
Kopits, M.G. (2012) Can fiscal sovereignty be reconciled with fiscal 
discipline? Acta Oeconomica 62(2), 141-160. 
Kopits, M.G. and Symansky, M.S.A. (1998) Fiscal policy rules. International 






Krafchik, W. and Wehner, J. (1998) The role of parliament in the budgetary 
process. South African Journal of Economics 66(4), 242-255. 
Krogstrup, S. and Wyplosz, C. (2009) Dealing with the Deficit Bias: Principles 
and Policies. In Ayuso-i-Casals, J., Deroose, S. and Flores, E. (editors) 
Policy instruments for sound fiscal policies: fiscal rules and institutes. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 23-50. 
Krogstrup, S. and Wyplosz, C. (2010) A common pool theory of 
supranational deficit ceilings. European Economic Review 54(2), 269-278.  
Lago-Peñas, I. and Lago-Peñas, S. (2008) Explaining budgetary indiscipline: 
evidence from Spanish municipalities. Public Finance and Management 8(1), 
36-69. 
Lavielle, B., Pérez, M. and Hofbauer, H. (2003) Latin American index of 
budget transparency: a comparison of 10 countries. International Budget 
Project IBP, Mexico and Washington DC. 
https://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Latin-American-
Index-of-Budget-Transparency-2003.pdf Accessed 1 February 2015. 
Lebrun, I. (2009) Fiscal Councils, Independent Forecasts and the Budgetary 
Process: Lessons from the Belgian case. In Ayuso-i-Casals, J., Deroose, S., 
Flores, E. and Moulin, L. (editors) Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal 
Policies. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 320-345. 
Legal Notice 216 of 2017 Government Borrowing and Management of Public 
Debt Act (Cap. 575) Commencement Notice. 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lp&itemid=
28628&l=1 Accessed 1 June 2018. 
Leloup, L.T. and Ferfila, B. (2003) Have parliaments influenced budget policy 
during democratisation? A comparison of Hungary and Slovenia. Journal of 
Transforming Economies and Societies 10(2), 46-65. 
Lienert, M.I. (2005) Who controls the budget: the legislature or the 






Lienert, M.I. (2010) Role of the legislature in budget processes. International 
Monetary Fund Technical Notes and Manuals. 
Lindbeck, A. (1976) Stabilization policy in open economies with endogenous 
politicians. The American Economic Review 66(2), 1-19. 
Le Duc, L., Niemi, R.G. and Norris, P. (editors) (2010) Comparing 
Democracies Elections and Voting in the 21st Century (Volume 3). Sage 
Publications. 
MacRae, C.D. (1977) A political model of the business cycle. The Journal of 
Political Economy 85(2), 239-263. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (no date) Publications. 
https://mfac.org.mt/en/publications/Pages/Publications.aspx Accessed 10 
June 2018. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2015a) An assessment of the macroeconomic 
forecasts for the Maltese economy prepared by the Ministry for Finance in 
April 2015. 
https://mfac.org.mt/en/publications/Documents/MFAC__%20Macro%20Proje
ctions_30_4%20_15-FINAL-VERSION-Parliament.pdf Accessed 30 April 
2018. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2015b) An assessment of the main fiscal 
forecasts prepared by the Ministry for Finance and presented in the Update 
of the Stability Programme for Malta 2015-2018. 
https://mfac.org.mt/en/publications/Documents/MFAC-Fiscal-Assessment-
May%202015-FINALVERSION-Parliament.pdf Accessed 30 April 2018. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2015c) An assessment of the medium term 
fiscal strategy 2015-2018, annual report 2014 and half yearly report 2015 
published by the Ministry for Finance. 
https://mfac.org.mt/en/publications/Documents/MFAC_Assessment_Septem
ber_2015(2015_09_30).pdf Accessed 30 April 2018. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2018a) Assessment of the macroeconomic 







20Forecasts%20Assessment%20USP%202018-2021.pdf Accessed 30 April 
2018. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2018b) Assessment of the fiscal forecasts - 
update of Stability Programme 2018-2021. 
https://mfac.org.mt/en/publications/Documents/MFAC%20Fiscal%20Assess
ment%20USP%202018-2021.pdf Accessed 30 April 2018. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2018c) Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts 2017. 
https://mfac.org.mt/en/publications/Documents/MFAC%20Annual%20Report
%202017.pdf Accessed 4 May 2018. 
Malta Government Gazette (2015) Notice No. 33 Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(Cap. 534) 16 January 2015 
https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/DOI/Government%20Gazette/Governme
nt%20Notices/Pages/2015/01/Gov-Notices-1601.aspx Accessed 1 June 
2018. 
Malta Tourism Authority (no date) History Modern Malta. VisitMalta.com. 
https://www.visitmalta.com/en/modern-malta Accessed 1 November 2018. 
Maltritz, D. and Wüste, S. (2015) Determinants of budget deficits in Europe: 
The role and relations of fiscal rules, fiscal councils, creative accounting and 
the Euro. Economic Modelling 48, 222-236. 
Mason, J. (1996) Qualitative Researching. Sage Publications. 
Mikecz, R. (2012) Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues. 
Qualitative Inquiry 18(6), 482-493. 
Ministry for Finance (no date) Library - Reports (Fiscal Responsibility Act). 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/Pages/default.aspx Accessed 20 June 2018. 








alta_s_Fiscal_Framework.pdf Accessed 5 May 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2014) Malta: Update of Stability Programme 2014-2017. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/epd/Documents/library/stability/Update%20of%20Stabi
lity%20Programme%202014.pdf Accessed 10 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2015a) Annual Report 2014. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/Library/Documents/Annual%20Reports/Annual_Report
_2014.pdf Accessed 10 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2015b) Malta: Update of Stability Programme 2015-
2018. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/epd/Documents/library/stability/Stability_Programme_2
015_full.pdf Accessed 14 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2016a) Malta: Annual Report 2015 in line with Article 41 
of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/Library/Documents/Annual%20Reports/Annual_Report
_2015.pdf Accessed 10 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2016b) Medium-term fiscal strategy for Malta: Update of 
Stability Programme 2016-2019. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/epd/Documents/library/stability/UpdateofStabilityProgr
amme2016_vers2.pdf Accessed 14 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2017a) Malta: Annual Report 2016 in line with Article 41 
of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/Library/Documents/Annual%20Reports/Annual_Report
_2016.pdf Accessed 10 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2017b) Medium-term fiscal strategy for Malta: Update of 
Stability Programme 2017-2020. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/epd/Documents/library/stability/Stability%20Programm
e%202017.pdf Accessed 14 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2018a) Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy for Malta: Update 







2018.pdf Accessed 14 June 2018. 
Ministry for Finance (2018b) Malta: Annual Report 2017 in line with Article 41 
of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
https://mfin.gov.mt/en/Library/Documents/Annual%20Reports/Annual_Report
_2017.pdf Accessed 10 June 2018. 
Mink, M. and De Haan, J. (2006) Are there political budget cycles in the euro 
area? European Union Politics 7(2), 191-211. 
Mierau, J.O., Jong-A-Pin, R. and De Haan, J. (2007) Do political variables 
affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence. Public 
Choice 133(3-4), 297-319. 
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. (2004) Good, Bad or Ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules 
with creative accouting. Journal of Public Economics 88(1-2), 377-394. 
Mourão, P. (2008) Towards a Puviani's fiscal illusion index. Hacienda pública 
española 187(4), 49-86. 
Mourão, P. and Veiga, L. (2010) Elections, Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Illusion. 
Núcleo de Investigação en Politicas Económicas, Universidade do Minho 
Working Paper Series No. 18. 
Mulas-Granados, C. (2003) The political and economic determinants of 
budgetary consolidation in Europe. European Political Economy Review 1(1), 
015-039. 
Mulas-Granados, C., Onrubia, J. and Salinas-Jimenez, J. (2009) Do Budget 
Institutions Matter? Fiscal Consolidation in the New EU Member States. 
Eastern European Economics 47(1), 60-91. 
Mullard, M. and Pirotta, G.A. (2008) The Politics of Public Expenditure in 
Malta. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 46(1), 128-141. 
Nardo, M., Saisana, M., Saltelli, A. and Tarantola, S. (2005) Tools for 







Nerlich, C. and Reuter, W.H. (2013) The design of national fiscal frameworks 
and their budgetary impact. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 
1588. 
Noor, K.B.M. (2008) Case study: A strategic research methodology. 
American Journal of Applied Sciences 5(11), 1602-1604. 
Nordhaus, W.D. (1975) The political business cycle. The Review of 
Economic Studies 42(2), 169-190. 
Odendahl, T. and Shaw, A.M. (2002) Interviewing elites. In Gubrium, J.F. 
and Holstein, J.A. (editors) Handbook of Interview Research: Context and 
Method. Sage Publications. 299-316. 
OECD (2002) OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency. OECD 
Journal on Budgeting 1(3), 5-14. 
OECD (2007) International database of budget practices and procedures. 
http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/internationalbudgetpracticesandp
roceduresdatabase.htm Accessed 1 August 2016. 
OECD (2012) International database of budget practices and procedures. 
https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=7F309CE7-61D3-4423-A9E3-
3F39424B8BCA Accessed 10 June 2016. 
OECD (2014) Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent 
Fiscal Institutions. Public Governance and Territorial Development 
Directorate, Paris: OECD. 
OECD and Joint Research Centre, European Commission (2008) Handbook 
on constructing composite indicators: methodology and user guide. OECD. 
Olden, B., Last, D., Yläoutinen, S. and Sateriale, C. (2012) Fiscal 
Consolidation in Southeastern European Countries: The Role of Budget 






Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017) Republic of 
Malta Early Parliamentary Elections 3 June 2017. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Assessment Mission Final Report. 
Padovano, F. and Venturi, L. (2001) Wars of attrition in Italian government 
coalitions and fiscal performance: 1948–1994. Public Choice 109(1), 15-54. 
Parliament of Malta (2012) Transcript of Plenary Sitting No. 536, 10 
December 2012. [English translation] https://parlament.mt/en/11th-
leg/plenary-session/ps-536-10122012-0600-pm/ Accessed 15 May 2018.  
Parliament of Malta (2014a) Transcript of Plenary Sitting No. 175, 14 July 
2014. [English translation] https://parlament.mt/en/12th-leg/plenary-
session/ps-175-14072014-0600-pm/ Accessed 15 May 2018. 
Parliament of Malta (2014b) Transcript of Permanent Committee for the 
Consideration of Bills Meeting No. 32, 18 July 2014. [English translation] 
https://parlament.mt/en/12th-leg/plenary-session/ps-181-18072014-0900-am/ 
Accessed 15 May 2018. 
Parliament of Malta (2015) Motion that the House do resolve to approve a 
drawdown from the contingency reserve. Motion No. 289. Plenary Sitting No. 
338, 9 December 2015. [English translation] https://parlament.mt/en/12th-
leg/motions-12th/motion-no-289/ Accessed 20 May 2018.  
Parliament of Malta (2016a) Transcript of Public Accounts Committee 
Meeting No. 96, 28 June 2016. [English translation] 
https://parlament.mt/en/12th-leg/public-accounts-committee/pac-096-
28062016-0630-pm/ Accessed 8 May 2018. 
Parliament of Malta (2016b) Transcripts of Plenary Sittings Nos. 427 - 447, 
17 October to 2 November 2016. [English translation] 
https://parlament.mt/en/menues/reference-material/media-
archive/?legislature=186993 Accessed 12 May 2018. 
Parliament of Malta (2016c) Transcript of Plenary Sittings No. 460, 7 
December 2016. [English translation] https://parlament.mt/en/12th-






Parliament of Malta (2017) Transcript of Public Accounts Committee Meeting 
No. 101, 30 January 2017. [English translation] https://parlament.mt/en/12th-
leg/public-accounts-committee/pac-101-30012017-0630-pm/ Accessed 9 
May 2018.  
Peltzman, S. (1992) Voters as fiscal conservatives. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 107(2), 327-361. 
Perotti, R. and Kontopoulos, Y. (2002) Fragmented fiscal policy. Journal of 
Public Economics 86(2), 191-222. 
Persson, T. and Svensson, L.  (1989) Why a stubborn conservative would 
run a deficit: Policy with time-inconsistent preferences. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 104(2), 325-345. 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2002) Do political institutions shape economic 
policy? Econometrica 70(3), 883-905. 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2004) Constitutional rules and fiscal policy 
outcomes. American Economic Review 94(1), 25-45. 
Pesaran, M.H. (2006) Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous 
panels with a multifactor error structure. Econometrica 7(4), 967-1012. 
Posner, P. and Park, C.K. (2007) Role of the legislature in the budget 
process: recent trends and innovations. OECD Journal on Budgeting 7(3), 
77-102. 
Poterba, J.M. (1994) State responses to fiscal crises: The effects of 
budgetary institutions and politics. Journal of Political Economy 102(4), 799-
821. 
Poterba J.M. and von Hagen, J. (editors) (1999) Fiscal institutions and fiscal 
performance. University of Chicago Press. 
Randma-Liiv, T., (2002) Small states and bureaucracy: Challenges for public 







Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the euro area. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011R1173&from=FR Accessed 1 
March 2018. 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft 
budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R0473 Accessed 1 March 2018. 
Ricciuti, R. (2004) Political fragmentation and fiscal outcomes. Public Choice 
118(3-4), 365-388. 
Riege, A.M. (2003) Validity and reliability tests in case study research: a 
literature review with "hands-on" applications for each research phase. 
Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal 6(2), 75-86. 
Rίos, A.M., Bastida, F. and Benito, B. (2018) Risks and Benefits of 
Legislative Budgetary Oversight. Administration and society 50(6), 856-883. 
Robson. C. (2011) Real world research: A resource for users of social 
research methods in applied settings. 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. 
Rogoff, K.S. (1990) Equilibrium political budget cycles. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 2428. 
Rogoff, K.S and Sibert, A. (1988) Elections and macroeconomic policy 
cycles. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 
1838. 
Roodman, D. (2006) How to do xtabond2: an introduction to “difference” and 
“system” GMM in Stata. 
Roodman, D. (2009) A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford 






Roubini, N. and Sachs, J.D. (1989) Political and economic determinants of 
budget deficits in the industrial democracies. European Economic Review 
33(5), 903-933. 
Saisana, M., Saltelli, A. and Tarantola, S. (2005) Uncertainty and sensitivity 
analysis techniques as tools for the quality assessment of composite 
indicators. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in 
Society) 168(2), 307-323. 
Santiso, C. (2005) Budget institutions and fiscal responsibility: parliaments 
and the political economy of the budget process in Latin America. World 
Bank Institute. 
Sarapu, K. (2010) Comparative Analysis of State Administrations: The Size 
of State as an Independent Variable. Halduskultuur - Administrative Culture 
11(1), 30-43. 
Sayer, A. (1992) Method in Social Science A Realist Approach. 2nd edition. 
Routledge. 
Schaechter, A., Kinda, T., Budina, N. and Weber, A. (2012) Fiscal Rules in 
Response to the Crisis—Toward the “Next-Generation” Rules. A New 
Dataset. International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 187. 
Schick, A. (2002) Can national legislatures regain an effective voice in 
budget policy? OECD Journal on Budgeting 1(3), 15-42. 
Schuknecht, L. (1994) Political business cycles and expenditure policies in 
developing countries. International Monetary Fund Working Paper No.121. 
Shelton, C.A. (2014) Legislative budget cycles. Public Choice 159(1-2), 251-
275. 
Shi, M. and Svensson, J. (2006) Political budget cycles: Do they differ across 






Standing Orders of the House of Representatives Order (1962) 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=8970&l=1 Accessed 25 June 2018. 
StataCorp (2013) Stata 13 Base Reference Manual. StataCorp LP College 
Station, Texas: Stata Press. 
StataCorp (2017) Netcourse 471: Introduction to panel data using Stata. 
Stein, E., Talvi, E. and Grisanti, A. (1998) Institutional arrangements and 
fiscal performance: The Latin American experience. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No.6358. 
Stienlet, G. (2000) Institutional reforms and Belgian fiscal policy in the 90s. In 
Strauch, R.R. and von Hagen, J. (editors) Institutions, politics and fiscal 
policy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 215-234. 
Tabellini, G. and Alesina, A. (1990) Voting on the budget deficit. The 
American Economic Review 80(1), 37-49. 
Thorhallson, B. and Wivel, A. (2006) Small states in the European Union: 
what do we know and what would we like to know? Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 19(4), 651-668. 
Tornell, A. and Lane, P.R. (1999) The voracity effect. American Economic 
Review 89(1), 22-46. 
Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and 
monetary union, 2012. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-
2_en.htm Accessed 1 March 2018. 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, 2012. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT 
Accessed 5 July 2018. 
Tsebelis, G. (1995) Decision making in political systems: Veto players in 
presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. British 






Tujula, M. and Wolswijk, G. (2004) What determines fiscal balances? An 
empirical investigation in determinants of changes in OECD budget 
balances. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 422. 
University of Malta (no date) Registered Voters, Ballots Cast, and Valid and 
Invalid Votes, 1921 - 2013. Malta Elections A collection of electoral data for 
the Maltese Islands.  
https://www.um.edu.mt/projects/maltaelections/maltesepolitics/voters 
Accessed 1 November 2018. 
Veiga, L.G. and Veiga, F.J. (2007) Political business cycles at the municipal 
level. Public Choice 131(1), 45-64. 
Velasco, A. (2000) Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking. 
Journal of Public Economics 76(1), 105-125. 
Vicente, C., Bastida, B. and Benito, F. (2013) Transparency and Political 
Budget Cycles at municipal level. Swiss Political Science Review 2(19), 139-
156 
Volkerink, B. and De Haan, J. (2001) Fragmented government effects on 
fiscal policy: New evidence. Public Choice 109(3), 221-242. 
von Hagen, J. (1992) Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the 
European Communities. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, Commission of the European Communities Economic Papers No. 96. 
von Hagen, J. (2002) Fiscal rules, fiscal institutions, and fiscal performance. 
Economic and Social Review 33(3), 263-284. 
von Hagen, J. (2003) Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: Experiences 
with the stability and growth pact. ZEI - Centre for European Integration 
Studies, University of Bonn Working Paper No. B 06-2003.  
von Hagen, J. and Harden, I.J. (1995) Budget processes and commitment to 






von Hagen, J. and Wolff, G.B. (2006) What do deficits tell us about debt? 
Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU. Journal 
of Banking and Finance 30(12), 3259-3279. 
von Trapp, L. and Nicol, S. (2017) Designing effective independent fiscal 
institutions. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/designing-
effective-independent-fiscal-institutions-report.htm Accessed 1 July 2018. 
Wanna, J., Jensen, L. and De Vries, J. (2010) The reality of budgetary 
reform in OECD nations: Trajectories and consequences. Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Wehner, J. (2001) Reconciling accountability and fiscal prudence? A case 
study of the budgetary role and impact of the German Parliament. Journal of 
Legislative Studies 7(2), 57-78. 
Wehner J. (2004) Back from the Sidelines? Redefining the contribution of 
legislatures to the budget cycle. World Bank Institute Working Papers. 
Wehner, J. (2006) Assessing the power of the purse: an index of legislative 
budget institutions. Political Studies 54(4), 767-785. 
Wehner, J. (2010a) Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes. European 
Journal of Political Research 49(5), 631-653. 
Wehner, J. (2010b) Legislatures and the budget process: the myth of fiscal 
control. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wehner, J. (2010c) Institutional constraints on profligate politicians: The 
conditional effect of partisan fragmentation on budget deficits. Comparative 
Political Studies 43(2), 208-229. 
Wehner, J. (2013) Electoral budget cycles in legislatures. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 38(4), 545-570. 
Weingast, B.R., Shepsle, K.A. and Johnsen, C. (1981) The political economy 
of benefits and costs: a neoclassical approach to distributive politics. The 






Wierts, P. (2008) Fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes in EMU theory and 
evidence. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Reading. 
Woo, J. (2003) Economic, political, and institutional determinants of public 
deficits. Journal of Public Economics 87(3), 387-426. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2010) Econometric analysis of cross section and panel 
data. The MIT Press. 
Wyplosz, C. (2010) Eurozone reform: Not yet fiscal discipline, but a good 
start. VoxEU Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Policy Portal. 
https://voxeu.org/article/eurozone-reform-not-yet-fiscal-discipline-good-
start?quicktabs_tabbed_recent_articles_block=1 Accessed 20 February 
2018. 
Wyplosz, C. (2002) Fiscal discipline in EMU: rules or institutions? In Meeting 
of the Group of Economic Analysis of the European Commission, 16 April 
2002. 
Wyplosz, C. (2005) Fiscal policy: institutions versus rules. National Institute 
Economic Review 191(1), 64-78. 
Wyplosz, C. (2008) Fiscal policy councils: Unlovable or just unloved? 
Swedish Economic Policy Review 15(1), 173–192. 
Wyplosz, C. (2012) Fiscal rules: theoretical issues and historical 
experiences. In Alesina, A. and Giavazzi, F. (editors) Fiscal policy after the 
financial crisis. University of Chicago Press. 495-525. 
Wyplosz, C. (2013) Europe’s Quest for Fiscal Discipline. European 
Commission Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Economy Economic Papers No. 498. 
Yin, R.K. (2009) Case study research: Design and methods. 4th edition. 
Sage Publications.  
Yläoutinen, S. (2004) Fiscal frameworks in the Central and Eastern 






















   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Sub-index 1: Medium-term budgetary frameworks/targets 
National medium-term 
budgetary framework 
• Years since MTBF has been in place - Score equal to or greater than 1.0 in CION MTBF index since 2006 (10) 
- Score equal to or greater than 1.0 in CION MTBF index after 2006 but before 2010 
(5) 
- Score equal to or greater than 1.0 in CION MTBF index after 2010 (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF index 
• Scope of MTBF - MTBF covers the whole of general government or a large part of it (e.g. central 
government and social security) (10) 
- MTBF covers only central government (5) 
- There is no national MTBF (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF index (dimension 1) 
• Existence of co-ordination mechanisms 
prior to setting the medium-term budgetary 
targets 
- There is a proper ex-ante co-ordination mechanism between all levels of general 
government (10) 
- There are co-ordination mechanisms only for some general government sub-sectors 
(5) 
- There are no co-ordination mechanisms (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF index (dimension 4) 
• Connectedness between the multi-annual 
budgetary targets and the preparation of 
the annual budget 
- Fixed framework (articulated around a pre-defined path for government expenditure, 
generally not revised over time) (10) 
- The medium-term budgetary targets form the basis upon which the budget is 
prepared, but there can be deviation (5) 
- Flexible framework in which medium-term targets are only indicative (no clear link 
with the annual budget) (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF index (dimension 2) 
• Involvement of the national parliament in 
the preparation of the medium-term 
budgetary plan 
- Vote of parliament on the main medium-term objectives (10) 
- No vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament (5) 
- No formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF index (dimension 3) 
• Monitoring and enforcement of the multi-
annual budgetary targets 
- There are well defined actions in case of deviations from plans and a regular 
monitoring of targets (reports, etc) (10) 
- Some monitoring and enforcement procedures in place (5) 
- No clearly defined monitoring and enforcement procedures (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF index (dimension 5) 
Connectedness of Stability 
Programme to national 
MTBF 
• Connection of SCP to the medium-term 
budget plans in accordance with the 
medium-term budgetary framework 
- The SP is the medium-term budget plan established according to the MTBF (10) 
- The SP and the medium-term plans contain references to each other and explain any 
difference or revision (5) 
- The SP is produced independently and/or not linked to the medium-term plans (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF database (question 
1.6a) 
• Connection between the fiscal objectives 
specified in the SP and the fiscal targets 




- The SP constitutes the official medium-term budget plan or there is a legal obligation 
that the targets must be the same (10) 
- There is no obligation specified in law, but targets are the same (6.7) 
- Targets are usually the same, but differ sometimes (3.3) 




MTBF database (question 
1.6b) 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Connectedness of Stability 
Programme to annual 
budget 
• The SP (preliminary or final), or a 
document including the main medium-term 
macroeconomic and budgetary projections 
(that will be the basis for the preparation 
used for the SP) is annexed to the budget 
law 
- Yes, such a document is annexed to the budget (10) 
- No, such a document is not annexed to the budget (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF database (question 
7.2) 
• Connection between the budgetary targets 
in the budget law and those in the SP 
- There is a legal obligation that the targets must be the same (10) 
- There is no obligation specified in law, but targets are the same (6.7) 
- Targets are usually the same, but differ sometimes (3.3) 
- Targets usually differ (0) 
European Commission’s 
MTBF database (question 
7.3) 
Sub-index 2: Fiscal rules 
Fiscal rule with the largest 
coverage of the general 
government sector 
 





• Coverage of general government finances 
Score is summation of the following two components: 
- General government sector (5) 
- Central government (2.5) 
- Other (regional, local government, social security) (0) 
 
- 90% or more (5) 
- Less than 90% but more than 50% (2.5) 
- Less than 50% (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database (sector 
and coverage of general 
government finances) 
 
• Accounting system of the fiscal rule 
 
 
• Exclusions from the fiscal rule 
Score is summation of the following two components: 
- ESA (European system of national and regional accounts) (5) 
- Budgetary accounting system or other (0) 
 
- No, there are no exclusions from the rule (5) 
- Yes, there are exclusions from the fiscal rule (0) 
 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database 
(accounting system and 
exclusions) 
• Years since fiscal rule has been in place - At least one fiscal rule with 50% or more coverage of the general government sector 
in place before 2005 (10) 
- At least one fiscal rule with 50% or more coverage of the general government sector 
in place after 2005 but before 2010 (6.7) 
- At least one rule with 50% or more coverage of the general government sector in 
place after 2010 but before 2013 (3.3) 
- Fiscal rule with 50% or more coverage of the general government sector in place 
after 2013/fiscal rules in place before 2013 but with less than 50% coverage of the 






Fiscal rules database (rule in 
force since [year]) 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Fiscal rule with the largest 
coverage of the general 
government sector (cont.) 
• Statutory/legal base of the rule - Constitutional base (10) 
- The rule is based on a legal act (Public Finance Act, Fiscal Responsibility Law) (7.5) 
- The rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement reached by different 
general government tiers (and not enshrined in a legal act) (5) 
- Political commitment by a given authority (central/local government, minister of 
finance) (2.5) 
- No fiscal rule is in place (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database 
(statutory/legal base of the 
rule) 
• Room for setting or revising objectives of 
the fiscal rule 
- There is no margin for adjusting objectives (they are encapsulated in the document 
underpinning the rule) (10) 
- There is some, but constrained, margin in setting or adjusting objectives (5) 
- There is complete freedom in setting objectives (the statutory base of the rule 
contains broad principles or the obligation for the government or the relevant 
authority to set targets) (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database (room 
for setting or revising 
objectives) 
 






• Nature of the body in charge of 
enforcement of the rule 
Score is summation of the following two components: 
- Monitoring by an independent authority (fiscal council, court of auditors or any other 
court or the national parliament) (5) 
- Monitoring by the ministry of finance or any other government body (2.5) 
- No regular public monitoring of the rule (there is no report systematically assessing 
compliance) (0) 
 
- Enforcement by an independent authority (fiscal council or any court) or the national 
parliament (5) 
- Enforcement by the ministry of finance or any other government body (2.5) 
- No specific body in charge of enforcement (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database (the 
body in charge of monitoring 
and enforcement) 
• Enforcement and correction mechanisms - Automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-compliance (10) 
- There is an automatic correction mechanism in case of non-compliance and the 
possibility of imposing sanctions (6.7) 
- The authority responsible is obliged to take corrective measures in case of non-
compliance or is obliged to present corrective proposals to parliament or the relevant 
authority (3.3) 
- There is no ex-ante defined action in case of non-compliance (0) 
European Commission’s 









• Escape clauses 
Score is summation of the following two components: 
- There is real time monitoring of compliance with the rule, i.e. if alert mechanisms of 
risk of non-respect exist (5) 
- There is no real time monitoring of compliance with the rule, i.e. alert mechanisms of 
risk of non-respect do not exist (0) 
 
- Escape clauses are foreseen and clearly specified (5) 
- Escape clauses are not foreseen and clearly specified (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database 
(enforcement mechanisms, 
correction mechanisms) 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Fiscal rule with the largest 
coverage of the general 
government sector (cont.) 
• Media visibility of the rule • Observance of the rule is closely monitored by the media, non-compliance is likely to 
trigger public debate (10) 
• High media interest in rule compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to invoke 
public debate (5) 
• No or modest interest of the media (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database (media 
visibility of the rule) 
Other fiscal rules in place240 • Other balanced budget rules in place - Other balanced budget rules in place, covering at least 50% of general government 
finances (10) 
- Other balanced budget rules in place, covering less than 50% of general government 
finances (5) 
- No other balanced budget rules in place (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database (type, 
coverage of general 
government finances) 
• Debt rules in place - Debt rules in place, covering at least 90% of general government finances (10) 
- Debt rules in place, covering less than 90% but more than 50% of general 
government finances (6.7) 
- Debt rules in place, covering less than 50% of general government finances (3.3) 
- No debt rules in place (0) 
• Expenditure or revenue rules in place - Expenditure/revenue rules in place, covering at least 90% of general government 
finances (10) 
- Expenditure/revenue rules in place, covering less than 90% but more than 50% of 
general government finances (6.7) 
- Expenditure/revenue rules in place, covering less than 50% of general government 
finances (3.3) 
- No expenditure/revenue rules in place (0) 
Sub-index 3: Structure of 
budget negotiations within 
the executive 
• Place where negotiations take place - Bilaterally between the finance minister and spending ministers (10) 
- Full cabinet participates in the negotiations (5) 
- Outside cabinet between the political parties (2.5) 
- Other (0) 
Author’s questionnaire to all 
EA countries 
• Imposition of budget ceilings on the initial 
spending requests of each line ministry 
- Budget ceilings are imposed for total/overall expenditure of the line ministry (10) 
- Budget ceilings are imposed for other aggregate levels (e.g. by programme or sector) 
(6.7) 
- Budget ceilings are imposed for agency levels or other organisational level (3.3) 





OECD EA countries - OECD 
Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 31) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
                                                          
240 Since most of the fiscal rules with the largest coverage of general government finances are balanced budget rules, the full score is assigned if other rules covering more than 50% of general 
government finances are in place, whereas for other types of rules, the full score is assigned if there are rules covering 90% or more of the general government sector. 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Sub-index 3: Structure of 
budget negotiations within 
the executive (cont.) 
• Final/ultimate decision-making power to 
resolve/settle disputes during the budget 
negotiation process 
• President/Prime Minister/Minister of Finance (10) 
• Combination of chief executive, cabinet, finance minister (7.5) 
• Cabinet (5) 
• Ministerial committee (2.5) 
 
 
OECD EA countries - OECD 
Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 33) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
Sub-index 4: Structure of 
parliamentary process 
leading to the approval of 
the budget law 
• Formal powers of the legislature to amend 
the budget proposed by the executive 
- The legislature may not make any changes, it can only approve or reject the budget 
as a whole (10) 
- The legislature may only decrease existing expenditures/revenues (i.e. the legislature 
cannot increase existing items or create new ones) (7.5) 
- The legislature may make amendments but only if it does not change the total 
deficit/surplus proposed by the executive (5) 
- The legislature has unrestricted powers to amend the budget (0) 
OECD EA countries - OECD 
Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 64) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
• Sequence of voting procedure - The legislature first votes on the total amount of expenditure before it votes on 
specific appropriations (10) 
- The legislature does not first vote on the total amount of expenditure before it votes 
on specific appropriations (0) 
OECD EA countries - OECD 
Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 63) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
• Type of committee structures for dealing 
with the budget 
Where both the upper and lower chambers of the legislature are involved in the 
budgetary process, the score reflects the average for the two chambers. 
- A single budget/finance committee co-ordinates a process in which sectoral 
committees make recommendations to the budget/finance committee. The 
budget/finance committee then reviews and accepts or rejects these 
recommendations and formally considers all budget-related matters (10) 
- A single budget/finance committee formally considers the budget, but members from 
sectoral committees attend meetings of the budget/finance committee when 
expenditures in their specific areas are discussed (7.5) 
- A single budget/finance committee formally considers budget aggregates (total level 
of revenue and spending and their allocation to each sector) and sectoral committees 
formally consider spending for sector specific appropriations (5) 
- Sectoral committees formally consider appropriations for each respective sector/no 
budget/finance committee is in place or it provides technical assistance only/no 
formal committee involvement, but committees may choose to consider aspects of 





OECD EA countries - OECD 
Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 59) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Sub-index 5: Flexibility of budget execution 
Executive authority to 
cut/cancel/rescind spending 
• Whether executive can cut/cancel/rescind 
spending once the budget has been 
approved by the legislature 
 
 
• Whether executive has authority to 
cut/cancel/rescind all types of spending241 
 
- Yes (score is the average of the scope of executive authority to cut/cancel/rescind 
spending and thresholds and approval that apply) 
- No (0) 
 
- Authority applies to all types of spending (10) 
- Authority applies to three types of spending only (7.5) 
- Authority applies to two types of spending only (5) 
- Authority applies to one type of spending only (2.5) 
- Executive does not have authority to cut spending (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(questions 72-84) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
Executive authority to 
cut/cancel/rescind spending 
(cont.) 
• Whether there are any thresholds that 




• Whether approval is required for the 
executive to cut/cancel/rescind spending 
Score is summation of the following two components 
- No (5) 
- Yes (0) 
 
 
- No (5) 
- Yes (calculated as the sum of the following elements) 
- Approval by Ministry of Finance/Economy required (1.25) 
- Approval by legislature required (0) 
 
- Ex-post approval required (1.25) 
- Ex-ante approval required (0) 
 
Power of line ministries to 
re-allocate funds within their 
budget envelope 
• Whether line ministers can re-allocate 
funds within their own budget envelope 
 
• Whether there are any thresholds that 
apply to line ministers’ re-allocation of 
funds within their own budget envelope 
 
• Whether approval is required for line 
ministers to re-allocate funds within their 
own budget envelope 
- Yes (score is summation of the following elements) 
- No (0) 
 
- No (5) 
- Yes (0) 
 
- No (5) 
- Yes (calculated as the sum of the following elements) 
- Approval by Ministry of Finance/Economy required (2.5) 
- Approval by legislature required (0) 
 
- Ex-post approval required (1.25) 
- Ex-ante approval required (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(questions 72-84) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
                                                          
241 The following types of spending are identified in the OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Survey: mandatory, operational, discretionary and investment. This categorisation also applies to 
executive authority to increase spending. 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Restrictions on executive 
authority to increase 
spending 
• Whether executive can increase spending 




• Whether executive has authority to 
increase all types of spending 
 
- Yes (score is the average of the scope of executive authority to cut/cancel/rescind 
spending and thresholds and approval that apply) 
- No (10) 
 
- Authority applies to all types of spending (0) 
- Authority applies to three types of spending only (2.5) 
- Authority applies to two types of spending only (5) 
- Authority applies to one type of spending only (7.5) 
- Executive does not have authority to cut spending (10) 
 
Score is summation of the following two components 
- Yes (5) 
- No (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(questions 72-84) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
Restrictions on executive 
authority to increase 
spending (cont.) 
• Whether there are any thresholds that 




• Whether approval is required for the 
executive to increase spending 
 
- No (5) 
- Yes (calculated as the sum of the following elements) 
 
- Approval by legislature required (2.5) 
- Approval by Ministry of Finance/Economy required (1.25) 
 
- Ex-ante approval required (2.5) 
- Ex-ante approval required (1.25) 
 
Supplementary budgets • Top reason(s) why the supplementary 
budget/s were necessary242 
- No supplementary budgets/recession or cancellation of planned spending/formal 
approval of appropriations carried forward from one fiscal year to the next/transfer of 
funds from one appropriation to another (no net increase) (10) 
- Ad hoc emergency needs (e.g. natural disaster) (7.5) 
- Changing economic forecasts resulting in lower/higher expenditure/increase of 
estimates of mandatory spending or stimulus measures (5) 
- New policy initiatives (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 86) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
Sub-index 6: Budget transparency 
Comprehensiveness of 
budget documentation 
• Distinction of new expenditure and revenue 
measures in budget documentation 
 
Score is summation of the following two components: 
- Expenditures under current commitments in law and policy are always distinguished 
from new policies in the annual budget documentation presented to the legislature (5) 
- Expenditures under current commitments in law and policy are sometimes 
distinguished from new policies in the annual budget documentation presented to the 
legislature (3) 
 
                                                          
242 Data on the amounts of supplementary budgets was not available for several countries in the OECD Budget Practices and Procedures database and comparable data for all EA countries is not 
available from other sources. Hence, the top reason why the supplementary budget/s were necessary is used as a proxy. 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 




• Distinction of new expenditure and revenue 














• Inclusion in the budget documentation 
approved by the legislature of: financial 
liabilities, financial assets, state 
transfers/guarantees, municipal 
transfers/guarantees, tax expenditures with 
estimates of revenue foregone, off-budget 
expenditures, contingent liabilities 
- Expenditures under current commitments in law and policy are rarely distinguished 
from new policies in the annual budget documentation presented to the legislature (1) 
- Expenditures under current commitments in law and policy are never distinguished 
from new policies in the annual budget documentation presented to the legislature (0) 
 
- New revenue-raising measures are always distinguished in the annual budget 
documentation presented to the legislature (5) 
- New revenue-raising measures are sometimes distinguished in the annual budget 
documentation presented to the legislature (3) 
- New revenue-raising measures are rarely distinguished in the annual budget 
documentation presented to the legislature (1) 
- New revenue-raising measures are never distinguished in the annual budget 
documentation presented to the legislature (0) 
 
 
- All or almost all items included (10) 
- Most items included (7.5) 
- Some items included (5) 
- Only few items included (2.5) 
- None of the items included (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey  
(questions 48, 49, 38b, 39b, 
50b) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 




• Public availability of: methodology and 
assumption for establishing fiscal 
projections used in the budget, sensitivity 
analyses of fiscal and/or macroeconomic 
models, independent reviews/analysis of 
macroeconomic and/or fiscal assumptions, 
budget circular, pre-budget report to the 
legislature, executive budget proposal 
submitted to the legislature, fiscal policy 
objectives for the medium term, 
comprehensive annual financial plan 
encompassing all revenues and 
expenditures including off-budget 




- Most of the listed items are made publicly available (10) 
- Some of the listed items are made publicly available (6.7) 
- Few of the listed items are made publicly available (3.3) 
- None of the listed items are made publicly available (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 51a) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 




comprehensive annual financial plan 
encompassing all revenues and 
expenditures for all levels of government 
(including regional and local), medium-term 
perspective on total revenue and 
expenditure (possibly in the form of a 
medium-term expenditure framework), long-
term perspective on total revenue and 
expenditure, citizens’ budget, citizens’ 
budget guide (explaining the budget process 




budget approval process 
• Legislative authorisation of off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities 
- Legislative authorisation is required for all off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities (or these items do not exist) (10) 
- Legislative authorisation is required for most off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities (7.5) 
- Legislative authorisation is required for some off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities (5) 
- Legislative authorisation is required for few off-budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities (2.5) 
- Legislative authorisation is not required for any off-budget expenditures and 
contingent liabilities (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices and 
Procedures Survey 
(question 39) 
Author’s questionnaire to 
non-OECD EA countries 
Sub-index 7: Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs)243 
Formal powers of IFIs    
Independence  
• Legal independence 
 
 
• Operational independence 
 
 
• Safeguards on budget 
 
 
• Right to select, employ and pay staff 
Score is summation of the following elements: 
- Yes (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (2.5) 
- No (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (independence) 
                                                          
243 Only Belgium, Germany and Slovenia have two fiscal councils. Unless otherwise specified, for these countries, the scores are computed as the average for the two institutions.  
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Independence (cont.) Characteristics of governing/high-level 
management members 
Score is summation of the following elements: 
- Re-appointment is not possible (5) 
- There is the possibility of re-appointment (0) 
 
- Members can be non-citizens (5) 
- Members have to be citizens of the country concerned (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (resources) 
• Composition of governing/high-level 
management members 
- Members include only academics and/or policy experts (10) 
- Members include academics and/or policy experts as well as civil servants but not 
politicians (6.7) 
- Members include civil servants only (3.3) 
- Members include politicians (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (resources) 
• Appointment and dismissal of 
governing/high-level management 
members 
Score is summation of the following elements: 
- Appointment by parliament (5) 
- Appointment by other (not government) institution (2.5) 
- Appointment by government (0) 
 
- Dismissal by parliament (5) 
- Dismissal by other (not government) institution (2.5) 
- Dismissal by government (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (resources) 
Mandate/tasks   
• Forecasts used in the budget 
 
 
• Binding forecasts 
 
 
• Comply or explain requirement 
 
 
• Formal consultation or hearings  
 
 
• Fiscal council can stall the budget process 
Score is summation of the following elements: 
- Yes (2) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (2) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (2) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (2) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (2) 
- No (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (tasks and 
information)  
• Positive and/or normative analysis - Positive and normative analysis (10) 
- Positive analysis only (0) 
 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (remit) 
   
   





Table AI: The quality of budget institutions index - indicators, scoring scheme and data sources (cont.) 
 
Dimensions of budget 
institutions (sub-indices) 
How are the variables manifested? 
(indicators) 
Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Mandate/tasks (cont.) • Forecast preparation and assessment - Forecast preparation with or without forecast assessment (10) 
- Forecast assessment only (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (remit) 
- Whether fiscal council/s carry out the 
following tasks: recommendations; long-
term sustainability; optimality (the 
assessment of government budgetary and 
fiscal performance in relation to fiscal 
objectives and strategic priorities); costing 
of measures; monitoring of fiscal rules; ex-
post analysis; fiscal policy co-ordination; 
mandate beyond fiscal policy 
- Fiscal council/s carries out all the indicated tasks (10) 
- Fiscal council/s carry out most of the indicated tasks (7.5) 
- Fiscal council/s carry out some of the indicated tasks (5) 
- Fiscal council/s carry out few of the indicated tasks (2.5) 
- Fiscal council/s carry out none of the indicated tasks (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (remit – other 
tasks) 
Organisational capacity of 
the IFIs 
• Years since IFI has been in place244 Date of start of activity: 
- before 2005 for all or most fiscal councils in place and no major changes to 
mandate/institutional set-up since 2010 (10) 
- before 2005 for all or most fiscal councils in place but major changes to 
mandate/institutional set-up since 2010 (7.5) 
- after 2005 but before 2010 for all or most fiscal councils in place (5) 
- between 2010 and 2013 for all or most fiscal councils in place (2.5) 
- after 2013 for all or most fiscal councils in place (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (start of activity – 
year, year of major changes 
to mandate/institutional set-
up) 
• Number of staff245 - More than fifty (10) 
- More than twenty but less than fifty (6.7) 
- More than ten but less than twenty (3.3) 
- Less than ten (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (resources) 
• Legal obligation to share information 
essential for the fiscal council’s activity) 
- Yes (10) 
- No (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (independence) 
• Annual number and diversity of public 
reports 
Score is summation of the following elements: 
- More than ten publications (6) 
- Less than ten but more than five publications (4) 
- Less than five but more than one publication (2) 
- Only one publication (0) 
 
- More than five different publications (4) 
- Less than five but more than one different publications (2) 
- Only one publication (0) 
IMF Fiscal Councils 
database (tasks and 
instruments) 
                                                          
244 For the countries with two fiscal councils: in the case of Belgium, both IFIs were established before 2005. In the case of Germany, one of the fiscal councils was established before 2005 but 
another was established in 2010. In the case of Slovenia, one fiscal council, having a narrow remit, was established in 1991 whilst the other fiscal council was not yet operational. Scores were 
assigned accordingly.  
245 For those countries with two fiscal councils, the total number of staff of both institutions was considered for scoring purposes. 




Table AII: Secondary data sources for the quality of budget institutions and 
legislative budgetary power indices 
Main Data 
Sources 
European Commission (2016) medium-term budgetary frameworks database - old 
methodology. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/medium-term-budgetary-frameworks-
database_en 
European Commission (2016) fiscal rules database - old methodology 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/fiscal-rules-database_en 
European Commission fiscal governance databases  - data not available online, obtained 
upon request from European Commission services, DG Ecfin 
IMF fiscal councils dataset, 2015 (data online replaced with 2016 vintage) 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/council/ 
OECD 2012 international database of budget practices and procedures. 
https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=7F309CE7-61D3-4423-A9E3-3F39424B8BCA 





for all EA 
countries 
European University Institute, Department of Law (2015) Constitutional change through 
Euro crisis law, a multi-level legal analysis of economic and monetary union. 
http://www.eurocrisislaw.eui.eu 
Update of Stability Programmes 2015. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2015-
european-semester-national-plans_en (updates of previous years were also referred to 
where relevant) 
Other secondary data sources by country: 
Austria Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance – budget and economic policy. 
https://english.bmf.gv.at/ 
Fiskalrat, Austrian Fiscal Advisory Council. https://www.fiskalrat.at/en/ 
Ministry of Finance, Austria (2011) Presentation on Reforming Fiscal Frameworks - The 
Austrian case. In Economic Policy Committee meeting, Brussels 16 November 2011. 
https://www.bmf.gv.at/budget/haushaltsrechtsreform/2011-11-
16_Reforming_Fiscal_Frameworks_The_Austrian_case.pdf?67ruil 
Schilhan, C. (2011) Presentation on Budgeting in Austria. In Course on Macroeconomic 
Implications of Fiscal Issues, Joint Vienna Institute April 2011. 
https://english.bmf.gv.at/budget-economic-policy/BMF-Budgeting_in_Austrian.ppt?67rqbo 
Belgium Belgian House of Representatives (2014) The House of Representatives, the 
Budget.http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/en_11_01.pdf 
Belgium Service public federal Stratégie et Appui, Notion de Budget. 
http://www.begroting.be/FR/Pages/budgetDefinition.aspx); Forme et structure. 
http://www.begroting.be/FR/Pages/budgetShape.aspx); Le cycle budgétaire. 
http://www.begroting.be/FR/Pages/budgetCycle.aspx); Monitoring. 
http://www.begroting.be/FR/Pages/budgetMonitor.aspx) [translated from French] 
Cyprus Cyprus House of Representatives. http://www.parliament.cy/ 
Pantelli, G. (2013) A New PFM Reform Strategy for Cyprus. In IMF Public Finance 
Management blog, 3 July 2013, https://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2013/07/a-new-pfm-
reform-strategy-for-cyprus.html 
The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C22575
6F0023C6AD/$file/CY_Constitution.pdf 
Estonia Estonia Ministry of Finance, Rahandusministeerium, State Budget and Economy. 
https://www.rahandusministeerium.ee/en/state-budget-and-economy 
Finland Finland Ministry of Finance, Economic Policy – Budget, the EU. http://vm.fi/en/economic-
policy 
France French Ministry of Finance, Ministère de l’Action et des comptes publiques, Direction du 
Budget. https://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/) [translated from French] 
Germany German Parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, Committees, Budget. 
http://www.bundestag.de/en/committees/a08); Adoption of the federal budget. 
http://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/adoption/245712); Federal budget. 
http://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/function/budget 
OECD (2014) Budget Review: Germany. OECD Journal on Budgeting 14(2). 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-journal-on-budgeting-volume-14-issue-
2_budget-v14-2-en 
Greece Kaplanoglou, G. and Rapanos, V.T. (2011) The Greek Fiscal Crisis and the Role of Fiscal 








Table AII: Secondary data sources for the quality of budget institutions and 
legislative budgetary power indices (cont.) 
Ireland Houses of the Oriechtas (2015) Budget Process and Documents. Oriechtas Library and 
Research Service, 24 September 2015. 
Ireland Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012. https://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/FRA.pdf 
OECD (2015) Review of Budget Oversight by Parliament: Ireland. 
https://webarchive.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/housesoftheoireachtas/ireland-
parliamentary-budget-review-preliminary-draft.pdf 
Italy Italy Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (2015) 
Presentation on Reforming the Italian budget process: strengthening the allocation 
function and integrating the spending review. In 36th Annual meeting of the OECD Senior 
Budget Officials, Rome, Italy 11-12 June 2015. https://www.slideshare.net/OECD-GOV/d1-
pms2-aline-pennisi-italy 
Proença, M. (2015) Budgeting in Italy, Portugal Peer review. In 36th Annual Meeting of 
OECD Senior Budget Officials, Rome, Italy 11-12 June 
2015.https://www.slideshare.net/OECD-GOV/d1-pms2-manuela-proenca-portugal 
Latvia Latvia Ministry of Finance. http://www.fm.gov.lv/en 
Republic of Latvia, Regulations Regarding Utilisation of the State Budget Appropriation 
Reserve, Cabinet Regulation No. 594 Adopted 28 August 2007. 
https://likumi.lv/ta/en/id/162749-regulations-regarding-utilisation-of-the-state-budget-
appropriation-reserve 
The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. http://www.saeima.lv/en/legislation/constitution 
Lithuania Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania, Budget. http://finmin.lrv.lt/en/competence-
areas/budget 
Republic of Lithuania, Law on the Budget Structure, 30 July 1990, No I-430 (as last 
amended on 6 November 2012 – No XI-2318). https://e-
seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.440733?jfwid=cxhrny4f3 
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 
http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm 
Luxembourg Bausch, R. (2012) Presentation on Budget Reform in Luxembourg Overview of the 
Preparations. In 33rd Annual Meeting of OECD Senior Budget Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland 
8 June 2012. http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/D2-PM%20-%20Luxembourg%20-
%20R.%20BAUSCH%20-%20Luxembourg.pdf 
Malta Constitution of Malta. 
http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8566 
Financial Administration and Audit Act, Chapter 174. 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8692&l=1 
Financial Estimates 2017, Budget Speech 2017. https://mfin.gov.mt/en/The-
Budget/Pages/The-Budget-2017.aspx 
Fiscal Responsibility Act, Chapter 314. 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lp&itemid=26047&l=1 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council. https://mfac.org.mt/en/Pages/default.aspx 
Netherlands Government of the Netherlands, Budget. https://www.government.nl/topics/budget-day 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2009) Presentation on The Dutch Parliament and 
the Budget Process. In OECD parliamentary budget officials: first annual meeting, Rome, 
Italy 26 February 2009. http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/42466069.pdf 
Portugal Assembly of the Republic, Law No. 52/2011 of 13 October Budget Framework Law. 
http://www.cfp.pt/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1351707749.pdf 
Conselho das Financas Públicas. http://www.cfp.pt/?lang=en 
Statutes of the Portuguese Public Finance Council, Approved by Law No. 54/2011 of 19 








Table AII: Secondary data sources for the quality of budget institutions and 
legislative budgetary power indices (cont.) 
Slovakia Act of 23rd September 2004 of Budget Rules of the Public Service and of Change and 
Amendment of some Acts. 
http://www.finance.gov.sk/en/Components/CategoryDocuments/s_LoadDocument.aspx?c
ategoryId=495&documentId=242 
Act of 23rd September 2004 of Budgetary Rules of the Regional Self-Administration and of 
Change and Amendment of Particular Acts. 
http://www.finance.gov.sk/en/Components/CategoryDocuments/s_LoadDocument.aspx?c
ategoryId=495&documentId=244 
Slovenia Voljč, M. (2011) Presentation on Budget System and Budget Preparation Procedures in 
Slovenia. In Study tour for officials from the Ministry of Finance of Uzbekistan, Ljubljana, 
Slovenia October 2011. 
https://www.pempal.org/sites/pempal/files/event/attachments/3a_volj-_budget-system-and-
budget-preparation-procedures-in-slovenia_eng.pdf 
Slovenian Ministry of Finance. http://www.mf.gov.si 
Spain Gutiérrez, C. (2010) Presentation on Spanish Parliamentary Budget Institutions. In Second 
Annual Meeting of the OECD Parliamentary Budget Officials, Bern, Germany, 11-12 
February 2010. http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/44694100.pdf 
Spain Ministero de Hacienda y Function Publica, Secretaria de Estado de Presupuestos y 




    






Table AIII: Quality of budget institutions index – results (post-crisis data) 
 
AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
Quality of budget institutions  6.7 5.2 6.0 6.1 5.6 6.9 6.7 6.3 6.7 6.3 6.4 6.2 5.5 5.0 6.4 5.7 5.8 6.8 7.8 
1 Medium-term budgetary 
framework/targets 
9.2 6.7 7.5 5.0 7.1 7.7 7.1 6.9 5.8 7.9 5.0 5.2 4.8 6.3 7.5 7.1 6.0 8.3 8.3 
1a National medium-term budgetary 
framework (MTBF) 
8.3 7.5 6.7 7.5 7.5 10.0 7.5 9.2 5.0 9.2 8.3 5.8 6.7 8.3 10.0 6.7 8.3 8.3 10.0 
1a(i) Existence and coverage of national 
MTBF 
5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
1a(ii) History of national MTBF 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
1a(iii) Existence of coordination mechanisms 
prior to setting the medium-term 
budgetary targets  
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 
1a(iv) Connectedness between the multi-
annual budgetary targets and the 
preparation of the annual budget 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
1a(v) Involvement of the national parliament 
in the preparation of the medium-term 
budgetary plan 
10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 
1a(vi) Monitoring and enforcement of 
multiannual budgetary targets 
10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 
1b Connectedness between SP and 
national MTBF and annual budget 
10.0 5.8 8.3 2.5 6.7 5.4 6.7 4.6 6.7 6.7 1.7 4.6 2.9 4.2 5.0 7.5 3.8 8.3 6.7 
1b(i) Connectedness between national MTBF 
and Stability Programme (SP) 
10.0 8.3 8.3 1.7 10.0 4.2 10.0 5.8 6.7 10.0 1.7 5.8 5.8 6.7 6.7 10.0 4.2 8.3 10.0 
 
Connectedness between SP and 
medium-term budget plans in MTBF 
10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 
 
Relation between fiscal objectives in SP 
and targets in MTBF (if SP is not the 
official medium-term budget plan) 
10.0 6.7 6.7 3.3 10.0 3.3 10.0 6.7 3.3 10.0 3.3 6.7 6.7 3.3 3.3 10.0 3.3 6.7 10.0 
1b(ii) Connectedness between SP and 
annual budget 
10.0 3.3 8.3 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 1.7 3.3 0.0 1.7 3.3 5.0 3.3 8.3 3.3 
 
SP (preliminary or final), or a document 
including the main medium-term 
macroeconomic and budgetary 
projections (that will be the basis for the 
preparation used for the SP) annexed to 
the budget law 
10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 
    






Table AIII: Quality of Budget Institutions Index – results (post-crisis data) (cont.) 
  AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
1b(ii) 
(cont.) 
Relation between the budgetary targets 
for the year t (the ongoing budget year 
at the time of the preparation of the 
budget and the SP for the year t+1) in 
the budget law and the SP 
10.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 3.3 6.7 0.0 3.3 6.7 10.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 
2 Fiscal rules 6.1 5.4 4.2 4.4 4.6 7.9 6.8 5.4 8.0 8.0 6.8 5.5 6.9 5.7 7.5 5.7 6.7 3.3 8.6 
2a Fiscal rule with largest coverage of 
general government sector 
8.6 5.9 6.3 6.1 4.4 8.8 8.5 8.1 7.8 6.9 6.9 6.3 6.4 6.8 8.7 6.8 7.0 4.9 9.6 
2a(i) Coverage, definitions and years since 
rule is in place 
8.8 7.5 7.5 10.0 3.8 9.2 10.0 7.1 6.3 5.0 7.5 1.3 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 8.3 1.7 10.0 
 
Government sector and coverage 7.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 2.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 
 
Accounting system and exclusions 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 
 
Years since fiscal rules in place 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 10.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 3.3 6.7 10.0 
2a(ii) Legal basis and flexibility of objectives 8.8 5.0 8.8 5.0 6.3 10.0 8.8 8.8 8.8 7.5 8.8 8.8 6.3 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 10.0 
 
Statutory legal basis of the rule 7.5 5.0 7.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 10.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 10.0 
 
Room for setting or revising objectives 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
2a(iii) Enforcement mechanisms 6.9 6.1 8.9 4.4 2.8 6.1 5.3 6.4 6.1 5.3 6.4 5.3 4.4 6.1 6.1 3.6 6.1 4.2 8.3 
 
Nature of body in charge of monitoring 
and enforcement  
7.5 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 10.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 7.5 5.0 
 
Correction mechanisms 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.0 10.0 
 
Real-time monitoring and well-defined 
escape clauses 
10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 
2a(iv) Media visibility 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 
2b Other fiscal rules in place 1.1 4.4 0.0 1.1 5.0 6.1 3.3 0.0 8.3 10.0 6.7 3.9 7.8 3.3 5.0 3.3 6.1 0.0 6.7 
2b(i) Other fiscal rules in place - balanced 
budget rules 
0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 
2b(ii) Other fiscal rules in place - debt rules 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 3.3 
2b(iii) Other fiscal rules in place - 
expenditure/revenue rules 
3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 6.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 3.3 0.0 10.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 6.7 
3 Structure of budget negotiations 
within the executive 
7.5 4.7 8.3 7.5 7.5 5.8 8.3 10.0 9.2 9.2 8.3 7.5 7.5 8.3 7.5 5.6 6.7 9.2 10.0 
    






Table AIII: Quality of Budget Institutions Index – results (post-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
3a Place where budget negotiations take 
place 
7.5 5.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.5 5.0 7.5 7.5 10.0 7.5 5.0 5.0 7.5 10.0 
3b Imposition of budget ceilings by 
government on the initial spending 
requests of each line ministry 
10.0 6.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 
3c Final/ultimate decision-making power to 
resolve/settle disputes during the 
budget negotiation process 
5.0 2.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 
4 Structure of the parliamentary 
process leading to the approval of 
the budget law 
2.5 1.7 4.2 5.0 2.5 8.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 4.2 5.0 5.0 3.3 0.0 1.7 3.3 2.5 8.3 8.3 
4a Restrictions on formal powers of the 
Legislature to amend the budget 
proposed by the Executive 
0.0 0.0 7.5 5.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 
4b Legislature budgetary voting procedure 
- whether it votes first on the total 
amount of expenditure before it votes 
on specific appropriations 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 
4c Centralised parliamentary committee 
structure dealing with the budget 
7.5 5.0 5.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 10.0 10.0 0.0 7.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 
5 Flexibility of budget execution 7.7 6.7 7.2 6.6 3.9 5.8 6.7 5.7 6.6 3.8 5.6 6.9 6.1 6.1 4.1 6.7 6.6 6.9 6.5 
5a Executive authority to cut, cancel or 
rescind spending once the budget has 
been approved by the Legislature 
8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 0.0 5.6 6.9 7.8 7.5 4.4 2.5 0.0 8.8 8.1 0.0 8.8 10.0 7.8 10.0 
5b Possibility for line ministers to re-
allocate funds within their own budget 
envelope  
7.5 7.5 10.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 7.5 2.5 5.0 1.3 2.5 7.5 7.5 8.8 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.0 7.5 
5c Executive authority to increase 
spending after the budget has been 
approved by the Legislature 
4.4 5.6 5.0 2.5 5.6 10.0 2.5 2.5 3.8 4.4 7.5 10.0 3.1 4.4 3.8 5.6 3.8 10.0 3.4 
5d Supplementary budgets - top reason 
why supplementary budget/s were 
necessary 
10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 3.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
6 Budget transparency 
 
  
7.7 4.0 5.7 9.6 8.3 6.9 9.3 4.9 8.4 6.9 8.8 9.2 7.8 3.7 8.9 4.8 6.8 6.1 6.6 
    






Table AIII: Quality of Budget Institutions Index – results (post-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
6a Legislative authorisation of off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities 
10.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 7.5 5.0 10.0 2.5 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 
6b Comprehensiveness of budget 
documentation 
6.3 5.3 5.3 8.8 7.5 9.0 7.8 9.0 5.3 6.5 6.3 7.5 6.8 4.3 6.8 5.3 8.8 5.0 6.5 
6b(i) Distinction of new revenue-raising 
measures and between expenditures 
under current commitments in law and 
policy and new policies, in the annual 
budget documentation presented to the 
legislature 
5.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 3.0 10.0 5.0 8.0 
6b(ii) Inclusion in budget documentation 
approved by the legislature of financial 
assets and liabilities, state and 
municipal transfers/guarantees, tax 
expenditures with estimates of revenue 




2.5 7.5 5.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 2.5 5.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 2.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.0 5.0 
6c Public availability of budgetary 
information and methodologies 
6.7 6.7 6.7 10.0 10.0 6.7 10.0 3.3 10.0 6.7 10.0 10.0 6.7 6.7 10.0 6.7 6.7 3.3 3.3 
7 Independent fiscal institutions 6.4 7.2 4.7 4.6 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.2 5.5 3.9 5.4 3.9 2.2 5.3 7.5 6.6 5.6 5.8 6.4 
7a Formal powers of IFIs 6.2 4.4 6.4 5.7 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.5 6.0 5.3 5.9 3.9 2.5 6.0 4.9 6.6 4.8 4.1 6.1 
7a(i) Fiscal Council independence 5.5 4.3 6.3 6.7 6.7 6.5 4.6 5.3 8.3 6.4 7.5 6.0 4.4 8.3 4.4 8.4 8.4 5.1 4.9 
 
Institutional characteristics 7.5 5.0 7.5 5.0 7.5 7.5 5.0 5.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 2.5 
 
Governing/high level management 
members 
3.5 3.6 5.0 8.3 5.8 5.6 4.2 5.6 6.7 5.3 7.5 4.4 3.9 6.7 3.9 6.8 6.8 5.3 7.2 
7a(ii) Mandate/tasks of IFI 6.9 4.5 6.6 4.8 5.4 3.6 4.0 1.8 3.8 4.3 4.3 1.8 0.6 3.8 5.4 4.8 1.3 3.0 7.3 
7b Organisational/technical capacity of 
independent fiscal councils 
6.7 10.0 3.0 3.5 5.1 6.0 6.2 5.0 5.0 2.5 4.8 4.0 1.8 4.5 10.0 6.7 6.3 7.5 6.7 
7b(i) Number of staff 3.3 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 0.0 3.3 0.0 3.3 0.0 10.0 6.7 6.7 10.0 6.7 
7b(ii) Access to information  10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
7b(iii) Public reports 6.0 10.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 8.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 6.0 10.0 10.0 
7b(iv) IFI in place, years since start of activity 7.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 5.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 
Source: Results are produced by author 
    






Table AIV: Quality of budget institutions index – results (pre-crisis data) 
 
AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
Quality of budget institutions  6.1 5.9 - - 4.6 5.2 5.8 3.6 4.5 5.0 - - 4.7 - 6.3 4.8 4.8 6.3 5.5 
1 Medium-term budgetary 
framework/targets 
8.3 6.3 1.7 5.4 6.3 6.7 6.3 3.3 4.6 6.3 4.2 5.0 0.8 5.0 6.7 2.9 5.4 7.5 6.7 
1a National medium-term budgetary 
framework (MTBF) 
8.3 7.5 1.7 5.8 7.5 8.3 7.5 1.7 2.5 7.5 4.2 5.8 1.7 7.5 8.3 1.7 5.8 7.5 8.3 
1a(i) Existence and coverage of national 
MTBF 
10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
1a(ii) History of national MTBF 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
1a(iii) Existence of coordination 
mechanisms prior to setting the 
medium-term budgetary targets  
10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 
1a(iv) Connectedness between the multi-
annual budgetary targets and the 
preparation of the annual budget 
5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
1a(v) Involvement of the national 
parliament in the preparation of the 
medium-term budgetary plan 
5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
1a(vi) Monitoring and enforcement of 
multiannual budgetary targets 
10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 
1b Connectedness between SP and 
national MTBF and annual budget 
8.3 5.0 1.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.7 5.0 4.2 4.2 0.0 2.5 5.0 4.2 5.0 7.5 5.0 
1b(i) Connectedness between national 
MTBF and Stability Programme (SP) 
6.7 6.7 0.0 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 0.0 3.3 6.7 3.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 
1b(ii) Connectedness between SP and 
annual budget 
10.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 1.7 1.7 0.0 1.7 3.3 5.0 3.3 8.3 3.3 
 
SP (preliminary or final), or a 
document including the main 
medium-term macroeconomic and 
budgetary projections (that will be the 
basis for the preparation used for the 
SP) annexed to the budget law 
10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 
 
Relation between the budgetary 
targets for the year t (the ongoing 
budget year at the time of the 
preparation of the budget and the SP 
for the year t+1) in the budget law 
and the SP 
10.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 0.0 3.3 6.7 10.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 
    






Table AIV: Quality of budget institutions index – results (pre-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
2 Fiscal rules 3.5 2.7 2.4 5.2 3.9 4.2 4.6 0.0 1.9 3.8 3.0 3.1 4.0 0.0 4.9 2.3 4.7 4.5 5.5 




5.3 2.6 3.5 7.2 3.6 4.9 5.3 0.0 2.2 4.3 4.5 3.8 3.5 0.0 5.6 2.9 5.6 6.1 7.1 
2a(i) Coverage, definitions and years since 
rule is in place 
8.3 1.3 1.3 10.0 7.5 2.5 4.5 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 1.3 7.5 0.0 10.0 5.0 2.5 6.3 8.8 
 
Government sector and coverage 6.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 2.5 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 10.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 2.5 10.0 10.0 
 
Accounting system and exclusions 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 
 
Years since fiscal rules in place 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 
2a(ii) Legal basis and flexibility of 
objectives 
6.3 7.5 8.8 5.0 3.8 3.8 5.0 0.0 3.8 7.5 8.8 8.8 5.0 0.0 7.5 3.8 8.8 5.0 6.3 
 
Statutory legal basis of the rule 7.5 5.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 7.5 5.0 0.0 2.5 10.0 7.5 7.5 5.0 0.0 5.0 7.5 7.5 5.0 7.5 
 
Room for setting or revising 
objectives 
5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 
2a(iii) Enforcement mechanisms 6.7 1.7 4.2 3.9 3.3 3.3 1.7 0.0 3.9 3.3 4.4 5.3 1.7 0.0 5.0 2.8 6.1 3.3 3.3 
 
Nature of body in charge of 
monitoring and enforcement  
5.0 5.0 7.5 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 
 
Correction mechanisms 10.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 
 
Real-time monitoring and well-
defined escape clauses 
5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
2a(iv) Media visibility 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 
2b Other fiscal rules in place 0.0 2.8 0.0 1.1 4.4 2.8 3.3 0.0 1.1 2.8 0.0 1.7 5.0 0.0 3.3 1.1 2.8 1.1 2.2 
2b(i) Other fiscal rules in place - balanced 
budget rules 
0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 
2b(ii) Other fiscal rules in place - debt rules 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 6.7 
2b(iii) Other fiscal rules in place - 
expenditure/revenue rules 
0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 6.7 3.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 Structure of budget negotiations 
within the executive 
6.3 6.3 - - 6.7 5.0 7.5 5.0 5.9 10.0 - - 5.9 - 7.5 8.4 5.9 10.0 5.0 
3a Imposition of budget ceilings by 
government on the initial spending 
requests of each line ministry 
10.0 10.0 - - 3.3 0.0 10.0 0.0 6.7 10.0 - - 6.7 - 10.0 6.7 6.7 10.0 0.0 
    






Table AIV: Quality of budget institutions index – results (pre-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
3b Final/ultimate decision-making power 
to resolve/settle disputes during the 
budget negotiation process 
2.5 2.5 - - 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 - - 5.0 - 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 
4 Structure of the parliamentary 
process leading to the approval of 
the budget law 
2.5 1.7 - - 3.3 8.3 3.3 6.7 5.0 3.3 - - 6.7 - 0.0 3.3 3.3 8.3 8.3 
4a Restrictions on formal powers of the 
Legislature to amend the budget 
proposed by the Executive 
0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 7.5 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 - - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 
4b Legislature budgetary voting 
procedure - whether it votes first on 
the total amount of expenditure 
before it votes on specific 
appropriations 
0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 10.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 
4c Centralised parliamentary committee 
structure dealing with the budget 
7.5 5.0 - - 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 - - 10.0 - 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
5 Flexibility of budget execution 5.1 7.8 - - 4.5 5.9 5.8 4.6 6.1 5.5 - - 7.4 - 5.0 8.6 6.4 6.0 6.8 
5a Executive authority to cut, cancel or 
rescind spending once the budget 
has been approved by the Legislature 
5.0 10.0 - - 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 10.0 0.0 - - 5.0 - 5.0 7.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 
5b Possibility for line ministers to re-
allocate funds within their own budget 
envelope  
2.5 4.0 - - 2.5 7.5 7.5 6.0 5.0 7.5 - - 5.0 - 2.5 7.5 4.0 7.5 7.5 
5c Executive authority to increase 
spending after the budget has been 
approved by the Legislature 
5.8 9.0 - - 9.5 3.8 8.0 5.0 4.5 6.5 - - 9.5 - 2.5 9.5 6.5 6.5 4.5 
5d Supplementary budgets - top reason 
why supplementary budget/s were 
necessary 
7.0 8.3 - - 6.1 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 8.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 
6 Budget transparency 7.2 6.4 - - 7.5 6.3 8.3 5.8 7.9 6.1 - - 8.1 - 10.0 8.3 7.9 3.1 6.0 
6a Legislative authorisation of off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities 
10.0 7.5 - - 2.5 5.0 10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 7.5 




5.0 5.0 - - 10.0 3.8 5.0 5.0 8.8 5.0 - - 7.5 - 10.0 5.0 3.8 2.5 3.8 
    






Table AIV: Quality of budget institutions index – results (pre-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
6b(i) Distinction of new revenue-raising 
measures and between expenditures 
under current commitments in law 
and policy and new policies in the 
annual budget documentation 
presented to the legislature 
0.0 5.0 - - 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 - - 5.0 - 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6b(ii) Inclusion in budget documentation 
approved by the legislature of 
financial assets and liabilities, state 
and municipal transfers/guarantees, 
tax expenditures with estimates of 
revenue foregone, off-budget 
expenditures, contingent liabilities 
10.0 5.0 - - 10.0 7.5 10.0 5.0 7.5 0.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 7.5 5.0 7.5 
6c Public availability of budgetary 
information and methodologies 
6.7 6.7 - - 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 3.3 - - 6.7 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 6.7 
7 Independent fiscal institutions 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 
Source: Results are produced by author 
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Table AV: National MTBF sub-index (post-crisis data) and 
European Commission MTBF index 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient National MTBF sub-
index 
European Commission MTBF index 0.785 
Note: 
The national MTBF sub-index is based on the European Commission MTBF index 
but additionally includes the length of time that the national MTBF has been in place, 
whilst the scoring scheme is also different. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AVI: Fiscal rules sub-index (post-crisis data) with alternative weights and the 
European Commission fiscal rules strength index 









strength index  
Fiscal rules sub-index (baseline) 1.000 - - - 
Fiscal rules sub-index A 0.953 1.000 - - 
Fiscal rules sub-index B 0.960 0.881 1.000 - 
European Commission fiscal rules strength index 0.892 0.920 0.871 1.000 
Note: 
Fiscal rules sub-index, weights for the two components (fiscal rule with largest coverage of general government sector and 
other fiscal rules in place):  
Fiscal rules sub-index (baseline): 67%, 33% 
Fiscal rules sub-index A: 75%, 25% 
Fiscal rules sub-index B: 50%, 50% 
 
The fiscal rules sub-index uses the same data as the European Commission fiscal rules strength index and its components 
are also very similar. 
   Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AVII: IFI sub-index (post-crisis data) and Horvath (2018) 
fiscal council indices 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients IFI sub-index 
Horvath (2018) fiscal councils index based on the OECD 
(2014) principles for IFIs 
0.572 
 
Horvath (2018) fiscal councils aggregate scrutiny 
effectiveness indicator 
0.903 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AVIII: IFI sub-index (post-crisis data) with alternative 
aggregation method  
Spearman rank correlation coefficient IFI sub-index (baseline – 
additive aggregation 
method) 
IFI sub-index (multiplicative aggregation method) 0.996 
Note: 
The scores resulting from the multiplicative aggregation method were re-adjusted on 
a 0-10 scale. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
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Source: Produced by author 
 






Table AIX: Quality of budget institutions index (post-crisis data) - alternative weighting 
structures 
 Weighting structure 
 Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
1. Medium-term budgetary framework/targets 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 
1a. National medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 
1b. Connectedness between SP and national MTBF and annual 
budget 
0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 
2. Fiscal rules 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 
3. Structure of budget negotiations within the executive 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 
4. Structure of the parliamentary process leading to the approval of 
the budget law 
0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 
4a. Restrictions on formal powers of the Legislature to amend the 
budget proposed by the Executive 
0.33 0.50 0.50 0.50 
4b. Legislature budgetary voting procedure – whether it votes first on 
the total amount of expenditure before it votes on specific 
appropriations 
0.33 0.25 0.25 0.25 
4c. Centralised parliamentary committee structure dealing with the 
budget 
0.33 0.25 0.25 0.25 
5. Flexibility of budget execution 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 
6. Budget transparency 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.13 
7. Independent fiscal institutions 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 
Notes:  
In Option 1, equal weights are retained for the seven sub-indices, but within sub-index 1, more weight is assigned to the 
national MTBF than to the connectedness of the SP to the national budgetary process; and within sub-index 4, more weight 
is assigned to restrictions on legislative amendment powers than to the other two characteristics of the budget approval 
stage.  
In Option 2, the adjustments to the weights in Option 1 are retained and in addition, less weight is assigned to the budget 
transparency sub-index, since this can be considered as complementary to the characteristics captured by the other sub-
indices, rather than contributing directly to more fiscal discipline.  
In Option 3, half of the weight is equally distributed between sub-indices 1, 2, 6 and 7; and the other half between sub-indices 
3, 4 and 5, broadly reflecting the contracts and delegation approaches to fiscal governance, respectively.  
Table AX: Quality of budget institutions index (post-crisis data) with alternative weights 
 Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Baseline 1.000 - - - 
Option 1 0.889 1.000 - - 
Option 2 0.891 0.993 1.000 - 
Option 3 0.893 0.981 0.979 1.000 
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Table AXI: Quality of budget institutions index (post-crisis data) and forms of fiscal 
governance 
 Form of fiscal 
governance 
1. Medium-term budgetary framework/targets -  
1a. National medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) contracts 
1b. Connectedness between SP and national MTBF and annual budget other 
2. Fiscal rules contracts 
3. Structure of budget negotiations within the executive delegation 
4. Structure of the parliamentary process leading to the approval of the budget law - 
4a. Restrictions on formal powers of the Legislature to amend the budget proposed by the 
Executive 
delegation 
4b. Legislature budgetary voting procedure – whether it votes first on the total amount of 
expenditure before it votes on specific appropriations 
other 
4c. Centralised parliamentary committee structure dealing with the budget other 
5. Flexibility of budget execution  
5a. Executive authority to decrease spending during budget implementation delegation 
5b. Possibility for line ministers to reallocate funds within their own budget envelope other 
5c. Constraints on executive flexibility to increase spending during budget implementation other 
5d. Supplementary budgets other 
6. Budget transparency contracts 
7. Independent fiscal institutions contracts 
Notes:  
Some institutional characteristics (categorised as ‘other’) are not included in neither the delegation index nor the contracts 
index. Connectedness between the SP and the national budgetary process is not included in the contracts index since all 
EA countries are required to prepare a SP. Within the budget approval stage, the sequence of the voting procedure and 
the parliamentary committee structure are not included in the delegation index as they do not directly affect the relative 
strength of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive. In the budget implementation stage, flexibility for line ministries to 
reallocate funds within their own budget envelope and restrictions on the executive authority to increase spending and on 
the use of supplementary budgets are not included in the delegation index as they imply less power for the finance 
minister.  


































How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
I. Formal legislative budgetary power 
IA. Involvement of the legislature in national budgetary process 
1A1. Involvement of 
the legislature in the 
MTBF 
• Which actors are involved in establishing the budgetary 
objectives/targets and/or projections arising from 
medium-term budgetary framework? 
- only national parliament is involved (10) 
- national parliament is involved together with other entities (5) 




• Involvement of the national parliament in the preparation 
of the medium-term budgetary plan 
- the medium-term plan is formally sent, discussed and voted upon by the 
parliament, which may approve, reject or amend it (10) 
-  the medium-term plan is formally sent, discussed and voted upon by the 
parliament, which may approve or reject, but not amend it (6.7) 
-  the medium-term plan is sent and presented to parliament by a member of the 
government and discussed, but the parliament does not vote on the medium-term 
plan (3.3) 
-  the medium-term plan is not sent to parliament before its publication/the 




• Who is in charge of monitoring respect of the budgetary 
objectives/targets established according to the medium-
term budgetary framework in the draft budget? 
- only national parliament is in charge (10) 
- national parliament is in charge together with other entities (5) 




• Which of the following applies to the monitoring report? - the monitoring report is presented in parliament (10) 
- the government is obliged to comment on the monitoring report (0) 
- neither the government nor the ministry of finance comment on the monitoring 
report (0) 
-  the government is not obliged to comment on the monitoring report, but typically 
does so (e.g. by a public statement) (0) 
- the minister of finance is obliged to comment on the monitoring report (0) 
- the monitoring report is available to the public (0) 
- the minister of finance is not obliged to comment on the monitoring report, but 
typically does so (e.g. by a public statement) (0) 




IA2. Involvement of 
the legislature in fiscal 
rules246 
• Who is in charge of monitoring compliance to the fiscal 
rule? 
- only national parliament is in charge (10) 
- national parliament is in charge together with other entities (5) 






Fiscal rules database 
(question 4.1) 
                                                          
246 Refers to fiscal rule with the largest coverage of general government finances only. 












How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
IA2. Involvement of 
the legislature in fiscal 
rules (cont.) 
• Which body is in charge of enforcing compliance with the 
fiscal rule in case of non-compliance? 
- only national parliament is in charge (10) 
- national parliament is in charge together with other entities (5) 
- national parliament is not involved (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database 
(question 5.1) 
• Is a corrective plan presented to parliament in case or 
risk of non-compliance with the targets implied by the 
fiscal rule? 
- corrective plan is presented to national parliament (10) 
-  corrective plan is not presented to national parliament/other correction 
mechanisms or sanctions apply/no pre-defined action (0) 
European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database 
(question 5.4) 
IA3. Legislative budget 
amendment powers 
• Can parliament propose the annual budget independent 
from the government? 
- Yes (10) 
- No (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
• What are the formal powers of the Legislature to amend 
the budget proposed by the Executive?  
- the legislature has unrestricted powers to amend the budget (10) 
- the legislature may make amendments but only if it does not change the total 
deficit/surplus proposed by the Executive (7.5) 
-  the legislature may only decrease existing expenditures/revenues (i.e. the 
Legislature cannot increase existing items nor create new ones) (5) 
- the legislature may not make any changes; it can only approve or reject the 
budget as a whole (0) 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 64) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
• Notwithstanding the formal powers of the legislature to 
modify the budget, is a vote on the budget considered a 
vote of confidence in the government?  
- No (10) 
- Yes (0) 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 66) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
• Does the executive have the power to veto the budget 
approved by the legislature? 
- no, it does not have such power (10) 
- yes, it has line item veto power (6.7) 
- yes, it has package veto power (3.3) 
- yes, it has both line item and package veto powers (0) 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 68a) 
Author’s questionnaire 




• If the budget is not approved by the legislature before the 
start of the fiscal year, which of the following describes 
the consequences? 
- government shuts down, emergency budget applies until (interim) agreement is 
reached expenditure without legislative approval are not allowed (10) 
- last year's budget takes effect on an interim basis, i.e. for a limited period/other 
interim measures are voted on by the legislature (6.7) 
- the executive's budget proposal takes effect on an interim basis, i.e. for a limited 
period (3.3) 
- the executive's budget proposal takes effect (0)  
 
 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 67) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 












How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
IA5. Legislative authorisation to changes to the budget during implementation 
Executive authority to 
cut/cancel/rescind 
spending  
• Whether executive can cut/cancel/rescind spending once 
the budget has been approved by the legislature 
 
 
• Whether executive has authority to cut/cancel/rescind all 
types of spending247 
 
 
- Yes (score is the average of the following elements) 
- No (10) 
 
- Executive does not have authority to cut spending (10) 
- Authority applies to one type of spending (7.5) 
- Authority applies to two types of spending only (5) 
- Authority applies to one types of spending only (2.5) 
- Authority applies to all types of spending only (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(questions 72-84) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
Executive authority to 
cut/cancel/rescind 
spending (cont.) 
• Whether there are any thresholds that apply to the 
executive’s authority to cut/cancel/rescind spending 
 
• Whether approval is required for the executive to 
cut/cancel/rescind spending 
- Yes (5) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes, ex-ante approval by legislature required (4) 
- Yes, ex-post approval by legislature required (3) 
- Yes, approval (ex-ante or ex-post) by other entity required (0) 
- No approval required (0) 
 
Power of line 
ministries to re-
allocate funds within 
their budget envelope 
• Whether line ministers can re-allocate funds within their 
own budget envelope 
 
• Whether there are any thresholds that apply to line 
ministers’ re-allocation of funds within their own budget 
envelope 
 
• Whether approval is required for line ministers to re-
allocate funds within their own budget envelope 
- Yes (score is the average of the following elements) 
- No (10) 
 
- Yes (5) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes, ex-ante approval by legislature required (7.5) 
- Yes, ex-post approval by legislature required (6.25) 
- Yes, approval (ex-ante or ex-post) by other entity required (0) 
- No approval required (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(questions 72-84) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
Restrictions on 
executive authority to 
increase spending 
• Whether executive can increase spending once the 
budget has been approved by the legislature 
 
 
• Whether executive has authority to increase all types of 
spending 
- Yes (score is the average of the following elements) 
- No (10) 
 
- Executive does not have authority to increase spending (10) 
- Authority applies to one type of spending only (7.5) 
- Authority applies to two types of spending only (5) 
- Authority applies to three types of spending only (2.5) 
- Authority applies to all types of spending (0) 
 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(questions 72-84) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
                                                          
247 The following types of spending are identified in the OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Survey: mandatory, operational, discretionary, investment. This categorisation also applies to 
executive authority to increase spending. 












How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
Restrictions on 
executive authority to 
increase spending 
(cont.) 
• Whether there are any thresholds that apply to the 
executive’s authority to increase spending 
 
 
• Whether approval is required for the executive to 
increase spending 
 
- Yes (5) 
- No (0) 
 
- No (5) 
- Yes, ex-ante approval by legislature required (4) 
- Yes, ex-post approval by legislature required (3) 
- Yes, approval (ex-ante or ex-post) by other entity required (0) 







• Is legislative authorisation required for off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities? 
 
Legislative authorisation is required for: 
- all off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities (or off-budget expenditures 
and contingent liabilities do not apply) (10) 
- most off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities (7.5) 
- some off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities (5) 
- few off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities (2.5) 




OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 39) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
IB. Legislative involvement in SGP procedures 
IB1. Discussion of 
SGP documents in the 
legislature 
• Degree of involvement of legislature in the preparation of 
the SP 
- the SP is formally sent, discussed and voted upon by the parliament, which may 
approve, reject, or amend it (10) 
- the SP is formally sent, discussed and voted upon by the parliament, which may 
approve or reject but not amend it (8) 
- the SP is not formally sent to the parliament or subject to its approval, but it is 
derived from a document including the main medium-term macroeconomic and 
budgetary projections that had previously been approved by the parliament (6) 
-  the SP is sent and presented to parliament by a member of the government and 
discussed, but the parliament does not vote on the SCP (4) 
-  the SP is sent to parliament before its publication, but there is no formal 
presentation or discussion (2) 
- the SP is not sent to parliament before its publication (0) 






















How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
IB1. Discussion of 
SGP documents in the 
legislature (cont.) 
• Are the European Commission/Council 





• If the European Commission/Council Recommendations 
and Opinions on the SP are discussed in the Legislature, 
does this discussion take place before the discussion in 
Council or after the Council meeting? 
Score is average of the following two elements with a weight of 0.67 for the first 
element and 0.33 for the second element: 
- Yes (10) 
- Yes, but not on a regular basis/discussed in legislative committee/s but not in 
plenary (5) 
- No (0) 
 
- before the discussion in Council (10) 
- could be before or after the Council meeting (6.7) 
- after the Council meeting (3.3) 
- not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature (0)  
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
• Is the European Commission Opinion on the DBP 







- Yes, the Commission Opinion on the DBP is debated in the legislature in a 
specific session (10) 
- Yes, the Commission Opinion on the DBP is debated in the legislature during the 
budgetary debates (5) 
- The Commission Opinion on the DBP is debated in the legislature, but not on a 
regular basis (2.5) 




to all EA countries 
• Are the European Commission Opinion/Council Decision 
on the existence of an excessive deficit and the 
European Commission/Council Recommendation to end 




• If the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the 
excessive deficit are discussed in the Legislature, does 
this discussion take place before the discussion in 
Council or after the Council meeting? 
Score is average of the following two elements with a weight of 0.67 for the first 
element and 0.33 for the second element: 
- Yes (10) 
- Yes, but not on a regular basis/discussed in legislative committee/s but not in 
plenary (5) 
- No (0)  
 
- before the discussion in Council (10) 
- could be before or after the Council meeting (6.7) 
- after the Council meeting (3.3) 







to all EA countries 
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How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
IB1. Discussion of 
SGP documents in the 
legislature (cont.) 
• Is the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of 




• If the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the 
excessive deficit procedure is discussed in the 
legislature, does this discussion take place before the 
discussion in Council or after the Council meeting? 
Score is average of the following two elements with a weight of 0.67 for the first 
element and 0.33 for the second element: 
- Yes (10) 
- Yes, but not on a regular basis/discussed in legislative committee/s but not in 
plenary (5) 
- No (0) 
 
- before the discussion in Council (10) 
- could be before or after the Council meeting (6.7) 
- after the Council meeting (3.3) 
- not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
IB2. Discussion of 
SGP documents in 
legislative committees 





• If the SP is discussed in legislative committee/s, please 
specify the committee/s involved: 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- Yes (5) 
- Yes, but not regularly (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
- budget/finance committee (5) 
- economics committee (0) 
- European committee (0) 
- other (0) 
- not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
• Are the European Commission/Council 




• If the European Commission/Council Recommendations 
and Opinions on the SP is discussed in legislative 
committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved: 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- Yes (5) 
- Yes, but not regularly (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
- budget/finance committee (5) 
- economics committee (0) 
- European committee (0) 
- other (0) 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
• Is the European Commission Opinion on the DBP 






Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- Yes (5) 
- Yes, but not regularly (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 












How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
IB2. Discussion of 
SGP documents in 
legislative committees 
(cont.) 
• If the European Commission Opinion on the DBP is 
discussed in legislative committee/s, please specify the 
committee/s involved: 
 
- budget/finance committee (5) 
- economics committee (0) 
- European committee (0) 
- other (0) 
- not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees (0) 
 
• Are the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the 
excessive deficit discussed in legislative committee/s? 
 
 
• If the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the 
excessive deficit is discussed in legislative committee/s, 
please specify the committee/s involved: 
 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- Yes (5) 
- Yes, but not regularly (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
- budget/finance committee (5) 
- economics committee (0) 
- European committee (0) 
- other (0) 
- not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
• Is the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of 
the EDP discussed in legislative committee/s? 
 
 
• If the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the 
EDP is discussed in legislative committee/s, please 
specify the committee/s involved: 
 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- Yes (5) 
- Yes, but not regularly (2.5) 
- No (0) 
 
- budget/finance committee (5) 
- economics committee (0) 
- European committee (0) 
- other (0) 
- not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 





• Is the Legislature informed on the implementation of 
Council's recommendations to end the excessive deficit 
situation in your country? 
- Yes, the legislature is informed automatically on a regular basis and any 
deviations or risks thereof are explained (10) 
- Yes, the legislature is informed but only in case of deviations or risks thereof (6.7) 
- the legislature is informed only if it requests information (3.3) 
- No (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
II. Legislative budget organisational capacity 
II1. Time available for 
budget scrutiny 
• Specify the month for: submission of the draft budget to 
parliament; approval of the budget by parliament 
- more than two months between submission and approval (10) 
- two months between submission and approval (5) 




















How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
II2. Characteristics of 
legislative budget 
committees 
• Thinking about the following types of committee 
structures for dealing with the budget, please indicate 
which arrangement applies to each chamber249: 
- a single budget/finance committee coordinates a process in which sectoral 
committees make recommendations to the budget/finance committee. The 
budget/finance committee then reviews and accepts or rejects these 
recommendations and formally considers all budget related matters (10) 
- a single budget/finance committee formally considers the budget, but members 
from sectoral committees attend meetings of the budget/finance committee when 
expenditures in their specific areas are discussed. (7.5) 
- a single budget/finance committee formally considers budget aggregates (total 
level of revenue and spending and their allocation to each sector) and sectoral 
committees formally consider spending for sector specific appropriations. (5) 
- sectoral committees formally consider appropriations for each respective sector. 
No budget/finance committee is in place or it provides technical assistance only. 
(0) 
- No formal committee involvement, but committees may choose to consider 
aspects of the budget (0) 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 59) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
• If a budget/finance committee is in place in the 
Legislature, please indicate how long is the tenure of 




• Does the budget/finance committee have the power to 
request witnesses and to question ministers or senior 
civil servants? 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- five years or more (5) 
- the electoral term/four years (4) 
- between two years and four years (3) 
- less than two years/variable (2) 
- no budget committee in place (0) 
 
- Yes, and this takes place regularly (once a year or more) (5) 
- No (0) 
- Not applicable, budget/finance committee does not exist (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
II3. Specialised budget 
research office 
• Is there a specialised budget research office/unit 
attached to the legislature to conduct analyses of the 
budget?  
 
• If a specialised budget research office/unit is in place, 
please estimate the number of full-time equivalent staff 
employed by this office/unit 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- Yes (5) 
- No (0) 
 
 
- more than 20 (5) 
- more than 10 but less than 20 (2.5) 
- less than 10 (0) 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 60) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
                                                          
249 Where both the upper and lower chambers of the legislature are involved in the budgetary process, the score reflects the average for the two chambers. 
 












How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
II4. Access to 
budgetary information 
• Distinction of new expenditure and revenue measures in 
budget documentation 
 
Score is summation of the following two components: 
Expenditures under current commitments in law and policy are: 
- always distinguished from new policies in the annual budget documentation 
presented to the legislature (5) 
- sometimes distinguished from new policies in the annual budget documentation 
presented to the legislature (3) 
- rarely distinguished from new policies in the annual budget documentation 
presented to the legislature (1) 
- never distinguished from new policies in the annual budget documentation 
presented to the legislature (0) 
 
New revenue-raising measures are: 
- always distinguished in the annual budget documentation presented to the 
legislature (5) 
- sometimes distinguished in the annual budget documentation presented to the 
legislature (3) 
- rarely distinguished in the annual budget documentation presented to the 
legislature (1) 
never distinguished in the annual budget documentation presented to the 
legislature (0) 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(questions 48, 49) 
Author’s questionnaire 




• Inclusion in the budget documentation approved by the 
legislature of: financial liabilities, financial assets, state 
transfers/guarantees, municipal transfers/guarantees, tax 
expenditures with estimates of revenue foregone, off-
budget expenditures, contingent liabilities 
- All or almost all items included (10) 
- Most items included (7.5) 
- Some items included (5) 
- Only few items included (2.5) 
- None of the items included (0) 
OECD EA countries - 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(questions 38b, 39b, 
50b) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
• Public availability of budgetary information, assumptions 
and methodologies: methodology and assumption for 
establishing fiscal projections used in the budget, 
sensitivity analyses of fiscal and/or macroeconomic 
models, independent reviews/analysis of macroeconomic 
and/or fiscal assumptions, budget circular, pre-budget 
report to the legislature, executive budget proposal 
submitted to the legislature, fiscal policy objectives for 
the medium term, comprehensive annual financial plan 
encompassing all revenues and expenditures including 
- Most of the listed items are made publicly available (10) 
- Some of the listed items are made publicly available (6.7) 
- Few of the listed items are made publicly available (3.3) 
- None of the listed items are made publicly available (0) 
OECD EA countries – 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
(question 51a) 
Author’s questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 












How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 




off-budget expenditures and extra-budgetary funds, 
comprehensive annual financial plan encompassing all 
revenues and expenditures for all levels of government 
(including regional and local), medium-term perspective 
on total revenue and expenditure (possibly in the form of 
a medium-term expenditure framework), long-term 
perspective on total revenue and expenditure, citizens’ 
budget, citizens’ budget guide (explaining the budget 
process and actors involved), budget approved by the 
legislature. 
  
• Is the Legislature informed on implementation of the 
budget? 
- Yes, informed automatically on the implementation of the budget and 
explanations of deviations from the budget are provided (10) 
-  Yes, informed automatically but only in case of deviations from the budget (6.7) 
- Informed only if it requests information (3.3) 
- No (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
• Is a year-end fiscal report audited by the supreme audit 
institution released within six-months of the end of the 
fiscal year? 
 
• Is the audited year-end fiscal report discussed in the 
legislature? 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- Yes (5) 
- No (0) 
 
- Yes (5) 
- No (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
II5. Relationship of 
legislature with IFI 
• Please specify the way in which the parliament interacts 
with the fiscal institution in the planning stage of the 
budgetary process: 
- national parliament has to audition fiscal council during the budgetary process 
(10) 
- generally auditioned by national parliament during the process, no obligation (5) 
- no interaction (0) 
European Commission’s 
IFI database (question 
6.5) 
• Appointment and dismissal of governing/high-level 
management members 
Score is summation of the following two elements: 
- appointment by parliament only (5) 
 - appointment by parliament and government/other (2.5) 
 - appointment only by government and/or other (0) 
 
- dismissal by parliament only (5) 
- dismissal by parliament and government/other (2.5) 






IMF Fiscal Councils 




IMF Fiscal Councils 
Dataset, Dismissal of 
governing/high-level 
management members 












How are the variables manifested? (indicators) Scoring scheme (on scale 0 – 10) Data sources 
II5. Relationship of 
legislature with IFI 
(cont.) 
• Are reports by the IFI submitted to the legislature? - Yes and they constitute an important input in legislative budget debates (10) 
- Yes, but they do not constitute an important input in legislative budget debates 
(5) 
- Only some reports are submitted to the legislature/reports are not submitted to 
parliament but still constitute an important input in legislative budget debates 
(2.5) 
No, they are not submitted to the legislature and do not constitute an important 
input in legislative budget debates (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
to all EA countries 
• Can the legislature or its budget/finance committee 
request the leadership of the IFI or its senior staff to 
provide responses to legislative questions? 
- Yes and this takes place at least once a year (10) 
- Yes, but this takes place very infrequently (less than once a year) (5) 
- No (0) 
Author’s questionnaire 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON BUDGET INSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE BUDGETING TO 
OECD EURO AREA COUNTRIES 
Please respond to the following questions by inserting an X to indicate the correct 
answer or providing details as requested. Provide comments as necessary. 
 
I BUDGET FORMULATION  
i Structure of budget negotiations within the executive  
1 Where do budget negotiations take place?  
Full cabinet participates in the negotiations     _____  
Bilaterally between the finance minister and spending ministers   _____ 
Outside cabinet between the political parties     _____ 




II BUDGET APPROVAL  
i Structure of the legislative process leading to the approval of the budget law
  
2 Can the Legislature propose the annual budget independent from the government?
  
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




III BUDGET TRANSPARENCY  
i Publication of budgetary data  










4 Please specify whether these reports cover:  
consolidated general government sector      _____ 
consolidated central government      _____ 
central government, not consolidated and other public sector entities/ 
levels of government        _____ 
central government, not consolidated      _____ 




5 Please specify whether these reports are:  
on a cash basis         _____ 
in accruals  (ESA2010)        _____ 
 
IV ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE LEGISLATURE  
i Specialised committees  
6 If a budget/finance committee is in place in the Legislature, please indicate how long 





monthly quarterly Half-yearly annual 
One year or 
less 
Two years Five years 









Not applicable, budget/finance committee does not exist    _____ 
  
7 Does the budget/finance committee have the power to request witnesses and to 
question ministers or senior civil servants?   
Yes, and this takes place regularly (once a year or more)   _____  
Yes, but this takes place very infrequently (less than once a year)  _____ 
No          _____ 




Not applicable, budget/finance committee does not exist    _____ 
  
ii Access to budgetary information  
8 Is the Legislature informed on implementation of the budget?  
Yes, informed automatically on the implementation of the budget and  
explanations of deviations from the budget are provided    _____ 
Yes, informed automatically but only in case of deviations from the budget  
          _____ 
Informed only if it requests information      _____ 
No          _____ 
Other, please specify 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   
9 Is a year-end fiscal report audited by the supreme audit institution released within 
six-months of the end of the fiscal year?  
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 
Provide comments, if necessary   
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   
10 Is the audited year-end fiscal report discussed in the Legislature?  
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




V RELATIONSHIP OF LEGISLATURE WITH INDEPENDENT FISCAL 
INSTITUTION(S)  
11 Are reports by the independent fiscal institution submitted to the Legislature?  
Yes, and they constitute an important input in legislative budget debates  _____ 
Yes, but they do not constitute an important input in legislative budget debates _____ 
No, they are not submitted to the Legislature     _____ 
Other, please specify 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   
12 Can the Legislature or its budget/finance committee request the leadership of the 
independent fiscal institution or its senior staff to provide responses to the Legislature’s 
questions? 
Yes, and this takes place at least once a year     _____ 
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Yes, but this takes place very infrequently (less than once a year)  _____ 
No          _____ 
Other, please specify         
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   
13 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the relationship of the 
Legislature with independent fiscal institution(s), please include them here:  
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   
VI THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SGP  
i Involvement of Legislature in Stability Programme (SP)  
14 Is the SP discussed in legislative committee/s?  
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




15 If the SP is discussed in legislative committee/s, please specify the committee/s 
involved 
budget/finance committee       _____ 
economics committee        _____ 
European committee        _____ 
other, please specify        
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees _____ 
   
16 Are the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
discussed in the Legislature?  
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




17 Are the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
discussed in legislative committees? 
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




18 If the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
are discussed in legislative committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved: 
budget/finance committee       _____ 
economics committee        _____ 
European committee        _____ 
other, please specify 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   _____ 
  
19 If the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
are discussed in the Legislature, does this discussion take place before the discussion in 
Council or after the Council meeting? 
Before the discussion in Council       _____ 
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After the Council meeting       _____ 
Not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature     _____ 




20 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the role of the Legislature 
in the Stability Programme, please include them here:  
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   
ii Involvement of the Legislature in the Draft Budgetary Plan (DBP)  
21 Is the European Commission Opinion on the DBP discussed in the Legislature?  
Yes, the Commission Opinion on the DBP is debated in the Legislature in a specific session
          _____  
Yes, the Commission Opinion on the DBP is debated in the Legislature during the budgetary 
debates         _____ 
No, there is no discussion in the Legislature on the Commission Opinion  
on the DBP         _____ 




22 Is the European Commission Opinion on the DBP discussed in legislative 
committee/s? 
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




23 If the European Commission Opinion on the DBP is discussed in legislative 
committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved:  
budget/finance committee       _____ 
economics committee        _____ 
European committee        _____ 




not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   _____ 
  
24 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the role of the Legislature 
in the Draft Budgetary Plan, please include them here:  
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   
iii Involvement of the Legislature in excessive deficit procedure (EDP)  
Please respond to the questions in this Section with reference to the current ongoing 
excessive deficit procedure or most recent closed excessive deficit procedure.  
This Section is not applicable to Estonia and Luxembourg as they have never been subject 
to an excessive deficit procedure 
  
25 Are the European Commission Opinion/Council Decision on the existence of an 
excessive deficit and the European Commission/Council Recommendation to end the 
excessive deficit situation discussed in the Legislature? 
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 
Please comment, if necessary   






26 If the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the excessive deficit are discussed in 
the Legislature, does this discussion take place before the discussion in Council or after the 
Council meeting? 
Before the discussion in Council       _____ 
After the Council meeting       _____ 
Not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature     _____ 




27 Are the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the excessive deficit discussed in 
legislative 
committee/s? 
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




28 If the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the excessive deficit are discussed in 
legislative  
committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved:  
budget/finance committee       _____ 
economics committee        _____ 
European committee        _____ 
other, please specify 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   _____ 
   
29 Is the Legislature informed on the implementation of Council's recommendations to 
end the excessive deficit situation in your country?  
Yes, the Legislature is informed automatically on a regular basis on the implementation of 
the Council's excessive deficit recommendations and any deviations or risks thereof are 
explained         _____ 
Yes, the Legislature is informed but only in case of deviations or risks thereof _____ 
The Legislature is informed only if it requests information    _____ 
No          _____ 
Other, please specify       
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
    
30 Is the European Commission recommendation/Council decision abrogating the 
excessive deficit procedure discussed in the Legislature? 
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




31 If the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the excessive deficit 
procedure is discussed in the Legislature, does this discussion take place before the 
discussion in Council or after the Council meeting? 
Before the discussion in Council       _____ 
After the Council meeting       _____ 
Please comment if necessary 





Not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature     _____ 
  
32 Is the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the excessive deficit 
discussed in legislative committee/s? 
Yes          _____ 
No          _____ 




33 If the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the excessive deficit is 
discussed in legislative committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved:  
budget/finance committee       _____ 
economics committee        _____ 
european committee        _____ 
other, please specify    
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   _____ 
  
34 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the role of the Legislature 




35 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the role of the Legislature 
in the  
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, which were not covered by the 
questionnaire,  






36 If there are any additional issues that you would like to clarify or note that were not 






   
Respondent(s') Contact Information 
Please provide the contact information for the main person responsible for responding to the 
questionnaire.  
 
This information will only be used if follow up to clarify responses is necessary. If you wish to 
include more than one contact person, you can enter the information for the additional staff 
at the end of this page. The contact details provided will remain confidential. 
 
 
Surname(s):   ___________________________________ 
First Name(s):   ___________________________________ 
Respondent's institution: ___________________________________ 
Position/Title:   ___________________________________ 
Email address:   ___________________________________ 
Telephone:   ___________________________________ 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON BUDGET INSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE BUDGETING TO 
NON-OECD EURO AREA COUNTRIES 
Please respond to the following questions by inserting an X to indicate the correct 
answer or providing details as requested. Provide comments as necessary. 
 
I BUDGET FORMULATION  
i Structure of budget negotiations within the executive  
1 Where do budget negotiations take place?  
Full cabinet participates in the negotiations     ____ 
Bilaterally between the finance minister and spending ministers   ____ 
Outside cabinet between the political parties     ____ 




2 Does the government impose budget ceilings on the initial spending requests of 
each line ministry? (OECD Q31) 
Yes for total/overall expenditure of the line ministry     ____  
Yes for other aggregate levels (e.g by program or sector)    ____ 
Yes for agency level or other organisational level     ____ 
No, there are no such limits        ____ 
 
3 During the budget negotiation process, who has the final/ultimate decision-making 
power to resolve/settle disputes? (OECD Q33)  
President          ____ 
Prime Minister         ____   
Minister of Finance         ____ 
Cabinet          ____   
Ministerial committee         ____ 




II BUDGET APPROVAL  
i Structure of the legislative process leading to the approval of the budget law
  
4 Can the Legislature propose the annual budget independent from the government?
  
Yes          ____  
No          ____ 




5 What are the formal powers of the Legislature to amend the budget proposed by the 
Executive? (OECD Q64)  
The Legislature has unrestricted powers to amend the budget    ____ 
The Legislature may make amendments but only if it does not change the total 
deficit/surplus proposed by the Executive     ____   
The Legislature may only decrease existing expenditures/revenues (i.e. the Legislature 
cannot increase existing items nor create new ones)    ____   
The Legislature may not make any changes; it can only approve or reject the budget as a 
whole           ____ 
Other, please specify      
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   
6 Does the Legislature first vote on the total amount of expenditure before it votes on 
specific appropriations? (OECD Q63)  
Yes           ____ 
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No          ____ 




7 Please indicate whether, overall, the changes made by the Legislature to the budget 
in the last fiscal year involved: (Based on OECD Q65a) 
an increase in total spending        ____ 
total spending was unchanged       ____ 
a decrease in total spending       ____ 
no changes to the budget        ____ 




8 If the changes made by the Legislature to the budget involved an increase in total 
spending, has this been compensated by an increase in total revenue? (Based on OECD 
Q65) 
Yes, fully compensated        ____ 
Yes, but only partly compensated      ____ 
No, total revenue was not increased      ____ 
Other, please specify        ____ 
Not applicable, changes made by the Legislature to the budget did not involve an increase in 
total spending         ____ 
 
9 If possible, please provide the overall improvement or worsening in the budget 
balance made by the Legislature, in national currency in the last fiscal year. (Based on 
OECD Q65b) 
Overall improvement (increase in budget surplus/decrease in budget deficit) ____ 
Overall worsening (decrease in the budget surplus/increase in budget deficit) ____ 
 
10 Please indicate whether this change in the budget balance is typical of changes 
made by the legislature to the budget in previous years. 
Change in last fiscal year is typical of changes made by the legislature to the budget in 
previous years         ____ 
Change in last fiscal year is higher than typical changes made by the legislature to the 
budget in previous years       ____ 
Change in last fiscal year is lower than typical changes made by the legislature to the budget 
in previous years        ____ 




11 Notwithstanding the formal powers of the Legislature to modify the budget, is a vote 
on the budget considered a vote of confidence in the government? (OECD Q66)  
No          ____ 
Yes          ____ 




12 Does the executive have the power to veto the budget approved by the Legislature? 
(OECD Q68a)  
No, it does not have such power       ____  
Yes, it has line item veto power       ____ 
Yes, it has package veto power       ____ 
Yes, it has both line item and package veto powers    ____ 
Other, please specify 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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ii Reversionary budgets  
13 If the budget is not approved by the Legislature before the start of the fiscal year, 
which of the following describes the consequences? (OECD Q67) 
the executive's budget proposal takes effect     ____ 
the executive's budget proposal takes effect on an interim basis,  
i.e. for a limited period        ____  
last year's budget takes effect on an interim basis,  
i.e. for a limited period/other interim measures are voted on by the Legislature ____ 
government shuts down, emergency budget applies until 
(interim) agreement is reached       ____  
expenditure without legislative approval are not allowed    ____ 




III BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION  
i Flexibility of the budget execution (Based on OECD Q72-84)  
14 Does the Executive have the authority to cut, cancel or rescind spending once the 
budget has been approved by the Legislature?  
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
If you answered No, please proceed to question 20. 
 
15 If the Executive has authority to cut/cancel/rescind spending, does this authority 
apply to all types of spending? 
All types of spending        ____ 
Only some types of spending       ____ 




16 Are there any thresholds that apply to the executive’s authority to cut/cancel/rescind 
spending? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
 
17 Is approval required for the executive to cut/cancel/rescind spending? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
 
18 Please indicate what institution(s) must grant approval, if applicable 
Ministry of Finance/Economy       ____ 
Legislature         ____ 




19 Please indicate the type of approval, if applicable 
Ex-ante approval        ____ 
Ex-post approval        ____ 
 
20 Can line ministers re-allocate funds within their own budget envelope? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
If you answered No, please proceed to question 25. 
 
21 Are there any thresholds that apply to line ministers’ re-allocation of funds within 
their own budget envelope? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
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22 Is approval required for line ministers to re-allocate funds within their own budget 
envelope? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
 
23 Please indicate what institution(s) must grant approval, if applicable 
Ministry of Finance/Economy       ____ 
Legislature         ____ 




24 Please indicate the type of approval, if applicable 
Ex-ante approval        ____ 
Ex-post approval        ____ 
 
25 Is an increase in spending by the Executive possible after the budget has been 
approved by the Legislature? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
If you answered No, please proceed to question 31 in the next Section (Section ii 
Supplementary budgets). 
 
26 If the Executive has authority to increase spending, does this authority apply to all 
types of spending? 
All types of spending        ____ 
Only some types of spending       ____ 




27 Are there any thresholds that apply to the executive’s authority to increase 
spending? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
 
28 Is approval required for the executive to increase spending? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
 
29 Please indicate what institution(s) must grant approval, if applicable 
Ministry of Finance/Economy       ____ 
Legislature         ____ 




30 Please indicate the type of approval, if applicable 
Ex-ante approval        ____ 
Ex-post approval        ____ 
 
ii Supplementary Budgets (Based on OECD Q85-88)   
31 How many supplementary budgets have been approved in the last fiscal year? 
(excluding end of year cleaning budgets)   
Number of supplementary budgets      ____ 
 
32 What was the total amount of supplementary budgets (in national currency)? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Please comment, if necessary  
_____________________________________________________________________ 





33 Is the total amount typical of supplementary budgets in previous years? 
Yes, the total amount of supplementary budgets in the last fiscal year is typical of that in 
previous years         ____ 
No, the total amount of supplementary budgets in the last fiscal year is higher than that in 
previous years         ____ 
No, the total amount of supplementary budgets in the last fiscal year is lower than that in 
previous years         ____ 




34 Please select the top reason(s) why the supplementary budget/s were necessary 
(you can select more than one reason)  
Changing economic forecasts resulting in lower/higher expenditure   ____ 
Increase of estimates of mandatory spending; stimulus measures   ____ 
Ad hoc emergency needs (e.g. natural disaster)      ____ 
New policy initiatives        ____   
Transfer of funds from one appropriation to another (no net increase)   ____ 
Formal approval of appropriations carried forward from one fiscal year  
to the next          ____ 
Recession/cancelation of planned spending      ____ 




IV BUDGET TRANSPARENCY  
i Off-budget activities and contingent liabilities (Based on OECD Q38, 39)  
35 Is legislative authorisation required for off-budget expenditures (e.g. social security 
or public health funds, infrastructure/capital funds, special accounts managed by Finance 
Ministry/Treasury/Central Budget Authority and kept out of the budget)? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




36 Is legislative authorisation required for contingent liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees, 
law suits pending, public private partnerships)? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




ii Publication of budgetary data  





Other, please specify 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
38 Please specify whether these reports cover:  
consolidated central government      ____ 
central government, not consolidated and other public sector  
entities/levels of government       ____ 
central government, not consolidated      ____  
monthly quarterly Half-yearly annual 
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39 Please specify whether these reports are:  
on a cash basis         ____ 
in accruals (ESA2010)        ____ 
 
iii Comprehensiveness of budget documentation  
40 In the annual budget documentation presented to the Legislature are expenditures 
under current commitments in law and policy distinguished from new policies? (OECD Q48) 
Yes, always         ____ 
Yes, sometimes        ____ 
Rarely          ____  
Never          ____  
 
41 In the annual budget documentation presented to the Legislature, are new revenue-
raising measures distinguished? (OECD Q49)  
Yes, always         ____  
Yes, sometimes        ____  
Rarely          ____  
Never          ____  
 
42 Which of the following are included in the budget documentation approved by the 
legislature? (OECD Q38, 39, 50b)  
financial liabilities        ____ 
financial assets         ____ 
state transfers/guarantees       ____ 
municipal transfers/guarantees       ____ 
tax expenditures with estimates of revenue foregone    ____ 
off-budget expenditures        ____ 
contingent liabilities        ____ 
  
43 Please indicate whether the following are made publicly available, not publicly 
available, not applicable (e.g. not produced or not produced by government): (OECD Q51a)
  
methodology and assumption for establishing fiscal projections used in 
the budget         ____ 
sensitivity analyses of fiscal and/or macroeconomic models   ____ 
independent reviews/analysis of macroeconomic and/or fiscal  
assumptions         ____ 
budget circular         ____ 
pre-budget report to the legislature      ____ 
executive budget proposal submitted to the legislature    ____ 
fiscal policy objectives for the medium term     ____ 
comprehensive annual financial plan encompassing all revenues  
and expenditures including off budget       ____ 
expenditures and extra-budgetary funds      ____ 
comprehensive annual financial plan encompassing all revenues and  
expenditures for all levels of government (including regional and local)  ____  
medium-term perspective on total revenue and expenditure (possibly  
in the form of a medium-term expenditure framework)    ____ 
long term perspective on total revenue and expenditure  
(10 or more years)        ____  
citizens' budget         ____ 
citizens’ budget guide (explaining the budget process and  
actors involved)         ____  
budget approved by the legislature      ____ 
other, please specify        ____ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 





V ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE LEGISLATURE  
i Parliamentary structure  
44 If there is more than one chamber in the Legislature, how would you describe their 
relative powers over the budget? (OECD Q58)  
the Legislature is unicameral       ____ 
there are two chambers with equal powers over the budget   ____ 
there are two chambers, but only the lower chamber is involved in  
the budget process        ____ 
both chambers are involved in the budget process but the lower  
chamber can overrule the upper chamber     ____ 
other, please specify        ____ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   
ii Specialised committees  
45 Thinking about the following types of committee structures for dealing with the 
budget, please indicate which arrangement applies to each chamber: (OECD Q59)  
lower and upper chamber       ____ 
a single budget/finance committee coordinates a process in which  
sectoral committees make recommendations to the budget/finance  
committee. The budget/finance committee then reviews  
and accepts or rejects these recommendations and formally considers 
all budget related matters       ____ 
a single budget/finance committee formally considers the budget,  
but members from sectoral committees attend meetings of the  
budget/finance committee when expenditures in their specific areas  
are discussed.         ____ 
a single budget/finance committee formally considers budget 
aggregates (total level of revenue and spending and their allocation  
to each sector) and sectoral committees formally consider spending for  
sector specific appropriations.       ____ 
sectoral committees formally consider appropriations for each  
respective sector. No budget/finance committee is in place or it  
provides technical assistance only.      ____ 
No formal committee involvement, but committees may choose to  
consider aspects of the budget       ____  
other, please specify         
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Not applicable         ____ 
   
46 If a budget/finance committee is in place in the Legislature, please indicate how long 





   
 
Other, please specify         
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Not applicable, budget/finance committee does not exist    ____ 
  
47 Does the budget/finance committee have the power to request witnesses and to 
question ministers or senior civil servants?   
Yes, and this takes place regularly (once a year or more)   ____ 
Yes, but this takes place very infrequently (less than once a year)  ____ 
No          ____ 
One year or 
less 
Two years Five years 
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Other, please specify 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Not applicable, budget/finance committee does not exist    ____ 
   
iii Access to technical expertise  
48 Is there a specialised budget research office/unit attached to the Legislature to 
conduct analyses of the budget? (OECD Q60a)  
Yes, there is a specialised budget research office/unit    ____ 
No          ____ 




49 If a specialised budget research office/unit is in place, please estimate the number 
of full-time equivalent staff employed by this office/unit (OECD Q60b)  
Number of full-time equivalent staff      _____ 
 
iv Access to budgetary information  
50 Is the Legislature informed on implementation of the budget?  
Yes, informed automatically and explanations of deviations from the budget  
are provided         ____ 
Yes, informed automatically but only in case of deviations from the  
budget          ____ 
Informed only if it requests information      ____ 
No          ____ 




51 Is a year-end fiscal report audited by the supreme audit institution released within 
six-months of the end of the fiscal year?  
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




52 Is the audited year-end fiscal report discussed in the Legislature?  
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
Provide comments, if necessary  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   
VI RELATIONSHIP OF LEGISLATURE WITH INDEPENDENT FISCAL 
INSTITUTION(S)  
53 Are reports by the independent fiscal institution submitted to the Legislature?  
Yes, and they constitute an important input in legislative budget debates  ____ 
Yes, but they do not constitute an important input in legislative budget debates ____ 
No, they are not submitted to the Legislature     ____ 




54 Can the Legislature or its budget/finance committee request the leadership of the 
independent fiscal institution or its senior staff to provide responses to the Legislature’s 
questions? 
Yes, and this takes place at least once a year     ____ 
Yes, but this takes place very infrequently (less than once a year)  ____ 
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No          ____ 
Other, please specify 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   
55 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the relationship of the 




VIII THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SGP  
i Involvement of Legislature in Stability Programme (SP)  
56 Is the SP discussed in legislative committee/s?  
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




57 If the SP is discussed in legislative committee/s, please specify the committee/s 
involved:  
budget/finance committee       ____ 
economics committee        ____ 
European committee        ____ 
other, please specify        ____ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   ____ 
   
58 Are the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
discussed in the Legislature?  
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




59 Are the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
discussed in legislative committees? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




60 If the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
are discussed in legislative committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved: 
budget/finance committee       ____ 
economics committee        ____ 
european committee        ____ 
other, please specify        
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   ____ 
  
61 If the European Commission/Council Recommendations and Opinions on the SP 
are discussed in  the Legislature, does this discussion take place before the discussion in 
Council or after the Council meeting? 
Before the discussion in Council       ____ 
After the Council meeting       ____ 
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Not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature     ____ 




62 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the role of the Legislature 




ii Involvement of the Legislature in the Draft Budgetary Plan (DBP)  
63 Is the European Commission Opinion on the DBP discussed in the Legislature?  
Yes, the Commission Opinion on the DBP is debated in the Legislature in 
a specific session        ____ 
Yes, the Commission Opinion on the DBP is debated in the Legislature  
the budgetary debates        ____ 
No, there is no discussion in the Legislature on the Commission Opinion 
on the DBP         ____ 
other, please specify        
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   
64 Is the European Commission Opinion on the DBP discussed in legislative 
committee/s? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




65 If the European Commission Opinion on the DBP is discussed in legislative 
committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved:  
budget/finance committee       ____ 
economics committee        ____ 
European committee        ____ 




not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   ____ 
  
66 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the role of the Legislature 




iii Involvement of the Legislature in excessive deficit procedure (EDP)  
Please respond to the questions in this Section with reference to the current ongoing 
excessive deficit procedure or most recent closed excessive deficit procedure.  
 
67 Are the European Commission Opinion/Council Decision on the existence of an 
excessive deficit and the European Commission/Council Recommendation to end the 
excessive deficit situation discussed in the Legislature?  
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 
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68 If the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the excessive deficit are discussed in 
the Legislature, does this discussion take place before the discussion in Council or after the 
Council meeting? 
Before the discussion in Council       ____  
After the Council meeting       ____ 
Not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature     ____ 




69 Are the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the excessive deficit discussed in 
legislative committee/s? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




70 If the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the excessive deficit are discussed in 
legislative committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved:  
budget/finance committee       ____ 
economics committee        ____ 
european committee        ____ 
other, please specify        ____ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   ____ 
  
71 Is the Legislature informed on the implementation of Council's recommendations to 
end the excessive deficit situation in your country?  
Yes, the Legislature is informed automatically on a regular basis and any deviations or risks 
thereof are explained        ____ 
Yes, the Legislature is informed but only in case of deviations or risks thereof ____  
The Legislature is informed only if it requests information    ____ 
No          ____ 
Other, please specify 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
    
72 Is the European Commission recommendation/Council decision abrogating the 
excessive deficit procedure discussed in the Legislature? 
Yes          ____ 
No          ____ 




73 If the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the excessive deficit 
procedure is discussed in the Legislature, does this discussion take place before the 
discussion in Council or after the Council meeting? 
Before the discussion in Council       ____ 
After the Council meeting       ____ 
Please comment if necessary 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Not applicable, not discussed in the Legislature     ____ 
  
74 Is the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the excessive deficit 
discussed in legislative committee/s? 
Yes          ____ 
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No          ____ 




75 If the Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the excessive deficit is 
discussed in legislative committee/s, please specify the committee/s involved:  
budget/finance committee       ____ 
economics committee        ____ 
European committee        ____ 
other, please specify        ____ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
not applicable, the SP is not discussed in legislative committees   ____ 
  
76 If you have any additional comments or remarks regarding the role of the Legislature 






78 If there are any additional issues that you would like to clarify or note that were not 






Respondent(s') Contact Information 
 
Please provide the contact information for the main person responsible for responding to the 
questionnaire.  
This information will only be used if follow up to clarify responses is necessary. If you wish to 
include more than one contact person, you can enter the information for the additional staff 
at the end of this page. The contact details provided will remain confidential. 
 
Surname(s):   ___________________________________ 
First Name(s):   ___________________________________ 
Respondent's institution: ___________________________________ 
Position/Title:   ___________________________________ 
Email address:   ___________________________________ 
Telephone:   ___________________________________ 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET – QUESTIONNAIRE TO OECD EA COUNTRIES 
 
Title of Research Project: Budget institutions and fiscal discipline in Euro Area countries: a 
focus on legislative budgeting and on Malta’s budget institutions reforms since the Great Crisis 
 
Name of Researcher, Introduction and Invitation: I am Moira Catania, an assistant lecturer 
at the University of Malta. I am pursuing a PhD at the University of Bradford, UK, under the 
supervision of Dr M.J. Baimbridge and Dr I. Litsios. As part of my study, I am conducting 
research on budget institutions in Euro Area countries, with a particular focus on the role of 
the legislature in the budget process and in the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. In order to have a comprehensive dataset on budget institutions, questionnaires are 
being distributed to national experts. You are being invited to participate in this questionnaire 
on the basis of your official position and key role in the budget process in your country.   
 
Research Description: The aim of this research is to identify differences in budget 
institutions, and in particular in legislative budgeting, across Euro Area countries. The 
research will cover the following dimensions of budget institutions: fiscal rules and medium-
term budgetary frameworks; procedural rules which govern the budget process, for instance 
the role of the finance minister vis-à-vis spending ministers, and the role of the executive vis-
à-vis the legislature during the budget approval stage; rules concerning budget transparency, 
including budget documentation and publication of fiscal data; and independent fiscal councils. 
Numerical indices will be constructed, using the data generated by these questionnaires and 
other relevant data available from the OECD budgeting practices and procedures database 
and the European Commission DG Ecfin’s fiscal governance databases, to capture key 
characteristics of budget institutions and legislative budgeting in Euro Area countries. 
 
Procedure: The questionnaire concerns factual information on budget procedures in your 
country, which is not available from other sources. The research involves completing the 
questionnaire, which is provided as a word document, and sending the completed 
questionnaire back to the researcher, via email. It will take approximately 35 minutes to 
complete the questionnaire. If you have any queries on how to complete the questionnaire or 
need any clarification, you are welcome to contact the researcher via email or telephone. It 
would be appreciated if you could return the completed questionnaire within two weeks from 
receipt of this invitation. We fully understand that it may not be possible for you to respond to 
the questionnaire yourself and you can nominate another respondent from your institution. If 
this is the case, please provide the additional respondent’s details at the end of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Consent, Participation and Withdrawal: Filling out and returning the questionnaire will 
indicate your consent to participate in the research. Given your expertise on the budget 
process in your country, your contribution is crucial to the research and it would be appreciated 
if you could complete all the questionnaire. However, participation is entirely voluntary and 
you are welcome to respond only partially or not at all to the questionnaire. Please note that 
you can withdraw your participation at any time. If you decide to withdraw your participation 
after submitting your responses to the questionnaire, please inform the researcher via email 
and the information provided will be deleted and will not be used in the research.  
 
Confidentiality: Your name and a precise reference to your official position will not be 
divulged when disseminating the results of the research and in publications. Furthermore, the 
participants’ institutions will not be identified individually for each country but rather in 
aggregate form for the entire sample. Each participant will be assigned a country code and 
details of the participants will be stored securely and separately from the responses to the 
questionnaires. Access to the participants’ contact details will be restricted to the researcher.  
These personal records will be destroyed once reports or publications from this research have 
been finalised. 
 
Data Storage and Retention: The data generated from the questionnaires will be stored in 
secure data files during the duration of the study and for ten years after the completion of the 
study. Records will not be stored on laptops or other transportable devices. Paper copies of 
the data will be stored in a locked cabinet and will be shredded after any reports or publications 
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from this research have been finalised. The data will be accessible and available for use by 
the researcher and her PhD supervisors, Dr M.J. Baimbridge and Dr I. Litsios. 
 
Result Reporting: If you wish to be kept updated on output emanating from the research, you 
are welcome to request this by sending an email to the researcher and you will receive a short 
report on the main findings from the questionnaire. 
 
Ethical Review of the Study: This study has been granted ethics approval by the Chair of 
the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of 
Bradford on 17th June 2016. 
 
Contact Details: If you have any questions regarding this research, please feel free to contact 
the researcher or her PhD supervisors. The following are the relevant contact details: 
 
Researcher: Moira Catania 
Email: moira.catania@um.edu.mt; Tel: 00 356 23403089 
 
PhD Supervisors: 
Dr Mark J. Baimbridge,  
Senior Lecturer in Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bradford, UK: Email: 
M.J.Baimbridge@bradford.ac.uk; Tel: 0044127423 4792 
 
Dr Ioannis Litsios 
Lecturer in Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bradford, UK 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET – QUESTIONNAIRE TO NON-OECD EA 
COUNTRIES 
 
Title of Research Project: Budget institutions and fiscal discipline in Euro Area countries: a 
focus on legislative budgeting and on Malta’s budget institutions reforms since the Great 
Crisis 
 
Name of Researcher, Introduction and Invitation: I am Moira Catania, an assistant lecturer 
at the University of Malta. I am pursuing a PhD at the University of Bradford, UK, under the 
supervision of Dr M.J. Baimbridge and Dr I. Litsios. As part of my study, I am conducting 
research on budget institutions in Euro Area countries, with a particular focus on the role of 
the legislature in the budget process and in the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. In order to have a comprehensive dataset on budget institutions, questionnaires are 
being distributed to national experts. You are being invited to participate in this questionnaire 
on the basis of your official position and key role in the budget process in your country.   
 
Research Description: The aim of this research is to identify differences in budget 
institutions, and in particular in legislative budgeting, across Euro Area countries. The 
research will cover the following dimensions of budget institutions: fiscal rules and medium-
term budgetary frameworks; procedural rules which govern the budget process, for instance 
the role of the finance minister vis-à-vis spending ministers, and the role of the executive vis-
à-vis the legislature during the budget approval stage; rules concerning budget transparency, 
including budget documentation and publication of fiscal data; and independent fiscal councils. 
Numerical indices will be constructed, using the data generated by these questionnaires and 
other relevant data available from the OECD budgeting practices and procedures database 
and the European Commission DG Ecfin’s fiscal governance databases, to capture key 
characteristics of budget institutions and legislative budgeting in Euro Area countries. 
 
Procedure: The questionnaire concerns factual information on budget procedures in your 
country, which is not available from other sources. In order to create matching data for your 
country to the OECD dataset, it includes relevant questions from the OECD’s 2012 budget 
practices and procedures survey. The research involves responding to the questions in the 
questionnaire, which is provided as a word document, and sending the completed 
questionnaire back to the researcher, via email. It will take approximately 75 minutes to 
complete the questionnaire. If you have any queries on how to complete the questionnaire or 
need any clarification, you are welcome to contact the researcher via email or telephone. It 
would be appreciated if you could return the completed questionnaire within two weeks from 
receipt of this invitation. We fully understand that it may not be possible for you to respond to 
the questionnaire yourself and you can nominate another respondent from your institution. If 
this is the case, please provide the additional respondent’s details at the end of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Consent, Participation and Withdrawal: Filling out and returning the questionnaire will 
indicate your consent to participate in the research. Given your expertise on the budget 
process in your country, your contribution is crucial to the research and it would be appreciated 
if you could complete all the questionnaire. However, participation is entirely voluntary and 
you are welcome to respond only partially or not at all to the questionnaire. Please note that 
you can withdraw your participation at any time. If you decide to withdraw your participation 
after submitting your responses to the questionnaire, please inform the researcher via email 
and the information provided will be deleted and will not be used in the research.  
 
Confidentiality: Your name and a precise reference to your official position will not be 
divulged when disseminating the results of the research and in publications. Furthermore, the 
participants’ institutions will not be identified individually for each country but rather in 
aggregate form for the entire sample. Each participant will be assigned a country code and 
details of the participants will be stored securely and separately from the responses to the 
questionnaires. Access to the participants’ contact details will be restricted to the researcher.  
These personal records will be destroyed once reports or publications from this research have 
been finalised. 
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Data Storage and Retention: The data generated from the questionnaires will be stored in 
secure data files during the duration of the study and for ten years after the completion of the 
study. Records will not be stored on laptops or other transportable devices. Paper copies of 
the data will be stored in a locked cabinet and will be shredded after any reports or publications 
from this research have been finalised. The data will be accessible and available for use by 
the researcher and her PhD supervisors, Dr M.J. Baimbridge and Dr I. Litsios. 
 
Result Reporting: If you wish to be kept updated on output emanating from the research, you 
are welcome to request this by sending an email to the researcher and you will receive a short 
report on the main findings from the questionnaire. 
 
Ethical Review of the Study: This study has been granted ethics approval by the Chair of 
the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of 
Bradford on 17th June 2016. 
 
Contact Details: If you have any questions regarding this research, please feel free to contact 




Email: moira.catania@um.edu.mt; Tel: 00 356 23403089 
 
PhD Supervisors 
Dr Mark J. Baimbridge 
Senior Lecturer in Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bradford, UK 
Email: M.J.Baimbridge@bradford.ac.uk; Tel: 00 44127423 4792 
 
Dr Ioannis Litsios 
Lecturer in Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bradford, UK 
Email: I.Litsios@bradford.ac.uk; Tel: 00 44 1274 23 5584 
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  Ethics Ref:  
 
Research Ethics Application Form 
 
 
This form has been approved by the Committee for Ethics in Research 
A1.  Title of Research Project:  
Budget institutions and fiscal discipline in Euro Area countries: a focus 
on legislative budgeting and on Malta’s budget institutions reforms 
since the Great Crisis 
 
A2. Contact person (Principal Investigator, in the case of a staff-led research 





First Name/Initials: Mark. J 
 
Last Name: Baimbridge 
Post:    Principal Supervisor 
School/Department: Faculty of Social Sciences, Economics 
 
Email: M.J.Baimbridge@bradford.ac.uk 






First Name/Initials: Roberto 
 
Last Name: Espindola 
Post:    Secondary Supervisor 
School/Department: Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for International 
Development 
Email: R.Espindola@bradford.ac.uk                                                                  
Telephone: +44 (0) 1274 233823 
 
 
A2.1.    Is this a student research project? 
 
 If yes, please provide the student’s contact details and course: 
Yes. PhD, part-time extra-mural 
Student details: Moira Catania (UB no. 11017269) 




Telephone: 00 356 23403089 
Mobile: 00 356 79002324 
 
A2.2. Other key investigators/co-applicants (within/outside University), where 
applicable: 
  








A2.3 Name of body funding the project (if appropriate) and any other 
declarations of interest: (NOTE:  Only projects with the funding confirmed 
need approval) 
PhD is being funded from a scholarship fund at the University of Malta, where 
Moira Catania is employed as an assistant lecturer. 
A3. Proposed Project Duration: 
  
Start date: 2011 
 
End date: 2018 
  
 
Complete this form if you are a member of staff or a student who plans to 
undertake a research project which will not involve the NHS but which will involve 
people participating in research either directly (e.g. interviews, questionnaires 
and/or clinical studies not involving NHS patients) and/or indirectly (e.g. people 
permitting access to data and/or tissue).  Ultimate responsibility for gaining 
ethical approval lies with the Principal Investigator or Principal Supervisor of 
the project. 
 
Documents to enclose with this form, where appropriate: 
This form should be accompanied, where appropriate, by an Information Sheet / 
Covering Letter / Written Script which informs the prospective participants about the 
proposed research, and by a Consent Form.  Applicants should also attach any 
unvalidated Questionnaires, Interview Guides and the full research proposal. 
 
Further guidance on how to complete this application form is available in the 
document Guidelines for Completing the Research Ethics Application form and 
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this can be found at: http://www.bradford.ac.uk/rkts/research-support-for-
academics/ethics/ResearchEthicsApprovalProcess/ 
 
It is essential that this form is completed with reference to the information in 
the application form guidance document.  Please pay particular attention to 
completing the form in sufficient detail to allow reviewers to judge ethical 
issues raised by this study.  The form is intended to expand to allow as much 
space as is needed. 
For University staff and students working with NHS patients or staff, or working on 
NHS premises, research ethics applications should be made through an NHS 
Research Ethics Committee: NHS Research Ethics Committee (REC) 
Travel Overseas to High Risk Areas:  if you are planning to travel overseas to high 
risk areas, as advised by the Government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, you 
should read the guidelines and complete the Risk Assessment form to be submitted 
to Finance.  A signed copy of the Risk Assessment form should also accompany this 
form when applying for Research Ethics Approval.  The Risk Assessment form is 
available at http://www.bradford.ac.uk/finance/finance-teams-contacts-and-
services/insurance/travel-insurance/ (Please scroll down to bullet point 4 under the 
heading Prior to Travel.) 
Once you have completed this research ethics application form in full, and other 
documents where appropriate, check that your name, the title of your research project 
and the date appears on the first page and email it to the Research Support Unit 
Ethics Administrator.   Please keep a copy and note that the original signed and dated 
version of ‘Part B – the Signed Declaration’ of the application form should also be 









Yes X No  
Consent Form 
Further details on this issue are 
available in Section A9.1 of the 
application form. 
 
Yes  No X 
Research Proposal 
 
Yes X No  
Unvalidated Questionnaires 
 
Yes X No  





Yes X No  
Risk Assessment Form 
(only required when involving travel 
to high risk areas) 
 









involves children or young people aged under 18 years 








*Please contact the University’s HTA Designated Individual, Sue Boyce, Ethical 
Tissue, [s.g.boyce@bradford.ac.uk  or ext. 5897] for advice.   
http://www.bradford.ac.uk/rkts/research-support-for-
academics/ethics/GuidanceonEthicalIssues/  - click on Human Tissue Act 
 
A5. Briefly summarise the project’s aims, objectives and methodology 
(this must be in language comprehensible to a lay person) 
This research aims to assess budget institutions in Euro Area (EA) countries 
and to analyse their effect on fiscal discipline. The study focuses on the role 
of the legislature in the budget process and includes a case study on Malta. 
The study involves three research components. The first component involves 
a description of budget institutions in EA countries, using numerical composite 
indicators. The second component involves an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between characteristics of budget institutions and fiscal discipline 
in EA countries, with a particular emphasis on the influence of legislative 
budgeting. The third component involves a case study on Malta and aims to 
understand how the reforms to the EU’s fiscal governance system, which were 
introduced following the Great Crisis, affected Malta’s budgetary institutions.  
The first and third components of the study will involve the generation of 
primary data, through questionnaires and interviews, respectively.  
In the first research component, questionnaires will be sent, via email, to 
budget directors from the 19 Euro Area countries. The questionnaire 
comprises questions on budget procedures and institutions, with a particular 
focus on the role of the legislature in the budget process and in the 
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implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Indices capturing 
characteristics of budget institutions will be constructed using this primary 
data, complemented with secondary data from the OECD budgeting practices 
and procedures and the European Commission’s DG Ecfin fiscal governance 
databases. In order to obtain matching data to the OECD dataset for the four 
non-OECD Euro Area countries (Malta, Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania), the 
questionnaires to these countries will also include the relevant questions from 
the OECD budget practices and procedures 2012 survey. 
In the third component of the study, interviews will be used to gain an insight 
on how the reforms to the EU’s fiscal governance system following the Great 
Crisis affected Malta’s budgetary institutions. The case study on Malta will 
start at the national level, by analysing the reforms to the budget institutions 
and assessing if and when encounters with the EU have taken place, to 
identify the causal processes through which change came about. The 
participants involve high ranking officials and politicians involved in the reform 
process of Malta’s budget institutions.  
A6. Is there any potential for physical and/or psychological harm / distress 
to participants? 
 It is not expected that the participants could be directly physically or 
psychologically harmed by taking part in the research. The questionnaire 
concerns factual, standardised information on budget procedures. Similar 
data has already been provided by national authorities to the OECD and/or 
European Commission. As regards the interviews, possibly there could be 
some embarrassment for the participants if their responses differ from the 
official government stance and the information is made public. This possible 
risk will be addressed through measures to ensure that the participants are 
not named or otherwise identified when disseminating the research results 
and in publications. Furthermore, participants will be allocated a code and 
their names and details will be stored separately from the data records. 
Further details on the measures to ensure confidentiality of the data are 
provided in Section A13. 
Both the participants in the questionnaires and in the interviews constitute 
high-ranking officials and given their busy schedules, the time required to 
participate in the research may constitute an inconvenience. The 
questionnaire is estimated to take approximately 35 minutes to complete for 
participants from the fifteen OECD Euro Area countries and around 75 
minutes for participants from the non-OECD countries. In order to reduce the 
response burden, the timing of the questionnaire will be carefully selected and 
known busy periods (e.g. budget preparation) will be avoided. Furthermore, 
participants will also be offered the possibility to nominate another respondent 
from their institution, if they wish. As regards the interviews, these are 
estimated to take around 45 minutes. Finding a timeslot for the interviews may 
be difficult and so participants will be offered flexibility to choose a date and 
time which is most convenient to them, even after office hours.  
A7. Does your research raise any issues of personal safety for you or other         
researchers involved in the project and, if yes, explain how these issues 
will be managed? [especially if taking place outside working hours, off 
University premises or outside the UK] 
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 The research will be carried out off University of Bradford premises as the 
student is based in Malta. The questionnaires will be sent to participants in EA 
countries via email. On the other hand, the interviews will be carried out in 
Malta. The research does not raise any issues of personal safety for the 
researcher or for the participants.  
A8.1 Explain how the potential participants in the project will be: 
Identified:  
Potential participants, for both the questionnaires and the interviews, will be 
identified on the basis of their official position.  
The key participants for the questionnaires will be the budget directors from 
the 19 EA countries. A reserve list of participants will be prepared (consisting 
of officials from fiscal councils or academics with relevant expertise, from each 
country) and the questionnaire will be sent to them if there is no response from 
the first participant contacted. The budget directors as well as the participants 
on the reserve list will be identified from the official websites of the institutions 
concerned. 
 For the interviews, the participants will involve high-level officials and 
politicians that have been involved in the reform process of Malta’s budget 
institutions, namely officials from the Ministry for Finance, parliament, 
representatives of the two main political parties, the Malta Fiscal Advisory 
Council and the Central Bank of Malta. The inclusion criteria for these 
participants is that they hold a position of significant responsibility (defined as 
comparable to the post of Director in Malta’s public service). Through my 
previous work at the Ministry for Finance, I had worked closely with some of 
these officials and this will facilitate the process of identifying participants for 
the interviews. Although I know some of them on a personal basis, currently 
there is no power relationship with the potential participants, as since 2010 I 
have been employed as academic staff with the University of Malta. As some 
officials may have changed positions and new individuals could have been 
appointed, a snowball sampling technique will then be used, asking the 
participants that I know on a personal basis to contact and facilitate the 
interview with the other participants. 
Approached:  
For both the questionnaires and the interviews, potential participants will be 
approached through an email, which will inform them briefly on the aims and 
objectives of the study, explain how they were selected and invite them to 
participate in the research.  
Recruited:   
With the invitation email to the potential participants for the questionnaire, the 
questionnaire and the participant information sheet will be attached. The 
questionnaire will be attached to the email as a MS Word document and 
participants will be requested to return, via email, the document with the 
responses to the researcher.  
Participants in the interviews will also be recruited via email. Once they reply 
positively to the email invitation to participate in the research, a further email 
will be sent to set up an appointment for the interview. If necessary, further 
contacts with the participants will be made via telephone to set up the 
appointments. 
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A8.2 Please give rationale for sample size (as appropriate): 
The total number of participants for the questionnaire will be 19 experts, one 
from each country. This is similar to the approach used by the OECD and the 
European Commission to generate their databases on budget institutions and 
procedures. As explained above, the participant will be offered the possibility 
to nominate another respondent from the same institution. Furthermore, in 
case of non-response from a country’s budget director, the questionnaire will 
be sent to another national expert.  
The total number of participants for the interviews will be around 15. The 
number of participants is limited as the participants constitute key experts 
knowledgeable on Malta’s budget process and involved in the reform of 
Malta’s budget institutions. Despite the small sample, the participants 
comprise officials from different institutions thus providing a comprehensive 
perspective on the reform process. The sample comprises two participants 
from each institution. This will reduce the risk of bias in the interviews and 
clarifications will be sought on conflicting responses. Furthermore, this also 
reduces the risk of identifying the participants, thus enhancing the 
confidentiality of the interviews.  
A9. Will informed consent be obtained from the participants?      
Yes X No  
If informed consent or consent is not to be obtained please explain 
why: 
Further guidance is at: http://www.bradford.ac.uk/rkts/research-support-for-
academics/ethics/GuidanceonEthicalIssues/  - click on Consent 
 
A9.1.   If you are planning to obtain informed consent, please explain the 
proposed process: 
With the invitation email, the participants in the questionnaire will receive the 
information sheet as an attachment. The information sheet will include details 
on the aims and nature of the study, as well as confidentiality issues, and it 
will explain that filling out and returning the questionnaire will indicate their 
consent to participate in the research. They will be explained that given their 
expertise, their contribution is crucial for the research and that they are thus 
invited to complete all the questionnaire, but that of course participation is 
entirely voluntary and that they are free to respond only partially or not at all 
to the questionnaire.  
As regards participants in the interviews, once they respond positively to the 
invitation email, they will receive a second email to set up the appointment for 
the interview. With this second email, they will receive the information sheet 
providing details on the nature of the study and on confidentiality issues. 
Verbal informed consent will be obtained at the beginning of the interview. 
Since the interviews involve high-ranking officials and politicians, obtaining 
written consent may make the interview more official and discourage some 
participants from taking part in the research. The participants will be explained 
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that they are invited to reply to all questions in the interview but that they are 
free not to reply to any of the questions if they wish.   
A9.2 If you have obtained informed consent, what arrangements are in place 
to ensure participants receive on going relevant information about the 
study and the opportunity to withdraw consent if required? 
 Participants in the research will be informed, through the information sheet, 
that they can withdraw from participation at any time, even after they have 
submitted their responses to the questionnaire or the interview has been 
conducted. They can ask for the information provided not to be used in the 
research and for the information to be deleted. To this effect, they will be 
provided with the email contact details of the researcher.  
 In order to be kept updated on output emanating from the research that 
directly draws upon their participation, in the information sheet, the 
participants will be informed, that if they wish, they can request a short report 
of the main findings, by sending an email to the researcher.  
A9.3  If you have obtained informed consent, how long will the participants 
have to decide whether to take part in the study? (If less than 24 hours, 
please justify) 
 For the participants in the questionnaire, if no reply is received to the invitation 
email within 10 working days, a reminder will be sent via email. If no reply is 
received within 10 working days of the reminder, a final contact will be made 
via telephone to establish whether the participant is willing to participate in the 
study. If this is not the case, the questionnaire will be sent to the participant 
from the reserve list for that country, using the same procedure. 
 For the participants in the interviews, if no reply is received to the invitation 
email within 10 working days, this will be followed up with contacts via 
telephone as this could facilitate the setting of the appointment. If after another 
10 working days, an appointment for the interview has not been set, the 
participant will be considered not to be interested to participate in the 
research.  
A9.4 Will informed consent be obtained from participants from one of the 
following groups? 
 
• Children under 18 
• People with learning disabilities 
• People with a terminal illness 
• People with mental health problems 
• People with dementia 
• Asylum seekers 
• Those with a particularly dependent relationship with the 
researcher 
• Other potentially vulnerable groups (please specify)  
    
No. 
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If yes, please state what special arrangements have been made to deal with the 
issues of obtaining consent from the participants above? 
 N/A 
 
A10. What special arrangements have been made for participants for whom 
English is not a first language? (If there are no arrangements, please 
explain why) 
 Although the questionnaire will be sent to officials from Euro Area countries 
where English is not a first language, the participants are high-ranking officials 
and using English as a working language is not expected to be a problem. For 
the participants in the interviews, this is also not an issue as English is Malta’s 
second official language, but interviewees will be asked whether they prefer 
to hold the interview in English or Maltese. 
 
A11. What steps have been taken to ensure participants have not been 
involved in  similar studies (in order to prevent over exposure) where this may 
be an issue? 
 
Some studies on budget institutions have also been based on questionnaires 
to budget directors in European countries (e.g. Gleich, 2003; Ylӓoutinen, 
2004; Hallerberg et al. 2007, 2009). However, given that these are now 
somewhat dated, it is unlikely that the same participants will be involved. On 
the other hand, more overlap is likely with the participants from the most 
recent (2012) OECD budget practices and procedures survey and the 
questionnaires by the European Commission (DG Ecfin) to compile its fiscal 
governance databases, which are conducted annually. Nevertheless, given 
their key role in the budget process, it is not appropriate to exclude budget 
directors from the sample as this could impact negatively on the quality of the 
data generated. In order to reduce the burden of participating in the 
questionnaire, its timing will be carefully chosen to avoid known busy periods 
for the participants and to avoid coinciding with the European Commission’s 
annual questionnaire. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, participants will be 
able to nominate another respondent from their institution for the 
questionnaire. 
 
As regards the participants in the interviews, overexposure from other studies 
is unlikely given the lack of studies on Malta’s budget institutions. But there 
may be some overlap with the European Commission’s fiscal governance 
questionnaire. Furthermore, the budget director will be asked to respond to 
the questionnaire and also to take part in an interview. The small size of 
Malta’s public administration limits the potential participants with the 
necessary key expertise on the budget process. The budget director 
constitutes a crucial participant in the interviews given the key role in the 
budget process, whilst participation in the questionnaire is required in order to 
have comparable data for Malta to that of the other EA countries for the first 
component of the study. In order to reduce the inconvenience to this 
participant, the timing of the questionnaire and the interview will not coincide 
together and ample time will be allowed between the two (a month, as a 
minimum). 
 
A12. Could this project potentially disadvantage any group of persons not 
included in the research? 
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 No, because there is no direct benefit to the participants from taking part in 
the research. 
 
A13.   What measures will be put in place to ensure confidentiality and/or 
anonymity of personal data, where appropriate? 
 The participants in the research do not constitute vulnerable individuals and 
the content of the questionnaire and the interview does not involve private 
information. But since the participants involve high-ranking officials, the 
responses to the questionnaire and the interviews will be confidential. Since 
the participants involve key experts, it is not possible to gather the data 
through completely coded data collection techniques. Nevertheless, it will be 
ensured that the participants are not named or otherwise identified when 
disseminating the results of the research and in publications. Furthermore, 
details of the participants will be stored separately from the research data and 
code identifiers will be used on the data records. For the data generated by 
the questionnaires, country codes will be used for each participant (e.g. MT 
for the participant from Malta), whilst codes for each institution will be used for 
the data generated by the interviews (e.g. BO1 and BO2 for the two 
interviewees from the Budget Office).  
The participants in the questionnaire involve one key expert from each 
country. This would be no different to their participation in completing the 
OECD and European Commission questionnaires and similarly, the aim of this 
questionnaire is to obtain factual information on the budget procedures and 
institutions. Nevertheless, any reports or publications from this research will 
neither identify the names of the participants nor will there be precise 
reference to their official position. In order to reduce further the risk that 
participants are identified, the participants’ institutions (ministry of finance, 
fiscal councils and academia) will not be identified individually for each 
country, but rather at an aggregate level for the whole sample. 
 As the interviews seek to generate data on the extent and depth of reforms in 
Malta’s budget institutions, additional measures will be adopted to further 
reduce the risk that the participants are identified, by interviewing two 
participants from each institution. The names and official position of the 
participants will not be revealed and the interviewees will be referred to 
through their institution. The organisational affiliation of the participants 
constitutes key analytical categories for the research and not using the 
participants’ institution as descriptors of the data generated would result in 
substantial detail in the reported findings being omitted, thus compromising 
the relevance of the data for addressing the research questions at hand. 
Having two participants from each institution mitigates to some extent the risk 
that statements are attributed to particular individuals, and when possible and 
relevant, combined rather than individual responses will be used. 
Furthermore, particular attention will be devoted to remove other personal, 
contextual identifiers from the generated data, to avoid that the individual 
participants are identified through deductive disclosure. It is recognised that 
given the necessarily confined sampling frame, the guarantee of 
confidentiality limits the ways that the interviews’ accounts can be reported 
and data will not be disclosed if there is a risk of potentially exposing the 
participants’ identities through specific quotations or presented examples.  
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 The data generated through the questionnaires and the interviews will be 
stored in a secure data file during the duration of the study and for ten years 
after the completion of the study. Records will be kept only on the student’s 
work computer and home computer. The data will not be stored on laptops or 
other transportable devices. Paper copies of the data will be stored in a locked 
cabinet at the student’s work office and shredded after any reports or 
publications from this research have been finalised. The data will be 
accessible and available for use by the student, Moira Catania, and her 
supervisors, Dr M.J. Baimbridge and Dr R. Espindola. 
The personal details of the participants and the key list, linking the codes used 
on the data records with the participants’ names and official positions, will be 
stored securely, separately from the data records. Access to these details will 
be restricted to the student, Moira Catania. Such personal records will be 
destroyed after any reports or publications from this research have been 
finalised. 
 
A14. Will financial / in kind payments (other than reasonable expenses and 
compensation for time) be offered to participants? (Indicate how much 
and on what basis this has been decided) 
 Yes  No X 
 It is not considered appropriate to offer any financial/in kind payments to 
participants in order to encourage them to take part in the research, since the 
participants involve high-ranking officials who may even consider such offer 
as offensive. 
A15.  Will the research involve the production of recorded media such as 
audio and/or video recordings? 
Yes X No  
 The questionnaires will not involve the production of recorded media, but 
audio recordings of the interviews will be used. 
A15.1. This question is only applicable if you are planning to produce recorded media: 
How will you ensure that there is a clear agreement with participants as 
to how these recorded media may be stored, used and (if appropriate) 
destroyed? 
Before the actual start of the interview, participants will be asked permission 
to audio-record the interview. The audio tapes and paper copies of their 
transcripts will be stored in a locked cabinet at the student’s work office. They 
will be destroyed after any reports or publications from this research have 
been completed. Electronic copies of the recordings and the transcripts will 
be stored only in a secure data file, on the student’s work and home 
computers, for the duration of the study and for ten years after the completion 
of the study. They will not be stored on any laptops or other transportable 
devices. The audio tapes and copies of the recordings and transcripts will be 
accessible and available for use by the student, Moira Catania, and her 
supervisors, Dr M.J. Baimbridge and Dr R. Espindola. 




A16. Which institution has agreed to act as research sponsor for the project? (If 
you are conducting the research as either a student of the University of 
Bradford or as a researcher working on a University of Bradford research 
project, the University of Bradford will normally act as research sponsor. If you 
are conducting the research as a student or employee of another university, 
that institution should normally sponsor the research.) 
 
 This research is being carried out as a PhD student at the University of 
Bradford. 
 
A17.  Please confirm that the research sponsor has provision in place for 
indemnifying the researcher for negligent or non-negligent harm to 
participants?  
 
 (If you are conducting the research as either a student of the University of 
Bradford or as a researcher working on a University of Bradford research 
project, such indemnity is in place.  If you are conducting the research as a 
student or employee of another university, that institution should normally 
provide indemnity.)   
 
More information is available at: 
http://www.bradford.ac.uk/rkts/research-support-for-
academics/ethics/GuidanceonEthicalIssues/  - click on Insurance for Research 
 
Part B – The Signed Declaration 
Title of Research Project: Budget institutions and fiscal discipline in Euro Area 
countries: a focus on legislative budgeting and on Malta’s budget institutions reforms 
since the Great Crisis  
 
I confirm my responsibility to deliver the research project in accordance with the 
University of Bradford’s policies and procedures, which include the University’s: 
▪ ‘Research Governance & Quality Assurance Code of Good Research 
Practice’   and the 
▪ ‘Code of Practice for Ethics in Research’ (Ethics Policy)  
http://www.bradford.ac.uk/rkts/research-support-for 
academics/ethics/EthicsPolicyandStrategy/    
 
and, where externally funded, with the terms and conditions of the research 
funder. 
 
In signing this research ethics application form I am also confirming that: 
 
▪ The completed form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.  
▪ The project will comply with the University’s Research Ethics Policy. 
▪ I undertake to adhere to the content and process of the project as 
detailed in this (and attached) documents and to inform the Panel of any 
changes. 
▪ I am aware of my responsibility to be up to date and comply with the 
requirements of the law and relevant guidelines relating to security and 
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confidentiality of personal data, including the need to register when 
necessary with the appropriate Data Protection Officer.   
▪ In the case of Human Tissue, blood and tissue samples, I have liaised 
with the University designated HTA Individual. The Human Tissue Act 
Designated Individual is currently Mrs Susan Boyce, Head of Ethical 
Tissue. 
▪ I understand that the project, including research records and data, may 
be subject to inspection for audit purposes, if required in future and that 
these records will be stored for a period of 10 years from the end of the 
project. 
▪ I understand that personal data about me as a researcher in this form will 
be held by those involved in the ethics review procedure (e.g. the 
Research Support Unit Ethics Administrator and/or Ethics Reviewers) 
and that this will be managed according to Data Protection Act principles. 
▪ If this is an application for a ‘generic’ project all the individual projects 




Name of the Principal Investigator (or the name of the Principal Supervisor if this 
is a student research project): 
 
Dr M.J. Baimbridge (Principal Supervisor) 
 
Signature of Principal Investigator (or the Principal Supervisor): 
 




Please email the completed application form together with supporting documents and 
provide a signed, hard copy of ‘Part B’ to the Ethics Administrator (ethics@bradford.ac.uk ), 
RKTS, F.24, Richmond Building. 
 







TABLE AXIII: Legislative budgetary power index – results (post-crisis data) 
 
AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
Legislative budgetary power  3.3 1.6 3.0 2.7 3.3 4.2 2.9 2.8 2.3 2.8 2.2 3.6 2.0 0.6 3.2 2.7 1.3 1.4 3.0 
I Formal legislative budgetary power 5.7 3.4 4.4 4.2 4.6 5.3 4.6 4.9 4.5 3.5 3.9 6.0 3.7 2.4 5.9 4.2 2.9 3.9 3.6 
IA Involvement of legislature in national 
budgetary process 
4.0 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.2 3.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 4.1 3.1 5.2 3.4 2.9 4.1 4.1 2.9 3.4 2.7 
IA1 Involvement of legislature in MTBF 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 6.3 2.5 4.2 0.8 5.4 3.8 3.8 5.0 0.0 5.8 6.3 1.7 3.3 1.3 
 
Involvement of parliament in establishing 
the budgetary objectives/targets and/or 
projections arising from the MTBF 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
 
Involvement of parliament in the 
preparation of the medium-term 
budgetary plan (domestic MTBF or SCP) 
10.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 10.0 0.0 6.7 3.3 6.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 3.3 10.0 6.7 3.3 0.0 
 
Involvement of parliament in monitoring 
respect of the budgetary 
objectives/targets established according 
to the MTBF in the draft budget 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Monitoring report is presented in 
parliament 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 
IA2 Involvement of legislature in fiscal 
rules250 
3.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 5.0 3.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Parliament in charge of monitoring 
compliance to the fiscal rule 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Parliament in charge of enforcing 
compliance with the fiscal rule in case of 
non-compliance 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
                                                          
250 In respect of fiscal rule with largest coverage of general government finances. 







TABLE AXIII: Legislative budgetary power index – results (post-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
 
Whether corrective plan is presented in 
parliament in case or risk of non-
compliance with the targets implied by 
the fiscal rule 
10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IA3 Legislative budgetary amendment 
powers 
10.0 5.0 5.6 2.5 6.7 3.3 6.7 3.3 1.7 4.2 6.7 7.5 6.7 5.0 4.2 8.3 8.3 6.4 7.5 
 
Whether parliament can propose the 
annual budget independent from the 
government 
10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Formal powers of the Legislature to 
amend the budget proposed by the 
Executive 
10.0 10.0 5.0 7.5 10.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 
 Notwithstanding the formal powers of the 
legislature to modify the budget, whether 
a vote on the budget is considered a vote 
of confidence in the government 
10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
 Whether the executive have the power to 
veto the budget approved by the 
legislature 
10.0 10.0 3.3 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 3.3 10.0 
IA4 Reversionary budget 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 0.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 10.0 10.0 3.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 
IA5 Legislative authorisation for changes to 
the budget during implementation 
1.3 2.2 1.9 2.1 5.8 6.5 1.1 1.8 3.0 5.0 5.2 6.7 2.2 0.8 4.6 1.7 0.8 4.2 0.8 
 
Executive authority to cut, cancel or 
rescind spending once the budget has 
been approved by the Legislature 
1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 10.0 4.0 1.3 0.8 2.0 5.3 6.0 10.0 1.3 0.0 10.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Possibility for line ministers re-allocate 
funds within their own budget envelope 
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.8 5.6 0.0 2.5 3.8 5.6 2.5 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 







TABLE AXIII: Legislative budgetary power index – results (post-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
 
Executive authority to increase spending 
by the Executive after the budget has 
been approved by the Legislature 
2.5 5.3 4.5 2.5 3.8 10.0 2.0 2.0 3.3 4.0 7.0 10.0 2.3 2.5 3.8 3.8 2.5 10.0 2.3 
IA6 Legislative authorisation of off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities 
10.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 7.5 5.0 10.0 2.5 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 
IB Involvement of legislature in SGP 
procedures251 
9.0 5.2 8.3 7.3 9.2 8.2 8.2 9.3 8.5 2.4 5.3 7.6 4.3 1.3 9.6 4.4 2.8 4.9 5.4 
IB1 Discussion of SGP documents in the 
legislature 
7.1 5.3 4.9 4.7 7.7 6.6 6.5 7.8 7.4 2.0 4.2 4.9 3.6 0.5 8.8 4.0 2.1 5.5 4.5 
IB2 Discussion of SGP documents in 
legislative committees 
10.0 7.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 2.0 5.0 8.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 6.0 3.0 6.0 5.0 
IB3 Legislature informed on implementation 
of EDP252 
10.0 3.3 10.0 n/a 10.0 10.0 n/a 10.0 10.0 3.3 6.7 10.0 n/a 3.3 10.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 6.7 
II Legislative budget organisational 
capacity 
5.8 4.6 6.7 6.6 7.2 7.9 6.4 5.9 5.1 7.9 5.7 6.0 5.4 2.4 5.4 6.4 4.5 3.5 8.3 
II1 Time available for budget scrutiny 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 
II2 Characteristics of legislative budget 
committees 
7.3 7.5 7.5 9.5 8.3 8.8 10.0 9.5 5.0 8.8 7.0 8.5 10.0 0.0 4.5 9.5 8.3 9.5 10.0 
 
Parliamentary committee structures for 
dealing with the budget 
7.5 5.0 5.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 10.0 10.0 0.0 7.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 
 
General length of tenure of legislators 
sitting on budget/finance committee  
4.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 4.0 10.0 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 
                                                          
251 Since Estonia and Luxembourg have never been subject to an excessive deficit procedure, their sub-index is computed on the basis of involvement of the legislature in the Stability Programme 
and Draft Budgetary Plan only. For Spain, due to data unavailability, sub-indices IB1 and IB2 exclude the component relating to involvement of the legislature in the abrogation of EDP. 
252 Sub-index not relevant for Estonia and Luxembourg since they have never been subject to an EDP and data not available for Germany. 







TABLE AXIII: Legislative budgetary power index – results (post-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
 
Power of budget/finance committee to 
request witnesses and to question 
ministers or senior civil servants 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
II3 Specialised budget research office 5.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
II4 Access to budgetary information 7.8 7.4 7.4 8.5 9.0 8.9 8.1 7.3 8.1 6.9 7.5 9.0 7.0 7.0 8.7 7.4 7.5 5.3 6.3 
 
Distinction of new revenue-raising 
measures and between expenditures 
under current commitments in law and 
policy from new policies in the annual 
budget documentation presented to the 
legislature 
5.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 3.0 10.0 5.0 8.0 
 
Inclusion in budget documentation 
approved by the legislature of financial 
assets and liabilities, state and municipal 
transfers/guarantees, tax expenditures 
with estimates of revenue foregone, off-
budget expenditures, contingent liabilities 
7.5 2.5 2.5 7.5 5.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 2.5 5.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 2.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.0 5.0 
 
Public availability of budgetary 
information and methodologies 
6.7 6.7 6.7 10.0 10.0 6.7 10.0 3.3 10.0 6.7 10.0 10.0 6.7 6.7 10.0 6.7 6.7 3.3 3.3 
 
Legislature informed on implementation 
of the budget 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 3.3 3.3 10.0 
 
Year-end fiscal report audited by the 
supreme audit institution released within 
six-months of the end of the fiscal year 
and audited year-end fiscal report 
discussed in legislature 
10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 
II5 Relationship of legislature with IFI 3.8 3.1 6.3 5.0 8.8 6.9 3.8 7.5 7.5 8.8 8.8 7.5 5.0 5.0 6.3 5.0 1.9 2.5 10.0 
  







TABLE AXIII: Legislative budgetary power index – results (post-crisis data) (cont.) 
  AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
 Interaction of parliament with the fiscal 
institution in the planning stage of the 
budgetary process 
0.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 
 Appointment and Dismissal of 
Governing/High Level Management 
Members 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.5 0.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 
 Reports by the independent fiscal 
institution submitted to the Legislature 
10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 2.5 0.0 10.0 
 Possible for the legislature or its 
budget/finance committee to request the 
leadership of the independent fiscal 
institution or its senior staff to provide 
responses to legislative questions 
5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 
  







Table AXIV: Legislative budgetary power index – results (pre-crisis data) 
 
AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
 
Legislative budgetary power  2.1 1.5 - - 3.1 3.4 3.4 1.2 0.9 5.0 - - 2.7 - 2.4 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.6 
I Formal legislative budgetary 
power 
4.8 4.3 - - 4.2 5.6 5.5 2.9 2.6 5.6 - - 5.0 - 5.5 5.8 4.9 3.9 4.4 
IA Involvement of legislature in 
national budgetary process 
4.8 4.3 - - 4.2 5.6 5.5 2.9 2.6 5.6 - - 5.0 - 5.5 5.8 4.9 3.9 4.4 
IA1 Involvement of legislature in MTBF 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 5.0 6.3 3.8 3.8 0.0 5.0 1.3 3.8 1.3 0.0 3.8 5.0 1.3 3.8 1.3 
 
Involvement of parliament in 
establishing the budgetary 
objectives/targets and/or projections 
arising from the MTBF 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Involvement of parliament in the 
preparation of the medium-term 
budgetary plan (domestic MTBF or 
SCP) 
5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
 
Involvement of parliament in 
monitoring respect of the budgetary 
objectives/targets established 
according to the MTBF in the draft 
budget 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Monitoring report is presented in 
parliament 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 
IA2 Involvement of legislature in fiscal 
rules253 
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 5.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 
 
Parliament in charge of monitoring 
compliance to the fiscal rule 
0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Parliament in charge of enforcing 
compliance with the fiscal rule in 
case of non-compliance 
0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 Whether corrective plan is 
presented in parliament in case or 
risk of non-compliance with the 
targets implied by the fiscal rule 
0.0 0.0 - 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IA3 Legislative budgetary amendment 
powers 
  
6.0 6.0 - - 6.0 8.0 10.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 - - 6.0 - 8.0 10.0 6.0 7.7 8.0 
                                                          
253 In respect of fiscal rule with largest coverage of general government finances. 







Table AXIV: Legislative budgetary power index – results (pre-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
 
Formal powers of the Legislature to 
amend the budget proposed by the 
Executive 
10.0 10.0 - - 10.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.5 5.0 
 
Notwithstanding the formal powers 
of the legislature to modify the 
budget, whether a vote on the 
budget is considered a vote of 
confidence in the government 
0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 - 5.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 
 
Whether the executive have the 
power to veto the budget approved 
by the legislature 
10.0 10.0 - - 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 3.3 10.0 
IA4 Reversionary budget 6.7 6.7 - - 3.3 6.7 3.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 - - 10.0 - 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 
IA5 Legislative authorisation for changes 
to the budget during implementation 
4.7 4.5 - - 8.2 2.7 4.0 2.2 2.2 5.8 - - 2.5 - 4.8 3.3 2.2 5.0 3.0 
 
Executive authority to cut, cancel or 
rescind spending once the budget 
has been approved by the 
Legislature 
2.5 2.5 - - 10.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 - - 0.0 - 5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 2.5 
 
Possibility for line ministers re-
allocate funds within their own 
budget envelope 
7.5 5.0 - - 7.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 - - 2.5 - 7.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 
Executive authority to increase 
spending by the Executive after the 
budget has been approved by the 
Legislature 
4.0 6.0 - - 7.0 3.0 7.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 - - 5.0 - 2.0 5.0 4.0 10.0 4.0 
IA6 Legislative authorisation of off-
budget expenditures and contingent 
liabilities 
10.0 7.5 - - 2.5 5.0 10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 7.5 
II Legislative budget organisational 
capacity 
4.5 3.4 - - 7.5 6.1 6.3 4.1 3.3 9.0 - - 5.4 - 4.4 5.3 5.5 6.4 5.9 
II1 Time available for budget scrutiny 5.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 
II2 Characteristics of legislative budget 
committees 
7.5 5.0 - - 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 - - 10.0 - 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
II3 Specialised budget research office 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 - - 0.0 - 7.5 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
II4 Access to budgetary information 
 
  
5.4 3.6 - - 10.0 6.9 5.0 6.3 8.1 5.8 - - 6.7 - 10.0 6.3 6.9 5.4 3.6 







Table AXIV: Legislative budgetary power index – results (pre-crisis data) (cont.) 
 AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
 
Distinction between expenditures 
under current commitments in law 
and policy from new policies in the 
annual budget documentation 
presented to the legislature 
0.0 5.0 - - 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 - - 5.0 - 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Inclusion in budget documentation 
approved by the legislature of 
financial assets and liabilities, state 
and municipal transfers/guarantees, 
tax expenditures with estimates of 
revenue foregone, off-budget 
expenditures, contingent liabilities 
10.0 2.5 - - 10.0 7.5 5.0 5.0 7.5 0.0 - - 5.0 - 10.0 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 
 
Public availability of budgetary 
information and methodologies 
6.7 6.7 - - 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 3.3 - - 6.7 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 6.7 
 
Year-end fiscal report audited by the 
supreme audit institution released 
within six-months of the end of the 
fiscal year and audited year-end 
fiscal report discussed in legislature 
5.0 0.0 - - 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 
Source: Results are produced by author 
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Table AXV: Legislative budgetary amendment powers sub-index IA3 (post-crisis 
data) with alternative weights 






Sub-index IA3 baseline 1.000 - - 
Sub-index IA3 alternative 1 0.915 1.000 - 
Sub-index IA3 alternative 2 0.915 0.731 1.000 
Notes: 
Legislative budgetary amendment powers sub-index IA3 comprises the following variables: 
- whether parliament can propose the annual budget independent from the government 
- formal powers of the legislature to amend the budget proposed by the executive 
- whether a vote on the budget is considered a vote of confidence in the government 
- whether the executive has the power to veto the budget approved by the legislature 
 
In the baseline sub-index, the second and third components are assigned a weight of 33% each, whilst the other 
first and fourth components are assigned a weight of 17% each. 
In the first alternative, each component is assigned an equal weight of 25% each. 
In the second alternative, only the second and third components are included, with an equal weight of 50% each.  
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AXVI: Sub-index IA Involvement of legislature in national budgetary process (post-



































of legislature in 
MTBF 
1.000 - - - - - 
IA2. Involvement 
of legislature in 
fiscal rules 





0.089 0.128 1.000 - - - 
IA4. Reversionary 
budget 
0.085 0.000 -0.390 1.000 - - 
IA5. Legislative 
authorisation for 
changes to the 
budget during 
implementation 







0.102 0.084 0.126 0.008 0.220 1.000 
Source: Results are produced by author 
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Table AXVII: Discussion of SGP documents in the legislature sub-index IB1 (post-
crisis data) with alternative weights 






Sub-index IB1 baseline 1.000 - - 
Sub-index IB1 alternative 1 0.996 1.000 - 
Sub-index IB1 alternative 2 0.993 0.989 1.000 
Notes: 
- Baseline sub-index: whether SGP document is discussed in legislature (weight of 67%), timing of discussion - 
before or after relevant Council meeting (weight of 33%) 
- In the first alternative, whether SGP document is discussed in legislature (weight of 75%), timing of discussion 
(weight of 25%) 
- In the second alternative, whether SGP document is discussed in legislature (weight of 50%), timing of 
discussion (weight of 50%)  
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AXVIII: Characteristics of legislative budget committees sub-index II2 (post-
crisis data) with alternative weights 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients Sub-index II2 baseline Sub-index II2 alternative 1 
Sub-index II2 baseline 1.000 - 
Sub-index II2 alternative 1 0.980 1.000 
Notes: 
Sub-index IB1 comprises the following components: 
- parliamentary committee structures for dealing with the budget 
- general length of legislators sitting on budget/finance committee 
- power of budget/finance committee to request witnesses and to question ministers or senior civil servants 
 
- In the baseline, the first component has a weight of 50%, whilst the other two components have a weight of 
25% each. 
- In the alternative, all three components have an equal weight of 33% each. 
Source: Results are produced by author 







Table AXIX: Legislative budgetary power index (post-crisis data) – results with alternative aggregation method 
 
AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES 
Legislative budgetary power index baseline  3.3 1.6 3.0 2.7 3.3 4.2 2.9 2.8 2.3 2.8 2.2 3.6 2.0 0.6 3.2 2.7 1.3 1.4 3.0 
Legislative budgetary power index alternative 1 5.7 4.0 5.6 5.4 5.9 6.6 5.5 5.4 4.8 5.7 4.8 6.0 4.6 2.4 5.7 5.3 3.7 3.7 5.9 
Note: 
In the baseline index, the formal powers and budgetary organisational capacity sub-indices (I and II, respectively) are aggregated using a multiplicative approach. 
In the alternative index, the two sub-indices are aggregated using a linear approach. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AXX: Legislative budgetary power index (post-crisis data) – descriptive statistics, comparison of linear and 
multiplicative aggregation methods 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Range 
Legislative budgetary power index baseline 2.6 2.8 0.9 0.6 – 4.2 
Legislative budgetary power index alternative 1 5.1 5.4 1.0 2.4 – 6.6 
Note: 
In the baseline index, the formal powers and budgetary organisational capacity sub-indices (I and II, respectively) are aggregated using a multiplicative approach. 
In the alternative index, the two sub-indices are aggregated using a linear approach. 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AXXI: Legislative budgetary power index (post-crisis data) – comparison of linear and multiplicative aggregation 
methods 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients Legislative budgetary power 
index baseline 
Legislative budgetary power 
index alternative 1 
Legislative budgetary power index baseline 1.000 - 
Legislative budgetary power index alternative 1 0.946 1.000 
Note: 
In the baseline index, the formal powers and budgetary organisational capacity sub-indices (I and II, respectively) are aggregated using a multiplicative approach. 
In the alternative index, the two sub-indices are aggregated using a linear approach. 
Source: Results are produced by author
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on Kim (2015) 
Option 2 Option 3 
I. Formal legislative 
budgetary powers 
0.50 0.565 0.565 0.50 0.50 
IA. Involvement of legislature 
in national budgetary process 
0.67 - 0.667 0.75 0.50 
IA1. Involvement of legislature 
in MTBF 
0.17 - 0.167 0.17 0.17 
IA2. Involvement of legislature 
in fiscal rules 
0.17 - 0.167 0.17 0.17 
IA3. Legislative budgetary 
amendment powers 
0.17 0.457 0.229 0.17 0.17 
IA4. Reversionary budget 0.17 0.243 0.122 0.17 0.17 
IA5. Legislative authorisation 
for changes to budget during 
implementation 
0.17 0.301 0.151 0.17 0.17 
IA6. Legislative authorisation 
for off-budget expenditures 
and contingent liabilities 
0.17 - 0.167 0.17 0.17 
IB. Involvement of legislature 
in SGP procedures 
0.33 - 0.333 0.25 0.50 
II. Legislative budget 
organisational capacity 
0.50 0.435 0.435 0.50 0.50 
II1. Time available for budget 
scrutiny 
0.20 0.146 0.088 0.20 0.20 
II2. Characteristics of 
legislative budget committees 
0.20 0.395 0.237 0.20 0.20 
II3. Specialised budget 
research office 
0.20 0.460 0.276 0.20 0.20 
II4. Access to budgetary 
information 
0.20 - 0.200 0.20 0.20 
II5. Relationship of legislature 
with IFI 
0.20 - 0.200 0.20 0.20 
Notes: 
In the baseline index, within formal powers, involvement of the legislature in the national budgetary process has 
a weight of 67% whilst involvement of the legislature in SGP procedures has a weight of 33%. 
In Option 2, the corresponding weights are 75% and 25%, respectively. 
In Option 3, the two components have an equal weight of 50% each. 
 




     
381 
     
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AXXIV: Sub-index I Formal legislative budgetary power index (post-crisis 
data) – correlation among its sub-indices 
Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients 
Sub-index IA: involvement of 
legislature in national budgetary 
process 
Sub-index IB: involvement of 
legislature in SGP procedures 
Sub-index IA: involvement of legislature 
in national budgetary process 
1.000 - 
Sub-index IB: involvement of legislature 
in SGP procedures 
-0.204 1.000 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
  
Table AXXIII: Legislative budgetary power index (post-crisis data) with alternative 
weights 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients Baseline  Option 1: weights 
based on Kim 
(2015) 
Option 2 Option 3 
Baseline 1.000 - - - 
Option 1: weights based on Kim (2015) 0.956 1.000 - - 
Option 2 0.937 0.970 1.000 - 
Option 3 0.981 0.902 0.874 1.000 
Note: 
In the baseline index, within formal powers, involvement of the legislature in the national budgetary process has a 
weight of 67% whilst involvement of the legislature in SGP procedures has a weight of 33%. 
In Option 2, the corresponding weights are 75% and 25%, respectively. 
In Option 3, the two components have an equal weight of 50% each. 
Table AXXV: Legislative budgetary power index (pre-crisis data) – comparison to 
other indices 




Kim’s (2015) index 
Legislative budgetary power index (pre-
crisis data) 
0.552 0.000 -0.024 
Notes: 
The sample size of the constructed index was adjusted to be the same as that in the other indices. 
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Table AXXVI: Legislative budgetary power and quality of budget institutions indices 
– comparison  
Legislative budgetary power index Quality of budget institutions index 
I Formal legislative budgetary power  
IA Involvement of legislature in national budgetary 
process 
 
IA1 Involvement of legislature in MTBF  
 
Involvement of parliament in establishing the budgetary 




Involvement of parliament in the preparation of the 
medium-term budgetary plan (domestic MTBF or SCP) 
Included in sub-index 1 medium-term 
budgetary framework/targets – national MTBF 
 
Involvement of parliament in monitoring respect of the 
budgetary objectives/targets established according to 
the MTBF in the draft budget 
Not included 
 
Monitoring report is presented in parliament Not included 
IA2 Involvement of legislature in fiscal rules  
 
Parliament in charge of monitoring compliance to the 
fiscal rule 
Not included  
 
Parliament in charge of enforcing compliance with the 
fiscal rule in case of non-compliance 
Not included 
 
Whether corrective plan is presented in parliament in 
case or risk of non-compliance with the targets implied 
by the fiscal rule 
Not included 
IA3 Legislative budgetary amendment powers  
 
Whether parliament can propose the annual budget 
independent from the government 
Not included 
 
Formal powers of the Legislature to amend the budget 
proposed by the Executive 
Included in sub-index 4 structure of the 
parliamentary process leading to the approval 
of the budget law, but different scoring system 
(restrictions to amendment powers yield 
higher scores in the quality of budget 
institutions index, but lower scores in the 
legislative budgetary power index) 
 Notwithstanding the formal powers of the legislature to 
modify the budget, whether a vote on the budget is 
considered a vote of confidence in the government 
Not included 
 Whether the executive have the power to veto the 
budget approved by the legislature 
Not included 
IA4 Reversionary budget Not included 




Executive authority to cut, cancel or rescind spending 
once the budget has been approved by the Legislature 
Included in sub-index 5 flexibility of budget 
execution, but different scoring system (in 
quality of budget institutions index, executive 
authority to cut or cancel spending yields 
higher scores, but lower scores in legislative 
budgetary power index)  
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Table AXXVI: Legislative budgetary power and quality of budget institutions indices 
– comparison (cont.) 
Legislative budgetary power index Quality of budget institutions index 
 Executive authority to cut, cancel or rescind spending 
once the budget has been approved by the Legislature 
(cont.) 
Also, in legislative budgetary power index, 
only required approval of legislature is 
considered, whereas in quality of budget 
institutions index, all forms of required 
approval are considered (e.g. ministry of 
finance or government). 
 
Possibility for line ministers re-allocate funds within their 
own budget envelope 
Included in sub-index 5 flexibility of budget 
execution, but different scoring system (in 
quality of budget institutions index, flexibility to 
shift spending yields higher scores, but lower 
scores in legislative budgetary power index) 
and in legislative budgetary power index, only 
required approval of legislature is considered, 
whereas in quality of budget institutions index, 
all forms of required approval are considered 
(e.g. ministry of finance or government) 
 
Executive authority to increase spending by the 
Executive after the budget has been approved by the 
Legislature 
Included in sub-index 5 flexibility of budget 
execution, but only required approval of 
legislature is considered, whereas in quality of 
budget institutions index, all forms of required 
approval are considered (e.g. ministry of 
finance or government) 
IA6 Legislative authorisation of off-budget expenditures and 
contingent liabilities 
Included in sub-index 6 budget transparency 
IB Involvement of legislature in SGP procedures  
IB1 Discussion of SGP documents in the legislature Not included 
IB2 Discussion of SGP documents in legislative committees Not included 
IB3 Legislature informed on implementation of EDP Not included 
II Legislative budget organisational capacity  
II1 Time available for budget scrutiny Not included 
II2 Characteristics of legislative budget committees  
 
Parliamentary committee structures for dealing with the 
budget 
Included in sub-index 4 structure of the 
parliamentary process leading to the approval 
of the budget law 
 
General length of tenure of legislators sitting on 
budget/finance committee  
Not included 
 
Power of budget/finance committee to request 
witnesses and to question ministers or senior civil 
servants 
Not included 
II3 Specialised budget research office Not included 
II4 Access to budgetary information  
 
Distinction of new revenue-raising measures and 
between expenditures under current commitments in 
law and policy from new policies in the annual budget 
documentation presented to the legislature 
 
 
Included in sub-index 6 budget transparency 
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Table AXXVI: Legislative budgetary power and quality of budget institutions indices 
– comparison (cont.) 
Legislative budgetary power index Quality of budget institutions index 
 
Inclusion in budget documentation approved by the 
legislature of financial assets and liabilities, state and 
municipal transfers/guarantees, tax expenditures with 
estimates of revenue foregone, off-budget expenditures, 
contingent liabilities 
Included in sub-index 6 budget transparency 
 Public availability of budgetary information and 
methodologies 
Included in sub-index 6 budget transparency 
 
Legislature informed on implementation of the budget Not included 
 
Year-end fiscal report audited by the supreme audit 
institution released within six-months of the end of the 
fiscal year and audited year-end fiscal report discussed 
in legislature 
Not included 
II5 Relationship of legislature with IFI  
 
Interaction of parliament with the fiscal institution in the 
planning stage of the budgetary process 
Included in sub-index 7 independent fiscal 
institutions 
 
Appointment and Dismissal of Governing/High Level 
Management Members 
Included in sub-index 7 independent fiscal 
institutions, but in the legislative budgetary 
power index, scores are assigned only if 
parliament is involved in the 
appointment/dismissal procedures, whereas in 
the quality of budget institutions index, lower 
scores are also assigned if other non-
government entities are involved  
 
Reports by the independent fiscal institution submitted 
to the Legislature 
Not included 
 
Possible for the legislature or its budget/finance 
committee to request the leadership of the independent 
fiscal institution or its senior staff to provide responses 
to legislative questions 
Not included 
Source: Produced by author 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 
Table AXXVII: Legislative budgetary power and quality of budget institutions 
indices (post-crisis data) 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients Legislative budgetary power index Sub-index IA3: Legislative 
budgetary amendment 
powers 
Quality of budget institutions index 0.391 -0.059 
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Table AXXVIII: Empirical analysis - variables description and data sources 
Variable Name Variable description Source 
Fiscal variables 
budget balance as a ratio to GDP net lending (+) or net borrowing (-): general government - ESA 2010; 
Percentage of GDP at current prices (excessive deficit procedure) 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
primary budget balance as a ratio to 
GDP 
net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest: general government 
- ESA 2010; Percentage of GDP at current prices (excessive deficit 
procedure) 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
cyclically adjusted budget balance 
as a ratio to potential GDP 
cyclically adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of general 
government: Adjustment based on potential GDP (excessive deficit 
procedure); Percentage of potential GDP at current prices 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
cyclically adjusted budget balance 
as a ratio to trend GDP 
cyclically adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of general 
government: Adjustment based on trend GDP Excessive deficit procedure; 
Percentage of trend GDP at current prices 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
cyclically adjusted primary budget 
balance as a ratio to potential GDP 
net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest of general 
government adjusted for the cyclical component: Adjustment based on 
potential GDP Excessive deficit procedure; Percentage of potential GDP at 
current prices 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online).  
cyclically adjusted primary budget 
balance as a ratio to trend GDP 
net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest of general 
government adjusted for the cyclical component: Adjustment based on 
trend GDP Excessive deficit procedure; Percentage of trend GDP at 
current prices 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
government debt ratio general government consolidated gross debt: Excessive deficit procedure 
(based on ESA 2010); Percentage of GDP at current prices (excessive 
deficit procedure) 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online). 
annual change in government debt 
ratio to GDP 
annual change in general government consolidated gross debt: Excessive 
deficit procedure (based on ESA 2010); Percentage points of GDP at 
current prices (debt t,i - debt t-1,i) 
Author's calculations from government debt ratio to GDP 
Institutional variables 
quality of budget institutions index composite index measuring the quality of budget institutions Author’s calculations (refer to Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 and Tables AIII and 
AIV in Appendix I) 
legislative budgetary power index composite index measuring legislative budgetary power Author’s calculations (refer to Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 and Tables AXIII 
and AXIV in Appendix II) 
European Commission MTBF index medium-term budgetary frameworks index compiled by European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
European Commission (2017c) MTBF database - old methodology 
European Commission fiscal rules 
strength index 
fiscal rules strength index compiled by European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
European Commission (2017b) Fiscal rules database - old methodology 
IFI dummy variable1 Dummy variable to indicate whether an independent fiscal institution is in 
place 





      
 






Table AXXVIII: Empirical analysis - variables description and data sources (cont.) 
Variable Name Variable description Source 
Institutional variables (cont.) 
legislative amendment powers 
indicator 
Indicator capturing whether the legislature has powers to amend the 
executive’s draft budget and whether any restrictions apply 
Author’s calculations – corresponds to indicator IA3: legislative budget 
amendment in Table AXII in Appendix II (refer to Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 
and Tables AXIII and AXIV in Appendix II). 
Control variables 
% change in real GDP  annual change in Gross Domestic Product at constant prices - 2010 
reference levels 
Author's calculations from GDP data at constant prices - 2010 reference 
levels, from European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic 
database (AMECO online) 
unemployment rate unemployment rate: total - definition EUROSTAT - percentage of civilian 
labour force 
European Commission (2017f) Annual macro-economic database (AMECO 
online) 
legislative election held dummy variable indicating that legislative elections were held in country i in 
year t (variable = 1 if elections were held, = 0 otherwise) 
Inter-American Development Bank (2015) Database of Political Institutions 
margin of majority fraction of parliamentary seats held by the government - calculated by 
dividing the number of government seats by total (government plus 
opposition plus non-aligned) seats 
Inter-American Development Bank (2015) Database of Political Institutions 
government fractionalization index the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties 
Inter-American Development Bank (2015) Database of Political Institutions 
bailout dummy variable dummy variable indicating that country i was subject to economic 
adjustment programme/balance of payments assistance programme 
during year t, starting in year when country concerned made request for 
assistance until the country exited the programme 
Author’s calculations from European Commission (2017g) and European 
Stability Mechanism (2017) 
Note: 
1 For Germany and Slovenia, the IFI dummy variable is set at 1 also when only one fiscal council (out of the two) is established. 
 
  
      
 






Table AXXIX: Empirical analysis – variables, descriptive statistics 
Variable Name Number of 
observations 
Mean Median Standard deviation Range 
Fiscal variables 
budget balance as a ratio to GDP 190 -3.5 -2.7 4.2 -32.1 – 5.1 
primary budget balance as a ratio to GDP 190 -1.1 -0.4 3.9 -29.3 – 6.7 
cyclically adjusted budget balance as a ratio to potential GDP 190 -3.0 -2.7 3.7 -31.0 – 3.1 
cyclically adjusted budget balance as a ratio to trend GDP 190 -3.6 -2.9 4.1 -29.6 – 4.3 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a ratio to 
potential GDP 
190 -0.7 0.0 3.5 -28.2 – 6.2 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a ratio to trend 
GDP 
190 -1.2 -0.2 3.9 -26.7 – 5.6 
government debt ratio 190 66.5 64.7 37.7 3.7 – 179.7 
annual change in government debt ratio to GDP 190 2.9 1.6 6.9 -26.6 – 25.8 
 
Institutional variables 
quality of budget institutions index 146 5.7 5.8 0.9 3.6 – 7.8 
legislative budgetary power index 146 2.6 2.7 0.9 0.6 – 5.0 
European Commission MTBF index 190 1.3 1.4 0.5 0.4 – 2.0 
European Commission fiscal rules strength index 190 0.5 0.4 1.1 -1.0 – 3.0 
legislative amendment powers indicator 146 7.7 10.0 3.4 0.0 – 10.0 
 
Control variables 
% change in real GDP  190 1.3 1.6 4.5 -14.8 – 26.3 
unemployment rate 190 9.6 8.3 5.0 3.7 – 27.5 
margin of majority 190 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.4 – 0.8 
government fractionalization index 190 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.0 – 0.8 
Note: 
The descriptive statistics for the quality of budget institutions and legislative budgetary power indices refer to the 2006-15 period and hence differ from those presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.7 and Tables 
5.6 and 5.9 in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, which are compiled separately for the pre- and post-crisis indices.  
Source: Results are produced by author 
  
      
 






Table AXXX: Empirical analysis – variables, correlation coefficients 











balance as a 
ratio to GDP 
cyclically adjusted 
budget balance as 
a ratio to potential 
GDP 
cyclically adjusted 
budget balance as 




balance as a ratio 
to potential GDP 
cyclically adjusted 
primary budget 
balance as a ratio 
to trend GDP 
annual change 
in government 
debt ratio to 
GDP 
budget balance as a ratio to GDP 1.000 - - - - - - 
primary budget balance as a ratio to GDP 0.890 1.000 - - - - - 
cyclically adjusted budget balance as a ratio to 
potential GDP 
0.786 0.732 1.000 - - - - 
cyclically adjusted budget balance as a ratio to trend 
GDP 
0.750 0.709 0.935 1.000 - - - 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a ratio to 
potential GDP 
0.584 0.729 0.862 0.811 1.000 - - 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a ratio to 
trend GDP 
0.606 0.732 0.838 0.908 0.921 1.000 - 
annual change in government debt ratio to GDP -0.644 -0.630 -0.419 -0.436 -0.364 -0.401 1.000 
 














legislative amendment powers 
indicator 
quality of budget institutions index 1.000 - - - - - 
legislative budgetary power index 0.147 1.000 - - - - 
European Commission MTBF index 0.441 0.252 1.000 - - - 
European Commission fiscal rules strength index 0.399 0.265 0.390 1.000 - - 
IFI dummy variable 0.544 -0.161 0.285 0.283 1.000 - 
legislative amendment powers indicator -0.131 0.025 -0.147 0.042 0.076 1.000 
 










ratio in year t-1 
bailout dummy 
variable 
% change in real GDP  1.000 - - - - - - 
unemployment rate -0.285 1.000 - - - - - 
legislative election held 0.063 -0.007 1.000 - - - - 
margin of majority 0.145 -0.126 -0.036 1.000 - - - 
government fractionalization index 0.131 -0.125 0.009 0.448 1.000 - - 
government debt ratio in year t-1 -0.288 0.281 -0.023 -0.098 -0.396 1.000 - 
bailout dummy variable -0.330 0.528 -0.038 -0.058 -0.124 0.308 1.000 
Source: Results are produced by author







Table AXXXI: Dynamic specification of the main model estimated using difference GMM 
(Arellano and Bond 1991) 
 one-step estimator two-step estimator 
Lagged budget balance % of GDP 0.642** 0.600*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
   
% Change in real GDP 0.274* 0.353* 
 (0.048) (0.019) 
   
Unemployment rate -0.095 -0.145 
 (0.685) (0.262) 
   
Legislative election held 0.740 0.305 
 (0.369) (0.474) 
   
Margin of majority 3.716 4.139 
 (0.572) (0.348) 
   
Government fractionalization index -1.902 -2.177 
 (0.415) (0.365) 
   
Bailout dummy variable 0.797 1.404 
 (0.533) (0.197) 
   
Quality of budget institutions index 0.225 0.400 
 (0.773) (0.353) 
   
Legislative budgetary power index -0.563 -0.411 
 (0.322) (0.339) 
F 80.37 34.25 
Observations 127 127 
No. of instruments 16 16 
No. of groups 19 19 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (p-value) 





Sargan test of overid. restrictions (p-value) 
(not robust, but not weakened by many instruments) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (p-value) 







   
 p-values in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Notes: 
The dynamic version of the main model does not satisfy the tests concerning the presence of autocorrelation and hence 
an alternative specification, excluding the lagged government debt ratio from the explanatory variables, is estimated. 
 
Given the sample size, the dynamic specification of the model is estimated using difference GMM (Arellano and Bond 
1991) rather than system GMM (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), which uses more instruments. 
Furthermore, to minimize the number of instruments, the number of lags used is limited by collapsing them as suggested 
by Roodman (2006). Both the estimates using one-step and the two-step Arellano-Bond GMM estimators are shown and 
the standard errors are calculated using Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction.  
 
Whilst the impact of cross-sectional dependence is more severe in dynamic panel estimators as the estimated 
parameters are inconsistent (De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006), the small sample size poses a constraint to address this 
problem using the common correlated effects estimator. Thus, the results of the dynamic specification of the model are 
being presented only for completeness. 
 
Source: Results are produced by author 
 










Table AXXXII: Reverse causality tests - from the budget balance to the institutional 
indices 
 Quality of budget 
institutions index 
Legislative budgetary power 
index 
Lagged budget balance % of GDP 0.003 0.003 
 (0.632) (0.560) 
   
Lagged quality of budget institutions index 0.797***  
 (0.000)  
   
Lagged legislative budgetary power index  0.797*** 
  (0.000) 
   
Country fixed effects yes yes 
   
Time dummies yes yes 
   
Constant 1.053*** 0.525*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
F 732592.0 260412.3 
Observations 127 127 
 p-values in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: 
The highly significant and large coefficient for the lagged institutional indices reflects the fact that there are  
only two readings for these variables (for the pre- and post-crisis periods), with the indices assumed  
unchanged in the interim years.  




Table AXXXIII: Reverse causality check - from the institutional indices to the  
budget balance 
 Budget balance  
(% of GDP) 
Budget balance  
(% of GDP) 
Lagged budget balance % of GDP 0.147 0.155 
 (0.054) (0.063) 
   
Lagged quality of budget institutions index 1.577  
 (0.082)  
   
Lagged legislative budgetary power index  1.122 
  (0.141) 
   
Country fixed effects yes yes 
   
Time dummies yes yes 
   
Constant -10.10* -4.832* 
 (0.032) (0.015) 
F 86.20 94.44 
Observations 127 127 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Results are produced by author 
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Testing the main model 
 
Test for heteroscedasticity 
The main model with fixed effects was run in Stata 13, without robust standard errors and then 
the modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression models was 
carried out (using command: xttest3). 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression 
model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (19) =  35029.72 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The null hypothesis of no groupwise heteroscedasticity is thus strongly rejected. 
 
Test for autocorrelation 
To test for autocorrelation in the panel data, the Wooldridge test was used, as suggested by 
Drukker (2003). This involves first setting the panel data (using command: tsset countrynum 
year, yearly)254 and then running the first differenced equation (using command: xtserial bdg 
[explanatory variables], output). 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(1, 18)  =  10.563 
Prob > F= 0.0044 
 
The null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is thus rejected.  
 
Test for cross-sectional dependence 
Pesaran’s CD test was used to test for cross-sectional dependence. This is an alternative to 
the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test, which is not appropriate for this panel 
dataset, since it exhibits substantial size distortions when T<N. The test was run after 
estimating the fixed effects model (using command: xtcsd, pesaran abs).  
 
Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence 
H0: cross sectional independence 
Pesaran’s test of cross sectional independence  5.997 
Prob = 0.0000 
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =  0.415 
 
The CD test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence. 
 
Test for normality 
To explore non-normalities in the panel data model, an extension of the standard Jarque-Bera 
test was used (using command: xtsktest)255, as proposed by Alejo et al. (2015). This test 
examines skewness and excess kurtosis in the error component of the panel data – both the 
country specific error (ui) and the random error (eit). 
 
Tests for skewness and kurtosis in the one-way error-components model 
H0: normality in u: skewness in u =0 and kurtosis in u = 3; 
H0: normality in e: skewness in e = 0 and kurtosis in e = 3 
Skewness_e P>|z|= 0.110 
Kurtosis_e P>|z|= 0.008 
Skewness_u P>|z|= 0.550 
Kurtosis_u P>|z|= 0.467 
Joint test for normality on e Prob>chi 2 =  0.0086 
Joint test for normality on u Prob>chi 2 = 0.6422 
 
                                                          
254 Countrynum is the panel variable and year is the time variable. 
255 The test was applied as a standard command for all variables since as a post-estimation command it only works 
with regressions estimated using OLS or with random effects models. 
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The null hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected for the country-specific error component 
(u) but it is rejected for the individual-specific component (e). However, there are only 
indications of excess kurtosis whilst the null hypothesis of no skewness cannot be rejected. 
 
Test for fixed effects vs pooled OLS 
To test whether a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a pooled OLS model, the F 
test provided in the fixed effects regression results was used (using command: xtreg bdg 
gdp unempl legelec maj govfrac debtlagged bailout qltybudginst legbudgpower, fe). 
 
Test for fixed effects vs pooled OLS 
F test that all u_i = 0: F(18, 118) =  3.250 
Prob > F =  0.0001 
 
The result strongly rejects pooled OLS, in favour of fixed effects estimation. 
 
Test for fixed effects vs random effects 
To determine whether it is more appropriate to use a fixed effects or random effects model, 
first the Hausman test was conducted. This involved running the fixed effects and random 
effects models and storing the results (as fe and re, respectively) and then carrying out the 
Hausman test (using command: hausman re fe, sigmamore)256. 
 
Hausman test for fixed effects vs random effects 
H0: difference in coefficients not systematic  
chi2(9) =  12.09 
Prob > chi2 0.2084 
 
The null hypothesis, that there are no systematic differences between the coefficients obtained 
using the fixed effects and the random effects estimator, cannot be rejected, indicating that a 
random effects estimator is appropriate. However, the Hausman test has important limitations, 
including that it assumes homoscedasticity and also does not allow for serial correlation 
(StataCorp 2017). In view of the presence of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, as 
shown by the results of the tests above, an alternative to the Hausman test – the Mundlak 
test, which is robust to heteroscedasticity and within serial correlation – was carried out to 
determine between fixed effects and random effects (StataCorp 2017). 
 
The Mundlak test involves generating the country-level means of the time-varying regressors 
(using command: bysort countrynum: egen double mvariablename = mean(variablename)) 
and including them in the random effects regression. The Mundlak test assesses whether the 
coefficients of the country-level means of the explanatory variables are zero: 
 
Mundlak test for fixed effects vs random effects 
H0: the coefficients of the country-level means of the time-varying regressors are zero 
chi2(9) =  60.45 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
The null hypothesis can be rejected, indicating that the unobserved random component is 
related to the regressors, and hence a fixed effects model is appropriate.  
 
                                                          
256 The sigmamore option helps to guarantee a positive-definite-differenced covariance matrix (StataCorp 2013). 
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Table AXXXIV: Secondary data sources for the case study on Malta’s budget 
institutions 
Maltese legislation Constitution of Malta 
Financial Administration and Audit Act (Cap. 174) 
Fiscal Responsibility Act (Cap. 534) 
Government Borrowing and Management of Public Debt Act (Cap. 575) 
Act XVI of 2013 Appropriation (2014) Act  
Act XL of 2014 Second (2014) Appropriation Act 
Act XXXIX of 2014 Appropriation (2015) Act 
Act XLII of 2015 Second (2015) Appropriation Act 
Act XLI of 2015 Appropriation (2016) Act 
Act LVIII of 2016 Second (2016) Appropriation Act 
Act LVII of 2016 Appropriation (2017) Act 
Act XXX of 2017 Second (2017) Appropriation Act 
Act No. VII of 2018, An Act to implement Budget measures for the financial year 2018 
and other administrative measures 
EU legislation Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union, 
2012 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States 
Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro 
area 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and 





Ministry for Finance (2013) Strengthening Malta’s Fiscal Framework, An Economic 
Assessment 
Ministry for Finance (2015a) Malta: Annual Report 2014 
Ministry for Finance (2015b) Malta: Update of Stability Programme 2015-2018 
Ministry for Finance (2016a) Malta: Annual Report 2015 
Ministry for Finance (2016b) Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy for Malta: Update of Stability 
Programme 2016 - 2019 
Ministry for Finance (2017a) Malta: Annual Report 2016 
Ministry for Finance (2017b) Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy for Malta: Update of Stability 
Programme 2017 - 2020 
Ministry for Finance (2018a) Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy for Malta: Update of Stability 
Programme 2018 – 2021 





European Commission (2016c) Assessment of the 2016 Stability Programme for Malta 
European Commission (2014b) European Economic Forecast Spring 2014 - Malta 
European Commission (2015c) European Economic Forecast Spring 2015 - Malta 
European Commission (2016d) European Economic Forecast Spring 2016 - Malta 
European Commission (2017h) European Economic Forecast Spring 2017 - Malta 
European Commission (2018c) European Economic Forecast Spring 2018 – Malta 
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Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2015a) An assessment of the macroeconomic forecasts 
for the Maltese economy prepared by the Ministry for Finance in April 2015. 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2015b) An assessment of the main fiscal forecasts 
prepared by the Ministry for Finance and presented in the Update of the Stability 
Programme for Malta 2015-2018 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2015c) An assessment of the medium-term fiscal strategy 
2015-2018, annual report 2014 and half-yearly report 2015 published by the Ministry for 
Finance 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2018a) Assessment of the macroeconomic forecasts – 
update of Stability Programme 2018-2021 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2018b) Assessment of the fiscal forecasts – update of 
Stability Programme 2018 - 2021 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (2018c) Annual report and statement of accounts 2017. 
Transcripts 








Parliament of Malta (2014a) Plenary Sitting No. 175, 14 July 2014 
Parliament of Malta (2014b) Permanent Committee for the Consideration of Bills, 
Meeting No. 32, 18 July 2014 
Parliament of Malta (2016b) Plenary Sittings Nos. 427 – 447, 17 October to 2 November 
2016 





Parliament of Malta (2016a) PAC Meeting No. 96, 28 June 2016 
Parliament of Malta (2017) PAC Meeting No. 101, 30 January 2017 
 
  





Details of Interview 
 
Date:      Location: 
Interview number:    Identifying code for participant: 
 
Introduction 
Thank you for accepting to take part in this research. This interview comprises part of my 
research on Malta’s budget institutions. The aim is to gain an insight on the changes which 
have taken place in Malta’s budget procedures, in the context of the reforms to the EU’s fiscal 
governance framework following the Great Crisis.  
I would like to assure you that your responses will be treated in strictest confidence and your 
name will not feature in any part of the written reports resulting from this research. The 
participants will be identified by means of their organisation and from each organisation two 
officials have been selected. 
I would also like to ask your permission to audio record the interview and to take some notes 
during the interview, so that I do not inadvertently miss out something you have said or change 
the words. 
 
1. Timing of the budgetary process 
Let us start by discussing the changes in the national budgetary timeline.  
 
1.1 The Stability Programme is being submitted in Spring, before, rather than after the annual 
budget in Autumn. How did this change in the timing affect the budgetary process? 
 
1.2 In 2015, the timing of the budget was shifted forward so that it preceded by a few days the 
deadline of 15 October for submitting the draft budgetary plan. What did this change in the 
timing of the budget entail? 
 
2. Medium-term budgetary framework 
 
2.1 How is the annual budget related to the medium-term budgetary framework presented in 
the Stability Programme?  
 
2.2 What considerations are taken into account when setting the budgetary targets? 
 
3. Numerical fiscal rules 
 
3.1 The Fiscal Responsibility Act introduced national fiscal rules in Malta for the first time. 
What considerations were taken into account when developing these rules? 
 
 
4. Independent fiscal institutions 
 
4.1 What were the main considerations which shaped the legislation establishing the Malta 
Fiscal Advisory Council (MFAC)? 
 
4.2 How has the establishment of the MFAC changed the budgetary process? 
 
5. Macroeconomic and budgetary projections  
 
5.1 Can you please explain the process of generating the macroeconomic and budgetary 
projections which feature in the Stability Programme and the annual budget? 
 
5.2 Please explain the process leading to the endorsement of the macroeconomic and 
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6. Budget execution 
 
6.1 How are unexpected developments which occur during the course of the budget year dealt 
with?  
 
7. Legislative budgeting 
The following questions concern the role of parliament in the budgetary process.  
 
7.1 An economic and financial parliamentary committee has been set up in 2013. What role 
can this committee have in the national budget process and in the implementation of the SGP?  
 
7.2 In some Euro Area countries, besides approving the budget, parliament also approves 
medium-term budgetary frameworks and monitoring budget implementation. What are your 
views on such roles for parliament in the budget process? 
 
7.3 Similarly, in some Euro Area countries parliaments discuss and vote on the Stability 
Programme and also discuss opinions, decisions or recommendations given by EU institutions 
under the SGP. What are your views on such roles for parliament in the implementation of the 
SGP? 
 
8. Other issues or comments 
 
8.1 Finally, have there been any other changes in Malta’s budget institutions, which have not 
been covered by this interview, and which you would like to point out? 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET – INTERVIEW 
 
Title of Research Project: Budget institutions and fiscal discipline in Euro Area countries: a 
focus on legislative budgeting and on Malta’s budget institutions reforms since the Great 
Crisis 
 
Name of Researcher, Researcher Introduction and Invitation: My name is Moira Catania 
and I am pursuing a PhD at the University of Bradford, under the supervision of Dr M.J. 
Baimbridge and Dr I. Litsios. As part of my study, I am conducting research on budget 
institutions in Malta, focusing on the reforms implemented following the Great Crisis. You are 
being invited to participate in this interview on the basis of your official position and your key 
role in the reform process of Malta’s budget institutions.   
 
Research Description: The aim of this research is to understand the causal processes 
through which the reforms to the EU’s fiscal governance system following the Great Crisis 
(namely the ‘Six-Pack’, the ‘Two-Pack’ and the Fiscal Compact Treaty) have affected Malta’s 
budget institutions. Budget institutions are defined as all those rules and regulations which 
govern how budgets are drafted, approved and implemented. They include both those formal 
rules and provisions which are written into law as well as informal ones which are followed in 
practice. Budget institutions thus include fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary frameworks; 
procedural rules which govern the budget process, for instance the role of the finance minister 
vis-à-vis spending ministers, and the role of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature during the 
budget approval stage; rules concerning budget transparency, including budget 
documentation and publication of fiscal data; and independent fiscal councils. The research 
will start at the national level, with the reforms of Malta’s budget institutions, especially the 
changes resulting from the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014 (Cap.534) to assess if and when 
encounters with the EU have taken place and to identify the causal mechanisms through which 
change came about.  
 
Procedure: The research involves taking part in an interview with me. The interview involves 
open-ended questions and you are encouraged to provide detailed responses in order to 
permit the generation of rich data on the reform process of Malta’s budget institutions. The 
interview covers different dimensions of budget institutions, namely the timing of the budgetary 
process, the medium-term budgetary framework, the introduction of fiscal rules, the set up 
and role of the Malta Fiscal Advisory Council, the generation of macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts, budget transparency, flexibility during budget implementation and aspects of 
legislative budgeting. The interview is expected to take approximately around 45 minutes. The 
interview can be conducted either in Maltese or in English, as you prefer. It would be 
appreciated if the interview could be audio-recorded.  
 
You will be contacted via email and/or telephone in order to set up an appointment for the 
interview, at a date and time which is convenient for you. The interview will preferably be held 
at your work office. 
 
Consent, Participation and Withdrawal: At the beginning of the interview, you will be asked 
to confirm verbally your consent to take part in this research. Given your expertise on Malta’s 
budget process, your contribution is crucial to the research and it would be appreciated if you 
could reply to all questions in the interview. However, you are of course free not to reply to 
any of the questions if you wish. Please note that you can withdraw your participation at any 
time. If you decide to withdraw your participation after the interview has taken place, please 
send me an email and the information provided will be deleted and will not be used in the 
research. Before the start of the actual interview, I will ask for your permission to audio-record 
the interview. This would ensure that I do not miss anything from what you said or inadvertently 
change your words, but if you are uncomfortable with this, feel free to indicate this and the 
interview can still take place. 
 
Confidentiality: The interviews will be carried out on a confidential basis. Any reports or 
publications from this research will neither identify your name nor will they include a precise 
reference to your official position. The interviewees will be identified through their institution 
and to reduce the risk that participants are identified, two officials from each institution will be 
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interviewed. Furthermore, any contextual information in the generated data, which could result 
in statements or examples presented being attributed to individual participants, will be withheld 
so as to protect the participants’ identity. Participants will be assigned a code relating to their 
institution and personal details of the participants will be stored securely and separately from 
the data generated from the interviews. Access to the participants’ contact details will be 
restricted to myself. These personal records will be destroyed once reports and publications 
from this research have been finalised. 
 
Data Storage and Retention: The data generated from the interviews will be stored in secure 
data file (for electronic copies of the recordings and transcripts) and in a locked cabinet (for 
the audio tapes and paper copies of the transcripts). The data will be stored for the duration 
of the study and for ten years after the completion of the study. The data will not be stored on 
laptops or other transportable devices. The audio tapes of the interviews will be destroyed and 
paper copies of the interview transcripts will be shredded after any reports or publications from 
this research have been finalised. The data will be accessible and available for use by myself, 
and my PhD supervisors, Dr M.J. Baimbridge and Dr I. Litsios. 
 
Ethical Issues: You may have concerns on how participating in this research could influence 
your work-relationships. If you wish to discuss these concerns, please contact me or my PhD 
supervisors, at any point during the research process.   
 
Result Reporting: If you wish to be kept updated on output emanating from the research, you 
are welcome to request this by sending me an email and you will receive a short report on the 
main findings from the interviews. 
 
Ethical Review of the Study: This study has been granted ethics approval by the Chair of 
the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of 
Bradford on 17th June 2016. 
 
Contact Details: If you have any questions regarding this research, please feel free to contact 




Email: moira.catania@um.edu.mt; Tel: 00 356 79002324 
 
PhD Supervisors 
Dr Mark J. Baimbridge 
Senior Lecturer in Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bradford, UK 
Email: M.J.Baimbridge@bradford.ac.uk; Tel: 00 44 1274 23 4792 
 
Dr Ioannis Litsios 
Lecturer in Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bradford, UK 
Email: I.Litsios@bradford.ac.uk; Tel: 00 44 1274 23 5584 
 






























1 The assessment of the fiscal forecasts, unlike that of the macroeconomic forecasts, is not an EU requirement. Whilst the macroeconomic forecasts are assessed by the MFAC before they are published, 
the assessment of the fiscal forecasts takes place after their publication. There is no fixed deadline for the publication of the assessment of the fiscal forecasts, but this is generally published within one 
month of the publication of the forecasts. 
2 The country-specific recommendations concern not only budgetary policy but also structural reforms. The European Commission’s proposed country-specific recommendations are discussed in Council 
in June and endorsed by the European Council in June/July. 
3 The European Commission’s opinion on the draft budgetary plan is discussed in Eurogroup generally in early December. 
 
Source: Adapted from the European Semester timeline (European Commission 2018d); information on Ministry for Finance’s and MFAC’s reports compiled from their websites (Ministry for Finance no 




















































































Table AXXXV: Interview data – examples of descriptive codes and analytical categories 
Descriptive code Analytical category Quote Reference Memo 
More cautious 
forecasts 
Prudent assumptions “when you are being scrutinised, you are more cautious, 
ensure that the assumptions are realistic”  
MFIN2 2016, pers. comm., 
2 September: 7 
Prudent assumptions in order to ensure 
that forecasts are endorsed by MFAC 
Important that 
forecasts are endorsed 
by MFAC 
Legal obligations “we cannot afford that our forecasts are not endorsed.” MFIN2 2016, pers. comm., 
2 September: 9 
MFAC has influence from legal obligation 
of endorsement of forecasts 
Important to comply 
with SGP obligations 
Supra-national legal 
obligations 
Referring to the SGP obligations: “very important obligations 
on which we cannot default”  
POL21 2016, pers. 
comm., 28 November: 10 
As a small country, Malta has to stick to 
the SGP rules – large countries have 
more leverage with the European 
Commission 
Budget deficit would be 
much higher without 
fiscal rules 
Delegation approach Without the fiscal rules: “the budget deficit would reach 6% 
year in year out”  
MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 
25 August: 6 
The fiscal rules act as an external anchor 
to strengthen the position of the Finance 
Ministry vis-à-vis spending ministries 
Conflict between 
Finance Ministry and 
spending ministers 
Delegation approach “it was always like this that the Minister of Finance is one 
against all” 
PARL12 2016, pers. 
comm.,13 October: 44 
Fiscal discipline responsibility applies to 
Finance Ministry but not to spending 
ministries. 
Requests for new 
spending during budget 
implementation 
Delegation approach  “the Ministry for Finance always receives requests for new 
expenditure measures” 
MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 
25 August: 5 




Prudent forecasts The prudent forecasts are: “serving as a capping on the 
expenditure side” 
MFAC4 2016, pers. 
comm., 7 September: 9 
The prudent forecasts are a deliberate 
strategy by the Ministry for Finance to 
limit spending requests by line ministries  
Ministry for Finance 
does not react to 
MFAC 
recommendations 
Advisory role of MFAC In meetings where the MFAC presents its recommendations 
to the Ministry for Finance: “very often they [MFIN officials] 
listen without commenting”  
MFAC4 2016, pers. 
comm., 7 September: 8 
Lack of comply and explain requirement 
 
Ministry for Finance 
discusses budgetary 
targets with European 
Commission and 
shows willingness to 
address any concerns 
Pre-emptive and 
accommodative stance 
Referring to the budgetary targets, “if there are problems, 
we [the Finance Ministry] would discuss with them [CION] 
and we would see that the budget is made in a way.”  
MFIN3 2016, pers. comm., 
6 September: 4 
Strong influence of European 
Commission on budgetary targets – 
Ministry for Finance wants to avoid open 











Table AXXXV: Interview data – examples of descriptive codes and analytical categories (cont.) 
Descriptive code Analytical category Quote Reference Memo 
European Commission 
imposes SGP rules on 
small countries but 
applies flexibility in 
respect of large 
countries 
Limited leverage as a small 
country 
“we know that whilst this – the equal treatment – is an 
important principle, it starts to be implemented only when 
the small [countries] are affected, when it is a large one, 
then, when it comes to large countries, the equal treatment 
takes on a somewhat different definition”  
POL11 2016, pers. 
comm., 4 October: 16 
As a small country, Malta has to stick to 
the SGP rules – large countries have 
more leverage with the European 
Commission 
Draft budget is 
approved without 
amendments 
Strong executive and lack of 
independent parliamentary 
action 
“what the government decides in the budget, it will pass 
through without any problems”  
POL11 2016, pers. 
comm., 4 October: 8 
Strong executive powers during budget 
approval process reflects single-party 
majority government and strong 
partisanship in politics 
Revisions in budgetary 
components even if 
budget balance target 
achieved 
Flexibility during budget 
implementation 
“it is the budget balance which the Ministry for Finance tries 
to stick to but not the components underpinning the budget 
balance”  
MFIN1 2016, pers. comm., 
25 August: 6 
Ministry for Finance is committed to 
budget balance target but expenditure 
ceilings are not binding 
Source: Produced by author 
  







Table AXXXVI: Main budget institutions reforms introduced by the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
Description of reform provisions Article/s in FRA Relevant EA requirement, if applicable 
Establishment of national fiscal rules, which require: 
- a balanced structural budget1 or in its absence, convergence towards the medium-
term budgetary objective; 
- maintenance of the general government debt ratio to GDP below 60%, or if this ratio 
is exceeded, it must be sufficiently diminishing and approaching this reference value 
Articles 7-11 Articles 5-8 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU 
Articles 3 and 4 of the Fiscal Compact Treaty 
Set up of an independent fiscal council, which is mandated to: 
- assess and endorse, as it considers appropriate, the macroeconomic and fiscal 
forecasts prepared by the Ministry of Finance; 
- assesses and issues reports on the compliance of government’s fiscal stance with 
the fiscal rules and the SGP and whether it is conducive to prudent economic 
management; 
- make recommendations aimed at improving the conduct of fiscal policy in Malta; 
- issue an opinion on whether exceptional circumstances exist that warrant departures 
from the fiscal plans and adherence to the fiscal rules. 
Articles 13, 42-
612 
Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013  
Article 4(4) of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 
Note: The fiscal council’s mandate, to assess and endorse, as appropriate, the fiscal 
forecasts and to make recommendations, goes beyond the EA requirements. 
Budgetary procedures during budget formulation: 
All ministries, departments and other public entities receiving a government 
subvention are required to prepare three-year rolling business and financial plans; 
Ministry of Finance assesses the plans and can propose amendments 
Article 14 Not an EA requirement 
Requirement of a national medium-term fiscal plan, which is submitted to parliament Article 15 Articles 9-11 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU 
Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013  
Note: Some provisions are not an EA requirement: for example, the requirement in 
Article 15(8) that the medium-term fiscal policy strategy contains a statement of 
responsibility signed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance attesting to the 
reliability and completeness of the information contained in the strategy and compliance 
with the principles of fiscal responsibility. 











Table AXXXVI: Main budget institutions reforms introduced by the Fiscal Responsibility Act (cont.) 
Description of reform provisions Article/s in FRA Relevant EA requirement, if applicable 
Consistency between the annual budget and fiscal rules and the medium-term fiscal 
strategy 
Article 17 Article 10 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU  
Note: Some of the provisions are not an EA requirement; for example, the requirement 
in Article 17(1) that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance sign a statement 
attesting to the consistency of the annual budget with the fiscal rules, the medium-term 
fiscal strategy and other provisions of the Act. 
Budgetary procedures during budget implementation: 
- proposals involving new or increased public expenditure, supported by detailed 
information, are assessed by Ministry of Finance3; 
- requirement that public service recruitment, pay policies, wage agreements, publicly-
financed social welfare and pension benefits comply with objectives of fiscal 
responsibility, fiscal rules and medium-term fiscal strategy; 
- any new or additional expenditures which exceed the relevant budgetary allocations 
requires the express approval of the Minister of Finance and can be financed through 
virements between funds within the same department, re-allocation of expenditure 
within the same Ministry, from unspent resources from other Ministries or entities 
(subject to a threshold) or drawdown from the contingency reserve (requires express 
approval of Prime Minister); 
- personal responsibility for unauthorised new or additional expenditures or for 
decisions and agreements which result in new or increased commitments concerning 
public wages and social welfare and pension benefits.  
Articles 20-28 Not an EA requirement 
 Introduction of a contingency reserve, to ensure that unforeseen expenditure or 
revenue slippages do not jeopardise compliance with the fiscal rules 
Articles 31- 38 Not an EA requirement 
Monitoring of budget implementation: 
- submission of a half-yearly report to parliament in July; 
- publication of an annual report in June  














Table AXXXVI: Main budget institutions reforms introduced by the Fiscal Responsibility Act (cont.) 
Description of reform provisions Article/s in FRA Relevant EA requirement, if applicable 
Increased budget transparency: 
- information required to be included in the medium-term fiscal strategy, annual draft 
budget and in the annual budget, as well as in the half-yearly and annual reports; 
- provisions for the publication of monthly fiscal data; 
- requirement that fiscal council publishes its assessments in a timely manner and in 
a form which can be understood by the general public. 
Articles 13, 15, 
16, 17, 39 
Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 
Articles 3, 9 and 14 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU 
Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013  
Note: The publication of the half-yearly and annual reports does not constitute an EA 
requirement. Some of the requirements for information to be included in the medium-
term fiscal strategy, draft annual budget and annual budget go beyond EA requirements. 
Notes: 
1 Article 3(3) defines the structural balance as the annual cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures. This is the same definition applied in the Fiscal Compact Treaty. 
2 Article 13 of the FRA fulfils the obligations of Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, which require that national MTBFs and draft budgets are based on independent macroeconomic 
forecasts and that EA countries have independent bodies in place to monitor compliance with fiscal rules. Articles 42-61 of the FRA provide for the independence of the fiscal council as well as for 
other provisions relating to its set-up and conduct of its work. 
3 Similar provisions apply for measures or legislation which involve lower budgetary revenues (Article 30). 
Source: Compiled by author from the Fiscal Responsibility Act, Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97; Council Directive 2011/85/EU, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 and the Fiscal Compact Treaty 
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Table AXXXVII: Ministry for Finance and European Commission forecasts - GDP and 
government budget balance 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
  MFIN CION MFIN CION MFIN CION MFIN CION MFIN CION 
GDP at constant market 
prices (% change) 
2.3 2.3 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.6 6.1 5.8 
General government 
budget balance (% of 
GDP) 
-2.1 -2.5 -1.6 -1.8 -0.7 -0.9 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.1 
Notes: 
 Forecasts refer to European Commission's Spring forecasts and Ministry of Finance's forecasts in the Updates of 
the Stability Programme. 
Forecasts refer to the same year, i.e. forecasts for 2014 in CION Spring 2014 forecasts and MFIN 2014 SP 
Source: European Commission Spring forecasts 2014-2018 (European Commission 2014b, 2015c, 2016d, 2017h, 
2018c) and Malta Updates of Stability Programme 2014-2018 (Ministry for Finance 2014, 2015b, 2016b, 2017b, 
2018a). 
 







Table AXXXVIII: Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s recommendations and Ministry for Finance’s reactions 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s 
Recommendations 
Ministry for Finance’s reactions Status1 
1 Consider the publication of more timely 
official statistics 
Earlier submission is in most cases not possible, because it implies less comprehensive or poorer quality data, but 
“government is committed to make every effort possible to reduce as much as possible the processing time from the 
receipt of statistical inputs and decisions to its translation into information to be transmitted to the Fiscal Council” 
Partially addressed 
2 Ensure closer synergy across government 
departments 
The process of integrating the ESA and the cash data is now being carried out within the Finance Ministry under the 
supervision of the National Statistics Office. But the fragmentation between the cash and accrual adjusted methodology 
is not considered to undermine the conduct of fiscal policy and the setting of policy objectives in ESA terms. 
Partially addressed 
3 Maintain detailed documentation on how 
the fiscal data is compiled. 
Methodology followed is that in Eurostat’s relevant manuals. “The Ministry is considering publishing an article on its 
website explaining the process in general.” 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
4 Provide detailed calculations of revenue 
measures 
Finance Ministry has provided the fiscal council with detailed estimates or explanations when requested. More detailed 
explanation “would render budget documents less accessible to the public”. “In the future one could consider publishing 
separately the technical details surrounding such models [econometric models used to generate revenue projections]” 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
5 Ensure higher consistency between the 
macro and fiscal forecasts 
“a high, even if not perfect, level of consistency is acceptable to ensure more timely delivery of information”. Regarding 
the effect of fiscal variances on the macroeconomic forecast errors, the Ministry has documented these ex-post but it 
“does not agree in principle to do this ex-ante”. 
Not addressed 
6 Rationalise expenditure Whilst, in general terms, the Finance Ministry agrees with this policy, it considers that further discussions are needed for 
the expenditure benchmark to become a fiscal rule. “The Ministry considers that it is debatable whether it is implied by 
the Stability and Growth Pact.” 
Not addressed 
7 Ensure that the budget timetable is 
consistent with European Semester 
Budgetary process now fully aligned with European Semester. Addressed 
8 Provide details about fiscal measures for 
years t+1, t+2 
“Details are already provided when measures are known in advance, including the impact beyond the year of 
implementation.” 
Not addressed 
9 Consider a buffer over the minimum 
required structural effort 
No longer applicable given that the MTO has been attained. Addressed 
10 Maintain accurate estimates on ageing 
costs 
Existing estimates are sufficiently accurate. Not addressed 
11 Perform closer monitoring of output gap 
and its implications 
The Finance Ministry is now producing a risk assessment of the output gap projections which also captures the 
implications on the structural budget balance. 
Addressed 
12 Raise awareness about the long term 
fiscal challenges 
Government considers that this is already the case in practice. Not addressed 







Table AXXXVIII: Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s recommendations and Ministry for Finance’s reactions (cont.) 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s 
Recommendations 
Ministry for Finance’s reactions Status1 
13 Specify in greater detail how expenditure 
growth will be constrained 
Detailed overview of spending reviews and fiscal impact of any specific expenditure saving measures are provided in 
the annual Update of the Stability Programme and Draft Budgetary Plan. 
Not addressed 
14 Consider new legislation to guide the issue 
of government guarantees 
Government Borrowing and Management of Public Debt Act (Cap.575) enacted by Parliament in July 2017, but section 
on government guarantees has not yet come into force. 
Partially addressed 
15 Provide more information about 
government guarantees 
Government Borrowing and Management of Public Debt Act specifies the information which will be published when the 
relevant provisions come into force. 
Partially addressed 
16 Provide quantitative estimates of the 
impact of assumptions used 
“The Government will consider ways of improving the presentation of fiscal risks.” Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
17 Provide higher detail on the impact of 
statistical changes 
“The Ministry will introduce a dedicated line item in the relevant Tables, when necessary to clarify the impact of ESA 
adjustments.” 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
18 Enhance the commentary on the drivers of 
variations in fiscal data 
The Ministry refers to the publication of a detailed table on stock-flow adjustments, published in the annual update of the 
Stability Programme and the Draft Budgetary Plan. It considers that sufficient details are being published and that more 
detail, especially on the tax elasticity assumptions, is not appropriate.  
Not addressed 
19 Publish a dedicated section in the Annual 
Report explaining possible deviations in 
the fiscal strategy 
“The Ministry for Finance views that the present format is already capturing such deviations in detail.” Not addressed 
20 State explicitly the reasons whenever the 
previous round of macroeconomic 
forecasts is retained 
“the most recent reports delineate more clearly why macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal projections are not 
typically revised mid-year despite the availability of more recent macroeconomic data.” 
Addressed 
21 Address the specific issues raised by the 
Commission in its assessment of the 
Update of Stability Programme in the 
Ministry for Finance’s publications 
Whilst highlighting certain practical difficulties, “the Ministry is not completely averse to the recommendation, particularly 
in the case where the half-yearly fiscal performance could indicate that there are risks to the compliance with 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Responsibility Act, in terms of compliance with the fiscal 
rules.” 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
22 Provide more details about the 
assumptions used to prepare the forecasts 
“this would unnecessarily complicate the presentation of the budget projections” Not addressed 
23 Revise historical data to ensure 
consistency with the latest published data 
“the Ministry takes note of this recommendation” Not addressed 
24 Achieve further progress in pension reform “the Ministry takes note of this recommendation” Not addressed 







Table AXXXVIII: Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s recommendations and Ministry for Finance’s reactions (cont.) 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s 
Recommendations 
Ministry for Finance’s reactions Status1 
25 Extend the average maturity profile of 
public debt 
This policy has been adopted in recent years. Addressed 
26 Use IIP funds cautiously “The government has complied with this recommendation.” Addressed 
27 Sustain progress towards attaining the 
Europe 2020 targets 
“The invitation is noted by the Ministry, but the Government considers that this recommendation goes beyond the 
requirements of the Fiscal Responsibility Act.” 
Not addressed 
28 Evaluate the economic efficiency of the 
current property-related taxation system 
“The invitation is noted by the Ministry, but the Government considers that this recommendation goes beyond the 
requirements of the Fiscal Responsibility Act and the matter is considered a Government prerogative.” 
Not addressed 
29 Use revenue windfalls primarily to build 
fiscal buffers 
Achieved through the budget surplus registered in recent years. Addressed 
30 Establish rigorous policies of how the 
Contingency Reserve can be resorted to 
“The Ministry believes that when this Reserve was used, it was in line with the legal requirements of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act” 
Not addressed 
31 Replenish the Contingency Reserve Recommendation complied with. Addressed 
32 Update the Budget Office’s methodologies 
to approximate better the ESA guidelines 
“The Ministry considers that its current methodologies conform with the ESA-based fiscal targets, as required by the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act and the Stability and Growth Pact” 
Not addressed 
33 Use consistent definitions and 
methodologies across forecast rounds 
Recommendation has been addressed in the past. Addressed 
34 Elaborate more on fiscal risks “The Ministry considers that the current risk assessment being published in the reports is already one of the most 
detailed assessments presented in the European Union…On the other hand, the Ministry can consider positively the 
recommendations to identify the specific risk scenario leading to the upper and lower bound limits, as well as the 
broadening of the fiscal risks that are evaluated. The Government will also be delegating to the Fiscal Council the risk 
assessment task, by revising the Fiscal Responsibility Act.”2 
Partially addressed 
35 Focus greater attention on developments 
in the structural balance 
The Ministry considers that this is already the case as the fiscal rules in the FRA are in terms of the structural balance, 
but it points out that “as long as the MTO is exceeded, the fiscal rules targeting the structural balance are less binding 
from a legal perspective, though the Government remains committed to continue to consider further improvements in 
the structural balance”. 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
36 Ensure technical issues are adequately 
addressed before announcing changes to 
tax or expenditure policies 
“The Ministry takes note of this recommendation.” Not addressed 
37 Evaluate the economic efficiency of the tax 
framework 
“The invitation is noted but the Government considers that this recommendation goes beyond the requirements of the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act and the matter is considered a Government prerogative.” 
Not addressed 







Table AXXXVIII: Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s recommendations and Ministry for Finance’s reactions (cont.) 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s 
Recommendations 
Ministry for Finance’s reactions Status1 
38 Ensure feasibility of expenditure restraint 
targets 
“expenditure projections shall continue to be compiled as reliably as possible, based on the information made available” Not addressed 
39 Focus more attention on the expenditure 
benchmark outlined in the Stability and 
Growth Pact 
The Ministry referred to Article 41(2)(e) of the FRA which requires that in the Annual Report the budget outcome is 
explained in the context of the SGP obligations and stated that “hence the Ministry confirms that it can comply with this 
recommendation”  
Not addressed 
40 Consider reacting publicly to the 
recommendations made by the MFAC 
The Ministry forwarded its official response which was included in the MFAC Annual Report for 2017 Addressed 
41 Establish clear guidelines on cash 
holdings 
The Ministry highlighted that its strategy aims to “minimize the level of cash balances and at the same time meet 
expenditure when it falls due”. 
Not addressed 
42 Maintain close monitoring and control on 
the Extra-Budgetary Units’ activities which 
have fiscal implications 
“The Ministry for Finance remains committed to monitor closely the situation related to Extra-Budgetary Units to ensure 
that budgetary targets are adhered to” 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
43 Address revenue arrears more strongly The Ministry stated that it agrees with this recommendation and referred to the relevant annex included in the Financial 
Estimates and reported upon in the mid-year assessment. 
Partially addressed 
44 Provide updates on the performance of 
fiscal measures announced in the Budget 
The Ministry will explore the feasibility of implementing this recommendation but considers that it should be limited to 
significantly large measures. “The recommendation could be implemented next year by including a small section in 
Chapter 2 of the Annual Report”. 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
45 Safeguard the efficacy of fiscal policy “The Government believes that compliance with the fiscal rules is being done in a way which does not limit the efficacy 
and the meeting of fiscal policy objectives.” 
Not addressed 
46 Explore options to improve fiscal accuracy “The Ministry stresses that whilst providing for any in-year budgetary decisions that may need to be taken, and 
assuming that line ministries (including their departments and entities) remain compliant with their budget allocations 
during the year, the containment of expenditure remains a budget priority.” 
Not addressed 
47 Assume stable elasticities unless justified 
by specific factors 
“The Ministry uses an element of judgement and precise elasticity point estimates can be difficult to justify.” Not addressed 
48 Maintain the MTO Government agrees with this recommendation. Addressed 
49 Monitor closely population trends and their 
implications 
The Ministry agrees with this recommendation. Addressed 
50 Prioritise productivity gains through 
transferring best practices across 
departments 
The Ministry agrees with this recommendation. Addressed 







Table AXXXVIII: Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s recommendations and Ministry for Finance’s reactions (cont.) 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s 
Recommendations 
Ministry for Finance’s reactions Status1 
51 Introduce more effective medium-term 
policy framework 
“The Fiscal Responsibility Act already allows for a rolling three-year Medium-Term Budget Framework.” Not addressed 
52 Provide a more detailed account on the 
absorption of EU funds 
“The Ministry will take action to ensure that the information provided is as comprehensive as possible, within timeframes 
prevailing and given resources, by consulting the EU funds managing authorities in this case.” 
Not addressed, but 
subject to further 
consideration 
53 Ensure publication of the Half-Yearly 
Report by end July even when the 
Parliament is in recess 
“An earlier submission by the Ministry of its Half-Yearly Report would undermine the objective of basing potential mid-
year fiscal policy decisions on information covering the first six months of the year and/or would require a higher degree 
of provisional estimates.” 
Not addressed 
54 Publish more background information on 
models used by the Ministry for Finance 
The Ministry agrees with this recommendation as it is a legal requirement of the FRA and the SGP. Addressed 
55 Monitor closely revenues derived from the 
IIP 
The Ministry agrees with this recommendation and monitors revenue from the IIP on a regular basis. Addressed 
56 Consider introducing direct reference to 
the expenditure benchmark in the 
legislation 
“The Ministry prefers to wait for possible developments at the European level before making any legislative proposals in 
this respect.” 
Not addressed 
57 Implement the necessary structural 
reforms 
The invitation is noted by the government and reference was made to a number of structural reforms implemented in 
recent years, such as in the labour market and in relation to welfare benefits. 
Addressed 
Notes: 
1 Status categories:  
‘Addressed’ indicates that the recommendation has been fully implemented. 
‘Partially addressed’ indicates that some action has been taken in respect of the recommendation, but it has not been fully implemented. 
‘Not addressed, but subject to further consideration’ indicates that the recommendation has not been implemented but the government is considering or plans taking action in the future. 
‘Not addressed’ indicates that no action has been taken in respect of the recommendation. This also includes cases where the government does not agree with the recommendation, where the 
government considers that the recommendation is already being fulfilled and where the government considers that the recommendation goes beyond the requirements of the FRA. 
2 Implemented through the amendments of March 2018. 
Source: Compiled by author from Malta Fiscal Advisory Council’s (2018c) Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 2017: 33-43. 
  







Table AXXXIX: Budget for 2017 – presentation, debate and approval by parliament 
Date Details Documents Remarks 
17/10/2016 Budget Speech (2017) by 
Minister of Finance 
Budget Speech 2017 
Draft Financial Estimates for 2017 
Economic Survey 2016 
Proclamation No XVII of 2016 on the Bill to 
implement Budgetary Measures for 2017 and 
other administrative measures1 
Bill to Implement Budgetary Measures for 
2017 and other administrative measures 
Statement by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance under the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act2 
House resolves itself into a Committee of Supply to consider the General Estimates 20173 
First Reading of Bill to Implement Budgetary Measures for 2017 and other administrative 
measures4  
 
19/10/2016 Motion of Procedure for Budget 
Debates on General Estimates 
2017 
- Schedule for parliamentary budget debates is agreed to. 
24/10/2016 Reply to Budget Speech by 
Leader of Opposition 
-  







Budget debates by Ministry and 
Vote 
- Intensive debate schedule with morning, afternoon and evening sessions on most days. 
For each Vote, the Government proposes the expenditure allocation as indicated in the Financial 
Estimates.  
On its part, for each Ministry, the Opposition requests an amendment to decrease Minister’s salary 
by one Euro (line item: holders of political office), as a signal of its disagreement with government.   













Table AXXXIX: Budget for 2017 – presentation, debate and approval by parliament (cont.) 
Date Details Documents Remarks 
7/12/2016 Approval of the budget Appropriation (2017) Bill For each Vote, members of parliament first vote on the Opposition’s amendment to decrease one 
Euro from the Minister’s salary and then on the allocation of expenditure for that particular Vote.  
This procedure involves the House resolving into Committee of Supply and back again for each 
Vote. The voting on the Budget for 2017 took around three hours. The session involved only 
procedural motions and voting, with no discussion taking place. 
After the voting by Ministry, the Minister of Finance presented the Resolution for aggregate 
expenditure allocation from the Consolidation Fund for 2017 and the Appropriation (2017) Bill for 
first reading. 
The second reading, committee stage and third reading of this Bill are carried out in this session, 
with voting taking place in each step. Again this involved no discussion and took only around 15 
minutes. 
7/12/2016 Supplementary Estimates for 
2016 
Second Appropriation (2016) Bill The same procedure as for the First Appropriation (2017) Bill is followed, including the House 
resolving into Committee of Supply and the second reading, committee stage and third reading, 
with voting taking place in each step. No discussion took place and the process took only around 
10 minutes. 
Notes: 
1 Article 73 of the Financial Administration and Audit Act requires that money bills must be recommended by the President of Malta. 
2 Article 17 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act requires that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance sign a statement attesting to the consistency of the annual budget with fiscal responsibility 
principles, the fiscal rules, the medium-term fiscal strategy and other requirements in the Act, and that this is presented to Parliament.  
3 To discuss the financial estimates, the House resolves into a Committee of Supply as provided in Article 71 of the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives. 
4 This Act was discussed in parliament between 10 January and 14 March 2018 and approved in April 2018 (Bill No. 174 Budget Measures Implementation Bill). 
Source: Compiled by author from minutes of parliamentary sittings (plenary sessions) Nos. 427 to 447 (17 October to 2 November 2016) (Parliament of Malta 2016b) and No. 460 (7 December 2016) 
(Parliament of Malta 2016c)  
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Table AXXXX: Budget variation 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 
General government balance (Eur millions) -13.3 4.1 166.7 379.5 
Total Revenue (Eur millions) 149.6 131.6 165.0 444.9 
Total Revenue (% change) 4.7 3.7 4.5 11.0 
of which (Eur millions): 
    
Taxes on production and imports 28.3 34.0 -12.8 85.6 
Current taxes on income and wealth 83.6 64.0 70.0 75.9 
Social Contributions 0.9 1.4 13.5 24.4 
Total Expenditure (Eur millions) 162.9 127.5 -1.7 65.0 
Total Expenditure (% change) 4.9 3.5 0.0 1.6 
of which (Eur millions):  
    
Compensation of employees 58.0 34.0 12.1 7.5 
Social benefits and social transfers in kind -8.0 -6.6 15.0 28.0 
Gross fixed capital formation 57.5 59.8 -72.2 -44.1 
Note: 
Budget variation corresponds to the difference between forecast (in Stability Programme published in April of that 
year) and first estimate for the year (in Stability Programme published in April of the following year). 
Source: Malta Annual Reports 2014-2017 (Ministry for Finance 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, 2018b) 
 
